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The period under study was characterised by two main features: the
appointment of members of the local 6Agm family as governors and the trend 
towards lengthening the tenure of governors. An investigation of the causes 
which brought about these developments shows that the decline of the Ottoman 
central administration facilitated the emergence of local power groups. The 
transfer of the command of the Pilgrimage, previously mainly held by local 
notables, to the governors of Damascus was a major factor behind the -leng­
thening of their tenure. The object of this study is to show how these de­
velopments came about and how the history of Damascus was shaped as a result, 
The principal sources include Arabic manuscripts and archival material. 
These are surveyed 'in the first chapter. The second chapter deals with the 
limits of the province of Damascus, analyses the importance of the period 
under study and examines various aspects of the administration and the re­
ligious institutions.
The local political developments which immediately preceded the appoint­
ment of the first ‘Azm governor, Isma*Tl Pasha, to Damascus are discussed, 
together with the origin of the ‘Azms, in the first half of Chapter 3. The 
remaining part of the chapter deals with his governorship and with the 
causes behind the downfall of the 4Asm governors in 1730.
The period between 1730 and 1741 which is discussed in Chapter 4> saw 
five governors appointed to Damascus, one of-whom was a 4Asm. The causes 
behind the rehabilitation of the ‘Asms are discussed here. Chapter 5 is de­
voted to the third phase of ‘Agm rule in Damascus in the period between 1741 
and 1757, After it their power was weakened. It was not till 1771 that a
34Agin was again appointed to Damascus,
The period between 1757 and 1760, which is discussed in Chapter 6, saw 
the governors seriously challenged by local forces inside and outside Damascus, 
They held the field for the time being, however, ^fter 1760 the forces in 
Damascus were quiescent, but the outside dangers x^ ere increasing. A large 
part of Chapter is devoted,- therefore, to an analysis of these dangers, 
which culminated with the occupation of Damascus by the Mamluks of Egypt in 
1770- The final chapter discusses the difficulties which the * Asm governor, 
Muhammad Pasha, encountered in his attempt to restore the hegemony of Damas­
cus ♦ His death in 1783 marks the decline of i kzm power and the transfer of 
the political initiative in southern Syria to the governor of Sidon, Ahmad 
Pasha al-Jazzare
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A' gUBYBY OF THE SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF DMASCUS IN THE
13TH QENTtJEY.
A. ARABIC SOURCES 
I. Chronicles.
a) Chronicles which deal with the internal history of Damascus* 1
1. Ibn Kinan, al-Hawadith al-yawmiyya, 2 vols. in manuscript form. Yol. I
deals with the period between 1111/1699-1700 and 1134-/1721-2, and Yol. II with 
the period between 1135/1722-3 and 1153/174-0-1. The author was born in Damas­
cus in 1074/1663-4- and died in it in 1153/174-0-1. He figured among the a* van
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of Muradi and, like his father, was affiliated with the Khalwatiyya tariqa.
He devoted a large part of his chronicle to information about the *Ulama' in 
Damascus. Details concerning the arrival and departure of pilgrims are abun­
dant in his work. Struggles among the power groups in Damascus are amply de­
scribed as well. Muradi had access to a copy of this work and utilised parts 
of it in the writing of his Silk al-durar. There are many additions in the 
margins, particularly in the second volume, probably by the author*s son Mb$- 
ammad Sa'id (1153/1740-1 - 1189/1775-6),^ who assembled its loose leaves in
5
1187/1773-4* In this task he was not wholly successful, as he himself con­
fessed.^1 However, the dates mentioned in the text and on the margins, to­
gether with the names of governors and other officials, minimise this dis­
advantage .
Trull bibliographical details of these works are given in the Bibliography, . 
see pp. t f / 2-  .
%uradl, Silk al-aurar> IV, 85, of. I, 132. Ibid.? 85.
Abn Kinan, I, f. 2a. 5Ibid.. II, f. 189a. 6lbid.
92* Within the period covered by the second volume of the work of Ibn Kinan, 
there is a very good account on the years between roughly 172*4 and 1727. It
covers fols. 55-60 in an MS in the Berlin Collection entitled Kitab ina.^ uf
“ — —> 1 f ihi... This narrative, attributed to *Abd al-Bahman al-Maw$ili, is of spec­
ial importance because it deals in detail with the period when the first iA^m 
governor was appointed to Damascus. The factional struggles, the extortions 
practised on the Damascenes and the fluctuations in the prices of foodstuffs 
are well described. Other sources substantiate this account.
3. Budayri's Hawadith Dimashq al-yawmjyya starts with the events of 1154/ 
1741, the year at which Ibn Kinan stopped, and ends with the year 1176/1762-3* 
This work, of which there exist in the Zahirxi^ yaw Library in Damascus two MSS, 
which were utilized for this study, and a third in the library of *Isa Iskan- 
dar ai-Ma^ Iutf, was edited by Dr. Ahmad *Izzat *Abd al-Karim and published 
in Cairo in 1959*
There is no biography of BudayrT in Muradi^ Silk al-durar. apparently 
because he did not rank among the a*van he selected. The little that is 
known about him is taken from his MS. As a barber he had occasion to meet 
many people, and this seems to have enabled him to keep in touch with what 
was happening in Damascus and to listen to various points of view. He de­
scribed the political and social developments in Damascus and elaborated
particularly on the fluctuations in the prices of foodstuffs. The fact that
3 - .Budayri was not well off made him more sensitive to the changes m  prices
which weighed heavily on the poor. As a devoted Muslim, he ascribed the nat­
T. r.rr
If this is true either this person was not the same * Abd a 1-Ra hma n^a1-Maw § ill 
whose-rdeath Muradi reported in 1118/1706-7, see II, 259-66, or Muradi was 
mistaken in dating his death.
2 —  ■See *Isa Iskandar al-Ma* luf, *Qa$r As4 ad Sasha al-1 Agm1, al-Mashriq. 24
(1926), p.9.
3BudayrI, ff. 4a.* 53b. (m. 7^. 3 ^ 7  ,
10
1
ural calamities that befell Damascus to the mischiefs that prevailed in it.
Unfortunately the MS of Budayri did not reach us in its original form, 
Al-Shaylch Muhammad Sa* id al-Qasimi (1259/1&43 - 1317/1900)^ acquired the ori­
ginal copy, which was written by Budayri in the colloquial language, and which,
he alleged, contained many unnecessary asides, trimmed it and then put it in
3
grammatical Arabic, deficient though this remains. There is no reason to be­
lieve that al-Qasimx might have altered what Budayri had stated. Apart from 
his religious upbringing and his appointment as Imam of the Sinaniyya Mosque in 
Damascus, al-Qasimi was a learned person who had written several books; chief 
among them was his work on the crafts in Damascus.^ These aspects of his car­
eer incline us to take his word that he bad not damaged the account of Budayri. 
True, there was a gap between the social status of al-Qasimx, who ranked among 
■fck® n^yan of Damascus, and that of Budayri, who was a barber, which could have 
affected their selection of events had they been writing on the same period.
But there is nothing to suggest that al-Qasimi had suppressed any information 
by Budayri which was prejudicial, for example, to other members of his class.
The statement in which BudayrT accused the Mufti ilamid Efendi a 1-* Imadi of
3
profiteering is not suppressed.
Budayrxbs account'; of the last five years of his chronicle, 1172-1176, is
unusually brief, with the exception of the year 1173* during which Damascus
was hit by a series of earthquakes; the immense damage necessitated ample
description. Contrary to Budayri!s claim in the title of his MS, that it cov-
^Budayrx. ff* 14b, 15a, 21a,
For his biography sees Muhammad, Jamil al-Shatti, Tara Jim a Van Dimaahq, 
Damascus, 1948; see alsos Qamus al-jina*efli al-5hamxyya, T, 8-10,
B^udayri, f. lb.
4lt is entitled Qamus al~Sinatfat al-Shamiyya, see Bibliography.
^Budayri, f. 29b.
11
ered the period between 1154 and 1176 iLH., the last year mentioned in the 
text by al-Qasimi is 1175. In a concluding statement al~®simT accused Bud.- 
ayrl of having inserted an extra year in the title. By examining the con­
tents of these last years we find thatal-Qasimi failed to notice that the 
events of the year 1173 were mistakenly grouped with those of 1172, and that 
1173 took the place of 1174 with a resultant difference of one year. It is 
difficult to ascertain who was responsible for this mistake. But It is
clear from the contents that two Mu^arrams were mentioned under the year 1172, 
and that the deposition of ‘Abd Allah Pasha * 1-Ohata.i j which took place in 
1173 is wrongly mentioned under 1172. In fact the year 1173 should be placed 
before the second Muharram (under 1172) in f, 25a, and the following years 
increased by one, Thus, the events would be placed in their correct histori­
cal sequence, and the original date of 1176 given by Budayri would then be 
justified.
Dr, Abroad *Izzat *Abd al-Karim erroneously agrees with al-Qasina (p. 236 
n. 1 of his edition) that the chronicle should end in 1175 and not in 1176, 
although he himself seemed puzzled (p. 230 n.2) that A^mad b. Siwarfs death, 
reported in the chronicle under 1172 (erroneously of course), is mentioned 
by Muradi as having taken place in 1173. This did not, however, excite in 
the editor an urge to compare the subsequent events in the chronicle with 
other sources, not even to question the allegation by al-Qasimi. By com­
paring this edition with the 21ahiriyya MSS, one of which in fact the editor
unfortunately used, we find mistakes in the edited text and worse ones in ;
(
the annotation. The introduction, in which he dealt inadequately with cer­
tain political and. administrative aspects of Ottoman Syria, contains many 
misleading statements. It is more profitable to use the gahiriyya MSS,
1 2
4. On the history of the eventful years 1184-5/1770-1, when the troops of 
*Ali B(ey invaded Syria, there is a very detailed and reliable account in an 
MS in the Berlin Collection entitled Ghara^tb al-bada*i* by Ibn al-§iddiq. 
Nothing is known about the author except what can be deduced from his chronicle,., 
Apparently he is a Damascene, and he wrote in the colloquiall language, more 
precisely in the Damascene dialect which makes it difficult for a person not 
acquainted with it to understand all the vocabulary he uses. From the parti­
culars he mentions of the movement of troops, especially those of Damascus, it 
seems that he was a member of a military corps, possibly the Yerliyya. some of
whose high ranking members he enumerates in an introductory list. One forms
the idea, moroever, from the expressions which Ibn al-giddTq uses and the 
warmth of his chronicle, that It was probably read before a gathering of people, 
possibly in one of the coffee-houses where story tellers related stories of 
adventure.
5. Mikha>il Barik, a Damascene Greek Orthodox priest, witnessed the events
he described in his chronicle, Ta>rikh al-Sbjam, 1720-82, ed. by Qustantln al~
1
Baste. He gave three reasons for starting his history from 1720 i firstly,
because he then became conscious of what was happening; secondly, because
this year marked the beginning of *A;gm rule; and thirdly, because Catholicism
2
began to spread rapidly at the time.
That the start of sA§m rule should be a determining factor is of signifi­
cance* Barik, as a Ghristian Arab, considered the *A;jms as the first group of
3awlad al-* Arab who became governors in *our country* (biladina), as he put it.
M^iktia7,ll al-Dimashqi. another Damascene chronicler, took up the account in 
his work, Ta* rikh Hawadith al-Sllam wa-Lubnan. from the point where Barik 
stopped, that is 1*782, and ended with the year 1841.
^p„ 2*. ^p. 36^ Au- &c&rtA> ?, n* I-
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His awareness of the importance of this change became sharper after the el­
ection of a person of local origin as Orthodox patriarch in 1720, Barik then
commented that this patriarch was the first to be ordained from awlad al- 
, . ^ i
contrast with the former patriarchs, who were of Greek origin, 
Again, as a Christian whose interests were not bounded by the limits of the 
Muslim world, Barik,alone among his contemporary Damascene chroniclers, re­
ported events which took place in non-Ottoman and hon-Muslim countries, 
mainly in Europe,
Barik devoted a large part of his chronicle to the squabbles which took 
place in Damascus between the Catholics and the Greek Orthodox. He was 
rather naive in believing everything of a miraculous nature. But his de­
scription of the political events in Damascus, although lacking in detail, 
is on the whole sound, and other sources substantiate his account. His dat­
ing, largely based on the Ghristian calendar, was not always exact. Of spe­
cial importance in this work is an appendix inserted, with others, by the 
editor, on the deposition of the *Asp governors in 1730. It was vritterjby 
the priest Tuma al-Labbudi for the information of his superior In Home.
6 . The chronicles of Ibn Jum*a and al-Qarl, edited by S. Muna J jid in Wulat 
DimashetV Jointly cover the history of Damascus in the 18th century. Ibn 
Jum*a, an 18th century Damascene chronicler, was an artisan who did not
figure among the a* van of MuradT* He seems to have written a long history
2of 74 chapters, of which this chronicle is chapter 74>~ und about which 
nothing else is known. His information, brief on the whole, is varied and 
reliable.
1 Z “  ~ ' ' ' “ ' ' ’ ™
p. 3.
2This is apparent in^ the title of the chronicle, and also referred to by the 
chronicler, see Wulat Dimasho. 28.
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There are two MSS in the Berlin Collection of this chronicle of Ibn 
Jum*a. The MS edited by Munajjid in the same one translated and edited later 
by H. Laoust in Les gouverneurs de),;., Damas. and is referred to in the Berlin 
Gat. 9785? Spr. 188. The other MS, which neither editor used, is referred to 
in the Berlin Gat. 9785,Vjh (II), 4-18. It is composed of 32 fols., whereas 
the former is of 26 fols. It is also more complete than the former and does 
not contain similar gaps.1 Neither MS mentions the date of copying. Most of 
the information inserted in the margins of the MS edited by Munajjid is neg­
lected by him. Laoust, more wisely, reproduced them in parenthesis. This 
marginal information is included in the text of the other MS. Munaj jid 
dropped also several sentences and phrases from the MS he used, and failed 
to read correctly several words in the text. When the edition by Munajjid 
agrees with both MSS, it is then cited in this study for reference) when 
otherwise, the relevant MB or MSS will be referred to.
Al-(&i was a sharif of a well-known Damascene family and seems to have
2written his chronicle in the first half of the 19th century* The informa­
tion he provides is reliable, although less detailed than that of Ibn Jura*a.
b) the Chronicles which deal with other parts of geographical S^ ria,
These chronicles deal mainly with the history of Mount Lebanon and its
3
relation with the governors of Bidon and Damascus. The main Lebanese chron­
iclers are:
^Wufat Dimashq. pp. 37, 4-9, 50*
p
w?or more particulars see, Ibid.. pp. 9, 10.
^On the development of Lebanese historiography see, A.H. Hourani, !Historians 
of Lebanon1, and IC. S. SALibi, !The Traditional Historiography of the 
Maronites1, in Historians of the Middle &ast. ed. by B. Lewis and P.M.Holt, 
London, 1962.
1 5
Uayder Ahmad Shihah. Tannus al~Shidyaq, and Hananiyya al-Munayyir.
1, Haydar Ahmad Shihab (1761-1835) wag a member of the ruling Shihab fam­
ily which was the main theme of his historical work. His major chronicle, the 
title of which is given in several variations.^  seems to have been called al- 
Ghurar al-jjiisan fi akhbar abna* al-zaman. This work, composed of three parts 
which start with the year 622, was published by N, Mughabghab, Cairo, 1900-1, 
The last two parts, which start with the transfer of the paramountcy in Mount 
Lebanon to the Shihabs in 1697, were published by A. Rustum and F, A, al- 
BustanT under the title Lubnan fi ‘ ahd al-Umara* al-Shihabiyyin, Beirut 1933*
By comparing the corresponding accounts in the two editions, we find that 
neither the phraseology nor the sequence of events is identical. Furthermore, 
different versions of certain events are given in both editions.
Taking for granted that Haydar was the author of this chronicle, he
was helped, nevertheless, by prominent writers such as Nagif al-Yaziji and 
~ 1
Niqula al-Turk in the preparation of his history. As a result, several copies
of his work existed, sometimes in abridged form, and with various titles. Some
copies were anonymously published$ hence, the confusion in knowing which work
2
belonged to which author.
2. Tannus al-Shidyaq (1805-61), in his Akhbar a 1-3Van fi Jabal Lubnan, de 
parted from the common practice of classifying events according to years. In­
stead, he dealt basically with the families of Mount Lebanon as feudal units,
1See Hourani, 1 Historians of Lebanon1, p. 232.
S^ees Anon., Kitab nuzhat al-zaman fi hawadltli Jabal Lubnan, MS. Bibliotheque 
Nationals! SnonTy^Histoire de la famille deT Ba sc hi r/, MS. Bibliotheque Rat­
ionale! cf, Haydar Ahmad Shihab. Kitab nuzhat al^zamanS fi lpawadit:h *Arabi-. 
stan, MS. Camb.! Niqula al-Turk, Hawadith al-zaman fi Jabal Lubnan, MS. Zmhi- 
riyya, see G. M# Haddad, lThe Historical work of Niqula El-Turk, 1763-1828*. 
JAOS. 81*3 (Aug.-Sept, 1961), p. 250.
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and, within this framework, he traced their history chronologically* He re­
veals in his account with whom real power rested in Mount Lebanon. By pro­
fession a clerk who was attached to the service of the Shihabs. Shidyaq was 
in a good position to acquire essential information.
3. 3$anahiyya al-Munayyir (1756-1832?) deals in his chronicle, al-Durr al- 
marguf (or al-mawsuf) fi ta>r£kh al-Shuf. with the history of Mount Lebanon 
between UO 9 /1697 and 1222/1807. According to his introductory statement, his 
work was not to be restricted to the history of bilad al-Shuf. but was to ex­
tend it to events-/ in neighbouring regions; he devoted, therefore, more atten­
tion to the internal history of Damascus than did Haydar or Shidyaq. On sev­
eral occasions he is more precise in his account than either. However, he 
omits the events of many years.
An MS in the Berlin Collection entitled Hadha ta'rTkh Jabal al-Duruz by
♦tlM II flL'J l l J lMIIM l ■'! IWI »l I.   ■ I IH W I— — W I I I  ■
an anonymous author, and covering the period between 1109/1697 and 1223/1809, 
seems to be another copy of al-Durr af-mar$uf. By contrasting these accounts 
we find that, except for slight variations, they agree with each other, very 
often v/ord for wo£d. The date of 1244-/1828-9 mentioned in this MS shoxjs that 
it is probably older than the copy edited by A. Sarkis in al-Mashriq.
It might be generally stated in conclusion that all of the above Leban­
ese chroniclers present confused information on names, dates and events re­
lating to the history of Damascus and particularly the *Agms. More detailed 
comment is made in the relevant contexts. They are important, however, be­
cause they provide an essential background for writing the history of Mount 
Lebanon, without which the history of Damascus remains unintelligible,
1See Hourani, ’Historians of Lebanon1, 233; Salibi, ’Traditional Historio­
graphy1, pp. 223-5*
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IX. Biographies.
a) Damas cene biographies.
The value of biographies, in general, depends on the period on which the
author is wilting and the quantity and quality of the chronicles available
about it, Muradi1 s Silk al-durar is of special importance to this study
because it provides missing links on different aspects, substantiates ' other
accounts and throws light on the social, background of many prominent persons
who played active roles in the history of Damascus in the 18th century. It
folloi^ s the same pattern as the centennial dictionaries of Ghazzi and MuhabbL.
The great-grandfather of Muhammad,Khalil al-Muradi migrated to Damascus
1
from SamarqvandV in the second half of the 17th century. Muliammad Khalil
was the third member of this family to become the fjanafi mufti of Damascus.
He held this office between 1192/1777 and his death in 1206/1791*^
Three factors prompted Muradi to write his dictionary: an inner urge,
an awareness of the importance of history, and the absence of a biographi-
3cal dictionary for the a4van of Damascus in the 18th century. He depended 
on personal information and corresponded with * Ulama* outside Damascus for 
this purpose. One of these was gasan b. 6Abd al-La^if of Jerusalem, who 
mentioned, in his work on the biographies of the eminent ‘Ulama* and shaykhs 
who lived in Jerusalem in the 12th century A.Ii. (BM. MS, Or. 3047), that he 
had compiled it at the request of Muradi. Another, more interesting figure, 
dith whom Muradi communicated was the Gairene Muhammad Murta<Ja al-Zabidi 
who asked his pupil *Abd al-Ha^man al-Jabarti to collect relevant material.^ 
M^uradT, IV, 129-30.
'Wlnon., Risala fi man tawalla wa-qada wa-afta, MS. Tdbingen, M.A.VI.8, 
ff. 32a, 32b. (
3silk. I, 3-5.
4-See D. Ayalon, ’The Historian al-Jabarti and his background1, BSOAS,
XXIII.2. (I960), pp. 217-49.
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Muradi also used the works of contemporary or near-contemporary Damascene 
authors such as Nabulsi, Ibn Kinan and Sa*id al-Samman. He quoted at length 
from a lost work by the last, whose flowery style, devoid of any substantial 
meaning, contrasts glaringly with his own prosaic style. He also quoted at 
some length from Mu^ibbi. He utilized the chronicle of thelSth centui^ r 
Aleppine chronicler Ibn Miro but, oddly enough, Muradi did not write a 
biography of him.-*-
Muradi!s Silk includes about 1000 biographies of Damascenes and others. 
Religious prominence was not the sole condition for a person to rank among 
kXs a*van. Some governors of Damascus figure among them but they are a very 
small percentage of the total number. Strangely enough, of all the ‘Agm gov­
ernors, four of whom were appointed six times to Damascus between 1725 and
While _ _ /
1783, only Muhammad Pasha al-‘A$m has a biography in Silk al-durar. /Muradi
might be excused for not writing the biographies of all nonlAsjm governors
who x^ ere appointed to Damascus in the 12th century A.H., probably because in
his opinion not all of them were worthy to rank among his a^van or perhaps
because it was difficult for him to trace their origins and whereabouts, the
all
absence from his list of/the *Agm governors but one is remarkable. Muradi
did not lack information about the iA^ ms, because the chronicle of Ibn MTro
2
which he used contained adequate biographies of several *ih;m governors. It 
was not difficult either for Muradi to draw on local anthologies which con­
tained information on the 'Agms, because he quoted amply from them on other 
occasions. Furthermore, the ‘A^ms built in Damascus several buildings to 
which Muradi referred in various parts of his work. It might be that Muradi
T^abbakh, X* lam al-nubalal . I, 35-7. 
2See Ibid., 111,329-30, 334-5.
19
found it difficult to reconcile the humble origin of the ‘Asms as peasants
(fallahin) in Ma*arra with the dignity they acquired later, at a time when
there was a prevailing contempt among the townspeople towards the fallallin, 1 
=. —  2
of which Muradi was aware.' Muhammad Pasha al- 4 Azrn ruled too late to be 
directly associated with this origin. In fact Muradi did not refer to the 
origin of his family in his biography. Furthermore, Muradi became mufti 
during his governorship and seems to have been on good terms with him. It 
might be also that Muradi found many inconsistencies in the conduct of the 
other 4A§m governors who combined exploitation with religious appeasement; 
hence, as a mufti, he had either to accept their behaviour as a whole or to 
discard it as a whole. As for Muhammad Pasha, there was a sort of unanimity 
among the chroniclers concerning his good administration in Damascus.
Another biographical work by Muradi, in manuscript form, is Matmafa al- 
wa.iid. It is divided into five chapters and deals mainly with the biography 
of his father. It contains important information on various administrative 
matters in Damascus. Of particular importance are Its remarks on the transfer 
of the command of the pilgrimage to Damascus towards the end of the 17th 
century.
There are two other biographical works on the a*van of Damascus in the
12th centuxy A.H., both of which are extant in manuscript form in the Zahirly-
ya Library, They were written by two Damascenes: Hasibi and Ayyubi, who
lived in the 13th century A.H, Both of them copied heavily from Muradi, very
often word for word. But they included biographies not found in Muradi.
5asTbifs language is ungrammatical, but it is correct in so far as he copies 
\
Of. Ibn al-§iddiq, f. S6b; Russell, The Natural History of Aleppo. 1,4*05. 
of. Muradi, III, 276.
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from Muradi. Hig biographies, like those of Ayyubi, are not alphabetically 
arranged. Biographies of governors do not appear in his work,I, which is al­
most completely restricted to biographies of religious persons from Damascus 
and, to a lesser extent, from Iraq and Egyptj there are hardly any from Ist­
anbul. This applies also to Ayyubi!s work. In general, both works do not 
substantially add to that of Muradi, except in so far as they provide infor­
mation on the 13th century A.H. On one occasion, Hasibx criticised Muradi
—  1
for having underrated SarId al-ICtnani in his biography.
kUmar al-Wakil wrote a biographical work on the governor of Damascus,
*&bd Allah Pasha Chataji, entitled, Tarwih al-qalb al-shaji, MS. Vienna.
* * — 1 > w w i  1 limn — 1— H w —
The author was attached to the service of Qhata.ii and seems to have been a 
Damascene as is suggested by the language and also by the ending of his 
chronicle before the deposition of 4Abd Allah Pasha from Damascus. He was 
very generous in showering praise on Qhata.ii. to the extent of considering 
him a sharif. which dignity Muradi did not mention in his biography of 
Chataji, The work contains several poems written by well-known Damascenes 
in praise of Qhata.ii. The historical narrative it contains is valuable.
b) Other biographies.
The main biographical works which deal with the history of ?ahir al-* Dinar 
at some length, although with varying reliability, are those of Mikha' il 
al-§abbagh, Ta* rikh al-Shavkh Zahir. ed. by Q. al-Basha. and of 6 Abbud al- 
gabbagh. al-Rawd al-sahir, MS. Bibliotheque Natioiiale, Both biographers 
were Christians from Acre and relations of the famous man of affairs of 
§ahir, Ibrahim al-Sabbagh. Mikha* il was attached to the French expedition
b. 41b.
of Napoleon in Egypt and wrote Ms work in France; whereas i Abbud wrote 
his work in EgyptSince the Sabbagh family reached the zenith of its fame 
under Zahir, the role it played could only be assessed against the back­
ground of gabir*s history. This is one reason why these authors wrote 
biographies of Zahir. Another seems to have been their desire to absolve 
Ibrahim al-§abbagh of . any responsibility for the failure of IJahir* In fact 
the authors produced a brilliant portrait of Ibrahim and extolled his many 
virtues.
Of the two accounts, the more reliable and straight!orward is that of 
*Abbud although it Is shorter and hardly mentions any dates, thus differing 
from Mikha,1l!s. Other sources, Damascene and otherwise, substantiate the 
account of 4Abbud, Mikha/ill. on the other hand, is very confused, highly 
misleading in certain parts, and not reliable about dates.
» r  O
A biography of Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar, attributed to Haydar Ahmad Shihab,
and entitled fa*rikh Ahmad Basha al-Jazzar, ed. by Ghibli and Khalife, is use
ful to this study. However, within the limited period where It coincides
cd~
with this study, it does not add much more to what is found in Ghltrar al- 
ijfean by Ijaydar Shihab.
Ill Miscellaneous Arabic Sources*
a) Lists of governors and religious officials.
There are several lists which give the dates of appointment and deposi­
tion of governors, judges and muftis. which help to confirm data provided
by other sources or to fill lacunae. The one MS available which gives the
•^ See the introduction by al-Basha.
2See G.M. Haddad, 'The Historical Work', p. 249; Hourani, 'Historians of
Lebanon*, 232.
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names of all three groups of officials from the Ottoman conquest till 124-0/ 
1824-5 is by an anonymous author and entitled. Risala fi man tawalla. Other an­
onymous MSS deal with one group or more of these officials, ■
b) Dl-wans (anthologies)
_  _  i _  _
Several diwans by 18th century Damascene poets such as Ahmad al-Kaywani 
and Sa*id al-Samman, contain poems dedicated to governors or prominent persons 
in Damascus on various occasions. These sources implicitly reveal also the 
identity of the groups whose support the person concerned had solicited,
c) Travel accounts.
Several accounts by Arab travellers who were contemporary or near-contemp­
orary to the period under study are available, mainly in manuscript form. *Abd 
al-Ghani al-Nabulsi (1050/164-1-1143/1731) , a Damascene * alim. described his 
travels in several works, most of them still in manuscript form. The largest 
of his travel accounts is ICitab al-haqiqa wa*1-majaz. Of special importance 
in this work is Nabulsi*s description of the Pilgrimage route between Medina
and Damascus in 1105-6 A.H, Several other descriptions of the Pilgrimage route
2
made at various times help, when collated, to make a comprehensive study of 
the halting places along this route,.
Two other useful travel accounts, still in manuscript form, are those of 
Kashf al-rada* by Mustafa al-Sidd.iqi, in which he described his journey from 
Istanbul on 3 Muharram 1139/31 August 1726, during which he visited Baghdad, 
Aleppo and Damascusj and Mawanifc al-uns by Mustafa al-Luqaym, in which he 
described his journey from Damietta, in Egypt, in 1143/1730-1 and his visit 
to Sidon and Damascus,
B. EUROPEAN SOURCES.
I. Archives
These fall into two main groups5 French and British. The French archives 
^For a list of the diwans utilized in this study see Bibliography,
p
''See Bibliography.
23
are the most important for the simple reason that French commercial in­
terests were deeply committed in southern Syria, The English, represented 
by the Levant Company, were more concentrated in the region of Aleppo. How­
ever, because of their commercial contacts with southern Syria, albeit on 
a small scale, the English kept vice-consuls, for short periods in the 18th 
century, in some ports in the south,
a) The French Archives.
In his article, !Les Correspondances des Gonsuls de France comme source
1
de l’histoire de Proche-Orient1, M.N.Svoronos umderlinbJthe important role 
which the French Archives would fill in the writing of the local history of 
the Hear East since the beginning of the 18th century. During this period 
the Fi*ench had a consulate in SIdon, another in Tripoli, and vice-consulates 
in Acre, Jaffa, and Ramie, and later on in other places. But they had none 
in Damascus, Although they had many commercial interests there, the French 
authorities remained reluctant to establish a consulate, fearing lest extor­
tions be practised on their officials, and also because they were apprehensive 
of political upheavals in it which might jeopardize their interests. The 
resident missionaries in Damascus - Jesuits, Capuchins and Terre-Sainte - 
provided an ominous example. They were under the protection of the local 
French authorities, who were very often put in embarrassing situations with 
the local authorities as a result of the complaints of these missionaries 
against maltreatment. This, on the other hand, enriched the archival coirres- 
pondence with much valuable information about the local authorities with whom 
the'semissionaries were embroiled. Appeals by the French consuls to their 
ambassadors at Istanbul to seek redress by exerting pressure on the governors
T ' *1 ~ ” " " '‘J-  ^"".....  1 '
See Actes du XXIe congres International des Qrientalistes. Paris, 23-31 
July 194$? Paris 1949.
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concerned through their Istanbul agents, enrich our knowledge with much im­
portant information about less known figures who backed the authority of these 
governors.
The bulk of the political information contained in these archives comes
from the dispatches of the consuls and vice-consuls. The consuls corresponded
sometimes with the French ambassadors in Istanbul, but mostly with the author-
1
ities in France. The correspondence of the consuls before 1793, that is be­
fore the Convention attached the consulates to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
/ 1
is kept in the Archives National©s under the title Bous-Serie B. Correspond- 
ance Gonsulaire, and those-after this date are kept in the Qua! dfOrsay, Other
documents of various contents, mainly commercial, are preserved in gous-Serie
111 7 i
. B and Marine B in the Archives Nationales. Sous-Serie B is relatively
better kept, and all are on the whole readable.
The information obtained from these archives, particularly from Sous- 
1
Serie B . are extremely valuable for this study. Although the main concern 
of the French officials was commercial, they described the political situation 
because it affected their interests. Very often the French consulsin Syria 
sent dispatches to Istanbul bearing on the local political situation. Such 
dispatches do not seem to have been transmitted by the consuls to France be­
cause no record is kept of them in the archives of their consulates. But the 
ambassador In his correspondence with France reveals the nature of these dis­
patches .
b) The Levant Company Archives.
The bulk of these archives is kept in the Public Record Office in London 
Since the main centre of the Levant Company in Syria was in Aleppo, dis­
patches were sent from this place to the headquarters of the company in Lon-
. >II<> ,c
For the identity of these authorities sees Gharles-Roux, Les Fchelles. 
pp.12-17.
don. Of all these archives series S.P.110 is the most useful for this study*. 
Apart from scanty information on major political events, the main interests of 
these dispatches are commercial. As such, they enable us to study the factors 
that contributed to the decline of the English trade in Aleppo, which partly 
caused the commercial revival of southern Syria.
The dispatches of the English ambassadors at Istanbul reveal that they 
used to receive reports on the political situation in Syria from their consuls 
and vice-consuls there. No record exists of these reports except what is 
quoted in the dispatches of the ambassadors to London,
c) Other archives.
The important archives include the Radcliffe papers, about 1$0Q items, 
kept in the Guildhall Library, London. They contain letters, reports and other 
documents largely sent from Aleppo and Smyrna by English merchants to their 
superiors, the Radcliffes, in London. J,he correspondence covers the period 
between 1702 and 1763, and analyses in detail the causes behind the decline of 
the English trade in Aleppo and those behind the flourishing of the French 
trade. I am grateful to Dr. M. E. Yapp from whom I first heard about these 
documents.
Another archival source consists of the letters from Missions. Of all 
the letters of the foreign missionaries, Terre-Sainte, Capuchins and Jesuits, 
who resided in Damascus, those of the Jesuits are the best known, good book 
which deals with the history and writings of the Jesuits in Syria is La Premiere 
Mission de la Compagnie de Jesus en gyrie by George Levenq.
The political information contained in the published letters of the Jes­
uits is small if compared with the religious information. However, the propor­
tion of political information in their writings varies from one country to 
another?, and from one missionary to the other. It might be that more letters 
may come to light containing information on the political conditions in Syria,
because not all the letters of the Jesuits are yet published.
1
• Travellers1 accounts.
We may classify the iSth century European travellers who visited Syria 
according to the motives that made them undertake their journey. Some were 
sent by their governments to report on the countries of the East, such as the 
Frenchman Paul Lucas in 1714- Others were either moved by curiosity, like the 
Frenchman Volney in the early •eighties, or by scientific interests like the 
Swede Hasselquist around the * fifties, or by religious motives - visiting the 
Holy Land - like the Italian Abb£ G. Mariti in the mid-1sixties.
Hot all the travellers who visited Syria came to Damascus. Those who tra­
velled from Istanbul, or through it, to Basra or Persia via Aleppo, were large­
ly officials or merchants such as the Frenchman Otter in the late 1 thirties, 
the Englishman J. Carmichael in 1751, and others mentioned by D. Carruthers in 
The Desert route to India. These travellers do not contribute much to this 
study* The travellers who went from Istanbul to Egypt or vice-versa, and those 
who travelled directly from Europe to the Holy land, usually visited Damascus. 
Such are 0. Perry in the mid-1thirties, R. Fococke in 1738, and Hasselquist.
Most of the travellers who visited Damascus and Aleppo gave more detailed 
description of the latter. This might be explained by the fact that in Aleppo 
the travellers could meet English as well as French merchants, who would give 
them information on various local aspects. In Damascus only foreign mission-
useful, although not wholly reliable, guide on European travellers is a 
book by E.G.Cox, A^Reference guide to the literature of travel. Washington, 
1935* Another useful book which gives information on travellers is by J. 
Ebersolt, Constantinople Byzantine et les Voyageurs du. Levant.Paris.1918.
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aries were found* but they lived in seclusion and hardly mixed with the local 
Muslim people. Much of what the travellers wrote about Syria lacks precision. 
The value of their accounts is limited to the factual observations they made.
The best-known yet the most controversial of these travellers is Con­
stantine -Francois Chasseboeuf, better known under the pseudonym Volney. He 
toured Egypt and Syria in the period between 1783 and 1785, His book, Voyage 
en Egypte et en Syrie. ms first published in French in two volumes, in 1787.
It was translated later into five languages, including Arabic. A recent 
French edition in one volume by J* Gaulmier appeared in Paris in 1959.
Volney was about twenty-five years old when he made his journey. A sud­
den access of fortune and a personal interest in the past and present history 
of the countries he visited set him on his tour, Aie one year or so he spent 
Egypt at the beginning of his voyage and the route he followed in touring 
Syria - he started from the north rather than from the south - seem to have 
provided him with adequate familiarity with the country before he came to 
southern Syria. This may explain why he wrote at length about it. The 
duration of his stay in Syria and the contacts he made with the local inhabi­
tants were surely very advantageous. The danger with these, however, was that 
they provided him with much oral information - most of it faulty. If to this 
is added his reliance on works by earlier travellers whose accounts were not 
always reliable, then the reasons behind his many errors, particularly on past 
events, can well be appreciated. Had Volney concentrated, with his penetrating 
mind, on describing the prevailing conditions rather than on digging into past 
history, he would have produced a more useful work.
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Chapter 2.
I. The Component Parts of the Province of Damascus.
According to ‘Ayn-i *Alifs account in 1609, the province of Damascus
consisted of ten ganjaqs or liwas (administrative divisions), namely:
Damascus, the administrative centre of the province, Jerusalem, Gaza, §afad,
Nablus, ‘Ajlun, Lajjun, Tadmor (Palmyra), Sidon and Beirut, and Karak and 
1
Shawbak, Host, if not all, of these ganjaqs seem to have been created by 
the Ottomans after the suppression on 26 Safar 927/5 February 1521 of the 
revolt of the governor of Damascus, JanbirdT al-Ghazali, I'rhich he started on 
17 Dhu'l- Qa*d® 926/24 October 1520.^ Several of these ganjaqs had been ad­
ministrative centres under the Mamluk Sultanate, and their governors were 
usually subordinate to those of Damascus. The reason for the creation of 
these several administrative divisions could be partly explained by the ex­
istence of various religious, feudal and tribal groups in these regions, who, 
helped by the geography of the country which largely made their existence 
possible, had been able to preserve their power, in varying degrees, and to
enjoy a semi-autonomous rule. The establishment of these centres could help
^See 1Ayn-i ‘All, Kavanin-i al-i 4Osman, tr. into French and ed. by M.Belin 
in !Du Regime desfTief^mlirtaires'kEns l!Xslamisme et principalement en 
Turquie1, JA*, 6.XV (1370), p. 274.
o
For some sources which tend to confirm this view see R. Mantran and J. 
Sauvaget, Reglement Fiscanx Ottoman% Les Provinces Syriennes. Damascus, 
1951, pp. 35, 43, 47, 53, 55, 56; B. Lewis, !The Ottoman Archives as a 
source for the history of the Arab lands1 _ (1951), PPj^  153-5. ^or
an account of the revolt see Muhammad b. Tulun I*’lam al-wara, translated 
into French and edited, by H. Laoust in Les Gouverneurs de Damas.. sous leg. 
Mamluks^Damascus, 1957, pp.^ 154-3; Muhammad b. Thlun, D^s^jjbinger^Jhag- 
ment der chronik des Ibn Tulun, ed. and trans. into German by R.Hartmann, 
Berlin, 1926, p. 117. Ma‘arra is to the north of Itamah, on the main road 
to Aleppo. 'Arish was dependent on the governor of Fgypt.
23
therefore In keeping a closer watch over these groups, in ensuring the safe­
ty of the lines of communication with Egypt, and in safeguarding the passage 
of the Pilgrimage.
When Sultan Selim I appointed al-Ghazali as governor of Damascus in 924/ 
151S he placed under his control the territory extending between Macarra in
, -r- 1the north and Ansh in the south. It is not known if this administrative 
arrangement continued until his revolt. However, there is evidence that the 
province of Tripoli was in existence in 926/1519-202 and probably a year 
earlier.  ^ in .924/15I6 there existed regulations for the liwa of Aleppo,^ 
probably as a component part of the province of Aleppo. It seems that fur­
ther administrative arrangements had been made shortly after the suppression 
of al-Ghagali1s revolt which may have affected the limits and the admini­
strative divisions of each province rather than the existence of the pro­
vinces themselves.
In the 17th century the province of Sidon was carved out from the pro­
vince of Damascus* In a firman dated 28 Mujiarram 1023/lJ-O March I6l4)the Sul­
tan ordered the formation of the province of Sidon from the ganjaqs of Sidon
and Beirut, and §afad,which had been until then under the jurisdiction of
5
the governor of Damascus. A bevlerbeyi was then appointed to govern it. 
Although there is ample evidence of the continued existence of the province 
of Sidon from 1660 onwards, it is not known how long it remaihed in existence 
after its first formation in 1614. It seems, however,that it was abolished
‘ktbn Tulun, ed. Laoust, 151; Ibn Tulun, ed. Bartmann, 120.
2Mantran and Sauvaget, 77. B^. Lewis, !Ottoman Archives1, 151. ^Ibid.,15^
U^* Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine. 1552-1615, London, 1960, pp. 47, 4§ 
'fannus al-Shidyaq, Akhbar al-a*yan, Beirut, 1859, p. 319.
30
i
in 1615. The abolition of a province after its formation, particularly*
if it was carved out of another province, was not an unfamiliar practice as
2
concerns the province of Damascus itself*
In 1660, during the vigorous administration of the Grand Vezir Muhammad 
Pasha KdprHlti, the province of Sidon was created once more, apparently In its ; 
earlier limits, and the conqueror of the Damascene janissaries eAll Agha al~
- . 3  4 ,
Daftardar^ was appointed its governor. The Ma ns did not then present a
serious military challenge to the Ottoman authorities* because after the
death of Fakhr al-Din in 1635 factionalism was seething among the ranks of 
5the Drupes. The creation of the province of Sidon, It is true, might pro­
vide a better safeguard for maintaining Ottoman authority* But there were 
other reasons which brought about this event* ^fter the complicityxf the gov­
ernor of Damascus with the revolutionary governor of Aleppo, Hasan Pasha in 
6
IO67/I656-7 , the Porte seems to have deemed It necessary to contain the 
ambitions of future governors of Damascus by limiting their resources* 
Furthermore, the upsurge of the insubordinate soldiery in Damascus during 
this period necessitated that its governor should devote more attention to 
internal security. Perhaps another reason was to find a suitable recompense 
for * All Agha al-Daftardar. After all a precedent had already been set when 
in 1614 the province of Sidon was first created.
S^ee Shidyaq, 319-21, cf. 360, 3&9. S^ee below p . ^ S e e  below p.Cn-
^Istifan al-Duwayhx, Ta^rlkh al-azmina, 1095-1699, ed^  by F., Taoutel, S. J. 
al-Mashriq 44 (1950 )± Bee p. 359; Haydar Ahmad Shihab, Ta^rikh al-Amir 
Havdar Ahmad al-Shihabx. ed* by H. Mughabghab, Cairo, 1900-1, p. 732;
Shidyaq, 390/TiSuFaT^Dibs, Ta?rikh Suriyya, & vols*, Beirut, 1905, VII. 
207-S* Laurent d*Arvieux, MemoiSi^xr'Qhevalier d'Arvieux, 6 vols. Paris, 
1735, 1, 396.
S^ee below p/?^ ,^ 166r B^ee below p*
3 i
During the period under study there was much fluctuation in the admini­
strative regulations pertaining to the territory under the jurisdiction of 
the governors of Damascus. The tax-farm (iltizam) of Haifa, for example, was, 
for a long period in the 18th century, attached to that of Acre which was under 
the jurisdiction of the governor of Sidon. gamah and Ijlms, mentioned by *Ayn-
i * Ali as liwas in the province of Tripoli, became in the 18th century mali-
— ?kanes" attached to the governors of Damascus in their capacity as Commanders 
of the Pilgrimage.3 xt may be safely stated,^  however, that the ganjaqs men­
tioned by *Ayn-i *AlT, with the exception of those that constituted the pro­
vince of Sidon, were still included in the province of Damascus during the 
18th century.
II The Political importance of the period under study.
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In glaring contrast to the 16th and 17tjh centuries with their excessive­
ly frequent change of governors, Damascus witnessed in the 18th century a 
lesser number of governors with longer tenure of office* Striking as this 
change might seem, it derives all the more significance from the coming to
power of the local family. The controversial origins of the ‘Asms will
5
be discussed elsewhere, but what concerns us here is that members of this 
family governed Damascus at intermittent periods for about 38 years between. 
1725 and 1783, with a sequel In the last decade of the 18th century and the ,
beginning of the 19th. Some of these governors together with other members of
the same family frequently governed the provinces of Sidon and Tripoli as 
well, either concurrently or at different times,
Ji III ■UIBJUM-LH Hi I nil I l|l I Ilf f I * | I W Tl W HUM IW -I I "I I - - 1 T I ' ~ • — * ■"■■ mmmrwr ..n W. I '» II. I 1 !»■■' »«l I .UUJPP.HT 1 ■' 1 1 lT1 J11 - IIHirnTII ,TPI^
S -  275.
2A system of tax-farms granted for life introduced by the Ottoman administra-
tion towards the beginning of the 18th centuxy.
^See below p* /ot.*
T^his is based on fragmentary information provided by 18th century Damascene 
chroniclers * 5See below p,/jy#
32
Such a rule of a local and lengtby nature was not peculiar to Damascus 
in the 18th century* Parallel examples oGarU be found in the Jalili govern­
ors of Mosul, in the Mamluk governors of Baghdad and, in a different way, in 
the derebeys (Valley-Lords) of Anatolia.^ ' But why ms it that such a trend 
appeared at this time, and why in these particular places? The ansx^ rer could 
be found in the conditions of the Ottoman Empire as a xwhole as well as in the 
regions concerned,
i
Since the failure of the Ottoman siegp of Vienna in 1683, which was fol­
lowed later on by the humiliating treaty of Garloxd.tz in 1699> Ottoman power 
in Europe x^ as on the defensive. Such military setbacks did not only impair 
the prestige of the Sultan, which was already debased by corruption x^ ithin 
the palace, but also brought its decline more into the open. The vigorous 
effort of the KBprtilh Grand Vezirs in the second half of the 17th century to 
rejuvenate the Empire had spent itself by the beginning of the 18th century. 
The existing intrigues in the Court were more exposed and were now aggravated 
by the lack of military glories, in the grand style, to overshadoxw them or 
at least to tone doxrn their excesses. Ck>ne x-rere the days when illuminations 
\.rere ordered in the Empire to celebrate astounding military victories. Many
x^ ere still ordered but mainly to celebrate the birth of royal babies, and 
2many they were.
The loss of initiative by the Sultans brought into the open, and in fact
^On the significance of this aspect of local rule see A. Hourani, A vision 
of History. Beirut, 1961, pp. 35-70, and Arabic thought„in_ the liberal age 
1798-1939, London, 1962, pp. 36, 37.
E^or some illuminating reflections on the decline of the Ottoman power see 
the dispatches by the British ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Everard Fawkener, ,■ 
FRO, S.P. 97/28: Istanbul, 18.5.36, Istanbul, 7.8 .36,(This form is used 
throughout this study to denote the date of dispatch,)
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aggravated, the rivalry between the Grand Vezirs and the Kizlar Aghas. each 
party trying to fill the power vacuum left at the centre. Around these two 
poles revolved the destiny of the provincial governors whose agents, Kaou 
Kahvasis  ^triumphed or lost according to the party they relied on. But 
this struggle in the capital, important though it was in deciding the con­
firmation, deposition, or reinstatement of the governors, was only one end 
of the clue to the situation. The other was in the local conditions that 
existed in the regions concerned.
The local causes for the lengthy rule of the Jalilis in Mosul and of
in Baghdad
Hasan Pasha and his son Ahmad Pasha, who were followed by Mamluk governors,/ 
differed in inanyuays from those which made the lengthy rule of the * A^ms 
possible, Mosul and Baghdad were frontier provinces, subject to attacks by 
the rulers of Persia. Hence- tjiere was a military necessity to tolerate the 
rule of strong governors. However, many attempts were made by the Sultan to 
depose Hasan Pasha and A^ imad Pasha and their successors, but their gallantry 
and their stand before the Persiansproved the futility of the Sultans at­
tempts to depose them by force. On the contrary, he was compelled to con­
done their governorships, even in spite of the suspect loyalty and alleged 
complicity with the Persians of at least Hasan Pasha and A^mad Pasha. In 
Mosul the Jalilis proved to be useful governors to the Ottomans against 
the Persians^ although not as militant nor as dangerous as those in Baghdad. 
Southern Syria had known several local fuling families during the Otto-
I^t was a common practice for provincial governors as well as for senior of­
ficials and notables to have agents at the Porte to look after their inter­
ests.
*TR0. S.P. 97/25*. IstanbuV8/l9.4-24* S.P.. 9?/27s Pera of Istanbul'* 12.3.34* 
Pera of Istanbul! 11.7.35?:; 3.P. 97/32; Istanbul 5.10*43,
3j0seph von Hammer-Purgstall, Histoire de 1 *Empire Ottoman, tr. from German 
by J. J. Hellert, IS vols., Paris 1835-43,XVI, 34-5.
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man period, such as the Ban! Barfush, the Ban! Sayfa, the Macns, the Shihabs 
and the Ziyadina. But the basis of their power had been mainly feudal and 
tribal. The regions in which they figured were traditionally and geographi­
cally suited for their emergence. The differed from these families in
two main respects. Firstly, whatever their origin, the *Agms developed their 
power as administrative officials. Secondly, the main centres where the 
4A^ms distinguished themselves as administrators, namely Damascus, Sidon 
and Tripoli, had been traditional centres of administration over which the 
central authorities had had relatively firm control.
That the ‘A m^s should gain such ascendancy and rule for such a long time 
and be tolerated by the Sultan must be due to peculiar reasons. It was part— 
ly through a protector at Istanbul, the use of much money in bribes, and, 
certainly, skill in manoeuvring that therms attained their power. But 
such means, useful at times, were risky at others because not based on mili­
tary power, which in the course of their rule they neither developed nor ex­
ploited to their benefit. The cA§ms fell victims to these very factors which 
helped them attain power. The fact that they used money, not always suc­
cess ully, to buy support at Istanbul made the Sultan more anxious to obtain 
it through confiscation. The way in which the ‘A^ ms were deposed, reinstated, 
or even executed was not unfamiliar in the Ottoman Empire. In 1730, for ex­
ample, after the revolt in Istanbul, the (k%m governors were hurriedly de­
posed and Imprisoned and their property confiscated. However, shortly after­
wards they returned to power. They were tolerated not so much because of a 
lack of alternatives as because of their wealth and the security they ach­
ieved in the territories they governed. There was something in the nature of 
these territories -which made their lengthy rule possible.
3 5
Unlike Mosul and Baghdad, Damascus at this time was not a frontier pro­
vince against an external enemy. Nevertheless, it had frontier problems.
The province of Damascus is the borderland of the desert and as such its
1
governors had many problems arising from Beduin insubordination. Foremost 
among their responsibilities was the ensuring of the safety of the Pilgrimage 
along the desert route to the IJijaz. It is no mere coincidence that the ten­
dency towards lengthening the rule of the governors of Damascus started sim­
ultaneously with their consistent appointment as commanders of the Pilgrim-
2
age, roughly in the first quarter of the 18th century. On the other hand, 
the extension of the province of Damascus over a large area interspersed with 
many tribal chieftains and powerful local not&bles created problems of se­
curity and placed several handicaps on the collection of revenue. This situ­
ation was certainly not new. But with the decline of the central authority 
the local chiefs had better opportunities to figure. The semi-autonomous 
communities in Mount Lebanon were thorns in the side of the governor of Dam­
ascus, not only because their territory bordered on his but also because he 
very often usurped or shouldered the responsibilities of the governor of 
Sidon, particularly when he was a relative of his. These problems, together 
with the increase in factionalism and insubox’dination among the various
T^he terms used by the local chroniclers for Beduin were ‘Arab. A*Mb. and 
sUrban, roughly meaning pastoral nomads. The Arabic term awlad aI-4Arab 
(Turkish, evlad-i 'Arab) had a different meaning. It mainly denoted local 
chieftains who may or may not havo^ been ofJ3eduin (i.e. nomadic) origin, 
cf. Heyd, pp. 48, 50, 75. al-Khurl Mikhp il Barik, Ta'rikh al-Sham, 1720- 
82, ed. by Q. al-Basha, Harl^ a, 1930, p. 36 referred“to~the * A^ ms as well 
as to ?usayn Pa.sha b. Makki as awlad al-*Arab meaning local people, irre­
spective of their origin, ^or Beduin he used the terms * Arab. A* rab or 
cUrban._ MiddS* ll al-§abbagh, Ta>rikh al-Shaykh Zahir al-fUmar, ed. by 
Q. al-Basha, gari§a, 1935, p. 174, stated that the term awlad al-*Arab meant 
local people. *Duwa$hi, 359, used the term in the same sense. 8'ordid'SMhab 
(:edvt Mughabghaby ,732.). t:That-:this-rjerm was also used in the same sense in 
Ottoman documents is apparent in a firman which referred to the native^ 
deputy-judges as evlad-i *Arab (Heyd, 55 n.6). Heyd!s grouping of evlad-i
(cont/
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troops in Damascus, provided a serious challenge to the governors. This 
situation partly explains why the governors of Damascus in the 18th century 
were no longer asked, after being entrusted with the command of the Pilgrimage 
to relieve the Sultan with troops in his wars outside Syria,
In fact, the most important occupation of the governors of Damascus was 
to ensure the safety of the Pilgrimage, This the 'Azms did fairly efficient­
ly and must have satisfied both the Sultan and the religious public. That 
a
such/duty helped them, when efficiently and safely carried out, to maintain 
their position at a time wjien many governors were deposed for their failure 
to do so, is quite evident. Paradoxically, this function was also responsibly 
when safely discharged for several years, for arousing the fears of the Sul­
tan lest the governors concerned should deepen their local roots and gain 
prestige as a result. Such an apprehension may be valid in an efficient 
central administration but, in the conditions of the prevailing decline, the 
distrust, the conspiracies and, above all, the need for confiscation had the 
priority. This was probably the main reason why we find many governors break­
ing the *Agm succession.. A yearly tenure for the governor could be more 
financially advantageous to the Sultan. It would also satisfy the pressing 
demands of many candidates for governorships, particularly because the of­
fice of the governor of Damascus had immensely increased in prestige and
Icont.) aArab" with 7 Arab. A*rab ancT^ Urba'n all meaning ah his opinion Beduin. 
(p.48 h.2) is therefore erroneous. He was nearer to the truth, in another 
statement of his (p. 55 ft.6), when he doubted the suitability of the term 
Beduin for referring to jevlad-i 4 Arab. To avoid using the various terms 
of *Arab. A* rab and ‘Urban", the standard term Beduin is henceforth used in 
this study.
2See below p.?2 *
T^he term Syria did not have an administrative significance under the Otto­
mans. It is used here, however, as meaning geographical Syria, that is 
the area extending be Ween the Taurus Mountains in the north and * Arish in 
the south, and between the Mediterranean in the West and the Euphrates in 
the east.
profit after the command of the Pilgrimage was attached to it. But such a 
yearly tenure was far from practicable in the conditions of 18th century 
Damascus. Because of the increased insubordination of various groups both 
inside and outside Damascus, a governor with a longer tenure and, certainly, 
of adequate ability, was more likely to assess the situation and restrain 
the insurgents, A long tenure of the governor, it could be argued, might be 
more beneficial for the inhabitants' who need not submit to the hurried exact­
ions of a governor trying to make the most of his short tenure. This applies 
in some cases $ but It is equally true moreover that a governor with a long 
tenure tends to be more familiar with the local conditions, and hence with 
the best ways of enforcing exactions, as we shall have many instances to note
in the course of this study.
The *A§ms did not work for an autonomous, let alone independent, rule. 
They were interested merely in their own welfare and prestige within the 
‘Establishment1. There was no danger as such that their growing local image 
might dwarf that of the Sultan. No matter how much the central administration 
had decayed, the religious ties between the Sultan and the Muslim people of 
his Empire were strong. However, it is to the credit of the * Azins that they 
had introduced the tendency of local rule in Syria which strengthened local 
self-assertion in many ways.
If the *Azms were unable or unwilling to challenge the authority of the
central administration even when their basic interests were at stake, other
local rulers, less regular in position but, partly because of this, more 
powerful, x^ ere able to do so. Almost simultaneously with the emergence of 4A^m 
rule in the first quarter of the 18th century, the Ziyadina, allegedly of 
tribal origin, started groping for power in the region of §afad, which was
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under the jurisdiction of the governors of Sidon. Their prominent chief, 
Shaykh Zahir al-* Umar, who was basically a multazim (tax-farmer) in the 
regions of §afad and Acre, was able to expand his authority and the territory 
he controlled, largely within the limits of the province of Sidon, to a de­
gree that made the Ottoman authorities consider him a rebel because of his 
many provocations. V ^
At the time of his emergence, the semi-autonomous amirs of Mount Lebanon 
were weak, largely because of internal factionalism and also because of the 
close watch kept on them by the governors of Sidon, The Shi*i Matawila of 
Jabal f Audi, Interposed between Zahir and the Druzes, were also weak. They 
x^ ere being used, as very often, by one party against the other. Their co­
religionists in the Biqa*, the Bani Harfush, had almost spent their power by 
the iSth century. Zahir therefore met no strong local rivals either among 
the tribal chieftains whose support he sought at the beginning, or among the 
local families of notables. His alliance with *Ali Bey of Egypt and the 
Russians in the early ‘seventies became intolerable to the Sultan. After 
his war with Russia had ended, the Sultan dispatched a naval force against 
Zahir, who was finally liquidated in 1775.
In \terms of power politics Zahir eclipsed the *A:jms. Although the part­
ies differed in the bases of their authority, yet it is true that the 
governors had tried several times to subdue Zahir but failed. If the ‘'Aijms 
had Introduced or rather shared in a new phenomenon in provincial administra­
tion, Zahir had resuscitated a local tradition of insubordination.
The power vacuum left by the death of Zahir and the decline in the power
the governor of Sidon.
of the governors of Damascus was filled by Ahmad Hasha al—Jazzar,/ Like the 
*Agms, lazzar developed his power within the ‘Establishment1, and ruled for
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several years, tie exploited all the resources of the territory he governed, 
most of them developed under gahir, to consolidate his authority. Unlike 
the 4A^ ms, however, Jazzar maintained his position by force in the style of 
Zahir. As a mamluk depending on mamluk troops, Jazzar had many similarities 
with the Mamlulc governors of Baghdad, Like them, for example, he was toler­
ated by the Sultan because of his power and of his ability to restrain the 
insubordinate local groups. The acquisition by Jazzar of the governorship 
of the province of Damascus in 1785 started a new phase in its history.
Ill Some aspects of the administration of Damascus.
1, The Governor,
The governors of Damascus usually held the rank of wazir. This was 
generally the case during the period under study. If a governor on his 
appointment to Damascus was not of the rank of wazir. he would then be pro­
moted to it. Because this rank had become largely honorary, the number 
of candidates for governorships was much increased. However, in Damascus 
the governors could make up for whatever debasement the rank of wazir had 
suffered by invoking their other title of Commander of the Pilgrimage.
The Arabic terms used by the local chroniclers to express the term 
governor* of Damascus underwent a change with the lapse of time. In the 
16th and 17th centuries the term na* ib a 1-Sham was very often used. This was
i
a continuation of Mamluk terminology and is best seen in the writings of Mu-j 
harnmad b. Tulun who lived under both the Mamluk and the Ottoman regimes Hot i 
until early in the 18th century was the use of this term almost dropped by 
the Damascene chroniclers .In the writings of Muhibbi and Muradi appear the 
terms Lnkim and kafil,both meaning governor.Ibn Tulun used the terms kafHanc
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kafala (governorship) in the same sense as najib and niyaba. The term walT 
(governor) was also used by* the Damascene chroniclers, particularly in the 
18th century.
Although the governors of Damascus were not excessively changed in the
18th century they were, nevertheless, yearly confirmed in office. The threat
to their continuation in office is thus still maintained, but, on the other
hand, they had enough means at their disposal, given the decay of Ottoman
administration, if not to reverse their deposition, at least to avoid it as
long as possible. However, the real significance of this confirmation lies
1in its bearing on the relations between the governor and the power groups 
inside Damascus.
The governor exploited theoccasion of the arrival of the firman of con­
firmation for propaganda purposes and the furtherance of his prestige. Guns
2
were fired and celebrations staged to mark the occasion. It is not clear 
whether the confirmation was made after the lapse of one year on the date of 
the appointment or of the previous confirmation of the governor, or whether, 
irrespective of this, it was made on a specific regular date. Whichever the 
case;,: it is apparent from the comments of the governors on certain occasions 
that the firman of confirmation sometimes used to arrive late. This may 
have been due to several reasons such as the manoeuvres of candidates at 
Istanbul, the degree of efficiency of the governor^ agent at the Porte, 
travel difficulties and bureaucratic corruption.
■^The term power groups inside Damascus is used in this study to denote the
following, who exercised powers the various military groups, the Ashraf,
the artisans, as well as the ^Ulaml1 and the notables, who included a 
cross section of several groups. On other occasions reference will be made 
to the power groups' outside Damascus which means the various tribal chief­
tains and families of notables who exercised power.
2Ibn Kinan. II, ££. 38b, 93b, 125a; Budayrl, ff. 35a, 35b; A.N..B 10235
Sidon, 4..1.73, Bl 1027s Sidon^  28.10.49.
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The headquarters of the governor in Damascus was known in the writings of
the local chroniclers as saraya. sometimes as sarayat al~hukm . It was loc-
  1
ated near Stiq a1-Darwis hiyya, in the vicinity of the citadel.
2, The Mutasallim.
2
During the period under study the term mutasallim was applied, In the
3province of Damascus. to two types of officials, both of whom deputized for 
the governor In one capacity or another* The governors of ganjaqs or of small­
er administrative divisions who were dependent on the governor of Damascus, 
were sometimes called mutasallimsThe term mutagarrif was used as an alter- 
native of mutasallim. in this capacity. Also, the person who deputised for 
the governor in Damascus during his absence was called mutasallim.^
The role of the mutasallim in Damascus is of paramount importance to this 
study. In the interregnum between the deposition of a governor and the arriv­
al of a successor, a mutasallim took control of the government. In this capa­
city he seems to have been known as mutasallim rtia-bayn. which means inter-
7
mediate governor. When the governor temporarily left Damascus on a certain
8
commission such as going on the dawra or on the Pilgrimage, a mutasallim 
deputized for him,
\luradi, I, 565 Muhammad al-Hasxbi, Tarajim Dimashqiyyln. MS. Zahiriyya, 
f am 4^63,f39b. Saraya or seray is a term of Persian origin, see J.W.
Redhouse, Redhouse!s Turkish Dictionary* London, 1880, p. 595*
2
The term was also rendered musallim sometimes by the local chroniclers but 
almost always in both the English and the French dispatches of the time which 
gave further variations of it as well,
n
"’This restrictive phrase is inserted for fear of generalization because the 
meaning of the term varied in other places though not in the other Syrian 
provinces, see S* J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and 
Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798. Princeton 1962, p. 196 (henceforth 
referred to as Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798).
^See, Ibn al-Siddxq, ff. 38a, 78a, 79b, 8laj Mawfill, f. 58a-, Muradi, Matmab, 
£. 115a| A.N.B 83s Aleppo, 28.1.60.
W-adx, II, 32. (cont.)
& 93. P > r
lb® mutasallim of Damascus was usually appointed by the governor and
1 M 
very often chosen from among his retinue. On one occasion Fathi, the daftar-
2
dar of Damascus, was appointed mutasallim. On others, the agha of either
3
the Yerliyya or the Kapi Kulus. or the alaybeyi (commander) of the feudal 
forces was appointed as mutasallim. On certain occasions the Sultan appointed 
the mutasallim. This took place mainly in cases when the governor was not yet
nominated by the Sultan and also when the governor-designate was not in a
4position to nominate his mutasallim. In emergencies the notables of Damascus
5sometimes appointed the mutasallim. On one occasion, the mutasallim entered 
Damascus, but * his1 governor was deposed before he assumed office. The succeed* 
ing governor sent another mutasallim.^
There was no continuity in the office of the mutasallim in Damascus. The 
mutasallim deputised for the governor only during his absence. In the pre­
sence of the governor he no longer had de .jure authority as such. The muta­
sallim who deputised for the governor in the period between his nomination and 
his arrival in Damascus was not necessarily the same one who deputized for the
governor during his absence later on.
CconlT) — — —
°The term qayim madam was sometimes used by the Damascene chroniclers in place
of that of mutasallim, see Ibn al-giddiq, ff. 22a, 24a, 6?b, 69b, 110a. The
mutasallim of Damascus in 1731 referred to himself, In a letter to the French
consul in Sidon, as ’caimacam1 (sic), see A..N.B^  1023* (Sidon, 17.2.31).
r- — B?Ibn Jum6a, 595 the Arabic term ma-bayn- means what is between. See below p,
^See Ahmad al-Muwaqqi*, al-Barq al-lami*. f• 250b$ M^aw§ili, if. 53b, 58a 5 
Ibn Kinan, II, f* 80a; Budayri, ff2a, 7a| Riaala. f. 14b. .
R^isala, f. 14b; Muwaqqi*, f. 250b$ see below p*.
%he Turkish form of the term is Kapi Kullari (sing. Kapi Kulu). The term Kapi 
Kulus is used in this study as the plural of the Turkishesinsular because it 
is near to the Arabic form given by the chroniclers as qablqul.
^cf. Ibn Jum6 a, 45$ Ibn al-Sidd.iq, x. 84b, ‘ •
^Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 60a$ cf. Budayri, f, 7a.
^Muwaqqi*, f. 250b.
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3. The Daftardar.
The financial accounts of the province of Damascus were kept by the
— 1 daftardar who held his office directly from Istanbul. He was the treasurer
who dealt with money matters including the receipt and expenditure of cash.
The finance office headed by the daftardar ms referred to in various terms
by the Damascene chroniclers. Sometimes the term used was derived from the
- ~ 2
Turkish one Ijasine-i *amire, rendered in Arabic al-IChazina a 1-* amir a. Very
^  3
often it was referred to as a 1-KhazIna al-Dimashqiyya. or al-Khazina al-
.. . IWI A It«!} /
mirivva al-Sultaniyya. or al-Khazina al-miriyya, or simply al-Kbazxna.b 
The daftardar was sometimes referred to as daftardar Dimashcu  ^or daftardar 
a1-Sham^. or daftardar Dimashq al-Sham.9 Very often he was referred to simply 
as daftardar or daftari. The arabicization of the term is apparent in the 
nisba-ending (i) which replaced the Persian dar. Sometimes one of the titles 
efendi^ and, less frequently, chelebi^ were added to the name of the 
daftardar.
■ ■I1IHI III II ■ XII I Jl ■ .1 J  I IIHH 11P ■ I *  II ■!* * III III W W I  I— !■ H i  W l.tll II 1.1 ■ I. liM'H >1 t M .*|H— M U IT ^ P I  ~BI i Mil I Ill I it lllllll II ■ ' II II I I 11 H IT  T T  ■ ! a W lW lJ ^ l i r ~ - g n T n i i r  ' Tl T 1 fl n~T~'l'TI I l f c y i lT I  T»  IIII ' ■ r~ TTI---------------- —rl~~^Tr^--T
1H.Jl.-R.Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West. 1 volume in two 
parts, London, 1951, 1957, I.i.201.
Muradl, I. 163. %uradi, Matmah. f. 225b.
f^uradi, III. 14-8. Miriyya is derived from miri . According to S.J.Shaw,
Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798. p. 64. n, 165, fin colloquial usage, the term 
miri was applied indiscriminately, as both noun and adjective, to all 
possessions and revenues of the Imperial treasury. However, it was more 
frequently used for the Imperial lands and the land tax revenues of the 
Treasury*, Henceforth, the term mini will be used In this study to refer 
to the land tax revenue of the Treasury.
5MuradI, II. 220, III. 135. 6Ibid.. IV. 38.
7,§afa£at fl ta’rikh Dimaaha fi* 1-gam al-hadT iashar^al-hijri', taken from
a chronicle by Isma^il al-Mahasinl and edited by Salah a1-Din al-Munajjid 
in Revue de I^nstitut des manuscrits Arabes. Cairo, Vol.. 6, (May, November, 
I960},p. 119.
^Ibid.. 95, 100; Ibn Jum*a, 27, %bn Jum*a« 59.
I°Efendi was a title generally applied to iMmmi . It was also given t<e 
— — - " (cont.)
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It seems that until roughly 975/156$ the province of Damascus and other 
Asian provinces were, as concerns fiscal matters, under the authority of the 
daftardar of Aleppo whose title was defterdar-i * Arab wa-*AS.iam. ^round this
date Hhis office vras abolished and separate treasuries were set up in each
1 — of those provinces1. The financial authority of the daftardar of Aleppo
over the province of Damascus during this period does not mean that there 
was no local treasurer in Damascus, albeit subordinate to the daftardar of 
Aleppo. In fact such an official oris ted and bore the title daftardar. It 
is stated that Sultan SelTm I created a defterdarlik in Damascus.^ The 
Damascene chronicler Ibn Tulun mentioned the existence of a daftardar in 
Damascus in Ramadan 922/3ept„-0ct. 1516, after the conquest of Sultan Selim 
1,3 Later on, the Damascene biographer, Najm al-Din al-Ghazsi, also men­
tioned the existence of a daftardar in Damascus around 944/1537-8.^ It is 
not clear, however, if these daftardars in Damascus were subordinate to the 
daftardar of Aleppo, or were directly responsible to Istanbul, as later on 
in the century.
(cont.) government secretaries, mainly those connected with the finance de­
partment, who were considered, together with the cTJlamaJ . as !men of the 
pen*, see Gibb and Bowen, I.i.120 n.5* The term is still in use in Arabic 
as a dignified title for various groups of people.
TIphelebi m s  a title applied to men of the upper classes in Turkey, primar­
ily poets, men of letters and also princes, between the end of the 13th and 
the beginning of^the 18th century. It was also applied to shavkhs of 
turuq (sing, tnriqa which means brotherhood of mystics) until "the ’20th cen­
tury.. In its secular meaning the term has been replaced by :efendi in the 
Ottoman Empire since ca. 1700, see W, Barthold /B. Spuler/, B.I., new ed.
s.v. Celfebi.   ._
%eyd, 4.2, 69 n,3(31)? cf. B., Lewis, E,I., new ed. s.v. Daftardar.
G^ibb and Bowen, I.i.129, n.5 quoting *Ata I, 96.
3lbn fuluii, ed. Hartmann, 128, 129, 131.
a1-Din al-Ghazzi, al-Kawakib al-sa; ira. ed. by Jibra’ il Jabbur,
3 vols., Beirut 1945-59, HI, 208.
From roughly 975/156$ the existence of separate daftardars in Damascus 
can easily be traced, A few remarks may be made here concerning them. 
Firstly, some daftardars were of local origin, such as Fathi al-Daftari.
This t^ as not due to the decline of the central administration, nor was it a 
trend initiated at a certainpperiod, as was the case with thetfA§m governors. 
Secondly, the length of the tenure of the daftaxdar was fixed neither by re­
gulation nor by practice. In one case a daftardar remained in office for
1 2 two years, in another for thirty years, both examples being from the 12th
century A.H. Thirdly, in some cases the daftardars were entrusted with other
duties. In 1041/1631-2^for example, the daftardar of Damascus was appointed
3 ~ .
commander of the Pilgrimage. On more than one occasion the daftardar acted
mutasallim in Damascus.^ However, during the Mamluk intervention in 
Syria in the early 1 seventies, the Sultan appointed a special daftardar to 
take charge of the financial affairs of the Ottoman army assembled in Damas­
cus.^
During the period under study four daftardars assumed office in Damascus. 
Although it is difficult to tell if this ms an improvement or otherwise 
over other periods in terms of length of office, the political importance 
which the office of daftardar had acquired, particularly under Fathi al- 
Daftarl, is of significance. The daftardar of' Dam^scus-t^?^h©:.peMo’d;/beti-7een 
1129/1716 and 1148/1736, with a minor interruption, was 4'Ali al-Daftari who 
was born in Hamah but graduated from Istanbul,?/ His father had earlier oc­
cupied the office of daftardar in Damascus In 110l/l689-90 and 1102/1691.^  
%uradi, II, 31.32. ^Ibid., III ,.209-12.
M^uhibbx, Khulasat al-athar, 4 vols., 'Cairo 1284/1869, X, 30, cf. IV,215. 
4luridi, IV, 75 see below p. M^uradl, IV, 7.
M^urasji, II, 31, 32.
In 1129/1716-7 the Grand Vezir banished many* officials, among whom was {Ali.
He was appointed daftardar of Damascus to keep him away from Istanbul. Al­
though tills was a paternal banishment it may illustrate the low esteem in
1
which this office was held at the Porte. The successor of *Ali was Fa$hi 
al-Daftarx, who occupied the office between l±/$/l73$-6 and his death in 
1159/174-6* ’ , ' After him the office of daftardar passed into political insig­
nificance. The term of his successor, Muhammad b. Rajab, known asiibn 
3
Farrukh - erroneously linked with the 17th century Far rule h family of not­
ables because he resided in the house they built on the outskirts of Damascus 
known as dar Banx Farrukh^ - extended over a period of thirty years and 
marked the subsequent political eclipse of the office of the daftardar. His 
Rumi5 origin was perhaps not a determined attempt on the part of the Sultan
%uradx, III, 209-12. S^ee below Budayri, f .19a. %uradi, IV, 36.
5 _
Originally the term Rum was applied by the Muslims in its political and geo­
graphical aspects to the Byzantine territory lying across the Taurus and the 
'.-Euphrates. Muslim chroniclers later on called the Seljuqs who were estab­
lished in Asia Minor Sala.iiqat al-Rum. in the geographical sense only; where­
as they still called the Byzantine Emperor malik al-Rum, using the term here 
in a political sense. When the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid acquired the title 
Sultan al-Rum from the Abbasid Galiph in Cairo in 797/1394 both aspects of 
the term, the geographical and the political^ were thus combined; see the 
detailed study by P. Wittek, !Le Sultan de 'Rum1.} Annua ire de l*Institut de 
Philologie et d’Histoire Qrientales et Slaves. Melanges Emile Boisacq Vol.- 
VT7193S)7 pp. 361-390, When the Ottomans occupied Syria, the terms Rum 
and Rumi. long used by the Muslims for the country and the people beyond the 
Taurus and the Euphrates, kept being used by the local chroniclers, and in­
deed by the Ottoman administration, in the same meaning. In a firman dated 
4 Juniada I 965,(20 July 1577) addressed to the governor of Damascus, the 
Sultan referred to the vacant places in the janissary corps in Damascus which 
were given to natives (yerl&j and foreigners (tat) in contradiction to his j
orders to give them to young men from Rt3m. According to Heyd, 63 n.6, cf. j
152, the term Rum here seems to refer to the old Ottoman provinces in Ana- 
tolia and Rumelia. The 16th century Damascene chronicler ibn fulun alter- !
.nafely1; used the terms gul^an al-Rum (ed. Hartmann, 147, 150), malik al- 
Rum (ibid. 131, 132), anTTE^uI^gn'a'l-*Hjbmanx (ibid. 122) in referring to 
the Ottoman Sultan. He referred to the Ottomans in Damascus as Rum and 
Arwam. sing. Rumx (ibid. 112, ^ 8) as well as Turk (ibid. 131, 145, 150,
154) • Najw ai-Dxn al-Ghazzi III, 150, referred to them as Rum, which term 
he used also for the Ottoman territory beyond the Taurus and the Euphrates
(cont.)
A  r*H
4 i
against local people, i*e. Fathi al-DaftarT and his relatives, because this 
change was in the tradition of the office. But his change of residence from 
what seems to have been the traditional centre of al~Qaymariyya^ (inside the 
town) to a place on the outskirts of Damascus, was more representative of a 
break~away from the past upheavals that were associated with the office and 
its occupant Fat£ii al-*Daftari. Under his successor Fayd Allah al-Akhsakhawi. 
a Rami, who assumed office in 1189/1775-6, the office again made political
'  j
news, partly because of the complacency of the then governor, Muhammad Pasha 
al~4Azm.^
Alongside the state financial officials there existed private household 
officials employed by prominent rich persons, such as the governor, the daf­
tardar and some notables, to take care of their private financial affairs,
^  ___  o  ^
Fathi al-Daftari, for example, had two khazinedars (treasurers;), Sulayman
Pasha al~tf Azni had a khazinedar as well as an influential wakil al-khar,j
Xcont7T*TlS7^oJ. MuhibbI in the 17th century used the term Rum in the same 
sense (II, 24-2). So did Murad! in the 18th century (ill, 227, IV, 7,^ 38, 82, 
'130, Matrnah, ff. 6a, 26a, 72b), but he differentiated between al-bilad al- 
* ilrabTyya and al-bilad al-Rumiyya (l, 4-1). Muradi also used the term Atrak
(iTpoTr He referred to Istanbul as Qu$tantiniyyat al-Rum (I. 274-, II, 13,
Matrnah, f. 5b) and sometimes used instead theTTric^ly Muslim term Islambul, 
meaning the city of Islam (I, 4-1, HI, 287, IV, 115, 219). Islambul first 
occurs regularly on the coins of Sultan A^mad III (1703-30), Gibb and^ Bowen, 
X.IL.21S n.l;. Most of the Damascene chroniclers used the term Islambul. Ibn 
Kinan described the pilgrims coming from beyond the Taurus as al-Hajj al- 
Rumi (II. ff. 31a, 71a, 92a, 165b, 171b). At the start of almost every gear 
in his^chroniele, Ibn Kinan gave the title of the Ottoman Sultan as Sultan 
al-mamalik (sometimes al-mamlaka) al-Rumiyya wa~ba*d (sometimes v/a-ak^ SrJ 
al-£Ai’abiyya waba^d al-4A.iamiyya,(II, ff. 28b, 37a, 69b, 80b, 85b, 119a)T 
All the other Muslim Damascene chroniclers used the term Rum in the same _ 
sense. The local Ghristian chroniclers used it in a different sense. Barik, 
for example, used the term Rum as meaning the Greek Orthodox community, 
local and otherwise, in the same sense as the Muslims had previously used it 
for the Byzantines, (see_jpp, 13, 16, 19, 61, 64., 65, 85). He referred to 
the Ottomans as *Uthmanli (pp. 62, 93). On one occasion, however, he seems 
to have used the term al-bilad al-Rumiyya (pp. 29) to refer to Rumelia,that 
is the European parts of the Ottoman Empirep
■^-Gf. Mulaibbl, I, 4-31. %uradi, IV, 38.
B^udayri, f. 18b.
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(superintendent of expenditure) who had previously served in this capacity 
under Isnia*xl Pasha and As4 ad Pasha, the * Azins. ^ Because the influence of 
these private officials depended on the influence of the person to whom they 
were attached, we rarely hear of other similar officials unless there was 
something spectacular in their career or in the career of their employers.
The above persons for example were mentioned on the occasion of the confis­
cation of the property of their masters.
While dealing with financial affairs, it is necessary to examine the role 
of the Jews and Christians in this respect. It is difficult to know the 
exact role which these two communities had played in the financial bureau- ' 
craGy in Damascus. The Ottoman authorities of Damascus relied more on Jews
than on Christians as far as fiscal matters were concerned. The Christians
2took more to commerce either on their own or as agents for the French and 
3
English merchants, Sometimes they acted as commercial agents for the daf­
tardar as well as for the governor.^ ' The Christians had. the advantage also 
of being employed as dragomans and as secretaries. Of the latter category
we may mention Ibrahim al-Sahbagh who was employed by Zahir and Ilyas al-
- — - 5
Iazi$i al-Himsjji employed by Sa*d al-Din Pasha al-*Agm.
After the Ottoman conquest of Damascus a Jew called §adaqa ms mentioned
6
as mu*allim dar al-4arb (chief official at the mint) in Damascus. Probably 
he was the same Mu* a Him. §adaqa mentioned shortly afterwards as a money-
Budayri, ff. 10a, 12a, 18a, 18b.
See for example, A*N.B^ 1030s Sidon, 27.3*53, Sidon, 30.3*53, Sidon, 313*53*
■^ See for example, PHO, S.P. 110/35* Aleppo, 17.3*61.
^JLN.B1 1023s Sidon, (?) .12.31.
5Cf. Barlk, 24, 2 5* on the role of the Christians and Jews see A. Hourani,
A vision of History, pp. 50-53; Gibb and Bowen, I.i.308-11.
^Ibn puffin, ed. Hartmann, p* 136.
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lender. In the second half of the 16th century many attempts were made to
dismiss the Samaritans, officially considered as Jews, from the offices ■
2 *
they occupied in the financial administration in Damascus. Thevenot, who 
visited Damascus In the late fifties of the 17th century, saw a place near 
the citadel fou I1 on bat la monaie, dans lequel les Juifs travaillent1 .3 
At the beginning of the period under study, a Jewish $ayrafi (banker) who 
was attached to the governor of Damascus, 1 Uthman Pasha Abu Tawq, suffered 
among others in the revolt staged by the Damascenes against the mutasallim 
and his entourage.^ Later on, in the early 'seventies of the 18th century, 
a Jew called Sheidy (sic) was mentioned as garraf (banker)^  sometimes re­
ferred to as sarraf bashi (chief banker,), of the governor of Damascus. In 
a financial dispute between this garraf and the English consul at Aleppo 
the latter admitted that 'Sheidy*s interest at Damascus seems very powerful 
and will be strengthened on the Basha's arrival from Mecca1 s* The registers 
of the mirl in Damascus were kept by Jewish sarrafs.^
Owing to their financial skill the Jews played an important role in 
commerce as well. According to Saint->1aure, who visited Damascus in 1721, 
!rien ne se negocie dans cette ville que par l!entremise des Juifs qui y 
sont presque les maitres du negoce1.? In Aleppo the English merchants em-
•i
Lewis, *A Jewish source on Damascus just after the Ottoman conquest1, 
BSO&S. X, 1 . (1939), p.|82.
H^eyd, 164, 172, 173 n.9.
O / /•2J. de Thevenot, Voyages de Monsieur de Thevenot en Europe. Asie et Afrioue. 
3rd ed„ 5 vols. Amsterdam, 1727, II,
4See below p. (ft.
5pRQ, S.P. 110/42s Aleppo, 26.4.73, 3ee also S.P. 110/40s Aleppo, 19.1.70, 
S.P. HO/4 2; Aleppo, 9.12.72, Aleppo, 11.3.73.
Cribb and Bowen, I.ii. 47.n.4.
^C.d# Saint-Maure, Nouveau Voyage de Grece d1 Eg vote. de Palestine... Fait en 
1721a 1722 et 1723, The Hague 1724, p. 172; on the speculation of,the 
saih-afs^ oriJ'ie' governors of Damascus in trade, see A.N.B- 1030: Sidog,y^c^
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1ployed Jews as commercial agents*
As for the currency of Damascus in the 18th century, there is no adequate
information in the sources available to permit a comprehensive study of it.
2
However, it is known that there was a mint in Damascus which struck coins.
But it is not clear what type of coins were struck in it, nor for how long
this mint was permitted to function, Budayri stated,that the fulus (the
word may have beeh used to denote a specific coin or coins in general) which
were struck in Damascus lost their value towards the end of Dhuyl-IJij ja
3
1157/early February 174-5- Because of several factors, mainly economic and
political, such as the repeated devaluation of the currency, the striking of
coins locally, counterfeiting, and the exactions of several governors, there
4
developed a difference in the value of the currency from one place to another. 
4* The Dawra
Before the command of the Bilgrimage was entrusted to the governors of 
Damascus, roughly in the first quarter of the 18th century, it was very of­
ten given to local chieftains and notables who were appointed governors of 
ganjaqs in the province of Damascus. Being tax-farmers of the regions they
governed, these local governors used part of the revenue they collected to
5
finance the Pilgrimage. When the governors of Damascus became commanders 
of the Pilgrimage, it was their direct responsibility to provide for its ex­
penses, largely from the revenue of their province. For this purpose the
^Radcliffe Papers, Guildhall Library, London, 6645/5** Aleppo, 19-5-59*
2 -v 3
Thevenot, II, 6885 Budayri, f. 14a. Budayri, f. 14a,
L 1
Of. A.N.B 1030: Sidon, 1.7.53; PRO, S.P. 110/38; Aleppo, 1 7.7.66,
Aleppo, 27.5.67; Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 117a, 171b; Maw§ili, f. 59b; Budayri, 
ff. 24b, 35a, 41a.
5
See below p*/p/,.
governors of Damascus, in their capacity as muhagsils (farmers-in-chief),
made yearly tours of their province to collect the revenue from the local
1 ; 
tax-farmers. This tour was called, in Arabic al-dawra.
The regions normally toured by the governors on the dawra were those of
Nablus, ‘Ajlun, Lajjun, Gaza and Jerusalem. On one occasion the region of
3al-Shuf was included. Such tours can be traced almost yearly ever since 
the governors of Damascus became commanders of the Pilgrimage, The only ob­
vious exception during the period under study was in 1185/1771-2, when the 
governor,' of Damascus was unable to go on the dawra because of the invasion
.  MM,
of his province by the troops of Ali Bey of Egypt.
float the governors of Damascus toured their province almost regularly
after they v/ere entrusted with the command of the Pilgrimage does not mean
that they did not tour it before. In fact they did so very often, mainly
to collect arrears in the mirf dues or for military purposes. But there is
no evidence that they made a dawra every year at a more or less fixed time
before they assumed the command of the Pilgrimage. This could be explained
by the fact that there was then no pressing financial need for the governors
In the French dispatches of the time the dawra was referred to as la tour- 
nde, see for example A.N.B 1031* Sidon, 28,7.56; R. Pococke, A Description 
of the East and some other countries. 2 vols., London, 1743-5, II,i,54 re­
ferred to the dawra as the circuit,
2 1 1 
Of. Mav§IlI, f. 58b; A.N.B 10271 Sidon, 27.7.43; A.N.B 1031s Sidon,
28.7.56, Sidon, 31.4.57.
%bn Kinan, II, f. 162a. This region was under the jurisdiction of the gov­
ernor of Sidon. That it was toured on the dawra seems to have been an ex-_ 
ceptional case because at the time the governor of Sidon was the son of Abu 
Tawq, the governor of Damascus. It could be jjhat Abu Tawq was directly in­
volved In some financial problems with the aiir of al-Shuf, who was in ef­
fect the amir of Mount Lebanon, or that his action was simply an expression 
of power politics.
4See below p. J71 . On another occasion in 1169/1755-6 the Sultan issued a 
firman appointing Husayn Pasha b. Makki governor of Jerusalem and authorIz-
(cont.)
52
to go on the dawra every year, so long as others conducted the Pilgrimage 
and provided for it. Furthermore, they were very often entrusted with mili­
tary duties outside the confines of their province, largely on the battle­
fields of Europe and on the border vrith Persia; hence they had no time to 
aaiiconduct the dawra regularly. Since they had been appointed commanders 
of the Pilgrimage, they were no longer asked to go on such campaigns outside 
Syria.
By the beginning of the 18th century the local families of chieftains 
and notables of the l6th and 17th centuries were either extinguished or 
weakened. Others, however, were coming to the fore, such as Zahir. The dawra, 
although primarily intended to collect the revenue, came to assume, by neces­
sity, the aspect of a military expedition to discipline the rebellious chiefa 
This is apparent, to give one example, in the campaigns of Sulayman Pasha al- 
fcA^m against Zahir, which took place at the time of the dawra. Such calcu­
lated attacks against a strong enemy tended to increase the length of the
dawra. On one occasion it lasted from 3 Pajab 1155/3 September 174^ until
— 2
5 Shawwal 1155/3 December 1742. Normally the dawra lasted for about a month
It usually started sometime between the beginning of Juraada II and early Sha- 
ban.^ Its duration depended on the problems the governor had to deal xjith, 
both inside and outside Damascus. While the starting date was left to the 
discretion of the governor, that of return xtfas timed with, sometimes dictated 
by, the date for the departure of the Pilgrimage. This obligation caused on
4
many occasions the curtailment of the dawra. However, the days most often
■ wittnm i*i*iii—w.twnii»i>wiwiMiw'">iLB.i n III    *       .1 >nn I> n p *** *' ■
(cont.) ing him to collect the revenue of the dawra. But it is not known 
If Susayn Pasha did In fact go on the dawra. in other words if the governor 
of Damascus was unable to go on the dax-jra that year, see below p. Z6H.
-^Budayri, f. 4a. 2Ibid.. f. 5b. % ee ibld>> 40a, 43a, 44b, 53b.
^Ibld., f. 6a; Abbud al-Sabbagh, al-Rawd al-zahir fi akhbar Dahir. Paris, 
Bibliotheque Rationale, PIS. F.A. 46IO, f. 8a.
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1reported for the return of the governor from the dawra were in Ramadan.
It seems that on the occasion of the dawra the governors of Damascus used 
to impose a special tax known as dawriyya on, at least, the foreign mission­
aries residing in Jerusalem. This is suggested by a statement In a command by 
the Sultan to ‘Uthman Pasha al-Kurfi, governor of Damascus (1766-71) which 
reads: *Votre Boyourdi t*obligerait de ne plus exiger d’eux (meaning the
missionaries of Jerusalem) pour Devrie ou pour Bandjakie rien en sur des 
7000 p. qu*ils sont depuis un terns immemorial dans I1usage de donner aux 
gouverneurs de Damas*.
5. The Diwan. ^
We may differentiate between two types of diwans in Damascus:
a) The administrative diwan. This was a general term given to the head­
quarters of the administration in Damascus. The diwan as such was an integral 
part of the s a ray a. the seat of the governor; hence, it was known as diwan 
sarayat al-hulm/4' It was composed largely of clerks who dealt with govern­
ment registers. We may mention here the office of,katib al-diwan.5 the office
_ .„6 — — 7of kaiib sil-*Arab! and the office of the diwan Efendi (sometimes referred
8
to by local chroniclers as diwan Efendisi). The last two offices wore im­
S^ee Budayri, ff. 35a, 4-Ob, 4Ih, 47b, 51b; Ibn KInan, II, f. l62a,
2 1
A.N.B 439: Istanbul: 18.8 .6 4 (Traduction d*un commandement du Grand Seign­
eur adress^ a Osman Pacha).
3Some say that the term Is of Persian origin and others that it is of Arabic 
origin, see E.I.. new ed. s.v. Diwan.
^Muradi, IV, 16. ^Ibid., IV. 8 . Ibid., Ill, 148; Ibn al-Sid&Iq, f.92a.
1
Budayri, f. 39b; for the diwan Efendl of Sidon see, A.N.B 1031s Sidon,
28.7.56, B1 1033: Sidon, 23.12.66.
8Xbn al-§iddiq, ff.. 74b, 110b.
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portant in the provincial administration. The katib al-zArab!. in charge
of Arabic correspondence, as the name suggests, was an influential person
because, as an I8th century French source put it, all governors (s*adressent
a lui pour en s9avoir les usages du pails*."*" He was also described as
*celuy qui aproche de plus pres les differentsgouverneurs qui ne font pres-
2 __
que jamais rien que par son entremise et sur ses conseils*. The diwan
3Bfendi.was a sort of a secretary to the governor. On one occasion, in an 
assembly of the consultative diwan. the governor asked the diwan Efendi 
to read the text of certain firmans which he had received from the Sultan 
There were other officials attached to the diwan. such as certain 
Sipahis who were either given timars or more probably retained their timars 
for their service in the diwan. There vrere also Gha u^ hs attached to the 
diwan who were low-ranking military officials under .the command of a bashi 
entrusted with ensuring public security.^
b) The consultative diwan was an assembly of officials who included the 
aghas of the military corps, the daftardar. the judge, the mufti, the naolb 
al-Ashraf, and of notables, generally referred to by the local chroniclers
7 ___
as akabir. a* van and afandiwa. To speak about a diwan in Damascus as 
always being composed of specified persons and meeting at more or less regu­
lar intervals is misleading. No such institution existed in Damascus, at 
least until the end of the period under study. The consultative diwan, was
1A.N.B1 1028s Sidon, 27.2.30. %.N.B1 1028s Sidon, 25.3*50.
3aibb and Ekwen, I.i.120, 152. ^Tbn al-$iddiq, ff. 110a, 110b.
M^uradi, IV. 16. S^ee R. Mantran, 35.1. new ed. s.v. ca*uph.
7Cf. Budayri, ff. 4a, lib; Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 18a; Ibn Kirin, II, f. 83a.
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summoned by the governor of the mutasallim or the notables, depending on 
the kind of occasion that warranted its convocation, I-ts decisions were not 
generally to restrict the authority of the governor but to facilitate the 
implementation of his decisions or those of the Sultan. It was also in­
tended to commit those attending it to its decisions,which very often af­
fected their interests.
6. The military forces.
Three main types of troops existed in Damascus during the period under
study: feudal forces, janissaries, and private or mercenary troops.
a) The feudal forces. It is only possible to draw here a general picture
of the decline in numbers and military importance of the feudal forces in
the province of Damascus, based on very scanty and fragmentary information.
According to the figures given by fAyn-i 4 All in 1609, which probably were
1
twenty to thirty years older if not more, the feudal forces in the province
2of Damascus numbered 3,197 out of a total of 120,535 for the whole Ottoman 
Empire.^ The number of fief-holders was 1006. The number of 3,606 given 
by Marsigli^ in the early 18th century for the feudal forces in the pro­
vince of Damascus seems to have been true of the period prior to-1660 because: 
the saniaqs which composed the province of Sidon at this date were included
* J | ii*i ■ vi«m ■iitffaiMP —  —
by him in the province of Damascus. M. de Girardin mentioned in 1687 that 
Damascus provided 700 timar cavalry (probably Sipahis only excluding the 
Zu*ama)?  He gave the number of fiefs (d!epee) as 1200.^ In 1193/1779 there
Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt. Syria.., pp. 4*3-4• ,
2*Ayn-i *Ali, 274. I^bid., 288, ^Oomte De Marsigli, L’Etat laiitaire
de l1Empire Ottoman, The Hague,
1732, p. 115.
^According to Heyd, 67 n„2, in many Ottoman documents the term Sipahi does 
not refer to all fief-holders !but means timar-holders as opposed to
(cont.)
were 128 zi*am&ts and 868 timars in the province of Damascus,
During the 16th century* and probably up till the third quarter of the 
17th century, when the janissaries of Damascus were replaced as garrison by
p
'fcke Kapi Kulus. it seems that the main duty of the feudal troops was to
garrison the fortresses along the Pilgrimage route and to provide necessary;
protection for the Pilgrimage.3 With the decline of the feudal system many
fief-holders managed to be exempted from military service through the payment
of money known as badal.^  However, many of them still performed military
duties in the 18th century. On 8 Jumada I Il60/l8 May 174-7, the governor
of Damascus, As1 ad Pasha al-^ A^ m, ordered the janissaries, the Zu‘ama and
the Sipahis to march against the Druses, On 16 Jumada 1/26 May, they paraded
before him in the Marja square in Damascus. It seems that the Zu*ama and
*^he Sipahis. in contrast to the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus, had no fixed
military duties in the 18th century,^  They %^ ere resorted to mainly in emer-
7
gencies, and very often it i^ as their religious sentiment that was appealed to
The feudal troops were commanded by an alavbevi who was a holder of a 
8Zi*amet. It seems that there was one alaybevi in every ganjaq of the pro-
9
vince, at least in the heyday of the feudal system.
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(cont.2 Zi4 amet-holders1, In fact this is apparent also in a statement by 
Budayri, f. 21a,when. he'. referred to the troops of As*ad Pasha al-^ A^ m. A 
Zi*amet was a fief which yielded between 20,000 and 99,000 aspres a year; a 
timar yielded a revenue of up to 19,999 aspres a year, see Heyd, 6 6,
B^elin, 290. _______
1  —  - *  '  ’ SiMuhammad Adib, ’ Itineraire de Constantinople a la Mecque. ed. by M.Bianchi, 
Paris, 1825, p.34*
%>ee below p. %ajm al-Din al-Ghazzi, III, 157; Heyd, 76.
4-H, Bowen, E.,1.. new ed.., s.v. Badal: Belin, 289 n.2; M. d'Ohsson, Tableau 
general d,e 1* Empire Ottoman, 7 vols., Paris, 1788-1824, 711, 377; Cf. Heyd, 
77; Muradi, Matmah, ff, 4^ a, 4^ b,
Budayri, f. 21a. 6Cf. Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 28b.
bf. Muradi, Majmah, f. 39a; Budayri, f. 7a. %ibb and Bowen,I.i.51, 146. 
9cf. B. Lewis* *Studies in the Ottoman Archives - I1, BSOAS. XVI.3*(l954) 
_pp. 471, 481J 48 2. _______________________
b) The Janissaries . There were two janissary corps in Damascus i the Yer- 
liwa (local janissaries) and the Kapi Kulus (Imperial janissaries), both 
of whom played an important political role during the period under study. 
Almost always they were opposed to each other and the Yerliwa very often 
were in the ascendant* To understand the background to this rivalry it is 
important to know how these two corps came to exist in Damascus. We may con­
sider the date 1070/1659-60 as a dividing mark between two phases in the 
history of the janissary corps in Damascus*
1. From the Ottoman conquest until roughly 1070/3.659~60, there x^as one jani­
ssary corps in Damascus under the command of an agha appointed directly from'
Istanbul. Rumis. presumably janissaries of Bumi origin, were stationed in
- 1the citadel of Damascus after its conquest by Sultan Selim I. The revolt
of JanbirdT al-Ghazali* shortly afterwards, was suppressed by Bumi Janis-
2
:saries and as a result the garrison of Damascus was strengthened. The pri­
mary duties of the janissaries as ; garrison were to guard the citadel and
q
the gates of the city, and to act as local police. However, during the 16th
and 17th centuries members of the janissaries accompanied the governors of
4
Damascus on their military expeditions both inside and outside their provmcB.
The changing character of the Janissary Corps in Damascus*
When the Ottomans occupied Syria the Janissary Gorps was well estab­
lished in the Ottoman Empire, but symptoms of decay were .already apparent
I*
in it**5 Like their fellow members, the janissaries of Damascus lived outside
■^ Ibn Jum*a,0jcf. Ibn Kinan, II, f* 159a* 2Ibn Jumsa, 4.
C^f. Muhibbi, IV, 310.
^See Ibn Jum* a, 36, 44 J Muhibbi, II, 124, 125; Heyd, 72,.
50n their decay see Gibb and Bowen, I*i. 179 ff.
their barracks, joined the crafts and became merchants and money-lenders.
Sach mixing on the part of the janissaries with the local population was not 
one-sided because many artisans, merchants and other influential persons 
joined the janissary corps to benefit from its many privileges. Means of 
avoiding any irritating duties resulting from, this membership were not lack­
ing, It came about therefore that many natives (Yerlil) and foreigners (tat), 
that./is,non-Turkish subjects of the Sultan like the Kurds,^ penetrated the 
janissary corps. In a firman dated 4 Jumada I 9£>5/f20 July 1575) addressed to 
the governor of Damascus, the Sultan ordered him to confer the places that
have fallen vacant in the janissary corps on young men from Rum and not on
3rich and wealthy natives and foreigners as was happening. The orders of 
the Sultan do not seem to have been heeded, and the process of natives and 
foreigners joining the janissary corps continued unabated.
Until roughly 10?0/l659-60 the influential members of the janissary 
corps in Damascus were not natives. It is true that many of them, x^ hether 
of Rumi or foreign origin, had become Daraascenized, but they still composed 
distinct groups. Members of the family of §asan al-Turkomani, a prominent 
janissary, together with their subordinates, composed about one quarter of 
the total number of the janissaries of Damascus in the first half of the 
17th century.^ *AlI b. al-Arna^ ut, of Albanian origin, was a prominent mem­
ber In this corps early in the 17th century. After his death in 1035/1625-6
—  —  5
his sons, KhadawardI and fAli, distinguished themselves in it. By far the
most influential group during this period was that of Kaywan who had been 
^f. Heyd, 69, n.3 (20). 2Ibid.. 63, n.2. I^bid., 68, 69,
^Muhibbi, III, 427; Muradi, II, 63. 5Mu^ ibbl, III, 156.
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a mamlulc of Ri<Jwan of Gaza.’*' He wielded such power and prestige in the
janissaxy corps in Damascus that when a person was attached to him he became
2
known as ibn ICaywan. Other members of Rumi origin held influential positions 
in this corps.3 Many of them originally came to Damascus in the service of 
a governor^ or with their fathers who were officials in it^ , or for some 
other reason,
1 i
When a person first enrolled in the janissary corps he was described by
—  —  —6
the Damascene ’.chroniclers as having become min a had al-jund al-Shami, that
~ 7is a soldier, nafar, (pi? ,ahfdr)ic Provided he did not lack influence and
initiative, the higher ranks of the corps were open to him as well. The
agha of this corps was frequently referred to by the Damascene chroniclers
during the 16th and 17th centuries as dabit al-jund al-Shami.^  His influence
in the corps was very much diminished, partly because of the growing insub-
9ordination of the members of this corps. Below the agha ranked the kahya
(ketkhuda) of al-jund al-Shami, 10 A very influential rank in the janissary
11
corps was that of yaya bashi- which seems to have been immediately below
^Muhibbi, III, 299. Muradi, I, 166, cf. I, 107; Muhammad Kurd *Ali,
Khitat al-Sham, 6 vols., Damascus 1925-28, Vol. II, 249, 259; cf. Heyd,
50, V.l (40.
2 _ 3
Muhibbi, I, 30. c^f. Ibid., II, 417.
^See for example, ibid.. II, 157. S^ee for example, ibid. II, 417.
Ibid.. II, 111; III, 156, 428. 7Ibn al-IBiddiq, f. 110b.
Muhibbi, 11,242. 9Cf. Ibid. 10lbid.. II, 220; 111,156, 427; Muradi,II,
6 4.
Muhibbi, I, 30; II, 417; III, 428; the Yaya Bashi (chief infantryman) 
was#a commander of a unit (bdldk) of janissaries whose size differed accord­
ing to time and place, see Gibb and Bowen, t.i.54, n.2; I.H.Uzunpar^ili, 
E.I.. nev; ed., s.v. Bttlttk. BBlfflc-Bashi, and Sorbaclii; cf. Venture de Paradis. 
Aledr au XVIIie siecle. ed. by E. Pagnan, Algiers 1898, pp. 70, 118.
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that of kahya. The rank of b Blllk bashi seems to have been lower than that
1 2 yaya bashi. The rank of chorbaji hardly figures in the writings of
Muhibbi• However, MaHasini mentioned in the second half of the 17th century
the chorkajis of the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus corps? In the 18th century
the yaya^bashis and the chorb) ajis of the Yerliyya corps^  played influential '
roles in Damascus. In this century the term ikhtiyariyyat al-Ojaq (from the
Arabic term ikhtiyar meaning choice) very often occurs In the writings of the
5
Danascene chroniclers, meaning the chosen and influential elders of the corps, 
Alongside these official titles, the Damascene chroniclers bestowed, 
social titles on the influential members of the janissary corps. Such mem­
bers were described as kubara* al-iund al-Shami^ (the elders of the Damascene 
janissaries), or min a*yan al-Sham^ (from the notables of Damascus), or min
  r*
acyan al-jund bi*1-Sham (from the notables of the Damascene janissaries),
^ ^ q
Muhibbi referred to Ibn al-Arna*ut, for example, as afaad kubara* jund al-Sham
(one of the elders of the Damascene janissaries), Ibn Junfa referred to the 
same person as min a‘yan Dimashq^  (from the notables of Damascus).
M^uhibbi, III, 4.2S* Hurd *Ali, II, 24-9. The bBlilk bashi was mounted and 
commanded certain bBl&ks known as bBlftks of the''~aSEa.T see I. H. Uzunparsili, 
E.I., new ed., s.v. BBlOk-Bashi.
2 ; ^See Ctibb and Bowen, I.i.62* I.Ii.Uauncarsilii E.I.. new ed., s.v. Gorbad.ii.
BBldk-Bashi,
Q /
pp. 119, 95 respectively. See Ibn al-Siddlq, (back of front .cover and f ,1b)
5
Of.. Ibn al-§iddlq, ff. 20a, 23b, 53b, 54a? Budayri, f. 47b.
6 *
Muhibbi, II, 129, III, 299. i'or the translation of .jund al-Sham as the
Damascene janissaries see below p.ft,
M^uhibbi, I, 30; Ibn Jum‘a, 33* M^uhibbi, II, 417.
9Ibid.. Ill, 156. 10p. 33. ' - ‘ % ,
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When there was one janissary corps in Damascus before 1070/l659~60, the 
Damascene chroniclers used to refer to it in vafious terms. Najm al-Dxn
1
al-Ghazzi. for example, used the term yanka.iariyya when referring to it. 
Muhibbi used this term but he also referred to the janissaries as al-.iund al" 
Shami.^  Ibn Jum^ a, who \m>te in the 18th century, used the terms inkisha- 
riyya-^ and ffanka.1 ar iyya4 when he referred to the janissaries of this and of 
the following period. Sometimes, he simply referred to them as o.iaq al-Sham 
or a^slcar Dimashq.^
Besides the term jund al-Sham, usually used by the chroniclers to refer 
to the janissary corps of Damascus before 1070/1659-60, there existed another 
term ^askar al-SHam or *askar Dimashq which, although occasionally used in 
the same sense as jund al»Sham. was very often used to refer to a large en­
semble of soldiers who accompanied the governors of Damascus on expeditions
6
inside and outside their province. Since these soldiers were composed of 
janissaries, feudal forces and private troops, in various proportions, a com­
prehensive designation, that of *asltar al-Sham or Dimashq. was used by the
*7 — 8chroniclersin referring to them.1 Won-Damascene chroniclers like Shidyaq, 
for example, referred to the troops 'which accompanied the governors of Damas­
cus on their expeditions during this period as 6askar Dimashq. Although this
term might have been envisaged by these chroniclers in the same comprehensive 
sense as that envisaged by the Damascene chroniclers, Its geographical con- 
■^ See for example, III, 50? 202r
2II, 111, 129, 24.2, III, 156, 299, 439. 3p-4. h>P- 31, 33.
5pp. 36, 37.
hjuhibbl, I, 388, II, 125, III, 137; MafcSsini, 97, 102, 105, 121.
Muhibbi, I, 388, II, 125, III, 137; Ibn Jum<a, 36; Budayri, f. 21a.
8pp. 154, 306, 359.
text is inherently emphasized in this case, lifter 1070/1659-60, Damascene 
as well as non-Damascene chroniclers tended to refer to each corps !y a 
special name.
The Suppression of the Janissaries.
As early as the latter part of the 16th century the Janissaries of Damas­
cus extended their zone of influence and exploitation outside the limits of 
this province. The janissaries who figured in these practices during this 
period were Khada WardI,Aq Yanaq, Qara Yanaq and Hamza al-Kurdi, whose names
suggest that they were not natives of Damascus. With corruption seething in
2
their ranks the janissaries of Damascus became less effective in war. The 
humiliations they suffered at the hands of Fakhr al-Din II not only demon­
strated their military inadequacy but made them more determined to avenge 
their wounded pride in the field by intensifying their exploitation of the 
people.^
Under Sultan Murad IV (1623-40) the Ottoman central administration ex­
hibited some vigour. Fakhr al-Din was finally defeated in 1633 and several 
militant chieftains in the province of Damascus were tamed as well. Thus 
the governors of Damascus retained the military initiative over their vassals. 
This triumph coincided with the upsurge in the power of the janissaries. Part­
ly as a result of their growing self-assertion; and partly also because of 
the weakening of the local chieftains who had provided commanders for the 
Pilgrimage for a long time, members of the janissaries were appointed to this
office.^ * However, because of the increase in the insubordination of the
^Muhibbi, II, 129, IV, 44-9, 450; 'Jabbakh, III, 219.
2See Muhibbi, III, 137; Ibn Jumea, 28; Shidyaq, 54, 359.
%uhibbi, III, 439. isee below p. gy.
63
janissaries and the corresponding increase in the authority of the governors 
of Damascus^  the latter started taking action against them.^ This marked the 
beginning of the struggle for political power in Damascus.
Towards the middle of the 17th century relations between the governors 
and the janissaries of Damascus became strained. Several clashes occurred 
between them. In 1062/1650-1, a plague spread in Damascus and caused the 
death of five hundred janissaries, among others. The governor used the oc­
casion to impose a tax of five hundred piastres on every vacant position 
(mahlul) in the janissary corps. Far from being resigned to their fate* the 
janissaries became more conscious of their interests, and they clashed in the 
same year with the governor.^ In 1063/1652-3, they were described as being 
the de facto rulers of Damascus, and in a clash with the governor that year, 
they caused him to flee the city,^ These frequent clashes culminated in a
big crisis a few years later. The crisis started in IO67/1656-7 when the
janissaries prevented the governor, Murta^a Pasha, an old enemy of theirs, 
from entering the city, although the Sultan was backing him. At the time, 
Muhammad Pasha Kdprfllft, the Grand Vezir (1656-61) was infusing vigour into 
Ottoman authority. Moved by fear and envy the governor of Aleppo, Hasan 
Pasha, revolted in 1067/1656-7 against the administration of Muhammad Pasha 
KSprlilli, the Grand Vesir, and ms supported by the governor of Damascus, 
Muhammad Pasha b. al-Tayyar* The revolt of IJasan Pasha, referred to by Ibn
■-WfeibbT, III, 152, 299-302; Muradi,' I, 107; Kurd rAlI, II, 259; Ita 
Jum*a, 33.
2Ibn Jum'a, 36, 37, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785, We (II) 418, ff. 13b, 14a.
■^ Ibn Jum'a, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785, We (II) 418j f. 14a.
•^Ibid., ff. 14a, 14b.
%uliibbi, II, 418.
at the
Jum*a as the HasanUyya affair, occur reel ,-■/ time when he was appointed as 
Commander-in-Ghief of the troops ordered by the Multan to support him 
against the rebels in Anatolia. The janissaries of Damascus who were placed
under his command took part in the revolt. After Hasan Pasha and Ibn al-
~ 1 Tayyar were eliminated by loyal troops, the janissaries of Damascus paid
next for their disloyalty and insubordination. In 1069/l65&-9 several
I
hundred Kapi Kulus were dispatched from Istanbul to Damascus. They took 
control of the citadel, the gates and other public services in the city which 
had been until then in the hands of the janissaries. Many prominent janis­
saries were put to death at the orders of the Sultan. Among those killed 
from the janissaries were ‘Abd al-Salam a 1-Mar* as hi and Muhammad a 1-Turko­
man!.^  whose names suggest that they were not natives of Damascus. Since 
many Damascenes had already penetrated the corps they shared as well in the 
casualties.A The elimination of many high ranking non-Damaseene janissaries 
increased the chances for the Damascenes to penetrate into the corps and to 
rise to its high ranks. Later evidence shows that this process was in fact 
accelerated as a result. Another important development at the time ms the 
appointment of ‘All Agha al-Daftardar, the conqueror of the Damascene janis- 
saries, as governor of the newly-created province of Sidon. The janissaries
■4?he Sultan was afraid lbst the Persians join forces with the rebel governor^  
see P. Ricaut (also Rycaut), Histoire de I1Empire Ottoman, trans. from Eng­
lish, 6 vols., The Hague 1709, Vol. II, 260-265; Hammer, XI, 55ff.
Muhibbi, IV, 310 gave their number as 300; whereas ^bn Jura*a, MS Berlin 
Cat. 9785, He (II) 4lS, f. 15b gave it as two thousand. The troops which 
were sent to Damascus seem to have been part of the fresh troops raised by 
Sultan Murad IV after he suspended the de vs hirme, c. cf i oGibb and Bowen, I.i. | 
181. On the state of the Kapi Kulus in the Ottoman Empire and their divi- j 
sion into infantry and cavalry, see, Marsigli, 32 ff. j
^Ibn Jum*a, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785. He(II) 418* ff. 14b-15b; Muhibbi, II, 4^ 7, . 
418, IV, 309, 310; Hammer, XI, 73; cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f* 159a.
AMu^ibbl, III, 448; MurSdl, I, 256. 5See above p. Jo*
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seem to have been entrusted, after this event, with guarding the fortresses
1 9along the Pilgrimage route* However, most of them stayed in Damascus.
2. From 1070/l659-6Q onwards two janissary corps existed in Damascus: the
Kapi Kulus and the local janissaries who came to be known as the Yerliyya.
Each corps had its own agha who was appointed from Istanbul. Before the Kapi
Kulus were sent to Damascus, the local janissaries were sometimes referred to
3
by the local chroniclers as al-qul « that is the slaves of the Sultan, Al­
though both the local and the Imperial janissaries were considered as slaves 
of the Sultan, the term qui. or al-qul or qabTriul came now to be almost ex-
*  I , J 1  TUl'th I I  « I III1 I M ■.« I Lllfcl.l. LI ll!—! M i itm ilM J
clusively used by the local chroniclers in referring to the Imperial janis­
saries. Since the Kapi Kulus as garrison were based on the citadel, they
-  &L ,
x^ ere occasionally referred to as daxHat al-qal (roughly masters of the
citadel). On the same fashion, but demonstrating their local identification,
$
the local janissaries v/ere sometimes referred to as dawlat DimashqT (roughly
^Ibn al-§idd1q, ff, 29a, 110b; cf. Babulsi, al-Haqiqa wa' 1-majaz, MS. Oamb. 
Qq, 300, ff. 381a, 381b, 384a; cf. * Uthmian."/XlXescr ip':bion" of""the Pilgrim- 
age route in 1156 A.IiJ, MS. Berlin Gat. 6147, X% :(l), 105, ff. 276a, 276b; 
Ibrahxm al-Khiyari^ Tuhfat al-Udabaf , MS. Berlin Gat. 6135, WE (i), 125, 
ff, 7b, 15a; Muradi, III, 12.
Earlier the feudal troops figured as guards In these fortresses, see Bajm
al-D*in al-Ghazzi. Ill, 157.
^Gf. Sux^ aydi, al-Nafha al-miskiyya, MS, BM. Add._l85l8, f. llBb, Khi^ari, 
f. 7b. Gf. Nabulsx, al-ffaqiqa, f. 380b; Murtada b. *'Alvran, ^a description 
of the Pilgrimage route in 1121 A.Hj?, MS* Berlin Cat, 6137, We (II), i860, 
f* 104a*
#Ibn Juw’a, MS, Berlin Gat. 9785, We (II), 418, f, 14b*
^Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 19b, 160a. 
hbid.. f. 160a.
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inasters of Damascus)* However, the various chroniclers used various terms
in referring to the local janissaries. Ibn Jum*a, for example, alternately
•  1 2 
used the terms o.iaq al-Sham and inkishariyya in referring to the local
h im  • ,._t * y  O
janissaries. Although Budayri sometimes used the term ojaq al-Sham , he 
very often used the term inkishariyya. 4 Ibn al-Siddiq, on the other hand, 
frequently used the term yanka.iariyya*^  sometimes alternately with Yerliyya^. 
Muradi almost always used the term. Yerliyya either on its own^ or, less
<3
frequently, together with other terms such as al-Yanka,iariyya a l~Yerliyya.
The term Yerliyya is used in this study to'refer to the local janissaries.
After the purge of the insubordinate janissary chiefs, the Yerliyya 
corps became more docile. The presence of the Kapi Kulus introduced a new 
factor which neutralised the power of the Yerliyya. However, the high­
handed policy displayed by tfamaa Pasha, governor of Damascus in 109&/1687-S, ■>
decided the lerliyya to resist and in their desperation they revolted against
9him. But they were violently suppressed. It is interesting to note here
the change in the composition of the Yerliyya as revealed in the terms which
10
were applied to it. Ibn Jum*a called those who revolted abna* Dimashq.
(the sons of Damascus). Muhibbi, on the other hand, referred to them as al- 
jund al-Shami.11 While It is possible that the Yerliyya were helped by some 
militant Damascenes (which frequently occurred later on because of the common 
■Sp- 43? 4^ * 2PP* $4? 68. % ee for example f. 21b.
4ff.-4a, 9b, 15a, 21b. 5ffV 23b, 59a, 110b. 6f. 63a.
7See 11, 215, HI, 286. 8III, 90, IV, 14.
9Ibn Jum‘a, 4.6, 4.8; Kurd ‘All, II, 383; Mufcdbbl, IV, 331, 333.
10Ibn Jum‘a, 46, 4.8 . 331, 333.
interests they* shared) it seems that both chroniclers were primarily refer­
ring to the Yerliyya corps which was becoming identified with the Damascenes.
The death in 1100/1688-9 of §alih b. Sadaqa, a prominent janissary, at 
the hands of the Kapi Kulus inaugurated the second phase in the liquidation 
of the Yerliyya chiefs. This also marked the beginning of a bitter hostili­
ty between the corps. In 1103/1692 the campaign of repression against the 
Yerliyya was stepped up. Nine of their prominent members, most of whom were 
Damascenes, were put to death by the governor of Damascus at the orders of 
the Sultan.^  Because these persons were prominent in the Yerliyya corps as 
well as in Damascus the chroniclers referred to them as aghawat al-wijaq,
■ — i m i m  I nil « ttiw  1111 *
a*yan Dimas hq and akabir Dimashq.
Yerliyya corps ms weakened after the elimination of several of Its 
prominent members* The Damascenes suffered also as a result because, with 
the removal of these personages who used to defend their interests, it became 
easier for the governors to enforce arbitrary measures.4 However, if the 
Yerliyya corps was weakened at the moment, another force, the *UIama*. came 
to the fore to fill the vacuum and defend the Damascenes.
Around the middle of the 17th century the "Ulania* of Damascus were weak­
ened as a result of the suspension of certain stipends which they used to re-
5ceive from the Sultan. This coincided with the groining prominence of the
Vbn Jum'a, 4 6; Sulayman al-Zahir, 1 Sax ha minaal-ta'rikh al-SlmmTJ;, BMP. 
17 (1942), pp. 445-50, see p. 448.    . .... .... ....
2Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 14b~l6a; Sulayman al-Zahir, p. 44-8; Kurd *Ali, II, 283, 
284; Ibn Jum^ ’a, 47, 4 8.
^Sulayman al-Zahir, 448- Kurd tfiili, II, 283, 284; Tbn Jum*a, 47, 4 8.
C f. Ibn  Juki* a , 46 , 48 . % uj?ibbl, I ,  402 , 403.
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janissaries, whose effective influence overshadowed that of the *~Ulama* .
However, towards the end of this century the ^lama* were able to assert
their power, largely because of the weakening of the Yerliyya which thrust
responsibility on them. In 1107/1695-6 some *hlama? including *&bd al-
Ivariin b. Hamza, NaqTb al-ilshraf, Sulayman b. Mahasin, Khatib al-Jami* al-
Ilmawv. and al-Shaykh *Uthman al-Qa$tan opposed the zulm (injustice) of the
governor and they were exiled as a result to Qal*at al-Qas’Jal, between Hims
and tlamah, on the orders of the Sultgn.-^  In 1118/1706-7 another group of
4Ulamn^  were exiled to Sidon, also on the orders of the Sultan, because they
2
ogjposed the governor who tried to exact money from the Damascenes. The
exile of the *Hlama* who stood for an apparently good cause gained them much
popularity and sympathy in Damascus. When the Sultan revoked the orders for
their banishment shortly afterwards, their prestige became established aiid
the validity of the cause they fought for was implicitly endorsed. More dar-
3
ing roles awaited them in the future. So long as the Yerliyya were rele­
gated to the background, the *Ulamay had the opportunity to step forward.
The major force that was locally sustaining the power of the governor
vis-a-vis the Yerliyya was the Kapi Kulus J* In IllS/l706~7 the Kapi Kulus
—  5
were strengthened by the arrival of a number of odas from al-Rum. Many of
^Ibn Jim* a, 4.9; Sulayman al-Zahir, 44$, 449; Muradi,^ 111, 167; for the 
identity of these persons see, Muradi,III, 66; IJasibi, f. 38b; Ayyubi, 
ff. 79,* 107, 173. “
Ibn Kinan, I, f. 67a; Sulayman al-Zahir, 449; Muradi, I, 224; cf, Hasibi, 
f. 36a.
S^ee below p. //£, ^Ibn Jum*a, 4&* 5 2.
I^bn Jum*a, $2 gave the number of these odas as four. Ibn Kinan, I, f. 67b 
gave it as eight. Qda means orta. In Istanbul as well as In the provinces, 
e&ch orta was housed in an oda (a room which means here barracks) and this 
is why the terms were sometimes alternately used, see Gibb and B0wen, I.i,
62, n.6. The number of persons constituting each orta varied according to 
time, place and occasion. It was estimated in the late 18th century^corr^ j
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the Kapi Kulus were of Maws ill and Baghdadi origin * Ibis made the Yerliyya 
consider them as aliens. Enmity between these corps was sharpened later, 
particularly because of the clash in their economic interests after the Kapi 
Kulus started penetrating the various fields claimed by the Yerliyya as their 
spheres of influence*
c) The private or mercenary troops. By private troops is meant here the 
cavalry and infantry forces that were employed by the governors of Damascus 
to help them discharge their duties. Being mainly of non-Syrian origin and 
seeking to sell their services for money,.such troops may well be called mer­
cenaries. In Damascus they uere composed of Dala.tly.ya and Lawand. both of 
them cavalry, and Ttifenq.iis and Ma^hariba MHO were Infantry. Reliance on 
such varied troops increased during the 18th century for various reasons. The 
feudal forces had enormously declined by then. The Yerliyya. although theo­
retically entrusted with guarding the fortresses along the pilgrimage route, 
became more interested in safeguarding their interests in Damascus against 
any intruder, not excluding the governor. The Kapi Kulus kept watch as a 
garrison in the citadel and served as a balance to the Yerliyya. Tension be­
tween the corps very often resulted in outbursts of violence. To enforce ■ 
their ox^ n authority the governors of Damascus relied on private troops. This 
x^ as all the more necessary because of their obligations to go on the dawra 
and, more important, to ensure the safety of the pilgrimage. But as one 
group of private troops became insubordinate the govexyiors had to rely on
(cont.) that an orta stationed in the provinces amounted to 300 persons in 
peace time and to 300 when it xfas sent on a campaign, see Gibb and Bowen, 
i;i.6l, n*5.. In 1769 a foreign source in Istanbul estimated the number of 
janissaries who constituted an orta at about 106 persons, who ranged in age 
between children of eight to old men of seventy, PRO. S.P. 97/45s Istanbul, 
4*4* 69.
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another group to neutralise it. This increased the numbers and kinds of the 
private troops and led to much tension and confusion in Damascus.
In studying the various types of these troops two aspects may be empha­
sized here. Firstly, their origin and recruitment and, secondly, their main 
functions.
The Dalatiyya
The term Dalatiyya (sing, Dalati) seems to have been a corruption of the
Turkish adjective deli, which means mad or wild. They were so called because
of their bravery and recklessness. Originally they were employed by the
governor of Rumelia around the beginning of the 10th/li6th century. Later on,
other governors employed them. By the 18th century the Dalatiyya had become
disorganized and corrupt. They x^ ere mainly recruited from Anatolian Turks,
1Bosniaks, Groats and Serbs. Their commander was known as deli bashi, but 
it is not clear hox^  many troops x^ ere under his command.
Like the Lawand and the Eaghariba, the Dalatiyya were lodged in a special 
Irtjan in Damascus knoxm after them.2 On one occasion, in llBty^W^? a group 
of them, under the command of a certain *Abd Allah a-l-Turk, were brought by
3
the governor of Damascus from Sidon to serve under his mutasallim in Damascus.
4
Very often the Dalatiyya accompanied the governors of Damascus on expeditions
as well as on the Pilgrimage.5 In Damascus they were used by the governor to
6
establish his authority against rival military groups such as the Yerliyya*
I^, H. Uzun^ar^ili, B.X.. new ed. s.v. Deli; Gibb and Bowen, I.i.l93,n.3.|
P. Ricaut, VI, 89 (Tableau de HEmpire Ottoman); cf. Ibn al~§idd!q, f. 17b j 
Budayri, f. 9b.
2Ibn al~§iddiq, f. 43b. 3BudayrI, f. 27a, cf. ff. 6b, 19b; Maw§ili,f.56a
^Budayri, ff. 4b, 21b, 22b. 5Ibn Jum'a, 53.
^Cf. Budayri, f, 15a.
The Dalatiyya were not always reliable in fighting*"** Sometimes they were
2
dismissed because of their insubordination. On many occasions they terror-
3
ised the local inhabitants*. They were also associated with moral corruption 
in Damascus/*1
The date on which the Dalatiyya. and probably other private troops, were
- —  5
paid was called waqt al-cljyun. and their pay was called wala ?if,J. hi f X, W  t — - - - - - - - - r-- 1 ~
The Lawand
The word is a corruption of the term Levantin© which the Venetians used
to refer to easterners who were employed in their fleet. The Ottoman navy
inherited the word and used it for its crews, who were recruited from among
the same native people who had earlier supplied the Venetians with their
crews. Towards the end of the 16th century, the Lawand were disbanded from
the navy and replaced by other Turkish recruits. Many of those disbanded
turned to brigandage, while others became employed as private troops. By
the end of the 17th century the Ottoman administration tried to eliminate
the Lawand. particularly from Asia Minor where most of them lived, because of
their insubordination. In spite of frequent attempts to get rid of them to-
6
wards the middle of the 18th century, the Lawand remained in existence xn
certain parts of the Empire till at least the last quarter of the 18th cen­
tury.
It seems that in the course of time the term lawand had lost its early
association with a special type of recruitsand came to be used rather loosely
i __ -« 7 _
Budayri, f* 21b;Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 43b.; . Budayri, f. 20a.
/ibid., ff. 19b, 24a £ Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 41a* ^Budayri, f. 21b.
%non*, 0,i^ati|ahir al-*TJmar. MS. ed* by *Isa_Iskandar al-Matfluf, 
al-Maghriq. 24 (1926)V^ee pT 554? Of. Budayri, f, 21b.
^Gibb and Bowen, I.i. 98, 99, 193, n.3; J. H.. Kramers, E.I., 1st ed.
s.v. Lawand.
7 2
i
as an adjective meaning cavalry and, sometimes, vagabond* In 18th cen­
tury Damascus the term lawand was very often associated with Kurds, hence
"* pLawand al-iUcrad.~ The Lawand troops in Damascus seem to have been composed
{ 3
mainly of Kurds, probably recruited from the regions of Killis and ‘Aintab. 
It is not strange, owing to the long use of the term lawand and the many 
groups that adopted it, that the Damascene chroniclers should thus have 
identified its bearers. However, on several occasions the term lawand was 
mentioned by the Damascene chroniclers without reference to the Kurds, This 
’shortened1 form was very often used by Ibn al-§iddiq who wrote in the last 
quarter of the 18th century*^ It seems that the identification of Lawand 
with Kurds had become so well established by then that it was no longer 
necessary to mention the latter term.
The Lawand in Damascus were under the command of an agha.^  They were
housed In a separate khan known as khan al-Lawand.^  On one occasion
n
Lawand troops were brought from Tripoli to serve in Damascus* In one of 
the final attempts made by the Ottoman authorities to eliminate the Lawand 
from bilad al-Rum, in the second half of the 18th century, a group of them
managed to escape and were employed by Muhammad Pasha al-*A§m, the governor
S
of Damascus, and by Jaazar, the governor of Sidon. Like other private
troops, the Lawand took part in the expeditions of the governors of Damascus
9
They very often clashed with rival military groups such as the Dalatiyya ,
•■4-Ieyd, 161, n.l (107)*. S^ee Budayri, ff. 6b, 47a.
^Bf. Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 9b. ^Ibid.* ff. 9b, 10b, 25b; cf. Budayri, f.50a.
5Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 10b. 6lbid.. f. 43b. ^xbid., f. 25b.
^Shibab. Lubnan. X, 118. ^Budayri, f. 6b.
7 3
—  1 ■ 2 Maghariba and the Yerliyya * and security in Damascus was endangered
as a result.
The Maghariba
These troops were largely infantry, ^ ku-b SOme of them were cavalry as 
well.4 They were recruited mainly from Algeria and Tunisia, the countries 
constituting the bulk of the area referred to in English writings of the 
18th century as Barbary (Fr. Barbarie); hence, these troops were known in 
European writings as Barbaresques. Obviously, the Arabic term Magbliriba is 
derived from the word al-Maghflb which in Arabic writings usually referred to 
Tripolitania, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.^
Maghariba troops were employed in Syria long before its conquest by the 
Ottomans. In 802/1399-1400 a Bawiya for the Maghariba was built in Damascus , 
which shows that a community of them was living in Damascus, as was the case 
in Jerusalem^ and Tripoli.^ However, the large number of mghariba troops 
employed in Damascus, and in the neighbouring regions, in the 18th century, 
in contrast with the two previous centuries, is significant. The increasing 
reliance of the governors on private troops in this century created an increase
^Budayri, f. 47a, ^Ibn al-§iddiq, f* 17b.
%bn al~SiddIq,f30b; Gibb and Bowen, I.i,213; cf. H. Maundrell, The Tra­
vels of*H.. Maundrell from Aleppo to Jerusalem, in the series The World 
Displayed. 3rd ed. Vol. XI, London, 1774* P* 102,
^Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 10b.
P^ococke, II.1, 124. The famous Dinkizli, who commanded a group of Magbariba 
ti’oops and was employed by Zahir al-'Umar^ claimed to be a native of Tahert , 
in Algeria, see Munayyir, al-Durr al^Harguf, 50 (1956), p. 196.
6 7 ^
G. Tver, B.I.. 1st ed. s.v* Maghrib. 'Cf, J. Sauvaget, Alep.Paris. 1941%
a - P-106
^unajjid, Wulat Dimashq, p. 10 n.4; cf, Ibn Tulun, ed. Hartmann, 155, 156;;
Ibn Tulun, ed. Laoust, 51; Ibn Jum*a, 10.
Lewis, * Studies - I*, BS0A3, XVI, 3 (1954), 479 , 4&0; NabulsI who vis­
ited Jerusalem in Rabl*I 1105/0 ct, -Nov. 1693 mentioned his visit in it to
(cont.)
in the demand for these troops. The consistent influx of Haghariha troops 
during the 18th century is unparalleled among the other private troops.. But 
how and why did these Maghariba troops come to be employed in Syria?
There were many opportunities for the Maghariba to come to They
could come for example apparently as mujawirs (persons living close to a re-
,  1 ligious shrine; or disguised as pilgrims or with the pilgrims of the Magh-
rib who joined the Pilgrimage of Oairo, It would then be easy for them to
come to Damascus, either directly or with the Damascene pilgrimage from the
I^&jas;. But the continuous influx of Ma^hariba troops to Damascus, largely
through Sidon, suggests that they came by another more expedient route.
From the information available it seems that the majority of these troops
2
came by sea to the Syrian coast and from there went into the interior in 
search of employment and fortune. It is significant that the governors who 
were appointed to Damascus and proceeded to it from the north, that is from 
bilad a 1-Rum, usually brought with them Dalatiyya. Lawand and also Albanian 
troops, but not Maghariba. This might be explained by the fact that the 
places from which these governors came were far from the regions usually fre­
quented by the Maghariba, namely the southern 8yrian coast and Egypt* The 
arrival of llaghariba by sea is consistent with their reputation as sea­
farers. The pirates of the Maghrib enjoyed a wide influence in the Medi­
terranean for centuries. In 1032/2.632,for example, three ships manned by
(cont.) to the mosque of the Maghariba, see al-Haqlqa, f. 94&.
10
'■Bank, 124. ______
1 * *The Egyptian commander of the (Pilgrimage employed some Magharlba pilgrims
as soldiers, see: S.J.Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the 18th centuryTllaryard*
1962, p.4 2,
2Cf. A.N.B 1027s Sidon, 27.7.48.
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— 1Maghariba fought with European ships in Acre, In 174$ French vessels were
— 2accused of transporting Maghariba between the Syriah ports. On his return
from the dawra in 1160/174-7-8, the governor of Damascus, As6ad Pasha, was ac­
companied by many Maghariba who, as the statement of the chronicler suggests, . 
were not with him when he left Damascus. Since the regions toured by the 
governors on such occasions included coastal regions, it is very probably that 
he recruited the Maghariba in or near the Syrian ports where they disembarked. 
On one occasion in 113l/l71S-9 when the i%ghariba troops were temporarily ex- , 
pelled from Damascus, they went in the direction of the coast to take to the ■ 
sea.^
It is not known if all the Maghariba troops employed in Syria were of
— -i ■ inr-r-rm ^  X V  tf
Maghrib! origin. Many sailors and passengers of various nationalities were
5 'kidnapped by the pirates of the Maghrib. Some of these captives may have
been used by a Maghriba. leader alongside his kinsmen to sell their services
to the faction-split Syrian and Egyptian provinces.^
Every group of Maghariba employed as private troops in Syria was usually
7commanded by a bash agha. In Damascus these troops were housed in a special
khan known as khan al-Maghariba. Among other duties, they accompanied the
9 io
governors on military expeditions and on the Pilgrimage. They were very of-
1-,
ten involved in military clashes with other troops in Damascus,  ^as well as
S^hitiab, .H.b".^ 1027; Sidon, 27.7.4-8•
^BudayrT, f. 24a. ^Ibn Kinan, I, 163b.
5?or a study on the Algerian pirates in the 18th century see Venture de 
Paradis, Alger. 38-56.
^For the existence of surplus man-power in Algeria see ibid., 57-965 T. Shaw, 
Travels or Observations relating to several parts of Barbary and the Levant, 
Oxford, 1738,pp. 312-24-; cf, PRO, S.P. 97/341 Istanbul, 21.11*4-9.
7Ibn al“§iddiq, ff. 10b, 21a; A.N.-B1 1033s (Sidon), Ramie 28.10.67.
%bn al-§iddiq, f. 47a. B^udayri, f. 21b; Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 10b.
^Budayri, f. 4-la; Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 25a; Ibn Kinan, I, f. 32b.
*^ See Budayri, f. 47a; Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 20b, 21a,
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with the Damascenes, Their pay, like that of the other private troops, was
* —  2 known as 4ala*if*
This is a Turkish term which means musketeers or fusiliers, and its bear-
13
ers were infantry. The commander of the Ttlfenq.iis wasc-called tdfenq.ii bag hi. 4 
There is mention of a bayraqdar (a standard-bearer) for this corps J* It is not 
clear from which regions the Tiifenq.iis were recruited,. Under As’ad Dasha the
-  -  5
3.il bashi was a Baghdadi. On one occasion the T&fenq.iis sided with the
» * ,  w .  6
Baghdadis and Maw§ilis in Damascus in their struggle i^ ith thd Lawand. Such
cooperation, in addition to the fact that the tUfenqji bashi was a Baghdadi,
suggests a common origin.
>
TUfenq.jis seem to have been mainly responsible for ensuring security
in Damascus,^ At times of emergency they were alerted alongside the other
8 9troops, and were entrusted with jnilitary duties outside Damascus. In gener­
al the Tdfenqlis were more law-abiding and less inclined to insubordination
HnMU .III I I ■ I ill I ■KlhfiAiMHBMUia
10
than the other troops,
IV The Religious institutions,of Damascus,
1, The Judge
Because of the official status, the almost continuous Rumi origin of the 
HanafI judges and the comparative ease in tracing them - many lists of their 
names are available - it is only natural that more information is available 
on them than on the judges of the other xnadhhabs.
a) The importance of the office of the ffanafi judge of Damascus. In the 
reorganization of the order of molias (chief judges) in the 18th century,^ 
the judge of Damascus, who i^ as considered a mo 11a and was sometimes referred 
to as qadl al-qudat,^ ’ ranked after the two main qadi~‘ askars,
lBudayri, f. 49a; see below, p.
2Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 30b; M.al-§abba,gh,158; Munayyir.al-Mnshrici,$0 (1956),196. 
^Budayri, f.30a; Barlk, 14., 15; A.N.B 1033! (Sidon) Kamle, 28.10.67; of. 
Gibb and Bowen, I.i.193, n.3, / « m
^Budayri,f,34b. B^arlk, 14, 15. Budayrr, f,35a. Ibid.,f,19b;Barik,66.
%bn al-§iddiq,f,19b. 9Ibid.. f.23b. 10Cf. Barlk, 15. ^Gibb and Bowen,1.^
-*'%u^ ibbl, III, 137; Muradi, Matmah. f.ISa; Ma^ iasini, 94-, 120,137.
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the judge of Istanbul, the judges of the two Iioly* Cities and the judges of
the former capitals of the Ottoman Empire, Brusa and Adrianople.1 Although
he was put in the same grade as the judge of Egypt, he ranked higher than 
o
him. because of the religious importance of Damascus, In 1193/1779 the office 
of the judge of Damascus'rwas described as 1 un mollalik ou office de cinq
3
cents aspre^  » It is not clear if this was the salary of the judge or a 
lump sum paid by a candidate, probably to the mufti, (shaykh al-Islam) of Ist­
anbul, for obtaining this office. However, it is known that the office of 
the judge of Damascus was farmed out for a certain sum of money. 4
b) The appointment, term of office and identity of the Hanafi
.judge of Damascus, The mufti of Istanbul usually appointed the 
mollas. Judges of lesser degree were nominated by the qa$i caskar of Ana" 
tolia.5 It is stated that by 1677 the tenure of mollas. including the one 
in Damascus, was fixed at one year.^ By surveying the list of the judges of 
Damascus from the Ottoman conquest until the end of the period under study, 
we notice two phases as regards their tenure. The year 1114/1702-3 may be 
taken as the dividing date. In the period before this date the general ten­
dency is for the judges of Damascus to occupy their office for about one year, 
However, several judges remained in office for more than one year' and some
indeed for four continuous years. Others held the office for more than one
Qyear at intermittent periods. It Is not known if/these cases the judge
iGibb and Bowen, I.ii.89. M^uradl, I, 32, IV, 219*
%uhammad Adib, 33. ^Cdbb and Bowen, l,ii,123.
5Ibid.. 98, 106 n.5, 122. Ibid., 106 n.5.
7Ibn Jum'a, 1, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 43; Risala. ff. 13b, 19a, 19b.
%ee Ibn Jum*a, 9, 10, 11, 12. 9lbid.. 5, 9, 14, 19.
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needed to be confirmed in office every year. After 1093/1682, the judges 
of Damascus usually held office for one year only. The trend towards the 
recurrent appointment of the same judge became less frequent. It was in 
conformity with the general ruling of the Ottoman authorities at the time 
to fix at one year the term of judges appointed by shaylch a 1-1 slain, such 
as the one of Damascus.
From 1114/1702-3 until the end of the period under study the judges of 
Damascus held their office on a yearly basis and were no longer reappointed 
to it. The reason behind this yearly change of judges seems to have been 
that it served to check the judges from exploiting the benefits of their 
long stay in office and, at the same time, to appease a long list of waiting 
candidates,! It is a paradox in the conditions of 18th century Damascus that 
whereas many governors remained in office for several years, contrary to 
previous practice, the judges, as a rule, were changed yearly although this 
departure from previous practice was less striking than in the case of the 
governors.
Sometimes a newly-appointed judge entered Damascus while his prede­
cessor was still in it because his term had not yet expired. But the new­
comer was unable to discharge his duties until the term of his predecessor
2
had expired to the day. If a judge died or was exiled while in office, it 
seems that as a rule his deputy acted in his place until the end of the 1
judge’s term. This emphasizes the fact that the one-year limit was adhered |
I
to. It is difficult to know if there was a specific date on which the judges*
■^ Gf. Gibb and Bowen, I.ii, 122 11.2. B^udayri, f. 4a.
A^non, Dhilcr asma* man tawalla qada Dimashq, Ml. Zahiriyya, * am 4419>
'  m m  - - u - ■!.. ,u - ................................. — — — t - . -  
ff. 120b, 121a, 121b.
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were usually deposed or appointed.
When the Ottomans occupied Syria they retained some of the Mamluk ad­
ministrators, such as al-Qhaaali, who showed apparent seal in their service. 
The judges were no exception and the Ottomans appointed as judges of Damas­
cus Ibn al-Farfur and Ibn Muflih, both descended from families which pro­
duced judges under the Mamluks, after they had adopted, as it seems, the 
— 1Hanafi madhhab. Within ten years of the suppression of the revolt of al- 
Crhaaali. the judges of Damascus were being recruited almost wholly from 
among f&imis. However, a sprinkling of local names still appeared in their 
lists. In 95l/l5$l the Damascene f^otfar Efendi al-*Imadi was appointed 
judge of Damascus.2 In 1104/1692-3 Ahmad Efendi al-Bakri al~§iddiqi became 
judge of Damascus.3 Although these examples do not exhaust the list of the 
judges of Damascus who were of local origin, it Is true to say that the 
great majority of the judges were of Rumi origin,
2. The Mufti .
' AIn the Syrian provinces, as indeed elsewhere in the Ottoman provinces,
mufti officially ranked after the judge and was considered the fourth
important official in the province after the governor, the mutasallim and
the judge.^  Like the Hanafi judge, the official mufti was Hanafi"appointed
by the shavkh al-Xslam of Istanbul, and only his fatwas (legal opinions) were
admitted in the law courts.^ But while the Hanafi judges were almost always
^Ibn Jum*a, 1; cf, Ibn Tulun, ed, Hartmann, 120.
2Ibn Jum'a, 14; Bisala. f. 19a.
^Ibn Jum^ a, 4 6; Risala, f. 19a; Muradi, I, 149.
^Gibb and Bowen,I, ii. 135.
5ferdinand Taoutel, ’Watha'iq ta'rikMyya '’an Halab - 4*, al-Mashriq, 50
T1956), p. 674.
D^. B, Macdonald, E.I., 1st ed., s.v. Mufti.
of Eumi origin and usually held office for one year, the Hanafi muftis 
were mainly of local origin, particularly from the 17th century onwards, 
and remained in office for long periods, sometimes for life.
If we study the list of the Hanafi muftis of Damascus in the period be­
tween 922/1516 and 1240/1824.-5 two main features emerge. Firstly,- about 
half of the muftis of Damascus In the 16th century were of Rumj- origin, the 
rest were of local origin. In the 17th century only two were Bum is out of 
a total of thirteen muftis. All the muftis of the' 18th century were of 
local origin. Secondly, in the period between roughly the middle of the 
17th century and the first quarter of the 19th century, two families, the 
'imadis and the Muradis, produced several muftis. Until roughly the middle
of the 18th century about one-third, of the total number of muftis were from
,  1 _
the *Imadi family. Later on the muftis were drawn more frequently from
the Murad I family.
Verv often the‘Ulema* of Damascus nominated the Hanafi mufti and for-tf 111! 1 iWJUl #  »1 ^  1111'11 M. I i» ■
warded his name for the approval of the shaykh al-Islam at Istanbul. On
some occasions the shaykh al-Islam did not agree to the nominations. In
1188/1774-5, for example, he appointed a mufti other than the one nominated
2
by the governor, the judge and several notables of Damascus. On another 
occasion he endorsed the demand of the Damascenes to have Husayn al-Muradi 
appointed mufti
3. Naqib al-Ashraf.
OfficiaDynaqib al-Ashraf ranked after the mufti. but in practice his
Of. Muradi, II, 11-9.
Slbid.. I, 243, Ma-tmak, ff. 101b, 102a; HasibT, ff. 44a, 44b.
Muradi, Matmah, f. 32b.
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power depended on his own authority and that of the Ashraf whose leader 
he was. The shifts in the balance of power among the various groups in 
Damascus in the 18th century contributed to many vicissitudes in his politi­
cal position and that of the Ashraf.
A sharij may be defined as a descendant of the Prophet Mujiammad through
his daughter Fatima and her husband *Ali. This could be either through the
1
eldest son, Hqsan, or the second, Husayn, For a person to be considered a
s liar if he needed a genealogical table to establish his descent and witnesses
o
to attest to it. Descent could be valid on the maternal, as well as on 
the oaternal side.  ^ If a oerson was a sharif on both sides so much the bet-y  i .  >n m i
ter.4- Probably because of many attempts to forge genealogical documents,
the authenticity of the genealogy was emphasized as something important.Q
The distinguishing mark of the Ashraf was the green turban, which colour
6they adopted towards the end of the 16th century. They also held the title 
of sayyid. The Ashraf were not identified with a special section of the 
society but rather cut across all levels of Muslim society. In Aleppo, where 
the Ashraf were strong, they were tried before special courts presided over 
by the naqib al-Ashraf in cases entailing imprisonment or corporal punish­
ment'.,, They also enjoyed special privileges such as exemption from certain
7 8
taxes. The same may have been true of the Ashraf of Damascus.
^Gibb and Bowen, I.ii.93, n.l. ^Muhibbi, I, 153*
%luradi, I, 10, 223, 241; Ayyuhl, f. 96; ilasTbT, ff. 38b, 52a, 53b,
^Muradi, I, 58 described such a person as ba;iz al-sharafayn.
M^uhibbi, III, 437; d’Ohsson, IV, 556-7.
Muhibbi, I, 153; J. Egmont and J, Heyman, Travels through parts of Europe^.-
Syria, Palestine, 2 vols., London, 1759, II, 259.
r-j f
A.N.B1 94: Aleppo, 16,4.77 (Memoire donnant connaisance de I’Bchelle d’AlepJ 
Russell, II, 321, 322,
O^f, Gibb and Bowen, I.ii.93.
In Damascus, as elsewhere, the naqib al-As hraf controlled the affairs of
the Ashraf >. He was appointed on a yearly basis by naqib al-As hraf of Istan- 
1bul» But his term could be renewed and in practice he held his office for 
several years.^ On one occasion al-Sayyid ^AlT al-*Ajlani monopolized this 
office ; istabadd*biha' - in the words of Muradi, from 1172/1758-9 to 1183/ 
1769-70.^ The naglbs in Damascus were of local origin and the office 
changed hands between the second half of the 17th century and the end of 
the period under study among three families j the rAjlahis, the IJamzas and 
the ICaylmiTs. Members of one family succeeded each other very often.^ What 
is significant is that the nadibs were drawn from Sbafi*Xs as well as from 
IJanafis. Among the Hamzas there were Shafi* i naaibs  ^as well as Manafi
( . « T#. 7
ones. • The same was true with the €AjlanTs.'
Contrary to Aleppo, perhaps the only place in the Ottoman Empire where
the As hraf played a major political role for reasons peculiar to the local-
8 .ity, in Damascus the Ashraf x^ ere comparative late-comers on the active
political scene. When they entered the struggle for politicalpower in Dam- .
ascus as a separate group, around the middle of the 18th century, they did
9not prove successful. This failure was largely due to their lack of politi­
cal experience as well as to the presence of the Xerliyya, which corps 
served as an alternative power-concentration for the Damascenes. It was only 
^Gibb and Bowen, I.ii.100; Russell, 1.321? HasibX, f. 34b.
2Cf. Muradi, III, 6 7. 3Ibid.. Ill, 207, 203.
^Ibid.. Ill, 203; Ayyubl, f. 79; BudayrI, £. 6a. 5MuhibbI, III, 4-39.
‘W'adx, III, 67. 7Ibid.. Ill, 206; Muhibbl, III, 436, 439.
^Cf. &.N.B1 94: Aleppo, 16.4.77 (Memoire).
^See Budayrl, £f. 24b, 25a, 49a.
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when the Yerliwa were enfeebled that the Astoaf emerged, mainly to balance 
the alien Kapi Kulus. How far the Ashraf were successful will be discussed 
in the course of this study.
V. Some Aspects of the Damascene Pilgrimage.
The transfer of the command of the ’Pilgrimage to the governors of Dam­
ascus roughly in the first quarter of the 13th century was an event of 
capital importance because it affected the development of events both inside 
and outside Damascus thereafter. The absence of the governor from Damascus 
for about four months every year while conducting the pilgrimage, and for 
an additional period on the dawra to provide for its finance, and the occupa­
tion of the bulk of his private troops on those commissions, created a sort 
of pox^ ervvacuum in the centre of theprovince no matter how efficient the 
mutasallim had been. This state of affairs encouraged the emergence and 
the consolidation of the power of various local forces. Furthermore, Damas­
cus suffered from -the presence of a growing number of mercenary troops 
needed to guard the Pilgrimage. Since the transfer of the command to the 
governors of Damascus was the result of political developments that took 
place within the province of Damascus during the 16th and 17th centuries, 
its investigation here not only puts this event in its historical perspect­
ive but provides as well a picture of the political developments which pre­
ceded. the period under study and shaped to a very large extent the course 
of its events.
A. An historical outline of the changes in the command of the Pilgrimage.
With the fall of the Mamluk Sultanate Damascus acquired a special reli­
gious importance in the Ottoman Empire. Pilgrims from the vast Ottoman
84
territories to the north of it swarmed into this city on the occasion of
the pilgrimage. Others from outside the boundaries of the Empire, notably
1
fi^ om Persia, did so as well.
The pilgrims assembled in Damascus were, for reasons of security, organ­
ised as a caravan usuallj7* referred to by the Damascene chroniclers in the
_  -  2
first two centuries of Ottoman rule as al-rattb al-Shami, and more frequently
_ ~ 3
later as a1-Haj j al-Shami, by way of distinction from the only other organ­
ized and official pilgrimage in the Ottoman Empires namely al-ralab al- 
Migri or al-Haj j al-Migri. Each of these Pilgrimages had a commander known 
as amir al-rakb or amir al-ga.i.i A
In tracing the history of the command of the pilgrimage from the Ottoman
A^Al4'
conquest of Syria until the beginning of the period under study, feed* stages 
may be noted.
1, Until the year 979/1571-2 nothing substantial is known about the iden­
tity of the commander of the pilgrimage. After the Ottoman conquest of Dam­
ascus special care i*;as taken by the Ottoman authorities to ensure the safety
5 —  —
of the Pilgrimage. With the revolt of al-Ghazali, the Ottoman hold over
the countryside was weakened. In need of supporters, al-GhazalT deposed
C^f. J. Sauvaget, *Les Caravanserails Syriens du Ijadjdj de Constantinopfe1, 
Ars Xslamica. Yol. IY, 1937, p. 98.
2Najm al-Din al-Ghazzl, III, 150, 201, IV, 434-; Muhibbi, I, 30, IV, 434;
cf. Muradi, I, 258* Ibn Jum*a, 35? 4-5? 4$. According to S.J.Shaw, Ottoman 
Egypt 1517-1798. p. 240 n,2*. the term amir rakb al-Mahmil was a Mamluk one, 
see also S.J.Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the StFcentury. p. 2 n.l.
%he term al-Ba.i.i al-Shami signifies, in a comprehensive sense, the ensemble 
of pilgrims who left Damascus for the pilgrimage under the command of amir 
al-Ijaj;]. This ensemble of pilgrims is referred to in this study as the_ _ 
Damascene Pilgrimage or simply the Pilgrimage. The term al-Ijaj j al-Shami 
was also used in a limited geographical^sense to denote the pilgrims of 
Damascus and its environs, see, Ibn ICinan, II, f. 80a. .
^Referred to in this study as commander of the Pilgrimage.
5lbn lulun ed. Hartmann, 128; Ibn |ulun, ed. Laoust, 145, 148,lg2ft^ 5^ ;
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Amir Sinan al-ltumi. governor of the BiqsF, and appointed, in his place, a
1member of the militant, but by then suppressed, lianash family. This gave 
a new impetus to the ambitions of other local chieftains and dealt a blow 
to the Ottoman reputation among the Beduin. Perhaps it was more than mere 
coincidence that the Pilgrimage was attacked in al-'Ula at this time.2
Al-Ghaaaii was suppressed and Damascus regained by the Ottomans, but it 
was difficult for them to exercise direct supremacy over the countryside. On 
16 Jumada II 927/24 May 1521 lyas Pasha, the governor of Damascus, bought off 
the Beduin whom he could not subdue so as to secure a safe passage for the
3
pilgrimage. This was the first weakening and many vicissitudes were to 
follox^ .
2. In the period between 980/1572-3 and the elimination of Fakhr a 1-Din 
Ma*n II in 1045/1635 there is evidence that the commanders of the pilgrimage 
were appointed from the local chieftains and families of notables. The per­
son chosen was always a governor of one or more of the following jganjaqs:
Gaza, 4 A j lun, La j jun, Nablus, Jerusalem and Kansk./1' If he was not a govern­
or then on his appointment as commander he would be made governor. That such 
governors were appointed commanders of the Eilgrimage may be explained by 
certain reasons. Strategically, these governors were in a good position to
ward off the attacks of the Beduin on the Bilgrimage. Being familiar with 
~(conl 0 al-Din al^giazz i, III . 1552
llbn Tulun, ed. Laoust, 1545 IhS Tulhn, ed. Hartmann, 117.
^Ibn Jum*a, 2* ^Ibn Tulun, ed. Laoust, 159.
^See, Najm al-Din GhazzI, III, 201* Muhibbi, I, 187-9, II? 417, III, 271, 
299, IV, 108-110, 426-75 Kurd ‘All, II, 293.
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the local conditions and strong enough to be chosen for this task, they were
1
able to manage the Beduin who might threaten the Pilgrimage. Financially, 
such appointments would persuade these governors to contribute to the ex­
penses of the Bilgrimage, either from the revenue of the regions they con­
trolled and whose muaata^ a.iis (tax-farmers) they were, or from a special tax
t ~  2 
known as mal aMfe.i.i which these territories were under obligation to pay.
Another reason was one of power politics, which explains why such chieftains
were appointed at all as governors and commanders of the Bilgrimage. Once
they were established and the Ottoman authorities were unable to subdue
them except at a great risk, the latter had to tolerate their presence and
regularize their position. Probably their own threat to the pilgrimage would
then be averted.
The elimination of Fakhr al-Din in 1045/1635 at the hands of the governor 
of Damascus gave the latter an undisputed supremacy in his province. Not 
until the emergence of IJahir al-*Umar in the 18th century did the governors 
of Damascus encounter a powerful vassal. Fakhr al-Din1s successors were 
unable to fill the power vacuum which he had left, particularly because the 
Yemeni Hruzes, the fAlam al-Dins, backed by the governors of Damascus, 
stepped into the political scene as rivals to the Qaysi Ma*ns. Most of the 
local chieftains and notables, who were dealt with harshly under Fakhr al- 
Din and were played off against each other by the contending parties, were 
losing influence. Other types of officials were appointed as commanders.
A new phase in the history of the command of the Bilgrimage, indeed in the
-^Of. He yd, 76, 77, 78, 105, 106, 116. 
^See below V . t o l -
history of the province of Damascus, had started.
3» Between IO46 /1636 and 1082/l6?l~2 there was a tendency towards appointing
the commanders of the pilgrimage from persons resident in Damascus, largely
1
from the janissaries. The local families of notables did not cease to pro- 
vide commanders, but they did so now less frequently than before.
The fact that several janissaries were appointed commanders of the pil­
grimage demonstrates the weakening in the position of the local families of
notables and attests as well the growing influence of the janissaries of
3
Damascus at the time. Viewed in a \fider context, more exactly in the geo­
graphical context, the appointment of the janissaries as commanders provides 
a further proof that Damascus was taking the initjabive, if not as yet as 
the centre of government for the commanders, at least as the place from which 
the commanders were increasingly recruited. This distinction between the 
centre of government and the place of recruitment of the commanders of the 
pilgrimage becomes very important at this stage. When a janissary or any 
other Ottoman official was appointed as commander,during this period, he 
was given on the occasion the governorship of one or more of the sanjaqs of 
Gaza, Nablus, *Ajlun, Lajjun, Jerusalem and Karalc, The reason for this 
practice was not so much the difficulty of departing from an established 
tradition as it was to enable the commanders of the Bilgrimage to collect 
the revenue of the regions which they were to govern, so as to defray part 
of the' expenses of the Bilgrimage. The appointment of the commanders as
XSee Mtthibbi, II, 219-20, III, 56, 4^ 8, IV, 434? Muradi,- II, 63, Matmah, 
f, 191b* Ibn Jum*a, MS. Berlin Gat. 97$5, 41®, £• T4a? Ibn Jum*a,
40.
2See, Nabulsi, al-Haqiqa, f. 7a; Mu^ iibbi, I, 442, II, S3, IV, 110;
MahasinI, 80; I£hiyaS4. ff. 4a, 4h.
3See a„bove p. £2 ,
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local governors was also intended to fill part of the power vacuum, which 
was created after the weakening of the local families of notables.
The appointment of Janissaries as commanders of the Bilgrimage seems to 
have caused a dislocation in the relations between this new type of command­
ers and the Beduin, who were more used to commanders appointed from local 
families of notables. Nor were the janissaries after 1660 as strong as they
had been earlier because they were subjected to repression by the governors 
1
of Damascus. The disastrous attack by Ibn Rashid on the Bilgrimage which 
was commanded by the janissary Musa al-Turkomani in 1081/1671, in as near 
a place as Hawran, seems to have decided the Ottoman authorities to appoint 
strong officials, such as governors of provinces, to this important office. 
After all this was the age of the efficient K&prlilft Grand Vezirs at Istanbul,
4 . The period between 103J/1672 and 1102/1691 saw a number of Ottoman offi-
 t p
cials of Rumi origin appointed commanders of the Bilgrimage. Among these
officials x^ ere some governors of Damascus. But janissaries and members of
the local families of notables were still appointed as commanders, though 
3
not frequently. The small number of commanders provided by these two
*# 'jfgroups during this period illustrates the latterS'growing loss of influence. 
After the attack on the Bilgrimage by Ibn Rashid, its security was dis­
turbed for some years. This seems to have been partly due to the increasing 
appointment of Ottoman officials who decreased the customary yearly payment 
(garr)^  made to the Beduin and hence exposed the Pilgrimage to danger.^ In 
See above p, a-
2See, Muhibbi, I, 244, 44B, II, 124; MahasinI, 97, 9&, 102, 135? Ibn Jum4a, 
41, 45.#
S^ee, Muhibbi, II, 133-4? Muradi, III, 24®; Ibn Jura*a, 43.
^See beloX'T p. ^Cf. Ma^ ha sini, 97, 9®.
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an attempt to restore the security of the Bilgrimage the Ottoman authorities 
appointed Khalil b. Kaywan, a prominent janissary in Damascus and a descend­
ant of Kaywan, the mmluk of Bidwiihu al-Ghazaawi, as commander in IO88/I67S. 
He held this office for four consecutive years. On his fourth pilgrimage, 
in 1091-2, he died.^ "
Three main features are apparent in this period, Firstly, behind this 
diversity in the identity of the commanders of the Pilgrimage lies the change 
in the balance of power among the governors of Damascus, the janissaries and
the local families of notables. The governors of Damascus were gaining the
some of
upper hand. SecondIy,/(he governors of Damascus were appointed commanders 
but not yet regularly. The Sultan needed their assistance in his wars^  parti- 
cularly in Europe. Furthermore, he seems to have been reluctant, at this 
stage, to augment their prestige by appointing them to such a dignified of­
fice. However, their occasional appointment as commanders, during this per­
iod, was a precedent for their regular appointment later on. Thirdly, not 
all of the Ottoman officials appointed commanders were given local governor­
ships, Hence, many of them stayed in Damascus with their troops, and, as a 
result, insecurity and lawlessness increased in Damascus. When a commander 
wan governor of, say, Gaza, it was not necessary for him to come with his 
troops to Damascus to conduct the pilgrimage. He seems to have assumed the 
actual command of the Bilgrimage at a certain point outside Damascus, as 
happened on one occasion when the governor of Damascus conducted the Bil-
%u£ibbi, XI, 133, 134; Muradi, III, 248; Ibn Jum'a, 43.
2
~Cf. Ibn Jum*a, 44, 45, 46.
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1
grimage to a place called Qubbat al-Hajj, on the outskirts of Damascus,
2
where the appointed commander then took over. That the Damascenes were 
spared on such occasions the rapacity of the troops of the commanders of the 
Bilgrimage is confirmed in a statement by Muradi. Around 1102/1690-1, when 
the commanders of the pilgrimage were no longer regularly appointed local 
governors but frequently stayed in Damascus with their troops, Murad al- 
Muradi, the great grand-father of the biographer MuradX, appealed to the 
Sultan to remove the command of the Bilgrimage from Damascus and- to return 
it to the governors of Jerusalem, *Ajlun and the neighbouring regions, as 
had previously been the case, because, according to Muradi, Damascus had 
suffered so much from' the rapacity of the troops who assembled- in it. The 
Sultan responded positively and removed the command from Damascus, where 
it had been for several years, and appointed to this office, in 1102/1690-1, 
al-Sharif Yahya, who was given the governorship of Jerusalem at the same 
time. Muradi states that Damascus was then relieved of the injustice of 
troops and of the oppression and the crimes which took place at the time of
4the Bilgrimage,
Al-Sharlf Yahya did not prove fit for the task entrusted to him. Owing 
to his neglect the Beduin attacked the pilgrimage which was under his command 
After this calamity al-Sharif Yahya was deposed and the command of the pil-
"S/b was the point at which the notables of Damascus awaited the return of the 
Bilgrimage, ’ see 31,fcOTt* It is situated to the south of the Qubaybai
quarter, outside Bab or Bawwabat Allah (the gate of God), so called because | 
it led both to Jerusalem and Mecca. See Muradi, Matmah, f. 37b; Pococke,
II.i.118.
G^f. MahasinT, 102. '
3lle was the son of Barakat III, Sharif of Mecca between 10S2/1672 and 1093/ i 
1682. Al-Sharif Yahya fled to Syria with his son Barakat IV, towards the 
end of the 17th century, under the pressure of his rival, al-Sharif Dhawu j 
Zayd, see G. Rent*, E.I., new ed., s.v. Barakat5 cf. Ibn Kinan, I, f. 159b;, 
.seejbelow p/h/7$) tSt*
^Muradi, Matmah. f„ 26b; cf. Ibn Jum*a, 47.
31
grimage was returned, to Damascus, where it remained until at least the time
_  _  1 
when Muradi was writing, roughly the end of the 18th century.
5. In the period between 1103/16.92 and 1119/1708, no janissaries or members
of local families of notables seem to have been appointed commanders of the
Bilgrimage. Mainly Ottoman officials of HumT origin were appointed to this
office. Out of fifteen known commanders during this oeriod, eight were gov-
o
ernors of Damascus. The statement by a Damascene chronicler on the occasion 
of the appointment of the governor of Damascus in 1115/1703 as commander of
o
—«  ™  J)
the Bilgrimage, which reads % tawalla al-hukm wa;> 1-lmara, was very often 
used^ latea^  on such occasions. The inefficiency of some of these commanders 
and the greed of others were mainly responsible for the BeduinTs attacks on 
the Bilgrimage, Moreover, the yearly change of commanders did not contri­
bute towards a bettbr understanding of the problem of the Beduin. It was 
only through force or exact payment that the security of the Bilgrimage was 
ensured. The application of the first of these means was largely responsible 
for the prolongation of the tenure of Na^suh Pasha who remained governor of 
Damascus and commander of the Pilgrimage from 1120/1703 to 1126/1714-5 , thus
inaugurating the trend of long governorships in the 18th century. Implicit
immediately
in this example, which came/after pm sustained attacks on the Pilgrimage, Is
M^uradi, Matmah, f. 27a (wa-ufc idat iinarat al-Ha.j.i ila Dimashq kama kanat wa- 
hiva ila*l-an.)
%ee Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 8a, 16b, 21a-24b, 29a, 32b, 45b, 47a, 47b, 49b, 54n, 
54b, 57b, 59a, 64b, 68b, 71a, 72b; Ibn Junfa 4 8, 49^ 51, 52; Ibn Jum*a,
MS. Berlin Cat._97B5, We (IX) 418, ff. 22a-23a; Muradi, Mafrnah, f. 26a; . 
Nabulsi, al-Haqiqa, ff, 333a, 373b; Mahasini, 90; Hammer, Vol. XIII,
52, 53, 55, 56, 100.
■^ Dhikr man tawalla, al-WIzara, f, 114a.
4-See Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 77a, 80a, 82b, 83a, 88a, -,97a, 99b, 104-b, 110a, 110b, 
114a; Ibn Jumfa, 52 , 54--
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the fact that the Sultan was willing to prolong the tenure of those governors 
who ensured the safety of the Bilgrimage. The Sultan, in his capacity as 
Guardian of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, was ultimately responsible for the 
safety of the Bilgrimage. That the governors remained in office for a
long time is partly explained by their ability to ensure the safety of the 
Bilgrimage.
From 1120/l70S-9 till at least the end of the period under study, the 
governors' of Damascus were .continuously appointed as commanders of the pil­
grimage. For this purpose they were exempted henceforth from going with 
their troops to the aid of the Sultan in his wars outside Syria as had for­
merly been their duty. A new phase in the history of Damascus had thus 
begun.
Apart from the religious prestige which the governors of Damascus ac­
quired as commanders of the Bilgrimage, they benefited financially from 
this new office. They used to inherit from all those who died on the Bil-
X
grimage. The rate of mortality ms usually high among the pilgrims, partly
because of the advanced age of many of them, partly because of the fatal
attacks by the Beduin on the Falgrimage, and partly also because of natural
2
calamities, such as floods, thirst and excessive heat.
B. The Composition, departure and return of the Pilgrimage.
The composition of the Bilgrimage: The fact that Damascus was the meet­
ing point of the pilgrims coming from the north had contributed to the shap-
P^RO, S.P. 97/31: Istanbul, 30.1.41; Volney, 315*
2BudayrT, f. 44b; of. Muradi, XI, 218, 219; Matmah, f. 33b.
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ing of its history. The pilgrims used to come to Damascus in groups, very
often defined geographically. The main groups were the Rumi pilgrims (al-
1 2 
Haj j al~Rumi), the Aleppine pilgrims (al-gajj al-Halabi)" and the Persian
pilgrims (al~Hajj al-^ fljami) T h e s e  divisions were not strictly territorial 
because many pilgrims from other parts, sometimes outside the Empire, joined 
one group or the other.
There is very scanty information as to the number of pilgrims who com­
posed the Damascene .pilgrimage. Most of the estimates available do not seem 
to be accurate ^ because they x^ ere mainly made on the occasion of attacks on 
the pilgrimage, and the tendency among the chroniclers in such .cases was to 
base their estimates either on conjecture or on hearsay. In the disastrous
attack on the Damascene Bilgrimage in 1757,^ * the number of pilgrims, as
5 6given by Volney, was sixty thousand. Another source in Istanbul puts it
between seventy and one hundred thousand. It is not without significance 
that Volney wrote about a quarter of a century, later, at a time when this 
calamity had lost its painfulness and passed into the realm of legend. The 
other estimate, although contemporary, emanated from Istanbul and was pro­
bably based on the reports of agents in Syria who were not necessarily on
the spot. On another occasion Volney estimated the number of pilgrims as
7being,in normal years, between thirty and fifty thousand. A missionary In
xIbn Jum‘a, 2* Ibn Kinan, II, ff. Via, H7a, 162a, 17lb.
2Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 78a, 80a, 86b$ BudayrI, f. 26b,* it was also called aJU 
rakb al-Balabl. see M. b. *Alwan, MS. Berlin Gat. 6137. We(II), i860, f ". 
102b.
3lbn Kinan, f, 12$b$ Ibn Jum*a 53; Budayri, ff. 2a, 38a, 40b.
4See below p. g'/?* p^. 253.
6?R0. S.P. 97/39t Istanbul, 3.12.57$ cf, J. Porter, Observations, London, i 
1771, p. 27.
7Volney, 322.
Damascus estimated the number of pilgrims in 1739 as between fifteen and
1
twenty thousand. This number, ntoderate in comparison with the previous ones, 
seems to have been a fair estimate because on some occasions when the number
2
of pilgrims soared for various reasons, it usually rose up .to forty thousand. 
Since many persons went on the Bilgrimage for commercial purposes, the vicis­
situdes in the trade with the far east through Mecca affected their number
3
and hence the total number of the Bilgrimage,
The departure of the Bilgrimage: Some pilgrims arrived in Damascus four 
or five months before the departure of the Bilgrimage,^ However, the major-
- 5ity usually arrived in the month of Ramadan, Late-comers arrived within a
6
few days of the departure of the commander with the Mahmil and the bulk of 
7 •
the pilgrims.
The departure of the Bilgrimage from Damascus was marked by a magnificent
processionih which the governor, accompanied by the Mahmil and the holy
/
standard (ganjaq), took part, together with the elite of his troops. The
date of his departure from Damascus was usually between the 12th and the 
— 820th of Shawwal. However, this was not necessarily always the case, nor
j
was it timed to coincide with a special day, say^  a Friday. Other obligations 
mainly financial, such as the dawra, or other military exigencies might war­
rant a further delay or an early start.
^Lettres edifiantes et curieuses (Gompagnie de Jesus), 34 vols., Paris, 1707- 
73, vol. XXVI (letter from Damascus, 4*11*39), 444- ^
G^f. R. Tresse, Le Belerinage Syrien, Paris, 1937, pp. 283, 284; of * A.N.B 
1036: Sidon, 12.1.73*
^Russell, I. 199. Sblney, p. 322; cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f. 162a.
5Cf. Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 39a, 86b.
%or the political significance of the Mahmil see Fr. Buhl, B.I., 1st ed.,
s. v. Mahmal: sge also Gaudefroy-Demombynes, *Le Felerinage a la Mekkey. 
Annales du Musee Guirnet, Bibliotheque deludes, vol. 33, 158-61.
7lbn Kinan, f. 125b; Budayri, ff. 2b, 35a. (contv)
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The commander of the Pilgrimage, accompanied by the Mahmil, the ganjaq
and the troops, halted for a short time in Qubbat al-Hajj, on the outskirts
1of Damascus, awaiting the pilgrims to follow. The latter were usually late, 
in leaving Damascus because they were interested in watching the procession
c
of the Malmnil. They had also to complete their preparations and to bid fare­
well to any of their relatives who stayed in Damascus; not to all, because
2
many accompanied the pilgrims to Muzayrib. As a result, the Bilgrimage pro­
ceeded from Damascus to Muzayrib in a rather loose manner, accompanied by 
relatives as well as by pedlars.
3
Within about a week of the departure of the governor with the Mahmil, 
the last of the pilgrims must have left Damascus, including any who had
arrived late^ or who had been waiting for Ottoman officials on their way to
5 « 6
Mecca. In Muzayrib the pilgrims halted for about a week to wait for the
late arrivals, to complete their preparationsand, for some of them, to depo-
7
sit their valuables in its fortress. The Bilgrimage then made a fresh
start as a more compact whole. The majority of those who had accompanied
the pilgrims to Muzayrib would then return to Damascus. As such they were
£
known as al-Muzayrbatiyya. However, a few persons accompanied the pilgrims
a little further. 
a(cont7)
See Ibn Kinan, II, f.J39a^ 86b; Budayri, ff. 38a, 38b, 42a, 43b, 47b; 
Maw§ili, f . 58a; Mahasini, 135£_Suwaydi, f. 114a.
•ktbn Kinan, I, ff. 156b, 175a; II, ff. 165b, 171b.
^Muzayrib, sometimes mentioned Mazarib, see Muradi I, 258, is a large vil­
lage about 103 km. to the south west of Damascus, cf. R. Dussaud, Topo­
graphic Historiques, Paris, 1927, p. 340; Tresse, 6 9.
3Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 27a, 39a, 87a; Budayri, ff. 11b, 31a.
^Budayri, f. 35a. %«bid. f. 2tt$
%bid., f. 6b; Muhammad AdTb, 39; Suwaydi, f. 114b.
7Ibn al-Siddlq, ff. 30a, 31a. B^udayri, f. 6b; Ibn Kinan, II, f£ 12§b,
169b.
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On the arrival of the pilgrimage at al-*Ula, the pilgrims sent letters
to their relatives and friends concerning their safety and affairs, A special 
\
messenger known as kattab carried these letters to Damascus, He usually ar-
2
rived sometime in the month of Dhu *1-Hijja.
The journey from Damascus to Mecca usually took about thirty-five days,3 
The return journey lasted for about the same time.^ One pilgrim estimated 
that it took 490 hours of travel to reach Mecca from Damascus.^ Another est­
imated the return journey at 450 hours.^
The Return of the Pilgrimage to Damascus. During the 18th century the 
return of the pilgrimage usually took place in the first half of §afar. On 
certain occasions, however, the Pilgrimage diverted its route, either to 
avoid an impending threat or to salvage what remained after an attack by the 
Beduin, and this entailed a late return.
The return of the Pilgrimage was usually heralded by the arrival in Dam­
ascus of various messengers entrusted with special commissions, mainly to do
7
with the condition of the pilgrims. The jawqadar a 1-Han.i. who was a spe-
8cial emissary dispatched by the commander of the Pilgrimage, usually from 
Ma‘an,^ to inform the Damascenes of the safety of the pilgrims on their way
^See Appendix XT,
2Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 73b^  113b, 153a, IX, ff, 141a^ 164a, 165b; M. b ‘Alwan,
f. 106a; Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 33a, 164a; Maw^ ili, f. 59a.
^Gf. Suwaydi, ff. 114a, 129a; Muhammad Adib, 39* 36; Volney, 322, put it 
at forty days.
G^f. Nabulsi, al-Haqiqa, ff. 344b, 373b, 335a; ^Muhammad Adib, 77. 
^‘Uthman, MB. Berlin Cat. 6147. Pm. (II) 105, f. 284b,
T^he term is from the Persian Jawki dar, meaning an officer on patrol for
watch duties, see R. Dosy, Supplement aux Dictionnaires arabes. I, p.230.
The emissary of the commander of the pilgrimage was sometimes referred to by 
the Damascene chroniclers as naijab, (Ibn Kinan, ff. 11a, 57b, 167a), an 
Arabic term which means a mounted courier.
8Ibn Kinan, II, ff. lb, 120b; Budayri, f. 3b. 9Muna.1.1id. Wulat Dimashq.,109
9 7
back, usually arrived in Damascus in the latter half of Muharram, roughly
between the 20th and the 30th and very often between the 25th and the 30th. 1
a
Within a week of the arrival of the .iawqadar./kattab. usually referred
— ■ 2 to as kattab al-gajj, entered Damascus carrying letters from the pilgrims.
It seems that the letters addressed to the Damascenes were distributed in
- 3the Darwishiyya market - a central place in the city.
Within a week of the arrival of kattab al-Hajj at Damascus, the first of
]| I III'" "l    ■! ■ *
4the pilgrims entered Damascus, The order in which the pilgrims entered Dam­
ascus was the opposite to that in which they left* More anxious now to be
5
home, they made their entry before the Mahmil and the commander,
G. The Military protection of the Pilgrimage.
Apart from the troops that accompanied the commander of the Bilgrimage 
and the garrisons in several fortresses along the Bilgrimage route, other 
troops were needed to protect the provisions carried to the returning Pil­
grimage, and to escort it as well. This escoi*t was known as the jarda. It
seems that the primary purpose of the ;jarda was to carry provisions to the
6
returning’ Bilgrimage. Because of threats along the route the iarda was well
armed. This military feature, in the conditions of the time, became its
7
dominant aspect.
Ibn ICinan, II, ff. lb, 8a, 120; Budayri, ff. 3b, 7b, 2Gb, 35b, 3Gb, 41a, 
44b, 45b.
%ahasinx, GO, 81, 95, 99, 103, 135, 136; Ibn Kinan,I^ Tf. 69b, 80b, 110a, 114a 
3Cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f. 159b. hbn Kinan, I, ff. 80b, 129b, 153b.
of. Ibid.. II, ff. 8a, 92a; Budayri, ff. 2a, 2b.
C^f. Budayri, f. 54a; SuwaydT, f. 134#-) A.N.B 1116s Tripoli, 25.5.31;
A.N.B1 1120: Tripoli, 1.10.63 (Bulletin); A.N.B1 88: Aleppo, 28.8.58. 
7Budayri, f. 2b n. ; Shitiab, ed. Mujftighab, 679, 727.
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The commander of the .iarda was referred to by the chroniclers by various
1 JZ __ 3
terms such as Pas hat al-jarda, .iarda .11* amir al-mulaaat , and very often
amir aI-iarda A  The group from which he was recruited changed with the
times? as was the case with the commander of the pilgrimage. The period of
uncertainty about his identity after the Ottoman occupation of Syria, is
longer than that connected, with the commander of the Pilgrimage. In the
17th century the commanders of the .iarda were chosen from the local families
of notables and from the janissaries of Damascus, nas were the commanders of
the Pilgrimage. Similarly, also, the commanders of the .iarda were recruited
$
from Ottoman officials towards the end.of the century. It seems that when
an official entrusted with this office did not have enough troops to enable
6
him to discharge his duties, extra troops were put under his command.. Some
of those appointed commanders of the iarda were governors, or were appointed
on the occasion as governors, of ganjaqs in the province of Damascus, such
7
as Jerusalem and Nablus. Before the command of the ’Hlgrimage was contin­
uously entrusted to the governors of Damascus, some of these governors were
8
appointed commanders of the iarda. Later on* during the larger part of the
9 io
13th century, the governors of either Sidon, Tripoli*- or, less frequently,
1Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 80b, 87b, 14.1b; Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 27b.
H^ammer, XIII, 101; of. Kurd 'All, II, 297. H^afcasini, 136.
^Tbn Kinan, I, ff. 47a, 54b; Ibn Jum'a, 51.
-’See Shihab. ed. Mughabghab. 677, 727; Mahasini, 136; Muhibbi, I, 18;
Ibn Jum'a, MS. Berlin Cat. 9785. We.(II), 418, f.22a.
See, Hammer, XIII, 100; cf. Ibn Kinan, I, f. 37b.
S^ee Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 7b, 144a» 136a. ^Ibid., f. 54b.
9See Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 27b; Ibn Kinan, II, 80b.
10See Ibn Kinan, II,f f. 87b, 126b; Budayri, ff. 6b, 45a, 52a; Kurd ‘All
II, 289, 297.
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1
Aleppo, were almost always appointed commanders of the jar da. The choice
of these governors was made for various reasons, such as the nearness of
their governorships to Damascus, which would ensure a speedy movement, and
2
the fact that these provinces contributed to the iarda. Hox^ ever, the 
choice of the commander of the ;iarda was influenced by the type of rule 
that existed at the time when members of one family were frequently ap­
pointed as governors of more than one of the Syrian provinces* When a *A|m, 
for example, was governor of Damascus and a member of the same family was 
governor of Aleppo and not of either Sidon or Tripoli, the one in Aleppo 
was appointed commander of the .iarda*
Like the commander of the Pilgrimage, the commander of the .iarda ms 
appointed by the Sultan.^ But it seems that the governors of Damascus, be­
fore they were regularly appointed commanders of the -pilgrimage, sometimes 
appointed, perhaps merely nominated, the commanders of the .iarda as well as 
of the Pilgrimage.^
Within a month after the departure of the pilgrimage, the commander
5
of the .iarda usually arrived in Damascus, if he was not resident in it*
His departure from Damascus to escort the Pilgrimage depended on the date of 
his arrival in it, the completion of his preparations and how urgently the 
Pilgrimage needed help. UBually he left Damascus in the month of Dhu '1- 
Qa* da or in early Dhu ?1-Hij As in the case of the pilgrimage, many
xSee Muradi, IV, 237; Budayri, ff. 2b, 38a. 2See below p. /cl*
%uradi, IV, 237; Budayri, ff. 6b, f. 38a; Kurd *Ali, II, 289.
%uhibbT, I, 18; Shihab, ed. Mughabghab. 683, 684, 728.
B^udayri, f. 6b; Ibn Kinah, II, f. 105a; Ibn al-Sidd'Jq, f. 27b.
A —
Budayrx, ff. 2b, 42a> 44b; Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 80b, 87b; of. Ibn al-§Iddiq,
f. 35a.
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people accompanied, the .iarda to Muzayrib, and they were called Muzayr-
1
batiyyat al-iarda.
When the commander of the .iarda arrived in Damascus, his troops usually 
stayed there with him. In the disturbed security conditions that prevailed 
in Damascus at the time, his troops added to political instability. In 
1173/1760 the Damascene chronicler expressed his relief when the commander 
of the .iarda stayed with his troops in a village outside Damascus.
The point at which the .iarda met the pilgrimage was not fixed as a rule. 
It depended on the date on which the .iarda left Damascus, the threats to 
the pilgrimage and to the .iarda itself, and the efficiency and dedication
of the commander of the .iarda. In the late 17th century Nabulsi mentioned
_ 3
Tabuk as the usual place where the jarda met the pilgrimage. In the 18th
century the point of encounter seems to have been very often in Mada'in
Salih.^ However, the threat of the Beduin to the Pilgrimage as well as to
( *
.iarda made the meeting point rather unstable.
In 1166/1752-3 two pashas, in this case 'Agra brothers, were jointly
6
appointed as commanders of the jarda. This was illustrative of the in­
fluence of the 'Azms and was a .further precaution after the attack on the
•  j .
7
Pilgrimage the year before. In emergencies a second iarda was necessary.
^Ibn Kinan, I, f. 68b, II, ff. 141a, 141b. B^udayri, f. 54a.
^al-Haqiqa, f. 362 b; cf. KMyarT-'.« f. 8a; Muhibbi, I, 18, II, 18;
Shihab, ed, Mughahghab, 679*
’^■Budayri, f. 2b n.
5See 'Umar al-Wakil, Tarwlh al-qalft al-shaji, MS. Vienna, f. 57b; Budayri, 
f. 54a *
B^udayri, f. 4^ a. I^bid., ff. 48b, 49a; al-Qari, 80.
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Appeals for volunteers to go on the .jarda always met with enthusiastic re-
1
sponse from the people.
D .1 The financing of the pilgrimage»
The resources of the Pilgrimages In spite of their varied nature, thbse
resources were drawn largely from the miri revenue in one form or another.
We may distinguish between resources allotted to the pilgrimage and others
allotted to the jarda. Within this framework the year 1120/1703-9 will be
taken as a point of departure.
Before 1120/1703-9 the commanders of the pilgrimage and of the jarda
were usually governors of one or more ganjaqs in the province of Damascus.
2As such, they were the tax-farmers of the regions they governed. It seems 
that they used part of the revenue to finance the jarda. This partly ex­
plains why the governors of Damascus used during this period to appoint the 
commanders of the pilgrimage and of the jarda? as muhaggils (farmers-in- 
chief) of their province they were entitled to appoint tax-farmers. Other 
regions, not administered by the governors who were appointed as commanders 
of the pilgrimage and of the jarda, were under an obligation to contribute
to the expenses of the pilgrimage and the jarda. The money which the govern-
3ors of these regions offered for this purpose was known as mal al-Hajj and 
mal mulaqat al-Hajj^ respectively. The nature of this financial obligation 
seems to have helped to sanctify it at a time when a large part of the local
1See Budayri, f. 8a; Ibn al-i3iddTq, ff. 22b, 109b.
2See MuljibbT, IV, 426; Kurd ‘All, II, 241; of. Shiliab, ed. Mughabghab,
71^ 5 cf. Heyd, 119 n 5.
—  1 i
S^hihab, ed. Mughabghab, 633, 6345 al-§abbagh, I64, 165$ cf. A.W.B 1037s
Sidon, 17.12.77. !
43hihab, ed. khghabghab. 677-9, 683.
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revenue was appropriated by strong local chieftains,
WhenJf after 1120/1708-9, the governors of Damascus were regularly ap­
pointed commanders of the Bilgrimage, they assumed immediate responsibility 
for its finance, B’or this purpose they went on the dawra every year. The 
fact that the revenue of the province of Damascus was largely used to defray
the expenses of the pilgrimage explains the meagre tribute which it sent to
2Istanbul and which did not exceed forty-five purses, according to Volney,
The provinces of Sidon, Tripoli and Aleppo were also under an obligation to
3
contribute to the expenses of the Pilgrimage and the .iarda ; irrespective of 
whose governor ms appointed- commander of the jarda.
In some cases impositions in kind were levied from merchants so as to 
supply the pilgrimage with provisions.^ " Since the commander of the .iarda 
usually halted in Damascus before he resumed his journey, this place contri-
5
buted towards his expenses.
With the decline of the feudal forces and the Statefs increasing need of 
cash, the holders of timars and zi*amets used to pay money in lieu of mili­
tary service. Ihis money, called by the Damascene biographer mal al-badal.
6was assigned by the Sultan to finance the Pilgrimage. Another source of
revenue in the 18th century was the income of certain malikanes. such as
Hims, Hamah and Ma'arra, which were given to the governors of Damascus in
7their capacity as commanders of the pilgrimage._________ ____ _ __________
lCf, Shihab, ed. Mughabghab, 651. p^p. 314> 35&; cf* Heyd, 119.
3Volney, 281, 287; A.N.B1 1036s Sidon, 28.2.7/+; cf. B 1025s Sidon,
6.2.41, Sidon, 10.11.41; A.N.B • 1032s Sidon, 14.3.60.
P^RO. S.P. 110^47s Aleppo, 27.6.83.
5See Ibn al-Sidcliq, ff. 25a, 25b, 27b, 91a; Budayri, f. 49a.
6Mura<ff, Majimafr. ff. 42a, 42b; see II. Bowen, E,I», new ed. s.v.Badal,
'Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 92a, 95a, 103b, 105a; MuradT, JI, 32, III, 4.7.
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Expenditure on the Pilgrimages Fart of the revenue assigned to the 
Pilgrimage seems to have been allotted for the pay of the troops that es­
corted it, the majority of whom, in the 18th century, were mercenaries. It 
is true that a large part of these troops were ordinarily in the service, 
and hence the pay, of the governor. But the occasion of the Pilgrimage nec- 
essitated the keeping, and at times the immediate recruitment, of extra
troops, and this entailed further expenses. The pay of the troops that
 1
guarded the fortresses along the Pilgrimage route, whether Sinahis or
2 —janissaries, was accounted for from other resources. Ihe Sioahis had
fiefs to provide for their upkeep and the janissaries had certificates of 
3
pay (esaiiil).
Another expense of a more fluctuating nature, yet very essential, was
the payment to the Beduin along the Pilgrimage route. Such a payment was
usually ref ex-red to as garr and less frequently as gurra.^  Not all tribes
along the Pilgrimage route received such a payment; only the militant ones
that could cause trouble and obstruct the passage of the Pilgrimage were
5
on the pay-roll of the commanders of the Pilgrimage. The sums paid to 
these tribes were intended mainly to procure a safe passage for the Pil­
grimage in the regions they dominated. This also implied that the Beduin
6
acted as guides to the Pilgrimage along the desert route.
^ajm al-Dln al-Ghazzi, III, 157.
^Ibid., IV, 215; Nabulsi, al-Haqiqa, ff. 381a, 384a; cf. Muradi, III, 12. 
^Ibn al-SiddTq, ff. 29a, 110b; cf. MuradT, III, 12.
^Both are Arabic terms which roughly mean a purse. Although the tex-m garr 
was usually used by the chroniclers to denote the sum paid to the Beduin, 
some of these chroniclers used the term gnrra in the same sense. ‘Umar al- 
Wakil, Taiwih. for example, used both terms alternately, ff. 44a, 46a,
46b, of ." MafiasinT, 97, 98. A differentiation between the terms is essen­
tial, because the term surra usually referred to the sum annually sent by 
the Sultan to the Holy Cities; see below p•10$.
5S e e  M.V.J.Seetzen, 1Memoire pour arriver a la connaissance des tribus/ . J
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Several of the commanders of the Pilgrimage during the 18th century
tried,with varying degrees of success, to withhold part of the sum allotted
to the Beduin* The latter retaliated by attacking the Pilgrimage.1 Usually
the attacks on the Pilgrimage took place on the way back* Probably the
large amount of merchandise which then accompanied the Pilgrimage tempted
the attackers* Furthermore, this was the last chance for a year for the
Beduin to obtain their full pay from the commander of the Pilgrimage. For,
2
according to Mariti, payment to the Beduin was made in two instalments, 
half on the way to Mecca and half on the way back. Some of the commanders 
of the Pilgrimage were reluctant to hand the Beduin their exact sum on the
3
way back because their hopes of getting through without payment were then bdgfc
Apart from the garr. some tribes received further pay for carrying the
pilgrims and their luggage to the Hijaz. Since a large number of camels
were needed for the journey, the help of the Beduin was essential. In 1110/
L 5
I698-9, for example, the ‘Anaza and the Sakhr Beduin carried the pilgrims
(cont.) Arabes en Syrie1, Annales des Voyages de la geographic et de 
Pliistoire, vol. 8, Paris 1809, pp. 281-32-4$ Mariti, II, 117.
^Volney, 315, 322, 4-15; M. Niebuhr, Travels through Arabia and other 
countries in the East. 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1792, II, 165; Hammer, XIII, 52.
■^ See, Hammer, XIII, 52, 53; Ibn Jum'a, MS. Berlin Gat. 9785. ¥e (ll) 4-1&,
f „ 22a; Ibn Kanan^ff. 16b, 21a-24-b; Maw§ili, f. 60a.
II, 117. 3See, Maw§ili, f. 60a.
^Around the end of the 17th century the *&nasa started a new migration from 
the Arabian peninsula towards Syria, in the direction of the Euphrates. 
Nabulsi (al-Haqiqa, f. 380a) who was 011 his way back from the Hijaz in 
Muharram lloS/Aug7~Sept. 1694*, mentions that the *Anaza had spread in the 
region between Medina and al-^Ula and that they were a great menace to the 
pilgrims. The vacuum created in northern Syria as a result of the waning 
power of the Hawaii tribe since the end of the 17th century, besides other 
factors, attracted the northward push of the <Anaza (see E, GrMf, 
new ed., s.v. *Anaza Bedouins). In the spring and summer the ‘Anaza spread 
in a region extending between Hadiyya in the south and the confines of 
Aleppo. In the autumn and winter they retreated into the interior, 
in the direction of Wadi Sarhan and Baghdad (see Seetzen, 282).
(cont.)
10 5
1for a fixed sum of money. Obviously the militant tribes were the ones who 
took part in carrying the pilgrims. It seems that the envy of other tribes 
was aroused as a result. It may well have been that a tribe attacked the 
Pilgrimage not so much to plunder it as to show its dissatisfaction at its 
neglect.
Apart from these resources assigned to the Pilgrimage, the Sultan made 
an annual contribution, referred to as surra, to the Ashraf, the *Ulama' 
and. the poor of the Holy Cities. He contributed also to the decoration of
p
the Kaeba* The Holy Cities in this respect usually meant Mecca and Medina. 
However, on occasions Jerusalem was included among them and some of its 
inhabitants received payment from the $urra.^  But there is no consistent 
evidence that Jerusalem regularly shared in the surra all through the 
Ottoman period.
The contributions made by the Sultan to Mecca and Medina were sent 
through the Egyptian^ as well as the Damascene Pilgrimages, '^he money car­
ried by the Egyptian Pilgrimage for this purpose was also known as gurra.
But whereas in the case of Egypt the gurra was sent to the Hijaz in the care 
of the Egyptian commander of the Pilgrimage, in the case of Damascus the 
§urra was entrusted to a special official referred to as amir al-gurra and
more often as gurra emini, who usually carried it, except for some intervals, 
(cont.)
The Sakhr were in the region extending between Nablus and BaIqa/ . They 
took part in tribal wars and seem to have been on good terms with the 
*Anaza at this time, see Murtada al-Kurdi, Tahdlilb al-atwar, MS. Berlin
"4curd rAli, II, 286* cf. Budayri, f. 6bj Ibn al-giddiq, f. 114a, Volney,322
C^f, Hammer, XIII, 54. %haw, Ottoman Egypt. 1517-1798, p. 261.
4lbid., pp. 253-62. ^Ibid., pp. 260-1.
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all the way through from Istanbul to the gijaz via Damascus, where he joined 
1its pilgrimage.
E. The Commercial Importance of the Pilgrimage.
The occasion of the pilgrimage provided a relatively safe means, in
comparison with other alternatives, for the movement of goods. It also pro-
vided a favourable market for the sale and barter of goods in Damascus. i
2 ;
The goods .carried with the pilgrimage to Damascus and elsewhere were
varied in nature and origin. They usually consisted of spices, textiles,
3precious stones and coffee. The coffee came mostly from the Yemen; the
bulk of the other goods came from Surat in India to the Red Sea port of
Jedda^ and were then transported, to Mecca.** There is no adequate information
on the types of goods which were carried with the Bilgrimage to the Hijaz.
Although the trade carried with the Bilgrimage benefited many regions,
its impact on Damascus was very important. On one occasion,in 1164/1750-1,
the Damascene chronicler commented that the arrival of the Persian pilgrims
6
with a variety of goods in Damascus stimulated commercial activity there.
1See, Hammer XIV, 183, cf. XIII, 53; d'Ohsson, III, 262; Ibn Kinan, II,
ff. 6a, 14'7a, 165b, 171b; Budayri, ff. 5a, 11a, 34h, 3Ba, 40b; Ibn ai- 
§iddiq, f, 11a.
2 — "T-See, Mantran and Sauvaget, 9;. Shihab. ed. Mughabghab. 737; Budayri, ff. 
7b, 8a; PRO, 3.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 23.12.57.
3pR0, S.P. 110/25, Pt. II: Aleppo, 27.9.26; Aleppo, 19.10.26; Radcliffe 
papers, 6645/2: Aleppo, 12.2.15; Volney, 323; Russell, I, 199.
Aa.H.B1 4.04: Istanbul, 10.8.31; PRO, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 23.12.57.
'’A.M.B1 1040s Sidon, 11.10.83; Pococke, II.i.125; Russell, I, 199.
6 —  r, ■
Budayri, f. 33a.
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THE FIRST PHASE OF t AZM TOE IN DAMASCUS 
The pre-*Agm period in Damascus, 1723-5.
Damascus witnessed in the period that preceded the appointment of 
the first governor a revolt which in one way benefited the'A^ ms.
The revolt flared up against the arbitrary rule of ‘Uthman Pasha Abu Tawq, 
a Rumi by origin,and formerly a qapudan pasha (Lord High Admiral) and a 
qa*im maqam (probably a deputy of either the agha of the janissaries or of
the Grand Vezir) in Istanbul. One source added that he was married to I
2 3 ' the sister of the Sultan. He was appointed twice to Damascus and it was
|
towards the end of his second governorship (19 Rabi* II 1135/27 January
1723^ - Jumada I 1137/January 1725^ ) that the revolt:: took place,
Abu Tavrq enjoyed the support of the Grand Vezir at Istanbul and his
credit at the Porte was in the ascendant. This culminated in the marriage
6of his son, governor of Sidon at the time, to the Sultan*s daughter. He 
counted, moreover, on his military power which held the people in awe not (
only in Damascus but also in the component parts of this province as well - j
1Ibn Kinan, II, f. 6b; A.N.B1 1021; Sidon, 19.5.21.
2A.H..Bm  232; Tripoli, 22.10.lS (mission de Maillet).
*%is first governorship in Damascus lasted from 23 Jumada I 113l/l3 April 
1719 to IB Jumada I 1133/13 March 1721. The MS. of Ibn Jum‘a used by ;
Munajjid, pp. 57, 59, erroneously stated that this was his second governor- :
ship in Damascus and the one after his third, but it failed to mention his 
first. The other MS. of Ibn Jum4a!s work, Berlin Gat. 97B5, We. (II) 418 j
f. 27a, described the last governorship of Abu £awq in Damascus as his sec-j
ond, which is true, but erroneously described his first one as his second, ; 
f. 26a. All other chroniclers agree that Abu Tawq was twice appointed to 
Damascus.
4ibn Jum*a, 59. ^A.W.B1 1021: Sidon, 25.1.25.
6a .N.B1 1021s Sidon, 21.10.21; PB0,-S'.P. 97/25: Istanbul, 5/16.1.23.
—  - - • ■ - . - .   i
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1 —as in the province of Sidon where his son was governor. Besides, Abu
2
Tawq had the reputation of beingra learned governor and this seems to 
have lulled the Ulama^  in Damascus for some time but could not avert
their final clash with him.
It seems that the preoccupation of Abu £awq withthe province.of Sidon
3
and his long absences on the d&wra and on the Pilgrimage, made bin rely on 
his subordinates in controlling the affairs of Damascus. Chief among
these was his Mutasallim Lukmush^ who cooperated with a group which in-
™  —  5 —-eluded Salih b. Sulayman Shaykh al-Ard, the shaykh of the Qubaybat
6 7 -  8quarter and the gubashia of the §alihiyya quarter. Together with their
t , Sidon,
A.N.B 1021s Sidon, 23.6.19, Sidon, 22.8.19,/3.9.19, Sidon, 19.5.21, 
Sidon, 19.1.24.
2 , - __
Ibn Kinan, I, f. 162a; Barik, 3; Muradi, Matmah, f. 10b.
3Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 162a, 164b; A.N.B 978s Acre, 15.4.24.
4
Mawsill, f. 55a,
5It is not known if the term shaykh al~ard was an administrative title or 
a surname probably acquired after an office occupied by one of his an- 
cestors. In dither^ .case the nature of this office is not known.
^Each quarter had a chief, called shaykh. whose position was recognized by 
the authorities and whose functions were of a police nature, see Gibb and 
Bowen, I. i. 279. The Qubaybat quarter was originally a village on the 
southern outskirts of Damascus. It was so called because its inhabitants, 
largely composed of gardeners and peasants, used to live in small cupola­
like houses. Kith the expansion of the Maydan quarter towards the south 
it absorbed this village. Although it retained its name later on as a 
quarter, it was sometimes known as the lower Maydan (al-Maydan al-Tah- 
tanx). To the south of al-Qubaybat was Bab Allah, see J. Sauvage'E, 
fEsquisse d!une Higtoire de la Ville de Damas*, RBI. 1934* P* 471; cf. 
BudayPJ ff. 11b, 12a; see attached town~plan,p.if*<.
7a police officer, see Gibb and Bowen, I. i, $1, 119, 154, 155, 279.
%l-§>alihiyya, called after Shaykh Abu' §alih founder of the first of its
(cont.)
109
assistants they formed a class of extortioners known as al-*awaniyya.
Exactions made by the ‘awaniwa loomed immm&f- over many Damascenes, 
and in Sha^ban 1136/April-May 1724, in the absence of the governor, a 
revolt started in the galihiyya and soon spread to other quarters. The 
shops closed and the mob stoned the law-court and injured the judge,
    Q
Isma" il Efendi Ta6biri-Zade, whom they held responsible for not enforcing 
’k*16 Shari4 a. in other words for not combatting the cawaniyva. This shows 
the ineffective authority of the judge and the populace*s fear of reckon­
ing directly with the mutasallim. It was only after the demands of the 
revolutionaries were conceded and the impositions revoked that the uprising 
subsided. In the meantime the parties concerned began preparing for their 
second move.^
(cont.)
many religious edifices (Sauvaget, lEsquisse' ..461) was considered in the 
18th entury sometimes as a village, sometimes as a suburban quarter. It 
was located to the north of Damascus, atjbhe foot of Mount Qasyun,which is 
also mentioned as Jabal al-§ali^iyya 69). _Al~Salihiyya, sometimes
referred to as Salihiyyat Dimas hq al-Sham (Nabulsi, al-Haqiqa, f. 12b), 
was famous among the * Ulama7 and the Sufis, many of whom lived there * 
particularly because it harboured the' tomb of the famous gufi Ibn al- 
‘Arabi (ibn Jum*a, 3). Thevenot who visited it in the late fifties of the 
17th century mentioned !un petit Hermitage... ou demeurent des Derviches1, 
above^al-Salihiyya, II, 692. In 1085/1674-5 the road leading to it from 
the Saruja quarter was paved by the governor of Damascus (Ibn Jum-; *a, 4l) • 
Pococke, II. i. 126 described this road as being in a good condition.
q " -
An Arabic term derived from the root 6awana. According to E.W.Lane,
Arabic-English Lexicon. Bk. I, 5 (London 1874) P« 2203, ‘awaniyy is an 
appellation applied to a 6awn (armed attendant or guard), who accompanied 
a Sultan,without pay or allowance. Dozy, II, 191, 192 translated the term 
‘awaniyy as 'mouchard, denonciateur, delateur1, roughly meaning informer. 
He gave the plural as cawaniyya. According to him also the terms *awania 
or * awan mean Hort fait de gaiet6 de coeur*.
Muhjbbiy I, 403 and Ibn Junfa, 32 used the terms ‘awana(t) and a‘wan re­
spectively in referring to those who helped others, usually Influential 
persons, in causing mischief. * Awaniyya was used_in the same sense, see 
Ibn Jum6a, 60, 6l. The exactions made by the 4awaniyya were called 6awan,
(cont.)
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On the return of Abu Tawq from the dawra he brought to account those 
accused of starting the revolt and reported to the Sultan that they had 
stoned the law-court. Those arrested by him included a manufacturer of
jars, a grocer and three members of the Taghlib family, ‘Abd al-Qadir b.
1 —2 
* Umar b. Taghlib. Hasan al-Taghlibi and Raslan al-Taghlibi. The Taghlib
family was of importance in Damascus because several of its members were
prominent Hanbali Ulama*« gufis, and, most important, propagators of the
Shaybanl Tarlqa? On Thursday 21 Shawwal 1136/13 July 1724, Abu Tawq put to
death the arrested Taghlib! members together with other persons from the
galihiyya, after he had procured a Khatti Sharif to this effect through his
son, who was in Istanbul at the time. Those who were not executed were
sent to Istanbul, but they were shipwrecked near Tripoli and eventually
saved by its governor.^ '
. (cont.) ^
•; see Hawaii!, f. 60a; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 73a;Gf*.Ibn Jum6a, 60,
/
Russell, I, 316, n.4 states that the term a vania, used in English writings 
at the time for exactions (its French' equivalent was avanie), was of Italian 
origin meaning literally an undeserved injury. According to him it was uni­
versally used in the Levant and applied to all oppressive or unjust ex­
actions under false pretences. In fact the term still means in Italian 
ill-treatment or insult. It is probable that the Venetians used this term 
to refer to such exactions In the Orient. There is reason to believe that 
other European writers used this Italian term because had they been trans­
literating Arabic terms a mosaic of spellings would have appeared in their 
writing as was the case for example with the spelling of the term rnutasallim, 
It does not seem probable, moreover, that any of the above Arabic terms was 
a corruption of the Italian one because they were used in earlier Arabic 
texts. It may well be that the opposite is true.
2 — —
Ibn Jum‘a, 60; _Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 162a, 164a referred to him-as Isma6il
Efendi Maftbar~2ade; Risala. f. 24a gave his name as Mufassar Isma6 il Efendi,
3 _ -
Ibn Kinan, II, f. 162a; Maw^ili, f. 55a.
■^ Probably a namesake of the one mentioned by Muradi, III, 58, 59 and 
Haslbi/ f. 35a as having died a year earlier.
2Ibn Kinan, II, f. 162 b. (cont.)
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The Judge left Damascus for Istanbul by the end of Shawwal 1136/ 
middle of ^uly 172,4 to present his case and that of the Damascenes to its
*i
authorities. He advised the Damascenes, moreover, to appeal in turn to 
the Sultan explaining their grievances. Accordingly, a deputation was sent 
from Damascus to Istanbul to plead against Abu Tawq and his mutasallim. It 
■consisted of *Abd Allah Agha for theTerliwa. a cheribashi' for the Zu*ama 
Abu *l-§afa al-Is$awani for the fcUlamay. and others representing the crafts, 
the quarters and the villages. Strong and fully' representative though this 
deputation was, the Sultan turned down its case. This indicates the strong 
backing which Abu Jawq had in Istanbul. His son, who was present at the 
meeting held for this purpose at the Porte, was shown the plea of the Damas­
cenes, and although he could not refute the charge he tried to exonerate 
his father and laid the responsibility upon Lukmush, his mutasallim. Strange­
ly, and perhaps characteristically,' enough, the members of the deputation fled
3
to save their necks. The Sultan seems to have had second thoughts later on 
about this affair. It seems also that the agent of Isma*il Pasha al-^ Aism 
had exploited the occasion to advance the cause of his candidate for the 
government of Damascus.
(cont,)
H^asibl, ff. 35a, 4.2b, 43a; .Ayyubi, f. 14.1. The Shaybani Tariqa was re­
ferred to^also as al-Tariqa al-Yunusiyya after the Christian1 name of its 
founder Yusuf al-Shaybani, L. Massignon, J3.I. JEst. Ed. s.v. Tarlka, 
described it as a wandering Syrian order.
Ibn Kinan, II, f. 162b; Maw§ili, f. 55b.
^Ibn Kinan, II, f. l62a; Maw§ili, f. 55a.
2A feudal official who ranked after the dlaybiyi and was chosen from among 
the Zu*ama, see Gibb and Boweni^  I, i. 51.
^Maw^ili, f* 55h.
112
In the second half of Rabib II 1137/first half of Januaiy 1725 Aba
Tawq withdrew to Sidon, which was governed by his son, apparently for re-
1
taxation, and there he received the news of his deposition* Things were 
warming up in Damascus in the meantime and rumours1 were rife about his de­
position. Although this was not yet officially confirmed in Damascus, the 
assembling of the notables of the city in the presence of the new judge in
Jumada I of the same year,to deliberate on the situation, sparked off a
_ 2 — revolt against his mutasallim and the *awaniwa. It was led by the Ijanafi
Mufti Muhammad Khalil al-Bakri al-Siddiqi/ Lukmush, the mutasallim, and a
few others of his supporters fled to Sidon and the erupting mob killed the
rest of the * a wan ivy a and mutilated their bodies. The house of the Jewish
§arraf of Abu. Tawq, a certain Ibn Juban-Qghlu. was demolished by the mob
who sacked also the house of a Christian for his co-operation with the
4awaniwa against his fellow believers/' In early Jumada II it was formally
announced in Damascus that Abu £awq was deposed, and on the 23rd/9th March
1725, Isma£il Pasha al~£Azm entered Damascus as governor.
It is remarkable that the revolt was led by the mufti and not by a
member of the military organizations, which had been represented on the
^Ibn Kinan, II, f. 164b; Ibn JunLfa, 6l; A.N.B^ 1021s Sidon, 25.1.25.
^Ibn Kinan, II, f. 164b.
^Ibn £um£a, 6l; Mawgili, f. 55a; Muradi, II, 84; Ayyubi, f. 230. The
Siddiqi family of Damascus was a branch of the Siddiqi family of Egypt.
The first member of the latter family to settle in Damascus was Muhammad 
Badr al-Din, see Muradi, I, 149-152; jcf. N. al-Ghazzi III, 675^  see also 
the genealogical^table given by Mu^tafa^ b. Kamal al-DIn al-Siddiqi in his; 
al—Khamra al-basiyya fi’l-rihla al-Qudsiyya^ MS. Berlin Cat. 614-9, Mq. 460, 
f* 2b7T?oira£biographical work'”on^he_^rddiqI family in Egypt see*.
Muhammad Tawfiq al-Bakri, Bayt al-giddiq, Cairo, 1323 A.H.
^Maw§ili, f. 55a; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 165a; Barik, 5-
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delegation to the Sultan. The Zu*ama and the other feudal forces in
Damascus were insignificant politically and indeed militarily, as ms
1
generally the case in the Ottoman Empire. As for the leiLiyya. they were
not yet in a position to stage a revolt, partly because of the successive
2
campaigns of repression to which they had been subjected in the past.
Nothing is more indicative of the decrease in the ■ revolutionary vigour 
which they had exhibited earlier than their being represented on a peaceful 
delegation to put the case of the Damascenes before the Sultan, rather than 
resorting to force. Only recently, in 1129/1717-8, the governor of Damascus 
had threatened the Yerliyya that he would appeal to the Sultan to remove 
their corps from Damascus because of a fight in which they took part. This 
and other recent clashes between them and the Kaoi Iiulus demonstrate, how­
ever, the ability of the Yerliyya to respond positively to challenge as well 
as attest their growing strength. On the other hand, theYerlivva corps 
was undergoing a change in structure at the time. More Damascenes were 
admitted to its ranks but they seem to have been niainly;; influential per­
sons whose interests were not encroached on by the* awaniyya. The rank and 
file of the Damascenes who suffered most from exactions do not seem to have 
started to penetrate the corps,and even if they did they were not influentia 
in it as yet. It was not insurmountable barriers that hindered them from 
penetrating it in strength, but it was a fatter of time before the corps 
swelled its ranks with them. Furthermore, the agha of the corps was not 
yet chosen from among the Damascenes. At the time the agha was a certain
1
See above p.
3Ibn Kinan, I, f. 14.8b.
O
See above pp.
114
6Abd Allah al-JEuikasi, a graduate of the Sultan*s saraya. He was appointed 
to this'office in 1113/1702-3 and remained in it till his death in 1140/ 
1727-8. But the Ottoman authority which he represented was undergoing a 
change, and on two occasions he was deposed by members of his own corps 
This could be a. result of the transition the corps was underling when 
it became increasingly identified with the Damascenes. He himself, reflect­
ing this change in his career, represented the Yerliyya on the delegation.
Because of the inability of both the feudal forces and the Yerliyya 
to take the initiative in staging a revolt at the time, responsibility was 
thrust on the 6Ulama* . The Mifti %1-Siddiqi was not the first 6diim. nor
indeed the last one,to defend the rights of the Damascenes during the 18th
2century. Others had preceded him shortly before. But his example was
certainly the most daring, and as such unique, among his class during the
period under study. His action could be explained by various reasons. If
we consider those who were arrested and'eventually put to death by Abu
Tawq as the ringleaders in the revolt, then it migjit be said that the revolt
was led by small business men, mainly shop-keepers who suffered the most
from exactions. Among them figured also some important and popular persons
like the Taj^ hlibi members who as Sufis seem to have enjoyed much backing.
These persons x-iQre in a good position to revolt, largely because of the
suburban nature of their quarter, the §alihiyya. Furthermore, the solidarity
was
of the quarter was an important factor, and when the revolt/sparked off 
others joined it as a mob usually functions. The supression of these re-
Muradi, III, 90.
2"See above p.
vblutionaries at the hands of Abu Tawq seems to have gained them the sym­
pathy and support of the mufti. His action in giving them a lead, so long
as it was justified,, was not against religious teachings* Indeed much
1
praise was- showered on him from religious people. The religious credit
of Abu Tawq was already debased in Damascus as a result of the ill-treatment
which he and his mutasallim had given al-Sharif Yahya in utter disregard of
his religious eminence • and his past career as Sharif of Mecca, Commander
2
of the Pilgrimage and governor of Jerusalem. This caused dismay in Damas- 
3
cus. Moreover, those who were led in revolt by the mufti had nothing to 
fear, at least religiously, and as things developed they were not even 
punished by the Sultan because the action of the mufti could be considered 
as a practical fatwa. although a rather forceful one*
The apparent powerlessness of the judge threw the responsibility on 
the mufti who was in a better position to act, given his local links and 
the origin of his power, Al-Siddiqi could draw much confidence from the 
prestige which his family enjoyed in Damascus, Egypt and Istanbul.
Perhaps al-Siddiqi wanted also by this act to heal some of the damage 
which his popularity had suffered earlier when he worked to dislodge the 
popular Mufti 6Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulsi,who ms installed mufti m  the initi­
ative of the Damascenes in 1135/1722-3* Through the Shaykh al-Islam in 
Istanbul, al-Siddiql reversed this decision and had himself appointed mufti
S'to the disappointment of many - an act which he himself regretted, later on.
“4>ee Ibn Jum*a, 61,62* Muradi, III, 90.
^See above p.^0 ; see also Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 159b, 179a, 179b, 183b.
3 Mansi, 1*1. f. 56b; Ibn Kinan,, II, f. 168b.-, —
4Muradi, il, 83, §4; Ayyubi, f. 2g§* HaBibx, ff. 40b, 41a.
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The bearing of this revolt on the appointment of the first *A?m
governor to Damascus was great. The revolt contributed to the removal
from Damascus of ‘Uthman Pasha Abu Tawq, who was a potential political
rival to Ismael Pasha al-^ Asjm, particularly because of his strong links
with the Sultan. Furthermore, Abu Tawq was known for his preference for
1
the governorship of Damascus to any other. But the Sultan could no longer
disregard the growing opposition of the Damascenes to Abu Tawq. More serious
things were occupying the attention of the Sultan at the time. Persia was
2torn by internal disorder and the Russians were taking advantage of it.
The rebel Ashr^f advocated Sunnism in Persia and this posed a challenge
3
to the religious authority of the Sultan. In Baghdad, too, the authority 
of the Sultan was challenged. After the death of Hasan Pasha, governor of 
Baghdad, in 1724, the Sultan reluctantly appointed his son Ahmad as his suc­
cessor.^ Things load to be settled peacefully in Damascus to avoid the er­
uption of another crisis which might threaten the safety of the Pilgrimage 
and obstruct the passage of the relief troops which were sent from Cairo to 
the Persian front through Damascus.5
Although Abu Tawq became governor of Sidon after his deposition from
Damascus, he still exercised wide' influence in several dependencies of
6 7 _
Damascus. One of his sons T'Zas governor of Jerusalem at the time, Abu
1 ,
A. Rabbath, Documents inedits pour servir & l!histoire du Christianisme 
en Orient. 2 vols., Paris, 1905-11 and Beirut, 1921, Vol. I, 370.
^PRO, S.P. 97/25: Istanbul, Vl5.1.24. 3Ibld.. Istanbul, /l9.2.24.
^Ibid. Istanbul, /19.4.24. hbn Kinan, II, f. 36b.
A.N.B1 978: Acre, 25.4.25, Acre, 30.4.25, Acre, 12.10.25.
7
Ibid. Acre, 10.2.25, Acre, 15.2.25, Acre, 23*2.25, Acre, 27.3.25,
Acre, 14*4*25*
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1
Tawq also tried to restore his credit in Istanbul. Had he lived longer
he would have been a great impediment to the expansion of ‘A^m rule. His
— 2 death on 17 Rabi6 II 1139/12 Dec. 1726 coincided with the upsurge in the
power of the sA^ms who filled the power!vacuum he left. But the sons of
Abu 'Jawq did not relinquish their efforts to be appointed to the governor-
shipsof Damascus and Sidon. No sooner were the ‘A^m governors deposed as a
3
whole in 1730 than a son of Abu Tawq was appointed governor of Sidon. This 
appointment shows the interest which the family of Abu Tawq still had in 
this region and further illustrates the importance to therms of the re­
volt of the Damascenes against Abu $awq.
The revolt had further bearing on the relations between Isnafcil Pa.sba 
al-i&sra and the Damascenes, and between the succeeding governors and the 
Damascenes. Isma*il Fasha, while governor of Damascus, ordereo his brother 
Sulaynian Pasha, governor of Tripoli, to give asylum to the shipwrecked 
Damascene prisoners who were sent by Abu Tawq to Istanbul.^ Ety* this act 
he was smoothing the way to cultivate the friendship of the Damascenes to 
whom he was already familiar as Commander of the jarda.
1
Ibid. Acre, 23.4.25; A.N.B 1021: Sidon (?).3.25.
^ A.N.B"'" 1021: Sidon, 24.4.27; Ibn Kinan, II, g>. 74b;_ al-Qasi, p.77, re­
ports his death in 1138/1725-6. The statement by Muradi IV, 15, that Abu 
Tawq was appointed governor of Basra around 1150/1737—8, appears erroneous. 
In fact Abu Tawq was appointed governor of ®asra but that_was around 1126/ 
1715 before his first appointment to Damascus, see Shidyaq^ 70, 4 1 7 _  
Shihab. Inbnan. I, 16; Nuzha. U3. Paris, f. 35b; cf. Abbas al— Azzawi,
Ta?rikh al-‘Iraq bayn ihtilalayn, £ vols., Baghdad, V, 187~8.
3
Bee below p.l£2*
^Maw§ili, f. 55b.
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The fact that the Damascenes revolted and killed several of the 
‘awanivva without being punished was of gneat significance for the future. 
Their attitude towards their governors was deeply affected, all the more so 
because the Sultan complied with their demands when he deposed Abu Jawq. A 
revolutionary tradition was thus established which was to inspire further 
revolts of greater magnitude and far-reaching results.
The Origin of the ‘Agms and their rise to power.
There has been much speculation about the origin of the ‘Asm family.
The most controversial attempt to trace their origin was made by ‘Isa 
Iskandar al-Ma‘luf, a versatile Lebanese author who wrote in the first half 
of the 20th century. Several later x^ riters quoted Mafc luf and the sources he 
used, but hardly added anything substantial to his arguments in this respect. 
The most recent of these writers is ‘Abd al-Qadir al-‘A§m whose account 
appears in his book entitled a al-Usra al-fc Asmiyya. The two major pro­
nouncements by Ma‘luf on the subject appeared in al~Mashriqin the form
of an introduction to his description of the palace of As‘ad Pasha al-6A^m
3
in Damascus, and in RAID while x^ riting about one of thei-rcontemporary 
members.
Ma*luf vib&gMl:. his article in al-Mashriq by mentioning a variety of ; 
sources he referred to. But these seem to have been of no great help to him I 
in tracing the origins of the ‘Asms, because the majority of them dealt with;
1
Published in Damascus, I960'.
2#Qa§r, As‘ad Basha al-‘Asm*, al-Mashriq, 24 (1926), 5-6.
3
*A1-Marhum Jamil Bek al~‘Agm*, RAAD. 14 (1936), 56.
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the Azms while in office. He stated that they were of the Bani ‘Asfm
tribe in Balqa. Saltan Selim I,according to him, made its chief an agha
in the Syrian countryside and took with him seven of his sons to Anatolia 
as hostages,to assure that other members of his family who were wazirs would 
not revolt, He then adds that al-Shaykh 6Abd al-Rahman al~Fasi al-Maghribx 
states in his history, written in Egypt after 1100A.H., that the title ‘Asm 
was given to them by the state but in origin they were * Urban from Badiyat 
a1-Sham. Their being Arabs, he continued, is confirmed by the fact that tbas 
was no trace of them in Konya and among the Turkish tribes which did not
even know them. But in another passage he states that two brothers of this
family, Qasim Bey al-‘Azm, known as Abi Katif, who died with no heir, and 
Ibrahim Bey, ancestor of the contemporary ‘Asms, were brought up in Konya. 
Ma‘luf then adds that according to some sources*the fcA|ms were Turks from 
Anatolia, hnd only God knows the truth!
In his later account in HMD, Ma^luf appears more inclined to believe 
that the ‘Azms originated in Turkey. The prominence he gave earlier to the 
probability that they were of Arab origin Is abandoned now. He mentions ! 
that the A^ms were from the tribes of Konya in Turkey and that some histor- : 
ians (i.e. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Fasi, whom he still quotes but, now, signifi­
cantly in a footnote) said they were descended from the Bani ‘Azim Arabs in 
HawfSn and its vicinity. Qasim Bey al-‘A§m, known as Abi Katif, who left 
no heir, and Ibrahim Bey, father of Isma‘il Pasha, distinguished themselves 
in Konya. Ibrahim moved to Baghdad in the reign of Sultan Murad IV and 
there Isma‘il Pasha and Sulaymn Pasha were born to him and they were the 
first to come to Damascus. He then adds that some Turkish papers men­
120
tioned that the title al 611am was given to them because of the big stature 
of their ancestor, Abi Katif, known in Turkish as kamtk^l.
In these two accounts irreconcilable statements appear in the first, 
while the second inexplicably adopts a different view of the origin of the 
6 Asms. Perhaps in his brief errata note in an earlier work Ma‘luf was near­
er to the truth" when he stated that Ibrahim Pasha, ancestor of the 4 Asm
.  _  1
family in Syria, came from Konya to Ma arrat al-Nu man,. which was within
2
the province of Aleppo. Other sources confirm that the *A$ms first started 
their political career in Macarrat al~Ntf man. But whether they were tribes 
and whether they were of Turkish or Arab origin is difficult to ascertain. 
What Is certain is that they were an established family in and around 
Macarrat al-Wu‘man in the first quarter of the 18th century. This view is 
supported by various sources.
1, The Damascene chronicler Sayyid Kaslan al-Qari, who wrote in the 19th
century, after the hegemony was eclipsed, mentioned that I-sma* il Pasha
—  3
al-6Azm was a fallah (peasant) from Maearra. This term may have been es­
sentially used by al-fiari to describe the original occupation of Isma‘il 
Pasha In Mafcaa?-ra. But if we consider the social standing of al-Qari as a 
sharlf and a member of a wealthy Damascene family,^ then his term might imply 
contempt as well which was characteristic in the attitude of the urban people
^Dawani al-jjutn'f fl ta/ rikh Bani al-Ma6 luf, Lebanon, 1907-8, p. 705.
See Ayh-i 4All, 276; Otter, Voyage en Turquie et en Perse. 2 vols^ , Paris,
■ 174.8, I, 91. In the 18th century Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man as given as malikane 
to the governors of Damascus, see below p*$6*1 *
3 —p. 77. This term, used alternately/ viith that of Mac arrat al-Nifman, is
a shortened form of the latter.
^Munajjid, Wulat Dimasha, p. 9.
1towards the rural people at the time, all the more so in this case because 
a person of peasant origin became a governor. What supports this view is 
another statement made by Baghib Pasha, who was nominated to succeed As*ad 
Pasha as governor of Damascus in 1757 tad later became Grand Vezir. Infur­
iated at the rejection by As*ad Pasha of a proposal he put to him to buy 
some of the longings of As* ad Pasha which were necessary to him in his
future office of Commander of the Pilgrimage, Baghib Pasha denounced him as
~ *— 2 _fallah ibn fallah (peasant son of a peasant). Although Baghib Pasha used
the term here in a contemptuous sense which reflected the low esteem in 
which the peasants were held, he was invoking, at the same time, the fact 
that the *Azms bad been peasants. But for a peasant like Isma*Tl Pasha al- 
A^m to be appointed governor of a province, he must have been a rather in­
fluential peasant, in other words a rural notable.
2. The Aleppine * AM Allah b. Miro, who was contemporary with
the *Agms, mentioned that the father of Isma*il Pasha was a .iundi (soldier) 
who settled in Manama probably around the middle of the 17th century.^ " Ac­
cording to this chronicler As6 ad Pasha al-*Azm, son of isma6il Pasha, was
5 Tborn in Ma‘artm in 1117/1705-6, and his brother Sa‘d al-Din was born in the
same place sometime after 1130/1717-8.^  This shows that the 6A?ms were
See for example Muradi, III, 276; Russell, I, 4-05; Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 64a, 
72b, 86b.
2
Bussell, I, 4-05; see below, p. 3.66* ,
S^ee Muhammad Baghib al-Tabbakh, 1* lam al-nubala* bi-ta*rikh Halab al~
Shahbaf , vols. Aleppo/#fc^ /l923-/, VI, 4-81; Kurd"*All, II, 289, Ibn Miro 
who died in Il84./l770~l( see Tabbakh, I, 55), left a work which apparently 
had no title and whose whereabouts are not known at the present time. 
Passages from this work are quoted in extenso by Tabbakh and, to a lesser 
extent, by Kurd 4Ali,
4The term jundi (pi. .fund) was used by the Damascene chroniclers to refer
1 2 2
resident in Ma/arra in the first quarter of the 18th century.
3. The Damascene chronicler Ibn Kinan, who was also contemporary with the .
^  ^  —  1 
‘Asms, referred to Isma/il Pasha as 'known as Ibn al-6Azm al-Nu*mani1, that
is from Ma4arrat al-Nu6man. When Sulayman Pasha al-4Azm ms deposed from
his i&Wc? governorship of Damascus in Rabi4 II lI5l/Ju!y-*Auguat 1738, he
left Damascus in Jumada I with his family and went to biladihi (his country),
2 _ 
as this chronicler put it. 'His country' according to Ibn Kinan was Hamah
_ _  __________  3
where Sulayman Pasha had a saraya (palace). It seems that the^^ms with
the rise in their power moved their main residence to Mamah which they
_  -  4
were given at intermittent periods, together with Ma arra <, as malikane.
4. Surpassing the previous accounts in identifying the 4Azms, al-Khuri
Mikha' II Barfk, an 18 th century Damascene chronicler, stated that Jusayn
Pasha b. Makki, a native of Gaza and governor of Damascus in 1170/1757, 'was
from the second group of awlad al-4Arab who became wazirs in our country.
The first group was Bayt al-fiAdm^ whose origin is from Ma‘arrat Halab,
awlad *Arab1.^  It is not clear if Barlk meant that the 4 Azins were of Arkb '
and not of 4Uthmanli origin, as he preferred to call the Rumis.^  But most
8 —certainly he meant that they were of local origin. Barik, Moreover, con­
sidered the rise of the 4Azms to power as an historical event which among
(cont.) to the Janissaries of Damascus in the 17th century, see above p,6'f, 
3Tabbakh, III, 334. 6Ibid., 329.
1Ibn Kinan, II, f. 163b. %bid., ff. 84b, 85a.
3Ibid*s I*- 105a, ^See for example £abbakh, III, 335.
T^his is a local pronunciation of the word 'iizm, cf, Lammens, La Syrie, II,9*1
6p. 36. 7pp,6 2, 93. above p.
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had
other things prompted him to begin his. history from 1720 by which time they/
1
.became governors. As an Orthodox Christian Arab he emphasised the fact that 
the ‘Asms were awlad ‘Arab and prided himself, on one occasion, oh their 
tolerant rule towards the Christians in Damascus. His 'arabism1 cut across 
his religious allegiances when he described Patriarch Cyrillus, a native by
origin, as the first to be ordained from awlad al~‘Arab instead of from the
3 iGreeks* Other evidence shows that the A^ms were considered Arabs by their
contemporaries.
5. The French Consul at Sidon referred to Sulayman Pasha al-^Ajm when he 
was governor of Sidon in 1729 as, *11 est et a toujours t^e- eleve a la 
campagne ou il est s'est accoutime'* a se obeir absolument ’ When the ‘Azms 
were deposed and their wealth confiscated in 1730, the French Vice-Consul In
Acre commented, 1 ils seraient encore heureux s'il se voyaient reduits a leur
/ £ 
premier etat de simples particuliers de campagne1P  On other occasions the
French dispatches referred to the ‘Azms as Arabs. On the appointment of
Sa‘d'al-Din Pasha al-‘Azm to the of Tripoli in 1746, the French
6 ✓Consul referred to him as 'un autre ^tcha arabe de nation1. In 1763 Muham­
mad Pasha al~4A$p, governor of Sidon at the time, was described in a dis-
/ n
patch as being *de la famille arabe nominee Beit SI adm1.
\
1 _ tk
See Barik, p.2. ~Ibid., 62.
3ibid., 3; it is significant also that Barik identified the area extending 
between Antioch in the north and ‘Arish in the south as al-bilad al- 
*Arabiyya. pp. 35, 68, 69.
h.N.B1 1022! Sidon, 20.9.29. ^A.N.B1 978s A°re> 20.1.31.
^A.N.B1 1118s Tripoli, 10.10.4-6. Ta.N.B1 1033! Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin}
In the first two statements the French officials revealed the accepted 
fact that the *Agms started their career in the Syrian countryside. By 1730
members of this family governed a wide region which extended from ’the bound-
,  -  1 o
aries of Arish Mi§r to the boundaries of Aleppo1, and this shows, as what
concerns us here, an entrenched family power which must have taken the6Agms 
some years to build up. Furthermore, the ‘il^ ms do not seem to have been grad­
uates of the Sultan’s saraya and were not transferred, at the beginning of 
their rule, from a non-Syrian province to a Syrian one, but held office at 
first in the region where they built up their power.
The other statements in the French dispatches which referred to the 
‘Asms as Arabs were based on a first hand knowledge by French observers on the 
spot who communicated with the 4Azm governors. These observers were reflect­
ing in their statements an established belief that the ‘Agms were Arabs most 
certainly,meaning local people. If this does not go back to the remote past^  
at least it shows they were considered so at the time.
That the ‘Agms lived in Macarra before they started their administrative 
career in the first quarter of the 18th century is already established. But 
how- were they able to attain such power?
According to Ibn MLro Ibrahim, the father of Isma* il Pasha al-<A§m, 
came as a .iundi to Ma‘artm.' In the fighting that broke out between the people 
of Fla4 anna and the Turkomans^ * who frequented its vicinity, Ibrahim was killed.
The garrison of 6Arish was composed at the time of Mutafarriqa troops, see,
M, al-ICurdi, f. 60b*
2Barik, ^See above p.f^,
^The Turkomans usually settled in the vicinity of urban centres, see:
Nabulsi, Hillat alpdhahab al-dljQg, MS. BM, OR. 3^ 22, f. 5bj Sauvaget,
Alep. 230: Fococke, II. I. 118.
1 2  5
One of his sons, Isma6I'l, born in Ma(arra shortly before 1070/l659~60, was 
able, later, to become governor of his birth-place as well as of Hamah.1
That Ibrahim came to Manama as a jundi. probably around the middle of 
the 17th century, fits into a common practice at the time. We have already 
seen that the janissaries of Damascus known in the 17th century as .iund 
Dimashq extended their zone of influence as far as Aleppo early in this cen-
2
tury and took control particularly of revenue collection in the countryside. 
True, the janissaries of Damascus were able to exercise such an influence 
partly because of their growing power. But on the other hand the conditions 
in the countryside were certainly favourable for this expansion in their in­
fluence. With such a practice established and the conditions inviting as 
they were, it is no wonder that other .iundis or perhaps mere adventurers 
should have flocked into this territory on the fringes of the province of 
Aleppo. It may well have been also that Ibrahim al-eA3m was appointed by 
the Ottoman authorities to guard MacaaTa against the threatening Turkomans. 
But the place from which Ibrahim came is an enigma which does not admit of a 
solution at the moment.
How far is Ibn Miro reliable and how far were the conditions in Ma6 arra 
at the time helpful for the ‘Azms to build up such a career? ‘Abd Allah Ibn
3Miro was descended from a family of notables known in the history of Aleppo 
in the 18th and 19th centuries for its trading activities. The commercial 
relations of the Miro family, particularly ‘Abd Allah, outside Aleppo^ * seem
T^abbakh, VI, 431. 2See above p.££-
S^ee SaimychR, ff. 4°b, 78a.
P^RO, S.P.llO/40: Aleppo, 11.8.69; Radcliffe papers, 6645/5* Aleppo,
i5.lO.4 8, Aleppo, 20,2.49.
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bo nave enabled him to obtain information on the inhabitants of the country­
side for his history. Moreover, his contemporary, the Biographer Muradi,
• x
copied at length from his history which suggests its reliability.
The location of Ma*arr& on the borderline with the desert was advanta­
geous because it served as a centre for trade with the Beduin. But on the
2
other hand its position made it vulnerable to their attacks. Furthermore,
Ma‘arra was located on the main road, between Aleppo and Damascus and this
3
enhanced its commercial importance, as well as enabled its authorities to 
control the traffic of passengers and goods. Thevenot described Ma‘arra 
in I65B as 1une mechante ville commandee par un Sangiac1, and noted the ruins 
that surrounded it.^ In 1105/1693 Nabulsi saw numerous Beduin roaming the 
region between Hims and Hamah.5 Pococke who visited Ma*arra in the thirties 
of the 18th century described the poverty of the town and the Independ&nce 
of its agha who levied contributions on travellers*^
Given the loose security that prevailed at the time, particularly in 
the countryside, it does not seem to have been difficult for a person like 
Ibrahim al-*A§m, who was a soldier by occupation, to build up a career in 
this region and for the Ottoman authorities to condone his rule because ap­
parently he helped to restore order. His death in the fighting with the 
‘Turkomans was a challenge to which Us family was able, to measure up. It
kabblkh, I, 36, 37* r::r
2Cf. Kamil b. Husayn al-Ghazzi, Nahr al-dhahab fi ta1 rifch Ijalab, 3 vols. 
Cairo, 1341-5, A.H. see X, 419.
Cf. Mantran and Sauvaget, 119. ^Voyages. II, 703, Suite de Voyage. Ill,
97, 98.
5al-Haqiqa, ff. 37a, 37b. 6II, i. H5, 146.
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seems that during the counter-attack which the Ottoman authorities launched
against the nomads who ravaged the countryside in the province of Aleppo in
1
the first quarter of the 18th century, Ismafil Pasha al-*Agm was recognised 
as governor of Mia*arra and Hamah. For, oncehe was able to assert his author­
ity, it x%ras only natural for the Porte to regularize his position by appoint­
ing him to a government post with all this entailed of ease in deposition and 
confiscation, through the good offices of the governor of Aleppo, cArifi 
A^mad Pasha, IsmasTl Pasha was made governor of two tugs and appointed to
i
the governorship of Tripoli in the early twenties. In this capacity he was 
appointed commander of the jarda as well. In addition, he was given, to­
gether with his brother Sulayman, Hims, IJamah and Mafcarra as malikanes. The
2
next step was his appointment to the governorship of Damascus in 1725.
Once the A^gms were initiated into the process of obtaining a governor­
ship, they devoted all their resources and skill to this purpose. Two essen­
tial conditions at the time to acquire a governorship were enoug'h money to 
buy the way through, and the offices of an influential person in Istanbul to 
insure that this was done. The *Agms did not lack either. Money was forth­
coming from their malikanes and other interests. They counted, moreover, on 
the resources of the province of Tripoli to which Isma‘il Fasha was appointed.
The Syrian littoral, between 4Arish and Latakia, was undergoing, at the 
time, a change in its economic fortune. Since the first quarter of the 18th 
century Aleppo had started loosing the initiative in trade which it had re­
tained all through the previous century. The Russian attack on Persia in 
1721-2 and the consequent occupation of its silk producing regions cut off the
^Kamil al-Ghazzi, III, 295*
2Ibid., III, 295, 296; Tabbakh, III, 316, IV, 481.
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flow of Persian sillc to Aleppo.’*' The resumption of hostilities between the
Ottomans and Persia impeded the traffic in goods between Ispahan, the Persian
2
Gulf and Aleppo. The deterioination in the commercial position of Aleppo
partly resulted in, and indeed coincided with, an expansion in the commercial
3
activity of southern Syria. This expansion was partly due also to the ris­
ing interest of the French in the commerce of the Levant particularly after 
1715. The treaty of Utrecht in 1713 brought peace to France, and its Medi­
terranean communications were no longer hampered. The economic policy of 
Colbert geared the whole effort of the state towards this expansion.^ " The 
English traders, centred on Aleppo, soon found dangerous rivals in the French 
traders who established themselves in southern Syria.^
The increasing demand for tobacco and sillc produced in the province of
6Tripoli brought heavy rewards to its governor. Its ash which was exported
to Europe for the use of the soap and glass industries provided an addition-
al profit. Nothing is more illustrative of the desire of the ‘A^ms for
amassing money and indeed or their ability to do so than the vast wealth
8
confiscated from them in 1730.
The ‘A^ms relied on influential persons in their drive for power, such as 
the governor of Aleppo ‘Arifi Ahmad Pasha. Like other governors they kept an
1gR0, S.P. 97/24, Pt. IVt Istanbul, 12.3.23; M. Shay, 90-5; Wood, 145.
'“PBO, S..P. UO/25, Pt. II; Aleppo, 20.4.26, Aleppo, 11.6.26, Aleppo, 17.6.26; 
Charles-Roux, Les Echelles de Syrie... au XVTIIe Siecle. p. 7.
2p. Masson, Histoire du commerce X?ranqais dans le Levant au XVIII Siecle. 
p. 512; cf. P. Lucas, Voyage... fait en 1714. Rouen, l'?19, I,’ 371.
^Charles-Roux, 3, 4. 5PR0, S.P. 97/24, Pt. IVs Istanbul, 16.9.21;Wood,141-6. 
6
A kind of soda supplied largely by the Beduin and produced from the burning 
of /certain alkaline herb, see A.N.B? 322? Sidon, 28.1.36; B111 45: Mar­
seille, 6.8.28; Volney, 347; The French dispatches referred to this mat­
erial as 1cendres1.
7A.N.B^ -^ - 45j Marseille,6.8.28; cf, T. Shaw, Travels■> 330.
°See below p.
123
agent at the Porte to look after their interests. Their agent at this time
t - . 1 -  2was a certain Khalil Efendi who was attached to the kabya of the Grand
Vezii*. In 172$, when Ismafil Pasha al-"A§m and his brother, Sulayman Pasha,
were appointed to Damascus and Tripoli respectively, they sent money to Khal-
Tl Efendi in the form of bills of exchange  ^drawn through the English factors 
5at Aleppo. It is not cleax* precisely for what these sums were paid. They
may have been part of the miri revenue sent by the 4Azm governors to the Im-
5 ___
peria.1 treasury at Istanbul.' They may well have been sent also to Khalil
them
Efendi in payment for his services to the "'Azins or to buy/favour. The fact 
remains, however, that this agent was taking care of their affairs in Istanbul* 
The First 4Azin Governor of Damascus.
Isma‘il Pasha al“fcAzm governed Damascus in the period between 23 Jumada 
II 1137/9 March 172$ and the first half of Jumada I 1143/Nov. 1730.^ The 
rnutasallim whom he sent to take control of its affairs was Sayyid *Abd al- 
Fattah Agha,^ whose daughter Isma* ll Pasha married.^
The policy of Isma^il Pasha in Damascus £
The main feature of Isma5il Pasha1s governorship in Damascus was the 
monopolistic policy he adopted particularly as concerns the sale of meat.
h.N.B1 1022s Sidon, 22.11.29.
%Ie actually controlled all the internal administration of the Empire, see 
Hammer, XIV, 218, 219; Of. PRO, S.P. 97/35* Istanbul, 2.12.52. Hammer, XV,
98, XVII, 43 referred also to this official as Minister of the Interior.
3PR0, S.P. 110/2$, Pt, Is Aleppo, 29.10.2$.
^See G. Ambrose, 'English traders at Aleppo, 16$8-17$6', EHR, III, 2 (Oct. 
1931), pp. 253-7; PRO, S.P. 110/36* Aleppo, 19*4*60. For the use of 'lettres 
de change* by French traders, see A.N.EF-^ - 3$s Marseille,.1$.11.38; J.Savary, 
Le Parfait Megociant* new ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1749, 4^ * I? 131-279; J. Sav- 
ary Des Bruslons, Dictionnaires Universal de Commerce, 3 vols., Geneva,
1742, I.ii.$74> cfT3^4T™
53PRO,S.P.- 110/2$, Pt.I* Aleppo, l/+.8.2$, Aleppo, 29.10.2$,S.P.110/2$, Pt.II, 
Aleppo, 20.12.26.
6Cf. Gibb and Bowen, I,ii.4-6 n.5. Ibn Jum‘a,64; Riaila, f.Ua; Mugaggi/,
%iaala. f.!4a; Muwaqqi* , f. 250b. %aw§ili, f. 55b.
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Ten batchers' shops and two slaughter houses were allowed to function. The 
next step was that he made himself the sole supplier of sheep. Stringent 
measures were taken against the inhabitants of the nearby villages who shel-
p
tered herdsmen x^ ithout his approval.~ Thousands of sheep were brought from 
his property,^ probably his malikanes of Hims, Hamah and Ma4aiE\va, and supplies 
were released by him for sale at intervals.^ * The price of mutton rose by more 
than half and on some occasions it was doubled. This stringent policy en­
couraged smuggling and profiteering. The prices of other foodstuffs follox-7ed 
suit and the people pronounced against the governor. This situation, x-rhich
lasted all through his governorship, x-xas aggravated during his third year of
6 7
office by a bad harvest and the price of wheat soared that year. True,
there were some outside factors which contributed to the rise in prices such 
through
as the passage/W Damascus in 1727 of troops coming from Egypt on their way to
3 ■ -jthe Persian fronts which seems to have diminished the available supplies and
made them dearer. But this was for a limited period^ and xxas by no means re­
sponsible for the persistence of the high prices during the x-jhole governorship 
of Isma‘il Pasha. Rather, IsmatfTl Pasha seems to have exploited the orders of
the Sultan to provide supplies to the troops on the Persian front to enrich
himself.10 Whenever he left the city prices and supplies returned to normal.
1Maw§ill, f. 56a; cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f. 74a; al-Qari, 73?.
2Mawsili, f. 53a. %bid. ^Ibid., f* 57b. 5Ibid.
6Ibn Jura4a, 63. 7Barik, 2.
1 1
8Ibn Kinan, II, f. 171b; A.W.B*1* 1116? Tripoli, 19.4.27; A.N.B 30s Aleppo,
24.7.27 estimated the number of these troops at 3600.
V  A.W.B1 1116: Tripoli, 14.2.27.
10Ibn Kinan, II, f• 75a; cf. A.N.B1 1116: Tripoli, 14-2.27.
M^ax-x^ ili, f. 53b.
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The transport animals which he confiscated eh the orders of the Sultan, to
be sent to the Persian front, were used by him instead to carry Christian
pxlgrxms to Jerusalem for a special charge. It Is significant that the
>
^hahbandar (the head of the merchants)2 was put to death in the citadel of
  3
Damascus shortly after the appointment of Isma6 il Pasha. The reason is not 
known, but this seems to have facilitated the execution of his policy.
How was Isma4II Pasha able to maintain his hold in spite of this injur­
ious policy^and what were the reactions of the Damascenes, who had only re­
cently revolted against the exactions of Abu Tawq? Isma4'!! Pasha was strong
enough to command obedience. He depended on his own bodyguard composed mainly
—* 4 5of Maghariba. On his appointment to Damascus heavy troops accompanied him.
Diplomacy was not lacking, moreover, and at the start of his governorship he
posed as the champion of the Damascenes1 rights, particularly of those of them
implicated in the revolt against Abu Tawq. When the latter sent some of those
accused to Istanbul and they were shipwrecked near Tripoli, its governor
Sulayman Pasha rescued them on the instructions of his brother Isma4il Pasha
who refused to hand them over to Abu Tawq in spite of a Khatti Slier if to
have them killed.^ Another act of religious significance and wider appeal
— —7
was soon to follow. The exiled Sharif Xahya who was formerly persecuted
—  3by Abu Tawq in Damascus, to the annoyance of many of its inhabitants, was
^Maw^ ili, f. 53b. 2 i^pp ana Bowen, 1.1.303.
3 —
Ibn Kinan, H, f. 165a. 4-Barilc, 7.
^Ibn Kinan, It, f.. I6$a. %aw§ili, f. 55b.
7See above p. %ee above p. //*>.
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welcomed as a settler In Damascus by Isma'Tl Pasha* . 'where he remained 
until his death in Jumada I 1138/January-February 1726; ^
Fitting into the classical tradition of Muslim governors and satisfy­
ing at the same time religious public opinion, Isma*il Pasha built a madrasa
(school) in Sqq al-Khayyatin near Mahkamat al-bab* Apart from its use for
2 —  3religious instruction, it provided accommodation for some *Ulama* and was
utilized by the gufis for dhikr (a gufi practice) He built a bath in the 
same suq .J and another in the Kharab quarter. He also built a coffee­
house and shops in the region known as taht al-qal*a (below the citadel).^
The coffee-houses, where, according to Pococke, the idle people, strangers 
and others who were not of the first rank assembled and passed their leisure 
time, were places of amusement in some of which music was played and Arabian 
stories told at fixed hours. An extra coffee-house may satisfy more people, 
but it could also be used as a rallying place where dissatisfaction may be 
disseminated.
Another achievement by Isma6il Pasha, which was of particular importance 
to the Sultan, was the comparative safety which he ensured to the Pilgrimage 
during his six years1 term of office. It suffered no serious attacks under 
his strong command and the escort of his brother Sulayman Pasha, except for
“*Tbn Kinan, II, ff. l6?b, 168a, 168b; cf* Maw§ili, f. 50b; SalayftSrf- al~ 
gahir, Safha, BMP, 17 (1942), 44-9.
2Cf. Muradi, II, 281, IV, 218. 3Cf. Ibid.. Ill, 93, IV, 154.
^Cf. Ibid. * II, 53; MuradT, Matmah1^  f. 194a.
5
Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 74b, 172b.
6Ibid., f* 118a. Many Shi*Is inhabited the Kharab quarter at the time, see 
Ibn al-§iddiq, f• 53a* : • .
'W^tafa al-Tarazi, Diwan, MS, Berlin Gat. 8034, (l) 287, f. 4b.
^Pococke, II.i. 122;* Gf. Russell, I, 146-8 .
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the last year when he clashed with the §arb Beduin in Hijaz. 1 The only
2   _
other calamities it suffered were natural, such as excessive heat. Isma*il 
Pasha relied on military strength? as well as on diplomacy^ in his relations 
with the Beduin along the Pilgrimage route. His credit as a result was aug- 
mented in religious public opinion in Damascus, His ensurance of the safety 
of the Pilgrimage must hage contributed in no small measure to his long dura­
tion in office.
!
This double-sided policy of profiteering and appeasement apparently | 
neutralized the Damascenes, but the situation was always liable to explode.
The deposition, shortly after Ismacil ?asha!s appointment to Damascus, of 
the Mufti IChalil al-Balcri al-§iddiqi who had led the discontented Damascenes ! 
in revolt against the * awaniwa of Abu Tawq, had removed a potential leader 
who could rally the Damascenes once more. His replacement by Hamid Efendi 
al~*Imadi restored the old traditional and peaceful line. Whether Ismacil 
Pasha had a hand in the deposition of al-§iddiqi is difficult to tell. It 
seems that the change of Shaylch al-Islam at Istanbul to whom al-§iddiqi was
7
attached had contributed, to his removal. Probably this news was received 
with relief by Isma"il Pasha because he bad no more to fear the past record 
of the ifefti.
Despite all these conciliatory and helpful acts by the governor, signs 
of unrest became apparent. A sharif. significantly one of the discontented r 
^A.N.B1 978s Acre, 18.10.30; fabbSkh, VI, 4-81.
Ibn Jum*a, 62, 63; Mawgili, f. 56a; A.I'J.B^  1116: Tripoli, 8.10.25,
Tripoli, 20.11.25. , ,
^Ibn Kinan, II, f. 165b. ^Ibid.. f. 75a; Maw§ili, f, 55b.
5 ~For poems said in his praise see Tarazi, ff. 4b, 73a. No matter how flatter­
ing these poets may have been they still represented and reflected the opin­
ion of influential sections of the Damascenes.
^Ibn Kinan, II, f, 165b; Maw§ili, f. 55b. M^uradi, II, 8 4.
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butchers, was implicated in an affair connected with the confiscation of 
transport animals and was subjected to the bastinado by the kahya of the 
governor. Some persons from the §ali£tiyya, the already oppressed and re­
volting quarter, suffered also in this affair. The *Ulama*. it seems, were 
not enthusiastic about a revolt probably because they were lulled by the re­
ligious works of Isma*il Fasha and also because they seem to have lacked a 
Bakri., Leadership, therefore, was thrust on the Yerliyya who were becoming 
more identified with the Damascenes, and hence more sensitive to their ills. 
Some members of the Yerllyya started a revolt against the kahya of the gover­
nor and soon the mob was formed. The shops closed and the law-court sit­
tings were suspended. This took place while the governor was on the dawra, 
sometime between Hajab and Hamadan 1138/March and Hay 1726, It was only
after the Him ordered the release of those arrested and the suspen-
1
sion of all penalties that things returned to normal.
Once a revolt was started and the ruler compromised, the discontented 
were merely bought off and, as a result, similar conditions could inspire 
other revolts. Towards the end of the same year two incidents occurred with 
grave consequences. Both took place in the absence of the governor on the
Pilgrimage. On 20 Dhu'l-Qa‘da 1133/20 July 1726, the mu;Msallim» who was
   2
the son of Isma'il Pasha, ordered the raising of thirty purses from the
crafts, the villagers, the Turkomans and the nomads of al-Biqa*', to be given 
as a khidma (recompense or wage), to the qaoiji (envoy) dispatched by the 
%aw§ili, ff. 33a, $3b,
%he nurse was an Ottoman unit of account introduced during the 17th cen­
tury. Its value differed according to the time and place where it was 
used, see S. J. Shaw, Ottoman Egypt in the .lSt^entu^, p. 10 n. 4. The 
Syrian purse, in the early eighties of the 13th century, was of 500 piastres 
see Gibb and Bowen, I.ii.45 n.2.
3a member of a. corps employed by the Sultan for various functions, one of 
which was to execute special commissions in the provinces, see Gibb and 
Bowen, I.i.33n.$, 347.
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Sultan to announce the evaluation of the gold coins. The shops closed,
the call to prayer and the Friday prayer were suspended and the populace
rose in revolt in protest. It is not known why the mob!s anger was directed
against the Safarjalani family whose members were described as having the
1
upper hand in Damascus. It may have been that members of this family who
o
were prominent merchants in Damascus had either used their influence to be 
exempted from this imposition with the result that the envy of the extorted 
classes was aroused against them, or that they cooperated with the governor 
in the execution of his monopolistic policy. It is significant that members 
of the Safarjalani family suffered later in the wake of As*ad Pasha!s death,3 
which suggests that this family had been cooperating with the cAzm governors. 
^ie agfoa °£ e Kapi KulusA  at the head of about two hundred soldiers, in­
terfered to relieve the mutasallim. and several persons were injured in the 
fighting. The affair was settled only after the judge, the mufti and the 
naqib al-Ashraf had issued a joint appeal to the Damascenes and excused them 
from payment, ilhen preparations for the .iarda became due at the end of Dhu *1- 
Qacda, the mutasallim had the opportunity to :take; revenge^ 'onlthese'religions 
leaders and he threatened that he would not prepare for the .iarda unless the 
sum of ten purses, which he had already paid to the qa.pi.ii, were refunded.
Anxious for the safety of the Pilgrimage, the religious leaders levied the
5
amount from the crafts and the villages.
H^asibi, f, 52a; cf. Muradi, I, 15-6; III, 137; Budayri, f. 32a.
2
Muradi, III, 137, 3cf. Ibid., IV, 210; see below t
^Maw§ili, f* 59b referred to him as aghat a1-Yankasbary. It seems that this
chronicler who referred to the Ysaiiyya and the Kapi Kulus by the same term,
mostly inkishariyya, probably meant here the Kapi Kulus who were usually on
the side of the governor against theYSgliyya, This may have aroused the 
hostility of some of theYerliyya who later revolted against the mutasallim.
5ifewsill, ff. 59a, 59b.
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the
The relations between the mutasallim and/Ierliyya deteriorated still 
further, each trying to discredit the other. On IB Dhu ?1-Hijja 1133/
IB July 1726, the mutasallim sent the gubashi accompanied by Tufenq.iis 
to enquire into alleged immoral acts committed in the house of cAbd Allah b. 
Sadaqa, a member of the Yerliyya. Opposite the latter*s house in Qasr al- 
Hajjaj street, the Mawgili family was celebrating the marriage of one of its 
members in the house of *Umar Agha al-^ ashif, also ffom the Yerliyya. Those 
attending included an assortment of*Ulama3. Ashraf. Yerliyya and others who 
seized on this occasion and denounced the gubashi as having unlawfully in­
truded on the privacy of the ha rim of Ibn Sadaqa. Although such an incident 
calls for alarm, the hostile reaction of the Yerliyya and their associates 
(a!-‘awan) could not be justified solely by this act. They killed the 
gubashi and threw his corpse in the law-court as a further act of defiance.
The mufti and the judge then intervened and demanded that both parties should
1
appear before the law. This assertion of political-.powerby the Yerliyya
i\ras further demonstrated in the middle of Muharram 1139/Septenber 1726 in a
struggle between them and the Kapi Kulus during which the shops closed for
, 2three days and .many casualties'' occurred.
The significance of these disturbances could be summed up as follows?
1. The role which the 4Ulama' had assumed in defending the Damascenes
3
against Impositions and injustices in the first quarter of the lSth century 
was changing in character. The religious officials such as the judge and 
particularly the mufti and the naqib al-Ashraf were adopting the conciliatory
1
Mawgili, ff. 59a, 59b.
2Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 169b, 170a; Ibn 62, 63.
^See above p. tfg.
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role of a go-between and were satisfied with enforcing the rules of the 
Shari*a on the contestants. This middle role was possible because the 
Yerliyya began to assert their power vis-^ a-vis the governor and to balance 
the Kapi Kulus.
2. These events reveal a change in the position of the Yerliyya. The 
Damascenes became more widely and effectively represented in the Yerliyya 
Corps, his is apparent in the attitude of this corps in defending the in­
terests of the Damascenes, and in the co-operation of the latter with its 
members. This was one reason why the Yerliyya were able to rally the mob 
behind them. Some Ulama^. as we have already seen, concerted action with 
Ihe Yerliyya because of the several interests they shared. In the religious 
atmosphere that prevailed in Damascus in the 18th century - one has only to 
look at the long list of cUlarna* from other places who resided in it and at 
the growing number of the adherents of the turuq - the term {alim was very 
loosely applied. With the widening in the recruitment of Damascenes to the 
Yerliyya Corps, many of those considered cUlama? penetrated the corps and 
many of those already in it identified themselves with the ‘Ulama* because 
it was rewarding both ways. The common denominator now between the Yerliyya 
and what we may call the militant *11 lama* was a unity of interest based on 
the merging in their recruitment. This new outlet, in the Yerliyya Corps,fo: 
those Damascenes who considered themselves as ‘Ulama* and who in the absence 
of this corps or in the closing of its ranks to them could have strengthened 
the religious class by a militant element, brought about this new relation­
ship. As a result of the penetration the Damascenes into the Yerliyya tbp 
its members mirrored the various social levels existing in Damascus. Among the
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members of theBxiliyya Corps there were those who were considered a{mn 
(notables) and those who were considered ruavag (rabble)
3- The Kapi Kulus appeared as restorers of order, and as such they were
on the side of the governor at this stage at least. But they were not immune 
to corruption and to penetration by the Damascenes as we shall see later. 
However, they were bitterly opposed to the Yerliyya as a rule.
U* A kind of balance was emerging beWeen the forces supporting the govern­
or and those representing the Damascenes. The security of the governor in 
Damascus depended either on mastering a superior military force or on keeping 
a balance among these groups.
5. As for the attitude of the Sultan towards these disturbances in Damas­
cus, it may be said that there was nothing very ■-.spectacular about them to 
warrant his direct interference. No Judges were implicated nor was the law- 
court stoned as happened under Abu Tawq. Then a deputation was sent to 
Istanbul to plead against his injustices, but now theYenlivra became power­
ful enough to look after their own interests. However, some complaints were 
made by the Damascenes to the Sultan against Isma'il Pasha. Similar com­
plaints were made at the same time by certain persons in the provinces of
Sidon and Tripoli against their "Asm governors. But the Sultan, seeing no
2
urgency to act, seems to have brushed aside these complainte , partly as it 
seems, because of 'the manoeuvres of the gAsms1 agents in Istanbul^ and partly 
perhaps because of the Sultan1s occupation at the time with the more serious 
problems of Persia.^
1 ___
See -Samm&mmpte Muradi III, 90; see below p.
^.N.B1 97&s Acre, 20.1.31. ^A.N.B1 400? Istanbul, S.12.29.
PRO, S.P. 97/25: Istanbul, 8.2.26, Istanbul, 24..1.27.
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The policy of Isiriafcil Pasha outside Damascus;
Unlike his apparenflycsonciliatory, although basically extortionate, 
policy in Damascus, Ismafcil Pasha exhibited a forceful policy blended with 
diplomacy towards the rural people in his province. The main lines of' this 
policy ^ were to take whatever measures were necessary to enforce the re­
strictions he applied on the sale of mutton in Damascus and to maintain his 
authority vis-a-vis the Beduin,
In the immediate neighbourhood of Damascus, in the villages of Jarmana, 
‘A r^aba, Bayt Sahm and of Ard a 1-Wadi (valley of Barada), the strong hand of 
Isma‘ il Pasha loomed over the inhabitants. On one occasion he held them 
collectively responsible for allowing unauthorized herdsmen to frequent their
lands, which was detrimental to his monopolistic policy in Damascus, and in-
1flicted penalties on them. On another, forced contributions were levied
p
-Uponthe villagers to pay the messenger of the Sultan,
In the Haw$an and in the region between the upper Jordan valley, and 
§afad and Nablus, Isma II Pasha introduced certain political adjustments 
among the local power groups.At first he acknowledged the authority of two 
Beduin chiefs, Jabr^in the Hawran and Rashid al-Nu‘aym^ in the region to the 
south west. This arrangement was designed to prevent Jabr from extending 
his authority towards Safad and Nablus, Eventually It failed, Jabr ex­
hibited power and influence to an extent that threatened to disrupt the
■W^ili, 53a. 2Ibid., ff. 59a, 59b.
I^t seems that he Is the one whom M» al-Sabbagh« p. 25, referred to as 
Rashid al-Jabr, Amir ma&hayikh *Arab gafad.
^Towards the end of the lSth century this tribe numbered about 10,000 persons 
and roamed the region between Damascus and Hims, Seetzen/291.
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balance of power which Isma4Il Pasha tried to establish^because the local 
chiefs in the regions of Safad, Nablus and Jabal 6Amil rallied around Jabr. 
Isma6il Pasha therefore expelled him and his tribe to the Hebron district,
1
where, although removed from an important region, he was more free to act, 
and recognized as chief in his place ‘J'ahir (also referred to as !£ahir,~ 
sometimes Dahir^ ) b„ Kulayb.^
The southern regions of the province of Damascus were frequented, in 
parts indeed settled, by various tribes. When there were strong local chiefs 
in these regions, as was the case with the Ghazzawis, the Furaykhs, Fakhr 
al-Din Ma*n IX and the Farrukhs In the 17th century.", these tribes were dealt 
with by such strong local rulers who usually either allied themselves with 
them or subdued them. In such cases the governors of Damascus were relieved 
from direct responsibility, so to speak, towards these tribes, but then the 
risk of managing thise* pox^ erful local rulers would be greater. During the 
first quarter of the 18th century there was no strong local chief in these 
regions to assume som& sort of responsibility towards these tribes. Zahir 
al-eUmar, X'rho figured shortly afterwards as paramount chief in the region j
I
of Safad, x^ as still groping for pox^ er at the time. Direct responsibility was; 
therefore in the hands of the governors of Damascus. NaspuhFasha. governor 
of Damascus between 1120/1708-9 and 1126/l714-Jv adopted a forceful policy 
towards the Beduin. He killed the then militant Beduin chief, Kulayb,
Shaykh of the Sardiyya, who held the titles of Shaykh 6 Arab bilad al-Sham
hhd Shaykh al-bilad al-Hawraniyya. Under the x^ eak succeeding governors,
T '" ’ ~ —
On the relations between Zahir al-6Umar and Jabr see below p. /?}/-
2 q
Ibn Kinan, I, f. 99a. M. al-Kurdi, f. 31a.
%aw§ill, f. 58b, cf. ff. 55b, 56b.
1 4 1
the Beduinl resumed their insubordination on a wide scale.^
Tahir b. Kulayb did not prove as militant as his father, and his
authority was challenged by other tribes. The fact that his tribe belonged
2 —  —to the Yemeni faction caused him trouble from the Qaysi faction. Isma*il
Pasha tried to support some local notables so as to balance the power of
3.
the Beduin chiefs. He appointed a member of the Tawqan family, probably
Ibrahim b. §alih, as governor, of ifiblus where this family was prominent.^
In Jerusalem he appointed for governor a certain Qara Mutasallim who had
served under AbulTawq in Damascus.^
Such arrangements, introduced by Isma*il Pasha, designed to ensure
order by guarding against any suspect groupings among the local chiefs
and by installing reliable rulers, did not altogether stand the strain of
the Beduin inherent insubordination and the repulsion of the local people
towards his exactions. He failed to eradicate the danger of the Beduin
who attacked places as near to Damascus as al-Ghuta and al-Marj and devasta-
6
ted the crops without being punished* However, the administrative mea­
sures taken by Isma‘1,1 Pasha helped him to enforce his monetary demands on 
the dawra rather easily. On one occasion he collected from the regions of
1 -
See Xbn Kinan, I, ff. 32b, 47a, 99a, 110b; M. al-Kurdi, ff. 8a-38b; Ibn 
Juma*, MS* Berlin flat. 9785. We(II) 418, f. 23a; Ibn Junfa, 52-55; Hammer 
XIII, 189, 258, cf. 101.
2 „
Cf. M. al-Kurdi, ff. 27b, 38a, 38b; for the Qaysi-Yemeni rivalry among the 
Druses, see below p. ; for the division of the population in the region 
betx^ reen Jerusalem and Tripoli into these two factions see, Heyd, 86 n.l,
G^f. Ihsan al-Nimr, Ta? rikh Jabal Bablus x<ra* 1-Balqa?, Vol. I, Damascus, 1938, 
79-104.
M^aw^ilT, f. 58a; cf. Muradi, I, 113; Hasibi, f. 52a,
5MawgilT, ff. 57a, 57b, 58a. 6Ibid., f. 603.
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Nablusj Jerusalem and Gaza more than the specified amounts !copying the
example of Abu £awq and even transcending him1, in the words of his con-
1
temporary chronicler. Such exactions were met sometimes with forceful de­
fiance on the part of the oppressed. In 1789 Isma‘il Pasha was besieged by 
peasants supported by Beduin forces in the region of Jerusalem because of 
the extortions he practised on them. His brother Sulayman Pasha of Sidon
came to his rescue and was recompensed by the Sultan, it is alleged, with 
- 2the title of wazir.
The Fortunes of the fiAzm family during the governorship of Isma4!! 
Pasha in Damascus»___________ ________ ____________________
When Isma4 II Pasha al4Jlgm was governing Damascus, other members of 
the 4 Azm family were appointed governors of the provinces of Sidon and 
Tripoli. This demonstrates the upsurge of their political power in a re­
latively short time.
Sulayman Pasha al-‘As;m succeeded his, brother Isma* il Pasha in Tripoli
3
as soon as the latter was appointed to Damascus in 1725. In this capacity 
Sulayman Pasha was appointed Commander of the jardaf" On 14 February 1727 
he was deposed from Tripoli and appointed to the province of Urfa.  ^ Far 
from being a move against the *Azms or against one of their members, which 
in a way it was if judged by their preference for local governorship^ this 
appointment was intended by the Sultan to strengthen his defences against
llawfili, f. 5Sh. A.N.B1 978s Acre, 15.4.30, Acre, 18.10.30.
3 — L — 1
Maw§ili, f. 55b. Ibn Kinan,II,f.80b; A.N.B 1116s Tripoli, 5.9.25, 
d. Tripoli, 8.10.25.
^A.N.B 1116s Tripoli, 14.2.27; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 75a mentions Erzerum 
instead.
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the Persians. eAbd Allah Pasha Koprulu of Urfa, whom Sulayman Pasha re­
placed, was disgraced inthe fighting against the Persians and was trans­
ferred to the governorship of Sidon which happened to be vacant after the
- 2  -
death of Abu Tawq. As a successor to Sulayman Pasha in Tripoli, another
member of the 6 kqm family, Ibrahim Pasha, son of Isma6il Pasha, was ap-
3 kpointed. Latalcia which was dependent on the governor of Tripoli was gov- 
  5
erned by Yasiift Bey, son of Ibrahim Pasha al-'Azm. With the temporary cessa­
tion of hostilities between the Ottomans and the rulers of Persia and the
6 _ _
conclusion of peace on 13 October, 1727, it seems that Sulayman Pasha was
in a position to use his influence at the Porte to acquire the governorship 
of Sidon. This he obtained in 1728. Thus the ‘A^ ms concurrently governed 
the three provinces of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli. As‘ad Bey al-‘Azm, son
of Isma*il Pasha, was appointed mutasallim for his father in both Hamah and
S —Macarra. In 1730, a few months before his deposition and arrest, Sulayman
»  Q H**
Pasha, as we have already seen, was raised to the rank of wazir. Khalil 
Efendi, the agent of the €Agms, was still efficient at Istanbul.^ The 6Asms
lA.H.B.’1' 1116: Trippli, 1^ 4-.27.
2A.N.B 1022s Sidon, 24.4.-27, Sidon, 25-5.27.
q 1
.A.N.B 1116: Tripoli* 11.3.27; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 75a gives his name as 
Sasid. Ibn Kinan, II, f.126, seems to have corrected his statement when he 
mentioned Ibrahim Pasha, son df Isma4!! Pasha, as governor of Tripoli.
4&.N.B111 45s Marseille, 6.8.28.
Barlk, 123; A.N.B'*' lll6t Tripoli, 26.10.30 (Relation de la revolte arrivee
a Tripoly de Sirie), gives his name as Mu§tafa.
6M. Shay, 125; A.N.B1 1116s Tripoli, 28.2.28; for the'text of the treaty 
see Hikmat, 183, 184-.
^A.N.B1 1022s Sidon, 1.11.28, Sidon, 24.12.28.
B^arilc, 124; Tabbakh. Ill, 334, IV, 48; cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f. 111b.^con .^ )
14 4
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used money also to extricate themselves from any dilemma there. By the end
of 1730 members of the *Azm family, together with their dependents, ruled an
2
area which extended from *Arish Mi^r to the boundaries of Aleppo. But 
things were changing in Istanbul and with them the fortunes of the tfA:£m family, 
The revolt in Istanbul and the deposition of the‘Azms.
On Thursday 15 Rabi4 I 114.3/28 September 1730 seventeen janissaries with
— 3Patrona Khalil at their head started a revolt in Istanbul. The Sultan, Ahmad
III, panicked and lost the initiative against the rebels while they were still
in a minority and undecided about the next step. He strangled the Grand Vezir
the latter*s kahya and the qaoudan pasha, whose death the rebels had asked for
This was the first weakening on the part of the Sultan, and was followed the
next day by his deposition at the request of the rebels and the installation
of his nephew Sultan Mahmud 1 .^
The ‘Asms suffered as a result of this revolt. Their agent at Istanbul,
5
Khalil Efendi, who was attached to the kahya of the Grand Vezir, lost his 
patron and with him his influence. Hardly had two months elapsed when offi­
cials were dispatched from Istanbul with orders to depose, imprison and con-
6 7 8
fiscate the property of the *Azm governors of Damascus, Sidon, Tripoli,
'Q'(cont r) n a q
'See above p.ity-2 . A.N.B 1022: Sidon, 22.11.29; cf. Babbath, II, 43-4*
b.N-B1 1022s Sidon, 20.9.29 . 2Barik, 124.
? 1^For the causes of the revolt see, A.N.B 402: Istanbul, 20.10.30; M. Shay,
27; B. Lewis, The Emergence of Npdern Turkey. Oxf. Univ. Press, 1961,pp. 4 6, 
47; J. Porter, Turkey. 2 vols., London, 1854? p* 191; H. Bowen, E.I., new ed. 
s.v* Almiad III; cf. Hammer, XIV, 217-8.
4For a detailed account of the revolt see C. Perry, A View of the Levant,Lon- 
don 1743, pp. 64-112; see also Hammer, XIV, 219-236; M. Shay, 27-30; PHO.
S.P. 97/62: Pera of Istanbul, 27.9*30, Fera of Istanbul, 30.9.30; A.N.B 
402: Istanbul, 7.10.30.
A^.N.B*^  400: Istanbul, 8.12.29* Istanbul, 16,1 .3 0 referred to this agent as 
secretary of the K^hva; A.N#b1 1022: Sidon, 22.11.29.
^Ibn Jmn'a, 6 4.
Ta.N.B 1023: Sidon, 4*1.31; A.N.B^978: Acre, 2 0.8 .3 1; al-Luqaymi, (cont.) I
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as well as of other members of this family* who were sub-governors* Although
similar but less severe orders were issued against other governors - the gov-
2 3
ernor of Aleppo, who was a nephew of the late Grand Vesir, was deposed yet I
the deposition of the VAzm governors as a group, their imprisonment, as well as
the confiscation of their property, exceeded what would normally be expected
after such an administrative change at Istanbul. The reaction of the people
who were governed by theisms is. significant in this respect.
Within about three weeks of the start of the revolt at Istanbul, news
of it was carried to the provinces of Aleppo, Tripoli, Sidon and Damascus by
special messengers.dispatched by the Sultan to announce his accession and the
deposition of his predecessor.^ In some regions in Syria, the populace seized
on this occasion and revolted against their governors. In Aleppo, a local
squabble developed into a demand for the reduction of the price of bread. The
villagers around Aleppo ..rose against the local judges whom they held respon—
£
sible for not checking vexations. But by far the worst revolts took place
in Latakia and Tripoli against the 6Azm governors. To relieve his son the
governor of Latakia, against whom the people of the city and its hinterland
revolted, Ibrahim Pasha al-^ Azm, governor of Tripoli, tried to send him jani-
these
ssary troops. But/janissaries* revolted on 27 October 1730, perhaps encouragec. 
by the revolt of their namesakes in Istanbul, and certainly taking advantage ,
(cont.) kawanibi al-fcBns,ff* 140a, 140b.
1116: Tripoli ? 26.10.30 (Relation de la revolte arrived a Tripoly de 
Syrie centre Ibrahim Pacha, gouverneur de cette ville) 5 cf. Charles-Rouac,^ :
Barik, 124. A^.W.B*^  Blj Aleppo, !14,10.30. i
V n . B 1 81; Aleppo,2.1.31; A.N.B 403J Istanbul,25.1.31.
///$
hsarlk, 123: A.N.BpTriooli, 25.10.30; A.W.B1 81s Aleppo, H-10.30,
Ibn Kinan, II, f. 12%.'
5A.N.B81s Aleppo, 10.11.30.
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of this opportunity to settle accounts with Ibrahim Pasha. Some of the in­
habitants of Tripoli joined them in their revolt . The real causes, however, 
were the extortions of the * awaniyya who were protected by the governor, and 
the letter’s monoooly of foodstuffs counselled, it is alleged, by his Jewish 
sarraf. Like his father, the governor of Damascus, Ibrahim Pasha exploited
the orders of the Sultan to send supplies to the Persian front to enrich him- 
1
self. The rebels demanded, a reduction in the price of meat, bread and other 
necessities. Several casualties occurred and the judge, as was very often the 
case elsewhere, was held responsible, and his house wasrsacked. The head­
quarters of the governor was stoned and he himself needed the protection of
2
some of the inhabitants.
In Sidon the situation stopped short of a revolt, as it seems, perhaps 
because there was no outside pressure as happened in the case of Latakia and \ 
Tripoli, and probably because the policy of Sulayman Pasha in Sidon was less 
economically oppressive than was the case with either his brother or nephew, j  
If Sulayman Pasha had spared the inhabitants of Sidon heavy exactions it was 
largely because he had other resources to count on. In the. flourishing econ-, 
omic conditions in southern Syria at the time, the rural regions in the pro­
vince of Sidon produced large quantities of cotton, silk and ash which were 
demanded for export. Sidon benefited from .this commercial activity and this 
explains why the French. Gonsulate ithe're was very active. Sulayman Pasha
A.N.B1 1116: Tripoli, 16.7.27.
p i  e
A.N.B 1116: Tripoli, 26.10.30 (Relation de la revolte); Charles-Roux-, 59, 
Barik, 123, 124.
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found it more profitable to concentrate on the countryside to enrich himself,
and for this purpose he speculated in trade, practised extortions, and op-
1
pressed his vassals. He also exacted money from the foreign merchants and
2from the missionaries established in his province. In his attempt to domin­
ate the countryside by force, Sulayman Pasha beseiged in 1730 the rebellious
inhabitants of Tiberias and used large guns in reducing them. In these ef~
3
forts he concerted action with his brother Isma6II Pasha of Damascus, The
subjugation of Tiberias is of great importance because it x^ as farmed by Zahir
al-6TJmar at the time.^ This marked the beginning of a bitter struggle between
Sulayman Pasha and Zahir which ended by the death of Sulayman Pasha in 1743
5while attempting to subdue Zahir.
Precise information on the attitude of the Damascenes towards their 
governor after learning of the revolt In Istanbul is lacking. The newsr 
started, however, a series of clashes between the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus. 
This seems to have served as a diversion for whatever Ill-feelings may have 
existed towards Isma4!! Pasha. During the fighting the shops closed for
6four days, the Friday prayer was suspended, and. several casualties occurred.
This was basically a struggle for political power. But the clash In economic
7interests between both corps after the Kapi Kulus joined the drafts gave this
h.N.B1 978: Acre, 15.A.30* Acre, 3.5.30* Acre, 13.10,30; A.N.B1 1023:
Sidon, 19.3.31,
2A.N.B 1022: Sidon, 15.10.30; A.N.B1 978: Acre, 20.8.31. 
3A.N.B1 978: Acre, 15.A.30, Acre, 3.5.30.
/ £
See beLxw p, } 72., See below p, Z (o ,
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struggle a sharp twist. It x<ras apparent, however, that the Yerliyya were
gaining the upper hand.’*'
It seems that the change of administration in Istanbul and the removal
of the cA§ms! agent from the centre of power bad revived the appeals already
made by the Damascenes and others to the late Sultan against the exactions of
the governor s. It may well be that the new administration", had invoked
them to justify its action against the ‘Asms. There were other reasons,
however, which had discredited Isma?;! Pasha, the senior governor among the
‘Asms, if only by virtue of his appointment to Damascus, at the Porte. On |
his sixth and last Pilgrimage Isma*il Pasha clashed with the militant Barb
tribe between Mecca, and Medina and, as a result, he changed his course and
2
avoided passing through Medina on his way back. This aroused the indignation 
of the Sharif of Medina and its inhabitants and, according to Ibn Miro-, had 
caused Isma*Tl Pasha1 s deposition.^ Seen in the context of the deposition of 
the governors as a: ..whole, it seems an exaggeration to attribute the de­
position of Isma*II Pasha solely to this cause. Religious indignation there 
certainly was, and particularly a new Sultan could not leave such an offence 
unpunished or unexploited. Appeal to religious opinion both in the provinces 
and at Istanbul was very much needed by hik at this early stage of his reign. 
Ostensibly, to- allay the alarmed religious opinion at what happened near 
Medina, he appointed the powerful eAbd Allah Pasha Muhsin-Zade as governor 
of Damascus - an office which he did not occupy in practice. The Sultan may
_ _ _ _ _ _ _  (S'ldonT ’ ”
cf. A..N#B 1023:/Damascus, 4*2.31.
2 i
A.N.B 973: Acre, 18.10.30.
3,{abbakh, VI, S&L.
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have used the appointment of this powerful person as commander of the Pil­
grimage to lull religious opinion at a critical time. That he played up 
this issue for other reasons mainly to camouflage the summoning of his strong 
supporters to Istanbul against whom the rebels protested, is clear. eAbd 
Allah Pasha helped the Sultan in putting to death several of the chiefs of 
the rebels on 14 Jumada I 1143/25 November 1730,- and was consequently appoin-
ted agha of the janissaries in Istanbul rather than governor of Damascus and
1
Qommander of the Pilgrimage.
It is obvious that the cAzm governors, not unlike several other govern­
ors, tried to exploit their position to enrich themselves. The extortions they
2
practised and the immense wealth confiscated from them partly attest to this 
fact. The reaction of the inhabitants manifested itself sometimes in appeals 
to the Sultan, sometimes in protests and strikes, and finally in revolts in 
some places. One should not underestimate the impact of the revolt at Ist­
anbul in igniting these local revolts. But, on the other hand, these re­
volts were only possible because a revolutionary situation did exist. These 
revolts may not have been the immediate cause fob the deposition and imprison­
ment of the sJlzm governors since they started in the second half of October 
and the 4 Azms were deposed in early November, and this makes a report to the
Sultan, a decision for deposition, and. an order to that effect hardly cred­
ible in so short a time.  ^ The revolts, however, may have confirmed the new
h.N.B 4.02: Istanbul, 30111.30; Hammer, XIV, 243-5; cf. Ibn Jum'a, 6 4.
2
For a detailed description see Barik, 124, 125*
^A.N.B1 1116s Tripoli, 26,10.30 (Relation de la revolt^; Barik, 124; Ibn 
Jum4a, 64; cf, Risala. f. 14a; Muwaqqi4 , f, 250b;
^0n one occasion, in 1740, it took an express messenger from Istanbul to
reach Sidon about forty-five days, see A.N.B^ 1025s Sidon, 16.3*40.
150
administration in Istanbul in its suspicions of the4lizms and possibly
in the wisdom of its action against them. The radical changes in the
administration at Istanbul with all that they entailed seem to have been the
main reason for the deposition of the ‘Asms. The confiscation of their
1
wealth would bring the Sultan much needed money for his Persian War. At 
the same time, the deposition would enable the new officials at Istanbul to 
provide governorshipsfor their candidates. These various factors contributed 
to the temporary eclipse of the frAzm governors as a group. It took them, 
however, a relatively short time to regain their prestige and to return to 
the administration,
1BarTk 127.
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Chapter A
THE PROVINCE OF DAMASCUS BETWEEN 
1143/1730 W.,,,J15iiZr741 
The Governors hip of * Abd Allah Pasha Aycltnli
‘Abel Allah Pasha Muhsin Z^ade, the successor-designate to Isma‘11 
Pasha al-^ Agm, assumed other duties in Istanbul and never occupied the 
governorship of Damascus* He was replaced by the Sultan’s brother-in-law,
4Abd Allah Pasha Aydinli,^ whose surname seems to have been conferred on him 
by the local chroniclers after the name of the province of Aydin which he had 
governed before his appointment to Damascus. ‘Uthman jjgha. the mutasallim 
of 6 Abd Allah Pasha Muhsin-Zade, who entered Damascus on 12 Jumada I 1143/
23 Nov. 1730,^ was replaced on 15 Jumada II 1143/26 December 1730 by Qara 
Sulayraan Agha, the mutasallim of ‘Abd Allah Pasha Aydinli. The latter ar­
rived in Damascus on 21 Ramadan 1143/30 March 1731.^ At the outset the ap­
pointment of ‘’Abd Allah Pasha to Damascus was part of a wider scheme to 
break ‘Asm rule. In Tripoli the imprisoned ‘A^m governor, Ibrahim Pasha, was
5succeeded by 4Uthman Pasha who was a muhas§Il in Aleppo. Ahmad Pasha, the
^f. A.N.B1 408; Istanbul, 7.11,33; PRO, S.P. 97/27; Pera of Istanbul, 3.5.35
-2Dhikr man tawalla al-Wizara, f. 114b; Risala. f. 14a; Muwaqqi*, f. 250b.
2 . 1
Muwaqqi4, f. 250b, cf. Ibn Iumca, 64; A.N.B 1023; Sidon, 8.2.31, Bidon, 
19.3.31, Damascus, (?).(?) 31; Radcliffe papers, 6645/4: Aleppo, 2.2,31.
^Ibn -Turn* a, 64; A.N.B1 1023; Sidon, 28*3.31 states that he entered Damascus 
on 22 March 1731.
h l . B 1 81: Aleppo, 2.1.31; A.N.B1 1116: Tripoli, 15.1.31; Barik, 125;
‘Uthman Pasha ms a native of Aleppo, Radcliffe papers, 6645/7: Aleppo, 
24.8.38.
152
son of 6Uthman Fasha Abu fawq and son-in-law of the late Saltan, was ap­
pointed governor of Sidon after the deposition and arrest of Sulayraan Fasha 
1
al-£ Asm.
  r \
Under ‘Abd Allah Pasha order was restored to Damascus. Already be­
fore his arrival, his mutasallim seems to have been able during his three 
months1 rule to re-establish tranquillity after the clashes that took place
between the Yerllyya and the Kapi Kulus. ‘Abd Allah Pasha entered Damascus
3
with a show of strength, and four thousand soldiers accompanied him. He
was, moreover, known in the Ottoman Empire for his valour and for the bravery
, through
of his private troops. The passage Damascus in Dhu Jl-Qa‘da 1145/April-
May 1733 of troops coming from Egypt to the amount of six thousand on their 
way to the Persian front, seems to have impressed the Damascenes, parti­
cularly the Yerliyya. and implicitly strengthened the authority of the gov- 
ernor. The fact that the Kapi Kulus received these troops, seems to have 
inspired confidence in the former and contributed to the docility of the Yer-
liyya. if not to the lessening of their hatred of the Kapi Kulus. News of
-  7
the attack of Tahmasp-Kuli Khan of Persia on Iraq and the encampment of his
^A.NJ3^ 1023s Sidon, A.1.31, Sidon, IS.2.31; Barik, 125.
2Barik, 8. h.N.B1 1023s Sidon, 28.3-31.
C^f. PRO, S.P. 97/2!?s Pera of Istanbul, 3-5.35-
%R0, S.P. 97/26? Pera of Istanbul, 5-6.33; Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 33a, 36b.
6 _
Ibn Kinan, II, f. 36b.
0^n entering the service of Shah' Tabinasp ll the future iJadir Shah became
known as Tahmasp-Kuli Khan. After his coronation on 27 January 1736, his 
original name was changed to Nadir and he became known by it, see Suwaydi, 
f. 10a; V. Minorsky, E.I. 1st ed. s.v. Nadir Shah, pp. 810, 811.
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X ?troops between Mosul and Baghdad and the consequent siege of the latter,~
brought the danger home.
3
In spite of a big increase in prices of food, especially of bread, 
in the last year of his governorship, 114.6/1733-4> n° disturbances occurred 
in Damascus. 4Abd Allah Pasha, it is true, did not make exactions. Perhaps 
his wealth - he was known as one of the richest governors in Turkey^ - ma.de 
him more interested in the prestige of his office as commander of the Pil­
grimage than in enriching himself deliberately as Ismacil Pasha had done be­
fore. The increase in prices was caused by various factors. The orders of
5
the sultan to the provinces to send much needed supplies to the Persian front
through
seem to have caused a shortage and hence a rise in prices. The passage i’i/; 
Damascus of numerous troops coming from Egypt must have increased the demand 
for food. The lack of water from which the pilgrims had suffered on their 
way .'back that year^ may have affected certain regions on whose supply Damas­
cus had depended. Plague spread also in Damascus as well as in the adjoining
7 S
regions in 1144/1731-2 and lingered on until the beginning ofIL45/l732,
9
causing heavy mortality. Apart from the falling-off it must have caused in 
the energies of the people, its impact in occupying the Damascenes with a 
serious immediate danger limited the chances of giving vent to insubordination
P^RQ, S.P. 97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 1.3.33; M. Shay, 142,1.45.
7^, %norsky, E.I. 1st ed., s.v. Nadir SHah.
^Barik, 8; Ibn Jum*a, 65; Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 3&b, 93b.
TRO, S.P. 97/27: Pera of Istanbul, 3.5.35.
5PR0, S.P. 97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 21.5.33. 6Ibn Jum‘a, 65.
7A.N.B1 1117: Tripoli,21.2.32, Tripoli, 25.4.32; Russell, II, 336 n.2.
8Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 28b, 30b. 9Ibid., Ibn Jum‘a, 65.
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Paradoxically, the governorship of cJLbd Allah Pasha witnessed a com­
mercial activity from which the Damascenes benefited.^ " This was probably 
responsible for lessening the impact of the rise in prices. The safety of 
the Pilgrimage under ‘Abd Allah Pasha encouraged more merchats to accompany 
it, thus increasing the -amobility and purchase of goods. But by far the 
greatest factor was the development of trade relations between Damascus and 
the neighbouring ports, particularly Sidon. The silk and cotton manufactures
 ^ as well as ash w^ere in increasing demand by the French. The daflrfar
2
of Damascus speculated in the trade in ash through Christian agents.
eAbd Allah Pasha1s main contributions while governor of Damascus were
connected with the Pilgrimage. He ensured its safety during the three times
he commanded it, and this gained him much credit-locally particularly among
Through force he held the Beduin in check.
the cIJlama? for whom he had a special affect ion, "V Two of their members who
committed a minor theft in MuzayrTb were put to death by him.^ ' On his second
Pilgrimage the Beduin attacked him while on his way back. Together with the
commander of the .jarda he defended the Pilgrimage and inflicted heavy casu-
5
alties on the Beduin. It is remarkable that the Information about this 
event came from sources in Tripoli and not from the Damascene chroniclers as 
usual. This was because the commander of the darda was the governor of 
Tripoli Sulayman Pasha al-'Asm who communicated the news to his mutasallim, 
his nephew As4ad Pasha. The latter ordered three days1 celebration in the
S
Garlic, 8. 1023s Sidon (?).11.31.
ll-Qari, 78. . 'WrTk, 1, 8.
^A.H.B1 in?: Tripoli, 30.7.32.
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citadel to mark this victory. It seems that a normal skirmish with the 
Beduin which did not excite the anxiety of the Damascene chroniclers was 
exploited by the 4Asm governor in Tripoli for propaganda purposes. The ‘Asms 
were very much in need of such publicity to repair some of the damage which 
their popularity had suffered earlier, and to consolidate their position at 
Istanbul,
Apart from his successful protection of the Pilgrimage, *Abd Allah 
Pasha built two embankments on the Pilgrimage route between §anamayn"^  and 
Musayrib. This facilitated the journey of the pilgrims and of those who used 
to accompany them to the latter point. He also paved the road leading from 
Damascus to Qunaytra, which seems to have been partly used by the pilgrims at 
the start of their journey. The local inhabitants certainly benefited- as 
well from these works. He reconstructed some fortresses along the Pilgrimage 
route as well as the bridge of al-Hasa. He built a fortress in al-^ Mudawarra 
and founded two water reservoirs in it. He contributed to the religious edi­
fices in Mecca, dcecorated the Mahmil and ornamented some of the famous tombs
2
in Damascus with relics brought from Mecca,~
Early in Slia‘ban 1146/January 1734? 4Abd Allah Paaha Aydlfjli was de­
posed from Damascus, and Sulayman Pasha al-^Azm was appointed to it.
The second phase of cAsm rule in Damascus.
I. The rehabilitation of the 6Apis.
Hardly had a year elapsed after the arrest of the ‘A§m governors and
^For this and other places along the Pilgrimage route see below Appendix K^iK
2al-QirI, 77, 73.
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the confiscation of their property when they were released from orison and
some of them offered new appointments. Isma6il Fasha was released from his
prison in the citadel of Damascus, in the month of Jurrtada I 1144ATovember
1
1731 and appointed governor of Ganea in Crete where he died in 1145/1732-3.2
who
His son Ibrahim Fasha/was imprisoned in Tripoli was discharged on 10 Jornada
3
1 of the same year and ordered to accompany his father. As6 ad Pasha was
also- ordered to go with his father but was later excused for reasons of 
health,^ Sulayman Pasha was the only who was appointed to a local gov­
ernorship. After his release from the citadel of Sidon on 15 Rabi4 II 1144/
5
17 October 1731* he was immediately appointed governor of Tripoli.
The appointment of Ismacil Fasha to a distant governorship in Crete 
which was very often used by the Ottomans for exile,  ^and the orders to his 
sons to accompany him, amounted to virtual banishment-uhencompared with the 
appointment of Sulayman Pasha to Tripoli. Such a contrast suggests that 
either Sulayman Fasha was working separately and that he was more influential 
at Istanbul or^that his past record was less odious than that of his brother, 
Isma4il Fasha. and of his sons. However, it is apparent that there was a 
change for the better in the attitude of the administration ati Istanbul to­
wards the ‘Asms and particularly Sulayman Pasha. An investigation of de­
velopments which occurred both in Istanbul and in Tripoli helps to clarify 
this point.
]'Ibn Kinan, II, f. 109a. Pococlce (ll,i,239) visited the island of Crete in 
the middle thirties of the 18th century and mentioned that it was divided 
into three governors hips £ Candia, Retimo and Canea; c£i‘, Barik 7.
2 _
Tabbakh, VI, 481 mentions that he died in Canea; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 65a states
that he died in Ratma (Retimo); cf, Barik, 7.
3A.N.Bl 1116: Tripoli, 25.11.31. ^abba£h,_III, 334, 335. 
^A.N.B 1116: Tripoli, 25.11.31; Lu^ymi, Mawanik al-Uns, ff, 141a, 142b;
7    (cont.J
15 7
111 Istanbul the prominent leaders of the September revolt were mass­
acred by the Sultan on 25 November 1730* Some of their fellow revolutionaries 
who remained at large took advantage of the discontent resulting from the
rise in prices to stage another revolt on 15 Ramadan 1143/24 March 1 7 3 1 but
1
their attempt was crushed. Although the revolutionary leaders were elimin­
ated, the feelings of distrust and intrigue which the revolts had created were
not easy to suppress. The spy system which was strengthened as a result help-
2ed the Sultan early In September 1731 to foil another attempted revolt.
These disorders in Istanbul are important to this study In two respects. On 
the one hand, the power of the Grand Vezirs was weakened as a result of the 
change in the attitude of the new Sultan. He was advised not to be blindly 
governed by his Grand Vezirs, but to change them frequently. What is remark­
able is that the ICizlar Agha, who was alleged to be behind this advice, em- 
erged now to fill the powers vacuum created. Rivalry then developed between 
the ICizlar Aghas on the one hand, and the Grand Vezirs on the other, each 
group trying to hove the upper hand.. This situation had repercussions on the 
provincial governors who gained or lost according to the party to which their 
agents were attached. To anticipate we may mention the future defiance by 
Fathi, the Daftardar of Damascus, of the 4Azm governors because he was backed
"(cont). Ibn ICinan, II, f. 109a,
6
Cf. Pococke, II.i.261; PRO, S.P. 97/35: Istanbul, 4-7.52, S.P. 97/41; 
Istanbul, 18.1.62.
3 n
PRO, S.P.97/26: Pera of Istanbul, >/l5.4.31; A.N.B 403: Istanbul, 28.3.31, 
Istanbul, 2.4.31; Hammer, XIV, 247, 248; M. Shay, 31,32; C. Perry, 112,113. 
2PR0, S.P.97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 3.9.31; A.N.B 404: Istanbul, 3.9.31; 
Hammer, XIV, 2/Q 250; M. Shay, 34*
■^ PRQ, S.P.97/26: Pera of Istanbul, 27.9.30; Porter, Observations, S3, 84;
M. Shay, 30,31.
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by the Kislar Agha and they by the Grand Vezirs, and the execution of
Asc ad Pasha which ms partly caused by the enmity of the Kislar Agha towards
him. Of more immediate importance, on the other hand, was the reconcile 
ation between the 0Asms and the new administration in Istanbul. Khalil 
Efendi, who protected the interests of the governors before their de­
position, was able to regain some power. In his efforts for the rehabilita­
tion of the *Agms, he relied on the Khan of the Crimea who helped the Sul-
2
tan in eliminating the chiefs of the September revolt.~ The limited re­
instatement of the ‘Asms illustrates, however, the difficulties they still 
encountered in Istanbul,
There were other reasons which helped the appointment of Sulayman Pasha 
al-*Azm to Tripoli, The governor of Tripoli, 6Uthman Pasha al-Muha§sil, 
was unable to restrain the revolutionaries who had revolted against his 
predecessor, Ibrahim Pasha al-*Agm, all the more so because they considered
the deposition of the *Agms as an endorsement of their point of view, On
- 34 April 1731 the janissaries of Tripoli revolted against Uthman Pasha.
He was ordered by the Sultan to suppress them,^ * but his departure on the
.iarda before he could put these orders into effect encouraged other places
to revolt. Some persons in Ma*arra, garnh and Latakia seized on the oc-
5
casion and revolted as well. Against whom and for what cause these revolts
were staged is not known. Of special importance, however, are the revolts in 
1
See below Pp. 2(6, W -  
^A.N.B1 4.02s Istanbul, 30.11.30; A.N..B1 1116: Tripoli, 15.1.31; Hammer,
rev, 242.
h.K.B'*' 1116: Tripoli, 15.4.31; cf. Charles-Roux, 59, 215-17, Masson, 287.
il.N.B1 1116s Tripoli, 25.5.31. -Ibid.. Tripoli, U.S.31.
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Ma* arra and Jamah, the 1 homeland1 of the 4 Asms, and their former malikanes > 
Harmed at these disorders which *Uthmam Pasha was apparently unable to cope 
with, and pressed by the growing influence of the agent of the *Azms in Ist­
anbul, the Sultan appointed Sulayman Pasha to Tripoli which he entered on
1 2 1 December 1731. Tripoli was then reported as calm. This might be ex­
pected after a mere change of governors, but with a member of the ^Asm family 
it is significant. Sulayman Pasha was already a familiar figure to the people 
of Tripoli. His first governorship in Tripoli (1725-7) did not leave the same 
bitter memories as that of his successor, Ibrahim Pasha al-‘Aam, When Sulay­
man Pasha was arrested in 1730, no revolt seems to liave taken place against 
him in Sidon because of his relatively mild rule there. He could appeal once 
more to the people of Tripoli as their good old governor whom they might dis­
tinguish from the line of Isma^ Tl Pasha. This past Record of Sulayman Pasha 
may have decided the Sultan to appoint him to Tripoli to quieten the situ­
ation. However,the rebels in Tripoli were temporarily quiet. Before they 
could marshal their forces and !au moment qu!ils y pensaient le mains*, Sulay­
man Pasha surprised them A  An enforced tranquillity was then established, 
SulaymSn Pasha was executing the orders of the Sultan when he acted against 
them and, at the same time, he was taking vengeance on the same leaders who 
had revolted against his nephew, Ibrahim Pasha A
After his restoration of order in Tripoli came his much publicised
. , 5 !
action of protecting the Filgrimagein his capacity as commander of the .laraa. ; 
His affairs, and indeed those of the 'Asans in general,seem now to have been p
^l.N.B1 1116* Tripoli, 17.12.31$ cf.'A.N.B1 Bis Aleppo, 18.3.32.
^A.N.B1 1116s Tripoli, 25.11.31.
-H.N.B1 1117s Tripoli, 25.A,32, Tripoli, 9.3*32.
^Ibld..'Tripoli. 9.3.32 (Relation de la punitfon des rebelles de Tripoli). 
^See above p.
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going smoothly* in Istanbul. After his transfer to Sidon, Sulayman Pasha
was appointed governor of Dasmascus. His brother Ismael Pasha. together
with his son Ibrahim Pasha, were recalled by the Sultan from Crete. Isma6Tl
1
Pasha was to have replaced Sulayman Pasha in Tripoli, but he died before he
2 _
left Crete. Thus the 6Azm family was back in favour. But apart from Sulay­
man Pas,ha it had no prominent member at the time. The promising members of 
the second generation of ‘Azm governors such as Ascad Pasha and his brother .
Sa& d a 1-Din Pasha were comparatively young. As‘ad Pasha was in his middle
3 — 4
twenties at the time and Sa‘d al-Dxn Pasha was still younger. Until his ■
death in 1156/1743 Sulayman Pasha was the most prominent governor among the 
* Azms.
II The first governorship of Sulayman Pasha al~*A%m in Damascus.
Preceded by the mutasallim. his kahya. Musa Agha. Sulayman Pasha en- 
tered Damascus on Thursday, 8 Sha‘ban 1146/14 January 1734. This appoint­
ment realised a long standing desire by Sulayman Pasha which once made him 
consult an astrologer as to whether and when it would come true.^ 1 In fact,
rumours had been rife in Tripoli ever since 5 Rabi6 I 1145/26 August 1732
7__________________________that he would be appointed to Damascus* The appointment of 6Abd Allah Pasha
Aydlnli to a military Dost on the Persian front served the interests of 
Sulayman Pasha.
T.H.B1 1117s Tripoli, 26.8.32. 2ffiee above p. If*' 3fabbakh, III, 334-.
Ibid.. 329.
5Ibn Kinan, II, f. 39a; Kisala. f. 14a; Muwaqqi*, f. 250b; Ibn Jam*a, 65 gave
the date of the entry of Sulayman Pasha to Damascus as 9 Sha4 ban which seeme 
erroneous because he as well as the other chroniclers agreed on the day of 
entry as Thursday which is 3 Shat ban.
^Muradi, I, 9; )$ag'ibl, f. 52a. Ta.N.B^ - 1117s Tripoli, 26.8.32.
^A.N.B 408; Istanbul, 7.11.33, cf. A.N.B 409s Istanbul, 14.1.34* (cont.,)
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Sulayman Pasha1s internal policy.
From the outset, Sulayman Pasha, was confronted with a delicate econo-
1
mic situation. Prices of foodstuffs were high, and some Damascenes attacked 
what seem to have been the private granaries of Sulayman Pasha and took 
possession of the wheat they found in them. Sulayman Pasha retaliated by
2
hanging four persons, and this caused the estrangement of many Damascenes,
The Damascenes were already familiar with the extortionate policy of his 
brother, Isma*Tl Pasha, and seemed to suspect the intentions of the new­
comer. After all, they knew Sulayman Pasha only as commander of the .jarda 
during his brother's governorship and that of iiydtfcnli, and his success in 
this task could serve as a good start. But still the past record of Isma'il 
Pasha was ominous, Such a state of affairs, at the beginning of his rule, 
made both sides, the Damascenes and the governor, reconsider their positions.
The insubordinate elements among the Damscenes gauged the power of Sulay­
man Pasha and were violently suppressed. What attitudes would he and they 
adopt next?
On returning from his first pilgrimage Sulayman Pasha held celebration
5
on the occasion of the circumcision of his sons. Such an event, usually ex­
ploited by the governors as well as by other dignitaries ' to impress their
prestige particularly on the poor, heralded a policy of reconciliation be­
tween Sulayman Pasha and the Damascenes. It was based as much on his past
(cont.) PBO, S.P. 97/27: Pera of Istanbul, 3.5.35; M. Shay, 145,H 6 .
1Ibn Juin'a, 65. 2al-Qari, 78.
\.H,B lll6 i Tripoli, 5.9.25, Tripoli, 8.10.25, Tripoli, 10.11.26.
4-A.N.B1 1117. Tripoli, 30.7.32; Ibn Kiran, II, f. 28b.
5al-Qsiri, 7S.
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experience as on the realities of the political situation in Damascus,
Its main lines were to relieve the Dantascenes from certain impositions, to 
ally himself with the ‘Ulama* , and with their help or rather acquiescence,
to strike against the insubordinate elements, and control the military corps.
-  1
Sulayman Pasha started by removing certain unjust practices (ma.%alini)
2
from which the Damascenes and particularly the artisans had suffered. The 
support of the artisans was important because they were the breeding ground 
for revolts by virtue of their organization and their links with the mili­
tary corps. It seems that partly as a result of this reform and partly be­
cause of a good harvest the prices of wheat and barley decreased remarkably 
in 1147/1734 to the popular satisfaction.^  Sulayman Pasha then embarked 011 
ensuring security. A certain Ibn Maghmur from the Shaghur quarter, who 
blocked the roads and robbed the people in the region between Bab al-Saghir 
and Bab Kaysan, ^ was put to death on 1 Habi*’ II 1148/21 August 1 7 3 3 This 
shows the insecurity that had prevailed near such important gates of the city. 
The fact that Bab al-Saghir bordered on the Maydan quarter, the economic 
artery through which Damascus was provided with the wheat of Hawran, means 
that such supplies could proceed now unhampered. On 3 Babifc II 114-8, Sulay­
man Pasha convoked a diwan which was attended by the Mufti Hamid Efendi al- 
Imadi.^ This was probably to make the dignitaries share in the responsibili­
ty of his acts, and certainly to win them to his side.
3-This is a rather general term on which no details could be provided in^ this 
particular case. These may have been the same, or of the type of, mazalim 
referred to by Budayri, f. 10fc, 011 another occasion, see below p. Hjf,
2al~Qari, 78; Barik, 8, 9. ^Ibn Kinan, II, f. 129a.
4-See attached planf**/^ , ^Ibn Kinan, II, f, 83a.
6Ibid.
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In 1148/1735-6 members of the Kat>l Kulus rose against their agha 
1
and killed him. It seems that this was not a purely internal affair be­
cause it developed into a state of disorder throughout Damascus. Sulayman 
Pasha stepped in and put to death twelve persons.2 In the same year he ar~
3
rested eight prominent members of the Yerliyya corps for an unknown reason. 
The authority of Sulayman Pasha was very much Enhanced as a result.
The safety which he ensured for the Pilgrimage during his term of 
office helped to make the Damascenes satisfied with his rule. He also 
strengthened his religious and material ties with them. He built a madrasa 
near his house^ In guqaq al-Barid^ as well as two baths, one near al-Haram- 
iyya^  and the other in the Kharab quarter, where many Shi* is lived.  ^ He 
also built a qaysariyya  ^in 0u^ al-^Ubi.^
^[bn Junk a, 66. The term qul which he used is a shortened form of Kapi 
Kulus (in Arabic Qafaiqul). cf. pp. 46, 53*56$ cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f. 73a; 
see above Barik, 9 was probably referring to the same incident when
he mentioned that the agha- of the inkishariyya was killed.
2Barilc, 9. 3Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 76a, 86b, C^f. Barik, 9.
^Ibn Kinan, II, f. 84b; Muradi, I, 8, II, 215; Suwaydl i . ,  f. 101b.
^Ibn Kinan, II, f* 84b. It seems that__this bath was located to the west of 
qaysarlyyat Bahram near al-Suq al-Jadid, cf. Ibid, f. 69b.
7See above p.
qaysariyya is made up of an enclosed space, partly paved, surrounded by 
rooms to house merchants and strangers, and stores for the keeping of goods 
see Russell, I, 36; Dozy, II, 432. The last says that the term is_derived 
from the Latin Caesarla. Very often the arabicized Persian term ghan is 
used in place of qaysariyya. see Lane, I.ii.826. M. Ecochard *Le palais 
ilzem de Da3najs1, Gazette Des Beaux-Arts. XIII, Paris 1935* P. 232, fig.3* 
referred to the khan of Sulayman Pasha which was in effect his_qaysariyya. 
According to Muhibbi, IV, 356, 357 the term wakala. that is k^ an, was used 
in Egypt for the building referred to by the Damascenes as .qaysariyya.
9Ibn ICinan, II, f. 84b.
At this time Sulayman Pasha bought numerous houses and gardens in
Damascus. Such a step of converting cash into real estate seems to have
been unwise because his wealth was always liable to confiscation. He seems,
however, to have been intent on making Damascus a residence for his family.
To have vested interests in it would enable the (Azms to figure among the
notables of Damascus and tc penetrate the Yerliyya corps, as in fact hap- 
1
pened later. This would help the Asms, when in power, to have solid support 
from below, and would give them, when not, more chance for manoeuvring 
against other governors from within. One nossible disadvantage of this
policy was that the cAzms would then incur the rivalry of local families of
- - 2notables such as that of Fat hi al-Dafari.
If Sulayman Pasha abstained from practising extortions on the Damas­
cenes, it was because he had other resources at his disposal. Besides what 
was usually allotted to his office from revenue by regulation, practice and ex­
pediency, he had an additional income from his malikane of Hamah and its de­
pendencies which he was granted for the second time when he x^ as governor of 
Tripoli in 1731-2, as equal partner with his nephew, As4ad Pasha, who re-
3sided in Hamah and took care of its affairs.''
The flourishing trade of Damascus played also into the bands of
Sulayman Pasha, In 1737 he gave the monopoly of the trade in ash to a single
French merchant through the intercession of Sulayman Pasha1s nephew, Ibrahim
1
See below p
hee below Vf.flq, 211,21-). 
iXabbakh, III, 335.
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Pasha, who was then governor of Sidon/ The centre of the Damascenes1 trade 
with the French merchants shifted now from Sidon to Damascus.2 This commer­
cial activity from which Sulayman Pasha benefited seems to have been largely 
responsible for the. building of his qaysariyya in Damascus. Afier his de­
position, Fathi al-Daftari took over, the protection of the French merchant
who monopolised the ash trade, on the recommendation of Sulayman Pasha him-
3 _
self. It is interesting to note here that Fathi,who became daftardar of
Damascus in 1148/1735-6^ seems to have been, at the time, on good terms with 
Sulayman Pasha. His protection of the French merchants was the first sign of 
his attempt to build up his economic and political power which he would use, 
later on, against the 4Azms themselves.
But by far the largest sphere for Sulayman Pasha!s exploitation was
outside Damascus. Such a policy of relieving the townspeople at the expense
of the rural people was Sulayman: Pas ha1 s habitual policy. It a creased the
urban malcontents, while the rural population would suffer extortion, some­
times with the Sultan*s acquiescence, under the pretext of checking their 
insubordination. The recurrent expeditions, of;,the. governor Into the country­
side were also intended to maintain a balance of power in the region, and im­
plicitly served as a safety valve for the insubordinate troops employed by him
The policy of Sulayman Pasha outside Damascus.
Sulayman Pasha was very much helped in this policy by the confused
1024s Sidon, 27.7.39 (Hemoire presente a M. Arasy).
2 1 ^ , / , 1  
A.N.B 1022: Sidon, 19.7.28 (Memoire pour le commerce de Seyde); A.N.B
1024: Sidon, 29.7.39.
3A.N.B3- 1024i Sidon, 27.7.39. (Memoir© presente a M. Arasy).
"Wradi, III, 211$ e
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1
state of affairs in Mount Lebanon and the adjoining regions of Jabal fiAmil 
and Safad. From being formidable enemies to the governors of Damascus in 
the first half of the 17th century, the amirs of Mount Lebanon had become 
occupied with internal factional strife since the second half of it. The 
governors of Damascus exploited this struggle and encouraged one faction 
against the other. This seething faction-manoeuvring, besides other factors, 
undermined the authority of the amirs over the inhabitants of the Mount^and 
their former dependencies on the periphery such as Jabal 6 Amil and the region 
of Safad moved away from their control. To understand what was really hap­
pening in these regions at the time, and to study the background for the 
emergence of §ahir al-cUmar, a survey of the developments that took place is 
necewsary ,
.After the elimination of Fakhr al-Din Ma€n II in 1635f his Ma‘n suc­
cessors were unable to fill his place as paramount chiefs. True, the estab­
lishment of the orovince of Sidon was intended to keep a close watch over 
Mount Lebanon. But there were other internal causes which weakened the 
power of the Macn amirs and their successors the ghihabs. Foremost among
2
these causes was the internal factional strife between Qaynis and Yemenis 
which resurged in this period of weakness, and in fact contributed to it, and
\fpunt Lebanon was sometimes referred to as Jabal al-Shuf, see Munayyir, 
a1-Mashriq.18 (1954) P* 672; it was known also as" Jabal al- Purus* this is 
apparent in the title of a work devoted to the history of Mount Lebanon 
between 1695 and 1805, Anon., Ta‘rikh Jabal al-Duruz, M.S. Berlin Cat. 9790> 
Vle.(ll) 377, which is probably another copy of Munayyir1 s al-Durr, see bbbve 
P. 5 Abbud al-Sabbagh, al-rawdl al-%ahir fi akhbar Dahir, Bibliotheque 
Nationale, £LS arabe 4610 > f.2&.
2On the origin of the Qaysi-Yemeni factionalism see, F.N.Haddad, ’Political 
parties in Syria and Palestine (Qai&i and Yemeni)* JPOS, Vol. I, Oct. 1920, 
No. 4, pp. 209-214-; on the Qaysi-Yemeni factionalism among Beduin and vill­
agers in the southern regions of the province of IDamaschs in the first 
quarter of the 18th century see M. al-Kurdi, Tahdhib, ff. 27b-3Sb, see above 
P-
1 6 ?
which cut across religious barriers. The Macns who were installed as amirs 
of Mount Lebanon by Sultan Selim I, superseding the pro-Mamluk Buhturids, 
were of the Qaysi faction. Opposed to them were the ‘Alam al-Dins, related 
but opposed to tbe Buhturids, who headed the Yemeni faction. The other 
families of notables adhered to one faction or the other, but the Qaysis 
x-jere in the majority and had the upper hand under the Ma^s. The Yemenis re­
mained potential enemies and caused trouble w^henever the occasion arose.^
This factional rivalry reached a high pitch after the execution of Fakhr al- 
Din II because the ‘Alam al-Dins allied themselves with the governors of Dam-
p
ascus against the %ysi Mafcns.
The death of the last Ma6n ruling amir in 1697 and the election of the 
first Shihab amir had two major consequences. Firstly, whereas the first 
Ma*n amir of Mount Lebanon was appointed directly by the Sultan, the first 
Shihab amir was elected by an assembly of notables. No matter how ’demo^ 
cratic1 this procedure was, the fact that the notables assembled themselves 
and elected the amir showed and indeed crystallized their consciousness of 
their strength, and this worked to undermine his authority. Secondly, the 
issue around which these, notables grouped themselves was the upholding of the
i
Qaysi solidarity and hegemony against the Yemenis. This crystallisation in j
i
rivalry made each faction determined to destroy the other. In the battle of
cAyn Dara in 1711, the 6Alam al-Dins were finally liquidated. The defeated !
i
faction was not only Yemeni, but contained a strong Druze element. As a result!
"^ Shidyaq, 323; Lammens, II, 89; fcAdel Ismab il, I, 32, n.5.
2ShidyIq, 54-6, 132-6, 380, 387, 388; ‘1‘del IsnS4Tl, I, 32, n.5; Dibs, VII,
209.
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Druze hegemony was weakened, all the more so because the Shihab amir was a 
Sunni. After the battle the Shihab amir recompensed his supporters by rais­
ing their chiefs to the rank of shaykh (tax-farmer). He addressed them as 
brothers* and appointed each as tax-farmer of a certain district. The Abu
* s —  o1-Lam s alone were raised to the rank of amirs. Thus the position of these 
shaykhs was further strengthened, and they would serve as a check on the power 
of the amxr.
Vfe may distinguish in the first quarter of the 18th century three feu­
dal gpups, defined geographically and answerable to the governor of Sidon?
1, Mount Lebanon was under the control of a Shihab amir whose residence 
was in Dayr al-Qamar, and who farmed his territory from the governor of Sidon, 
$t was divided into seven districts (muqata*at), namely: al-Shuf, al-*Arqub,
al~Jurd, al-Shahhar, al-Gharb, al-Matn and Kasrawan.^ These districts, and
5 6others created or merged later on, were administered by shaykhs of lead-
ing families, who farmed them in turn from the Shihab amir.
2. Jabal 6lmil was divided into three districts: Bilad Bishara, the two
4c, Salibi. 'Lebanon in Historical Perspective', MEF, March 1959* Vol.XXXIV, 
No. 3, p. 20.
I^bid.,* Shidyaq, 69; Anon. Nuzhat al-gaman fi hawadith Jabal Lubnan, Biblio-
*theque Nationale, MS. F.JL. l5§4* f. 341;• Shihab, Lubnan. I, 14.
S^hidyaq, 409.
Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 48 (1954) 672, 674; Haydar Ahmad Shihab, Buz hat al­
ga man fi hawadith'i&rabistan, MS. Gambridge, Or 63 (9), ff. lb, 2a; i
Ta^iukh"Jabal al-PuruzT" f * 13a.
^Shidyaq, 21-33; Poliak, 57.
6 -  Referred to also as muqata' ajis, see Poliak, 58.
7Salibi, 'Lebanon', 20.
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regions of al-Shamniar and al~Tuffah, and al-Shaqif. Their inhabitants
were largely Matawila Shi^s and their local chiefs, the Ban! al-Saghir in
the first, the Ban! Munlcir in the second, and the Bani §afcb in the third,
2
were of the Yemeni faction. These chiefs usually farmed their districts 
directly from the governor of Sidon, but in 1700 these districts were put 
temporarily under the control of the Shihab amir who became responsible for 
them to the governor of Sidon.3 The fluctuation in the direct dependence of 
these districts on the Shihab amirs or the governors of Sidon continued laten 
on.^ ' Several battles were fought between the Shihab amir and the Matawila, 
at this time, partly as a result of the antagonism between the first who was 
a Qaysi Sunni, and the second who were Yemeni Shi1 is. In addition, the 1
Shihab amir was in need of an easy conquest to bolster up his prestige. His j 
economic position would also improve if he could lay his hands on the tobacco- 
producing lands in Jabal ‘&mil. The danger of the Ziyadina to the south was 
not yet sufficiently strong to decide the Shihab amir to avoid becoming their 
immediate neighbour '.. Nevertheless, the occupation of the Matawila lands 
would safeguard his country from the south if only from their incursions.
3. The san.iaq of Safad was under the jurisdiction of the governor of 
Sidon. Its history in the first quarter of the 18th century is rather con­
troversial particularly as concerns the rise of Zahir al-cUmar. According 
to the accounts of the Lebanese chroniclers, Shihab and Shidyaq, the Shihab 
amir was given in 1700 wilayat $afad (probably meaning the saiyjaq of Safad) 
by the governor of Sidon to acquire his co-operation in suppressing the
S^hihab, Lubnan. 1,5. ^Ibid.. I, 8. 3Ibid, x9 5,6.
4-Ibid., 8^ 9; Hug ha MS, Paris, f, 33a; Shidyaq, 4-09-11.
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Matawali Yemeni rebel of Bilad Bishara, Mas hrif al-Sa^hir. Am£r Bashir
j
appointed his cousin, Amir Mansur, governor over Safad. cUmar al-ZaydanT, ! 
father of Zahir, became tax-farmer, with the rank of shaikh, over the de- !
9 *—pendent parts of Safad because he was a Qaysi.'' With the death of Amir 
Mansur in 1702, 6 Umar al-Zaydani became governor of Safad.^ Later, in 1706, j 
after the death of Amir Bashir and the accession of Amir Haydar and as a re­
sult of the change of the governor of Sidon, wilayat Safad, as well as the 
districts of Jabal ‘Amil, were taken away from the Shihab amir and cameJ "  f c w m n i i  —  - t~ 1 1 — Ti in
under the direct supervision of the governor of Sidon. The latter appointed 
Zahir al~tfUmar as governor over Safad and its dependencies (diyariha) and
• 4Acre and its dependencies.
From the above 'statements it is clear that ‘Umar al-Zaydani was al­
ready established in the region of Safad, and on this basis, besides his be­
ing a Qa7si> he ivras appointed, or perhaps merely confirmed, by Amir Bashir 
in 1700 as tax-farmer in wjliyat Safad. In fact, 6Ali, the father of vUmar 
and head of the Ziyadina family,was recognized before 1700 as tax-farmer of 
Tiberias by the governor of Sidon through the amir of Mount Lebanon,^ Muradi
confirmed the prominence of the Ziyadina at this period when he stated that
  6
Zahir!s father, grandfather and uncles were governors in Safad and in Acre,
The appointment ofeUmar al-Zaydani by Amir Bashir was, therefore, a re-
S^hidyaq, 409, 410; Lubnan, I, 5; Nuzha M^S. Paris, f. 32a.
S^hidyaq, 410; Shihab, Lubnan, 1^ 6, 78; Nuzha M^S^  Paris, f. 32a. I
^Shidyaq, 411; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 7.
^Shidyaq, 411; Shihab, Lubnan, 1,8; Buz ha .MS. Paris, f. 33a; cf. G. Yanni,
efahir al-'Umar1, al-Muqtataf, vol. 28, 4 (1903), ]5. 318.
A^. al-Sabbagh, f. 2a. ^Muradi III, 18^
sumption of an old practice in the family. Between 1700 and 1706 6Umar was
more attached to Amir Bashir because wilayat Safad was given to the latter,
but, still, the supreme authority was with the governor of Sidon. If we are
-  -1
to believe the account of Miradi that Zahir was born in 1106, at the lat­
est 1694* then his age in 1706 was twelve years. The statement by Shihab 
and Shidyaq that Zahir had become, by this time, the governor of Safad and 
Acre with their dependencies needs further explanation.
2
Acre at the time was not an Important place. It was almost in ruins 
and its commercial activity had not yet begun. Neither ‘A. al-Sabbagh nor 
M. al-Babbagh, who devoted their works to the history of Zahir, mentioned
that Acre was governed by 2ahir at this time. al-gabbagh mentioned, how-
_ . - 3
ever, that al-Damun, in the vicinity of Acre, was nominally farmed by Zahir.
Probably some of Zahir1s relations extended their authority over Acre at the
time. But this does not mean that Zahir held It by virtue of his own power 
ever since. It was not till 174-6 that he gained possession of it. The 
emphasis on Acre in the writings of Shihab and Shidyaq and those idio copied 
them seems to reflect the Important position It acquired later, of which 
they were witnesses*
Zahir at this early age was not raally the effective ruler of the dis­
trict he is supposed to have governed. His elder brothers deliberately
\luradi, III, 184,. age is^ somewhat corroborated by CA. al-Sabbagh,
f. 3a when he mentioned that Zajtir was fourteen years old when he was re­
cognized nominally as chief tax-farmer. It is understood from M. al~ 
§abba.gh, p. 17 that Zahir was born in 1689, and from Volney, p. 250, that 
he was born around 1686. Since the account of Muradi is supported by the 
careful chronicler ‘A. al-Sabbajgh, then we shall take it as being nearer 
to the truth.
2Nabulai, pl-Haqiqa, f, 79b,* Mass'on, 512,* Volney, 250* according to T.Shaw, 
Travels * 331\ 1 Tyre was no better and its port was choacked up with sand
and rubbish1. 3f# 2b.
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asked the governor of Sidon to issue the tax-farm in his name so that they,
the effective tax-farmers, could take cover behind the young Zahir in case
1
of any arrears in the miri tax. His authority, therefore, was only nominal. 
Munayyir was nearer to the truth when he mentioned in the events of 1706 
that the government of Acre and Safad was in the hands of a1-Mashayikh 
awlad Bani Zaydan. It.was not, however, till the early thirties of the 
18th century that Zahir started asserting his military power and expanding
3
outside his stronghold of Tiberias.
During the governorships of cUthman Pasha Abu Tawq in Damascus and 
Sidon, his military power loomed heavily over the mountain of Lebanon.
Isma4il Pasha al^Asm made political arrangements to neutralize the feudal 
and tribal forces within his province. No clashes were reported between 
* Abd Allah Pasha Aydtnli and any of the Shihab amirs or Zahir al-sUmar, 
probably because as a Rumi appointed for the first time to a Syrian province j
he was not acquainted with the local power groups, and also because there ;
was no immediate threat against the dependencies of Damascus. With the ap­
pointment of Sulayman Pasha al-4Agm to Damascus, the picture became quite
different. His past experience, his enmity against the Shihabs, and the 
dangerously growing power of Zahir al-4Umar brought him into military con­
flict with both of them. Sulayman Pasha picked the issue of the Lebanese 
raids on the Biqa* which was largely under his jurisdiction, to open
^A. al-Sabbagh. f. 2b. M^unayyir, al-Mashriq, 48 (1954) p. 674.
■^ A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 6b, 7a; M. al-Sabbagh, pp. 27-8, 31-6.
4Cf. Ibn Kinan, I, ff. 43a, 153b; Shihab, Lubnan. I, 123; Evliya Efendi,
Narrative of Trave]S in Europe. Asia  tr. from Turkishby Hammer, 1 vol; „
London, 1834-46. The author visited Damascus around the middle of the^17th 
century and mentioned, I.i. 93* that al~Biqa* is a ganjaq in the province
of Damascus.
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hostilities with the Shihab Amir Mulhim. The raids took place after a
  ^  1
victory obtained by Amir Mulhim over the Bani al-Saghir of Bilad Bishara.
Sulayman Pasha exploited the incident to avenge an old quarrel with the 
father of AMr Mulhim. He obtained the approval of the Porte to lead an ex­
pedition against him, and orders were issued also to the governors of Sidon 
and Tripoli to join him. The joint expedition inarched late in. 1736, but dis­
cord broke out between the governors of Damascus and Sidon and a compromise 
was reached with.the Shihab amir through the French Consul at Sidon before 
serious fighting started. Sulayman Pasha was to receive 1$0 thousand piastres 
from Amir Mulhim for calling off the expedition, and the latter was to put 
his brother and a son of each of the two principal shaykhs of Kasrawan - it
is not known why these two were chosen - as hostages with the French Consul
2 —to serve as security for the payment. The Expedition benefited Sulayman
Pasha economically and bolstered up his prestige politically. Encouraged by 
this success, he directed his attention towards Zahir al-^ Uraar who was a 
more dangerous enemy by virtue of his position and prospects for expansion 
than the somewhat isolated and weakened Shihab amir.
In his attempts to establish his power and extend his territory in 
the early Jthirties, Zahir allied himself with the principal local chiefs. 
After having acquired the iltizam of the regions he controlled from the 
governor of Sidon directly and not through the Shihab amir as previously - 
an act suggestive of his growing prestige - Zahir tried to trim the wings of
3
his strong but dangerous allies. In Hebron, the Beduin chief Jabr resumed
Hhidyaq, 4.18, 4.19; Muz ha. MS. Paris, f. 36a; Shihab, Lubnan. I, 30; Shihab, ,
Nuzha, MS. Camb, f. 16a.
%or a detailed account see A.N.B'*' 1024s Sidon, 4*2.37, Sidon, 17.7.37; 
A.N.B111! (?), 25.5.37; Charles-Roux,, 65.
S^ee above p
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his schemes for expansion. -He allied himself with the Saqr Beduin1 and
p  -became amir of the Beduin shaykhs of §afad. To guard against Ibn Madi,
a militant notable in the region of Nablus, who was cooperating with the
governor of Sidon, Jabr sought the alliance of Zahir. The latter welcomed
3
this alliance and used it to destroy his enemies. But having pledged him­
self to the governor of Sidon and to the inhabitants of the districts he had
acquired to ensure the security of his territory, Zahir was bound to clash
4
with his insubordinate allies, particularly the Saqr. His attempt to era­
dicate their insubordination alienated them, and they shifted to his enemies, 
Ibn Mad! and Ibn Jarrar, the paramount chiefs in the region of Nablus. Both
of these chiefs were answerable to the governor ■ of Damascus, and when Zahir
c
encroached on their territory, Sulayman Pasha came to their help.
Aware of the dangers he would encounter, Zahir started to reinforce
6 —the defences of his stronghold., Tiberias* Sulayman Pasha led an expedition 
against him
/in 1737 and was joined by the Saqr. The skirmishes that took place resulted
a
in the capture of Zahir*s brother, Salih, who was put to death in Damascus.
The subsequent deposition of Sulayman Pasha in 173$ brought a short respite
to Zahir# but hostilities were to be resumed on a wider and more forceful • 7
scale during his second governorship in Damascus.
1 ~ ‘ —  - " ' ■■—  - —  -
In the first quarter of the lSth century the__Saqr were centred on the
sanjaqs of Lajjun and §afad, see M. al-Kurdi, Tahdhilh. ff. 24b, 25b. 
al-§abbagh, 25. Ibid.. 31-5.
hbid.. 35, 3 6. hbid.. 4-6-52.
Cf. F. Hasselquist, Voyages and Travels' in the Levant in the years 1749.
50* 51* 52. London, 1766, p. 158.
7Pococke, II, I. 68, 69 : Barik, 9; al-Sabbath, f. 7a; Murad!, III,^184. 
The latter mentioned Mustafa in place of §alih. No, such name appears in
the list of Zahir* s brothers which was given by 4 A. al-§abba.gh, f. 2b.
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The last expedition by Sulayman Pasha before his deposition was
-  1  “ 3 2directed^according to Barik, against the Beduin of Balqa . It is not 
known whether these Beduin were being punished for threatening the safety of 
the Pilgrimage or for supporting Zahir. Since at the end of the century they
3
were reported as paying tribute to the governors of Damascus, Sulayman Pasha 
may have been enforcing this obligation.
On Saturday 1 Rabi4 II ll$l/l9 July 1738, Sulayman Pasha was deposed 
from Damascus^ On Thursday 3 lumada I 1151/19 August 1738, he left for ;
Hamah.3 He spent a lot of money at Istanbul to retain the governorship of 
'Damascus, but in vain/ In the meantime, he was not offered any governorship,
and he was still in Hamah in Dhu ;l~Qacda 115l/February-March 1739 awaiting
7 . a
a new appointment. In 1152/1739-40, he was appointed governor of Egypt.0
During the governorship of Sulayman Pasha in Damascus, an agent !qui
est le creature du Kiaya du Grand Vizir1, was taking care of his interests
at the Porte.^ It seems that with the deposition of the kafflra of the Grand
V:ezir in January 173810, the agent of Sulayman Pasha lost his influence. It
is significant that Husayn Pasha, who succeeded him in Damascus, was pro-
“For the activity of these Beduin in the first quarter of the 18th century se 
M. al-Ivurdi, ff. 27b, 31a. Towards the end of the 18th century the Beduin 
of Balqa? numbered between 40 and 60 thousand, see Seetzen, 296 , 297.
S^eetzen, 296, 297. ^Ibn Kinan, II, ff, 84a, 183b.
5Ibid.. f. 85a. 6Ibid., f. 84b.
7Ibid.. f. 105a. JabartT, I, 150.
h.N.B1 4.095 Istanbul, 25.5.34; A.N.B 414* Istanbul, 29.7.37.
10PR0, S.P. 97/29; Istanbul, 14.1.38.
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tected by the Grand Vesir himself. This may have been one of the reasons 
for the deposition of Sulayman Pasha. During his governorship in Damascus, 
there was apparently nothing in his record to discredit him, nor did the 
Damascenes complain to the Sultan of any injustices. Furthermore, his wealth
was not confiscated after his deposition. That he was still in favour is de­
monstrated by his subsequent appointment to the governorship of Egypt.
Political Changes among the Power Groups in Damascus.
Between 2 Rabi/ IX 1151/20 July 1738 and about the end of Rabi* II
1154/the f irst half of July 1741, three governors succeeded each other in
Damascus. Such a rapid change of governors in so short a period is remin­
iscent of the old practice which persisted until the first quarter of the 
18th century, and contrasts with the lengthy tenure of the ‘Asms. Events 
during this period were of paramount importance for the relations between 
the Damascenes and their governors, and the fortunes of the power groups in 
Damascus.
A. The revolt against Husayn Pasha al-Bustanji.
Before his entry to Damascus on 14 Jurnada I 1151/30 August 1738,
Husayn Pasha al-Bustanji, a Rumi by origin, appointed as his mutasallim on
_ _• _ o
2 Rabis II Fathi, the daftardar of Damascus, During his previous governor-
3
ship of Tripoli, Husayn Pasha had commanded the .iarda and was a familiar
L^ettres edifiantes (fbmpagnie;' de Jesus), 34 vols., Paris 1707~73, vol.
XXVI (1743), p. 442»
Risala, f. 14a; Muwaqqi4 , f 1250b; Dhikr man tawallai al 'W&zara, f. 114b; 
cf. A.N.B1 10245 Sidon,,27.7,39. IbnTinan/lI, f. 85b gives the date of 
his entry as 15 ^umada I,
3lbn Kinan II,f.l83a; A.N.B1 1117s Tripoli, 10.5.38.
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figure to the Damascenes. His appointmentof Fathi was a proof of this 
acquaintance and of the latter1s growing prominence. This familiarity 
might have enabled Husayn Pasha to formulate a tentative policy to apply 
in Damascus should he be appointed to it. But, it seems that he misjudged 
the situation, was over-confident in his private troops and under-estimated 
the strength of the Damascenes.
At the start of his governorship, Husayn Pasha hanged two persons and
1
left them on the poles for some time. Whatever their crimes, this was in­
tended to impress the people with his power and to create a feeling of terror. 
He then started amassing money, which he obtained, as it seems, through
p
fraud. The amount he collected during his first month in office was esti-
o __ ^ „ J
mated at 900 purses» He abolished, certain Sufi practices known as tahld-la.. 
Although the chronicler ^bn Jumca expressed relief and satisfaction at this 
ban, such a measure seems to have alienated the followers of the turuq who 
had. much influence in Damascus. This issue, added to the extortions of the 
governor, provoked the populace to revolt. They were exhorted to oo so by 
the religious_shaykhs who suspended the Friday prayer and urged the wor-
xXbn Jum‘a, 6 6. The term he used for hanging, galaba (crucified),jioes not 
seem really to denote an operation of crucifixion. The context of the term 
could be seen in another example. When the Mamluk Sultan Tuman Bay was 
killed on:e chronicler stated that after jthis was done, Sultan Selim X, 
Salabahu (i.e. fixed him to a pole) in Bab Zawila, see Anon., Dhikr_jiabd 
fT"'^ T-dawla al-Rumiyya wa > 1-saltana al-fc Hbhnani~yya, MS. Berlin cau. 972 .
00.63, f.Sa
3 *
2Ibn Jum6a, 6 6. Lettres edifiantes, XXVI (174-3), 437.
^Tbn Jumsa, 6 6. For some aspects of the jtahlila as practised in Damascus 
'in’ the 19th century, see Qamns- a 1-Aina4 at al-Shamiyya, Vol^ I by Muhammad 
Sa‘id al-Qasimi, Vol. II by Jamil a 1-Din al~Qisimi and Khalalal- Asm, ea. 
by Zas^ ir al-Qasimi, Paris, i960, II, 222, 223.
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shippers to avenge the honour of the Prophet, in reference to the abolition
'k*16 tahlila. and to demand the enforcement of the Shari*a.^
IJusayn Pasha, in his high-handed policy, alienated all the power
groups in Damascus and relied solely* on his private troops, composed mainly*
Haefoariba and Dalatiyya.^  On Friday 12 Jumada II 1153/27 September 1738,
less than a month after his entry to Damascus. awlad al-Sham. a common name
designating the Yerliyya who had become Damascenes in uniform, and other dis-
3
contented Damascenes, revolted against the governor, and many casualties 
occurred in the fighting, The Kapi Kulus were becoming acclimatized and 
they fraternised with the Damascenes to guard their own interests. They 
threatened the governor by directing the guns of the citadel on his head-
4quarters. The governor tried to gain time by negotiating with the a^ has 
of the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus.5 When his preparations were complete, 
he retaliated by attacking, at the heqd of 4>000 troops, the Maydan quarter 
and Its vicinity the Qubaybat, around the middle of Jumada II, These places 
were the strongholds of the Yerliyya, and by subduing them not only could 
the ringleaders be suppressed., but he could control the flow of the supplies
^Lettres edifiantes, XXVI (1743), 434; ef, Ibn Jumsa, 6 6,
2Ibn Kinan, II, x. 13a; A.N.B1 1024: Sidon, 2.9.39.
3 _
That awlad al-Sham or Dimashq meant in effect the Yerliyya and other Dam­
ascenes,' excluding the Kapi Kulus, is apparent in the first round of the 
fighting in which the Kapi Kulus did not take active part, see Ibn Junf_a, 
67; Barik, 9. When the Kapi Kulus took part in the fighting^ later, Barik:,
9, mentioned awlad Dimashq alongside the Kapi Kulus > Al-Qari, 78 used the 
common designation, 6askar al-Sham, to denote the various troops which _ 
fought against the governor. For an earlier use of the term *askar al-Sham 
In the;.same sense, see above p. 4f>
^Ibn Jumatf, 67; Lettres edifiantes XXVI (1743), 435; A.^.B^ 1024s Sidon, 
11.10.38.
^Lettres edifiantes, XXVI (1743)9 436.
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coming from Hawran to Damascus. The fact that these quarters were outside
the walls of the city, made them more vulnerable and facilitated, at the
same time, the mobility of the governor’s troops. Devastation, pillage and
1
casualties were reported in the fighting.
With the time for the departure of the Pilgrimage getting nearqr*, ' the
2governor gave up the fighting and went on the dawra to collect the revenue.
In the meantime, the Damascenes were taking precautionary measures. They re­
constructed the walls and the gates of the city to oppose the governor on his 
return. They pleaded, also, to the Sultan, but the protector of Husayn 
Pasha, who was the Grand. Vezir, brushed aside their appeals A
On his return from the dawra. Husayn Pasha freed the Damascenes whom
3
he had imprisoned and disbanded some of his troops to appease the Damascenes.
Shortly afterwards, he employed them once more to guard the Pilgrimage, The
6safety he ensured to the Pilgrimage, did not allay the enmity of the Damas­
cenes, or overcome their objection to the return of his troops.
From being mere sympathizers, the Kapi Kulus participated now in 
active fighting against the governor, and used the citadel to fire on his 
headquarters. The major obstacle that had hindered them from doing so pre­
viously was removed when some of their members arrested the agha of this
7
corps whom they suspected of communicating secretly with Husayn Pasha. The
^Lettres edifiantes. XXVI U/43)j, 437, 438; see a detailed description by
Husayn b, Tifma al-Baytimani, Diwan, MS. B.M. Or. 3175, ff. 17a, 17b.
P  1
Lettras edifiantes, XXVI (1743), 440; A.N.B 1024: Sidon, 27.2.39.
kettrea edifiantes. XXVT (1743), 441; Baytinani, f. 17b: Ibn Kinan, II,f.Hb
^Lettres edifiantes. XXVI (1743), 442. 5Ibid.
%bn Kinan, II, f. 141a.
7Lettres edifiantes, XXVI (1743), 445, 446; of. Ibn Jum‘a, 67.
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governor was driven out of the city and took refuge in the countryside.
The villages of al«Mu6 adamiyya, Mrrtin. and Qutayfa suffered from the ravages
of his troops, and some of their inhabitants came to Damascus to join in 
2protest. Faced with this widespread resistance, the mufti of Damascus,
who refrained, at the beginning, from sanctioning the revolt of the Damas-
3 Icenes, rallied, now,to their support and condoned their action.^
In the meantime, Husayn Pasha appealed to the Sultan for support.
The Sultan sent orders to the Damascenes to receive their governor, but they
were adamant in their opposition to his entry unless he disbanded. his troops
_ _ 5
ifjghariba and Dalatiyya. They went further in expressing their enmity
to his troops, expelling and even killing some of the remaining Magkariba
6who were the backbone of his power. It seems also that the resident 
Maghariba were considered a potential enemy and were expelled as well and
n
their Zawiya. which had existed for centuries, was destroyed.'
gusayn Pas ha was determined to subdue the Damascenes. But before his
plans for attacking them could be put into effect, the Sultan responded to
the persistent appeals of the Damascenes and had him deposed on Saturday
— — S
1 Jumada II 1152/5 September 1739- The news of his deposition was received
^Lettres edifiantes, XXVI (17X3), 44-6$ Baytimani, f. 17b; Ibn Kinan, II, ff.
lib, 13a; al-Qari, 78; A.N.bT 1024: Sidon, 29.7.39 (dispatch Bo. 2 under 
this date),Sidon, 2 .9 .3 9 (dispatch N0. 1 under this date).
2Lettres edifiantes XXVI (174-3), 4-4-7; cf. Ibn Jum‘a, 67; Ibn Kinin, II,
ff.llb, 13a.
^Lettres edifiantes. XXVI (1743), 4345 435. ^Ibid.. 447.
^A.N.B1 1024: Sidon, 2.9.39 (dispatch N0. 1 under this date).
Baytimni, f. 17b; Barik, 9. 7See above p. 13-
SBarik, 10; Ibn KinIfi,.-II, f. 13a; Baytimni, f. 17b} Ibn Jum*a, 67.
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with joy in Damascus, and celebrations were staged-there.
The significance of this revolt lies in the following points;
1. The Damascenes asserted themselves and revolted against their Rumi 
governor. This does not necessarily mean that they would not have done so 
against a governor of local origin if he committed the same acts. But the 
fact that Ilusayn Pasha was a Rumi and was opposed by the various groups in 
Damascus, for which he was principally to blame, must have brought forth in 
the minds of the Damascenes a comparison with the tolerant rule of his pre­
decessor, Sulayman Pasha al-*Agm. The Damascenes might not have been poli­
tically conscious of a distinction between governors of Rumi or local origin, 
because both were Muslims and were appointed by the Sultan, but their differ­
ent methods as administrators night well be a subject of comparison. The 
mere fact that the Muslim chroniclers started now, that is after the appoint­
ment of the governors, using more frequently the adjective Rumi for
governors of non-local origin implies that they at least were becoming more 
conscious of the distinction between the two types of origins. The Christian 
Barik went far ahead in describing the *A^ ms as awlad *'Arab.
The Damascenes had revolted several times previously but, by now, 
their revolts had become of a wider magnitude. The revolutionary tradition 
was becoming "ore legitimate particularly because the Sultan implicitly en­
dorsed their action by deposing Husayn Pasha. The Sultan went even further 
in courting the favour of the Damascenes, About the middle of Jumada II, a 
few days after the deposition of gusayn Pasha, he sent instructions that, as
^Ibn Kinan, 11, f. 13a,
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Damascus was his malikane. nobody must injure it, and justice must be upheld^
The term malikane.here, does not necessarily imply the strict sense of the
word, but seems to have been used by the Sultan to allay the Damascenes*
fears of further extortions by emphasising his direct responsibility and
patronage. Although such a concern was natural on the part of the sultan,
%
it must have strengthened the position of the Damascenes vis-a-vis their
governors. The ‘Sultan followed this by abrogating the practice that the
governor of Damascus should keep an agent in Istanbul, guaranteeing instead
2
to send him the news, good and bad, of what happened there. This suggests 
that the agent of Husayn Pasha had distorted the facts in his favour. How­
ever, the abrogation was not maintained.
2 . The Yerliyya took advantage of their alliance with the Kapi Kulus, 
and expelled the Maghariba who were often used by the governors in subduing 
them. The expulsion of the Maghariba, albeit temporarily, encouraged the 
Yerliyya and the Damascenes to demand, later on, the expulsion of the Kapi 
Kulus. The issue developed into a struggle (between Damascenes and aliens) 
and was given a sharp twist by the clash of their interests. As a result of 
the success achieved by the Yerliyya, insubordination increased among their j 
ranks to the extent that many members went out of control. These members
—  —  Q
were referred to by the chroniclers as zorab or zorbawat (sing, zorba) or 
simply as ashqiya* al-JundJ*
kbn Kinan, II, f. 13b. 2Ibid.
Zorba is a term of Turkish origin which means, both in Arabic and Turkish, 
insolent or rebel. See Redhouses's Turkish Dictionary, London 1880, p.589; 
Dozy II, 584.
/+Muradi, IV, 178.
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3. The mils and gatfes of the city were reconstructed and. barricades
could now be erected very easily. The narrowness of the streets was also of
1great help for this purpose. The Damascenes could draw confidence from the 
strength of their defenses, and despotic governors would, think twice, with 
this proof in sight', before they alienated them. The governors might, however 
have learnt a lesson from Husayn Pasha*s unsuccessful policy in depending 
solely on private troops to the exclusion of the localgroups*
4-. Fathi al-Daftari, who was appointed mutasallim by Husayn Pasha at the
start of his governorship, does not seem to have suffered any major setback 
as a result of his association with Husayn Pasha. His appointment as muta­
sallim did not necessarily mean that he deputized for the governor during
the whole of his governorship. It is stated that Husayn Pasha did not ap-
2
point any person to govern In his absence when he went on the Pilgrimage. 
Fathi, at this time, was still groping for power and watching how events 
were developing. It Is probable that the early- association of his name with 
Husayn Pasha had later caused him some discredit even though he had not sup­
ported him. It seems that because of this, and also as a result of the grow-
3ing influence of the Yerliyya. Fathi associated himself with them. This 
means, besides others, enabled him, later, to assert his authority against 
the 4l^m governors.^ '
P^ococke, II. 1.118; cf, Maundrell, 100. 
lettres edifiantes, XXVI (174-3), 443.
lluradi, III, 286; his statement that Fathi was muntamiyyan ila wi.jaq al-
Yerliyya is equivocal and does not necessarily mean that he became a member 
of this corps,
^See below jq%; 211, Z13*
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5. The revolt 'had disruptive effects on the economic life of Damascus.
The ravaging of the countryside by the troops of the governor, decisive
though it was in bringing the peasants into the struggle, was of a temporary
nature. Of more importance was the confirmation of the French authorities in
their conviction of the risk in sending their merchants to trade in Damascus,
1
or of maintaining a consul in it. The French had already encountered diffi­
culty in trading with the Damascenes. Once the French goods reached the city, 
the Damascenes enforced the prices they wanted; whereas, if they came to 
Sidon to buy them, better prices would be obtained. On the other hand, when 
the French merchants went to Damascus to buy ash, they were left at the mercy 
of the muleteers who carried it to Sidon, because they abused their oppor­
tunity.^ Such complaints were sharpened by the implications of the revolt.
The French King, acting on the recommendation of the authorities concerned,
prohibited the French merchants from sending their goods and buying any
3commodity in Damascus. This prohibition did not ban the trade with the
i
Damascenes, but transferred its centre to Sidon. Since Damascus was a prin­
cipal market for the French goods,^ the Damascenes lost several advantages 
as a result. Us late as 1733 the French authorities were still reluctant to
permit their merchants to establish themselves in Damascus for fear of ex-
5
actions and disorders.
^.N.B1 1024; Sidon, 29.7.39 (dispatch No. 2 under this date); cf. Rabbath,
II, 371-2.
^A.N.B1 1024; Sidon, 29.7.39 (dispatch No. 5 under this date); cf. PRO,
S.P. 110/3 8, Aleppo, (?).7.67.
3 1 1024; Sidon, 10.2.40.
c^f. A.N.B1 1024; Sidon, 11.10.33.
C "1 i
-t&.N.B" 979s Acre, 6,7.83 (Memoire sur le commerce).
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B „ The Dismissal of the Kapi Kulus from Damascus under ‘Uthman 
Pasha al~Muhass11.
On Monday 3 Jumada II 1152/7 September 1739, two days after the de­
position of Husayn Pasha, the mutasallim of *Uthman Pasha al-Muhas§il entered
1 , o
Damascus. The governor followed him on 17 Jumada II 1157/21 September 1739.
‘Uthman Pasha was born and brought up in Aleppo where he became a 
muhaggil (chief tax-farmer). He was no stranger to Damascus because as 
early as 1731, when he was governor of Tripoli, he had been Commander of the 
.iarda.4- His inability to suppress the revolt which took place in Tripoli and 
its dependent parts, was partly responsible for his deposition from Tripoli, 
at the time,^  He commanded the" .jarda once more during his first governor­
ship of Aleppo^ * (from / Sha‘ ban 1150/27 November 1737 until his appointment 
to Damascus).^
‘Uthman Pasha was faced with the further consequences of the recent 
revolt. Hardly had seven months elapsed since it took place, when a split 
develoned among the Yerliyya and the Kaoi Kulus corps. In Muharram 1153/ 
March-April 17/0, during the absence of6 Uthman Pasha on the Pilgrimage,
^Ibn Kinan, II, f. 13b.
2Ibn Jumc a, 67; al-Qarl, 78 gives the date of his entry as 9 Jumada II 1152/ 
13 Sept. 1739. h^e above date was preferred because it allows reasonable 
time for the journey of ‘Uthman Pasha who was reported as stillin Aleppo on 
7 September preparing for his departure to Damascus, Til doit partiil pen 
de jours1, see A.N.B 83s Aleppo, 7.9.39.
%uradi, III, 151; A.N.B1 8l:_Aleppo, 2.1.31; Badcliffe papers, 664.5/6: 
Aleppo, 2 3.8 .38; cf. Ibn Kinan, II, f. 14-lb.
hbn Kinan, II, ff. 36b, 105a; A.N.B1 1116: Tripoli, 25.5.31.
6 . —^See above p. Ibn Kinan, II, ff. 105a, 1/lb,
Mingana, (List of the Turkish P'overnors and High Judges of Aleppo from
(cont.)
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fighting started between the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus.
It seems that the combination of both groups against Husayn Pasha 
and the endorsement by the Sultan of their point of view, had contributed to 
the assertion of their power and to the creation of a more conscious faction­
al animosity once the common enemy was removed. The Kapi Kulus were more 
isolated compared with the Yerliyya who had broad local support. This made 
Kaoi Kulus more anxious to maintain their superiority and the privileges
p
they had obtained after they joined the crafts."' The Yerliyya were equally 
determined. to secure the upper hand. Previously, they load taken part in the 
Expulsion of the Mag ha riba from Damascus, and if they could drive out the 
Kaoi Kulus. their military superiority and economic interests would be un­
challenged by alien troops. Since their first installation in Damascus in 
10^/1653-9, Khe Kapi Kulus had controlled*among other things, the citadel 
and the gates of the city, which were previously in the hands of the jani­
ssaries.  ^ In 1737 they were still reported as holding these key positions^ 
During the revolt against Husayn Pasha, the gates of the city xyere reinforced, 
and this served to strengthen the hand of the Kapi Kulus. The Yerliyya. 
strong as they had become, could not tolerate the presence of such potential
(cont.) the Ottoman conquest to A.D.1747* Bulletin of the John Rylands 
Library, vol. 10, No. 2, July, 1926, p.55 Dhikr roan tax-ra 11a, f. 111b; 
Risala, f. 14aj_ Badcliffe papers 6645/65 iileppo7~"23.8.3^ 6645/71 Aleppo, 
24.B.38; Muradi, III, 159, erroneously states that ‘Uthman Pasha was ap­
pointed to Damascus before his first appointment to Aleppo, that is before 
4 Shaf ban 1150.
^Tbn Jumea, 6 8; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 159a. ^Ibn Jumca, 6 8.
\ihibbi, IV, 310; Ibn Kinan, II, f. 159a.
^Pococke, II.i.124.
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rivals in these strategic points. The clash with the Kapi Kulus seems to
have confirmed them in their suspicions, because the Kaoi Kulus immediately
made barricades in the quarters where they* were living with their families,
1
and closed the gates of the city over which they* had control. T'his was 
detrimental to the Yerliyya because the majority of them lived in the sub­
urban quarters of al~Maydan and Suq Saruja, outside the gates.
o
Amid this struggle two fresh odas of Kapi Kulus arrived in Damascus 
3
from Istanbul. Their subsequent penetration of the crafts shows that this 
was already an established practice.^ The Yerliyya regarded the reinforce­
ment of their enemy as prejudicial to their interests and superiority.
Ik® ‘Ulane* and notables, joined by ‘Uthman Fasha, protested against the 
corruption and the misdeeds of the Kapi Kulus? The Multan, impressed by 
this unanimity and anxious, as it seems, not to alienate the Damascenes,
6
sent a firman authorizing the expulsion of the Kapi Kulus from Damascus.
This took place around the middle of Rabi? II 1153/the first half of July 
71740* Some of the Kapi Kulus were killed and the majority were expelled. 
Those of them who had. families and exhibited good conduct by proving that 
they were not aorab, as judged by the notables of the city who reviewed each, 
at the door of his house, were permitted to stay, provided they gave up
1 2 
Ibn Jumca, 63. See above p,
^Ibn Jumca, 63; 1025$ Sidon, 19,3.4.0.
chief of a quarter (shaykh ffiara) is mentioned as having enrolled in the 
Kapi Kulus corps, see Ibn Kinan, II, f. 73a.
^Ibn Jumca, 68. Barik, 10; al-Qari, 73.
^Ibn Kinan, II, f. 188b.
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their uniforms and other privileges and became ordinary inhabitants. Some
2
of those expelled took refuge with the Druses, probably in Mount Lebanon.
The Druses were in a relatively safe country and were traditionally the de-
clared enemies of the governors of Damascus. It is perhaps significant that
the chronicler who mentioned that the expelled Kapi Kulus were dispersed in
different places was satisfied with identifying one place only, namely the
Druze country. The Druses were more compact as a community and easy to
identify geographically. Of more importance was the religious hostility
of the Damascenes to them, which would further discredit the Kapi Kulus if
3
their name was associated with the Druses. However, such a refuge seems to 
have been in the tradition of the Kapi Kulus because, as early as 10 Safar 
llO^/ll October 1693, Babulsi visited some prominent members of this corps 
who sought asylum with Amir Ahmad Ma‘n, after their clash with the Yerliyya 
of Damascus.^
It is interesting to note here the role played by Fathi al-Daftari in 
this affair. In his bid for power, Fathi, as we have already seen, associ­
ated himself with the Yerliyya so as to ensure a better guarantee for the
success of his plans* He seized on the present struggle and collaborated
5
with the interested parties for the expulsion of the Kapi Kulus. Such an
■^ Budayri, f. lb5 Barik, 10j Ibn Junfa, 68; Ibn Kinaq II, f. 188b; al-Qari,78. 
2
Ibn Kinan, II, f. 188b.
^For this religious antagonism see for example, Nabulsi, al-gaqiqa, f.69b; 
Ibn Jumta, 6, 7.
^Nabulsi, al-Baqiqa, ff. 69a, 69b.
5 _
Barik, p. 10.
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opportune move by Fathi gained him an easy personal success and further 
es tablis hed his pres t ige.
The Governorship of 4Ali Pasha*
4 Uthman Pasha al-Muha§§il was deposed roughly in the first half of 
Sha4ban 1153/second, half of October 1740.^ He was succeeded by cAli Pajsha,^
known as Abu Qili,^ who was until then governor of Belgrade, and who held the
rank of wazir like his father, 4Abdi Pasha.^ He entered Damascus on 23 
Sha4 ban 1153/13 November 1740^  and was deposed towards the end of Babie II 
1154/first half of July 174-1.6
7
Calm and security prevailed in Damascus during his rule. This was 
partly due to the expulsion of the Kani Kulus who had caused a lot of trouble 
previously. With their dismissal the Yerliyya emerged victorious and became 
the strongest single group in Damascus. But this victory gave further impet­
us to insubordination in the ranks of the Yerliyya. The full scope of this 
insubordination did not become apparent during the short tenure of ‘All 
Pasha. On the other hand, the dismissed Kapi Kulus who remained in Damascus 
had not yet recovered from the blow they were dealt, and hence had no chance 
to provoke the Yerliyya in the meantime. This was probably one reason for 
the calm and security during 4Ali Pasha1s governorship. Another was his re~
C^f. Ibn Junfa, 68; al-Qari, 78.
n
No information is available about his mutasallim.
•^ al-Qari, 78; cf. Muwaqqi6 , f« 251a.
^Dhikr man tawalla, f. 114b; Hisala, f. 14a; cf. Ibn Jura4a, 6 8.
^Ibn Jum4a, 68; cf. al-Qari, 7 8.
6Ibn Jum‘a, 6 8. B^udayri, f. 2fc. .
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putedly just administration. He was also praised for generosity and toler­
ance, particularly towards the Christians, which made Barik feel sorry for 
1
his deposition. Perhaps his orevious lack of acquaintance with the politics
of Damascus and its dependent parts, and his short duration in it, especially
if we take into account his departure on the dawra and with the Pilgrimage,
explain the absence of any clashes between him and either the Druses or
Zahir al~£Umar. Zahir benefited from this relative quiet which helped him
to maintain his authority - a fact which enabled him, a year later, to defy
Sulayman Pasha al-*Azm. However, the only incident during the governorship
of 4 All Pasha was his clash with the Harb Beduin in wadi a I- 4 Aqiq,^ while
3he was commanding the Pilgrimage. But he emerged victorious.
The deposition of cAli Pasha, after being in office for less than a 
year, was apparently due to the fact that his services were needed against 
Nadir Shah. He proceeded to Eraerum where he was appointed Sari *askar 
(commander-in-chief)/' His deposition cleaned the way for the appointment 
of Sulayman Pasha al-‘Azm who was deposed, the year before, from the gov-
5ernorship of Egypt.
p^p. 10, 11* cf. al-Qari, 78.
P —
It is about half an hour’s walk^to the west of Medina, see ‘Umar R. 
Kahhala, Jughrafiyyat shibh jazirat aI-4Arab, Damascus, 1944? pp* 141?142.
3Ibn Jum6a, 68; Budayri, f. 2b.
F^RO, S.P. 97/31* Istanbul, 8.5.41.
J^abarti, I, 151; cf. Muradi, I, 38, III, 47.
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Chapter 5.
THE THIRD PHASE OF ‘A?M RULE IN DAMASCUS
m w w — m i muw i^ .uiJii' m lul ftimrmurt i to n ■ '■ i t  wwruu. awjt wrem tf K *,* Ttmic^* r * rT ZL'.i tt±. ~r^ >* n „ ^
The Second Governorship of Sulayman Pag ha al~c Agm in JDamascus.
Ibratmn Agha. the mutasallim of Sulayman Pasha al-‘ Azin, entered 
Damascus around, the end of Rabi4 II 1154/first half of July 1741.  ^ On 12 
Jumada Il/25 August, Sulayman Pasha made his entry into Damascus.^ This was 
his second governorship of Damascus, and there was nothing very new about 
such a recurrent appointment if judged by other examples - the nearest was ^ 
that of Abu Tawq. But with the c Azms there was something particular about 
it. As they were a local family which distinguished itself by acquiring 
mainly local governorships^  their aim was always to stick to these governor­
ships and to prefer that of Damascus to any other, Whenever the Sultan tried 
to appoint or to transfer them to governorships outside Syria it was very re­
luctantly that they accepted their new appointments* A second appointment 
of Sulayman Pasha to Damascus was, therefore, quite an achievement for himself 
and for the 4 Azm family.
The Policy of Sulayman Pasha in Damascus.
The past policy of Sulayman Pasha of appeasing the Damascenes and 
tightening his grip on the rural people was maintained. But the political
^Dhikrjnan tawa 11a, ff, 114b,__115a| Hisala, f. 14-b. These^sources describe; 
Ibrahim Agha as the khazinedar of Sulayman Pasha* Budayri, f. 2b, states 
that he was his silahdar, apposition which he seems to have acquired after 
his previous one, or in addition to it. If he was the same Ibrahim who was 
killed later by the Beduin while acting as mutasallim for Sulayman Pasha, 
see Budayri, ff. 7a, 7b, then he was his mamluk as well.
B^udayri, f. 2b* Ibn Jum‘a, 69.
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situation in Damascus had. undergone by now a deep change which necessitated 
an equivalent change of policy to keep in step with what was happening. The 
new thing in Damascus during his present governorship was that the previous 
balance between the Kapi Kulus and the Yerliyya was destroyed with the dis­
missal of the former. The Yerliyya corps had emerged victorious after a ser­
ies of clashes with Husayn Pasha, the Maghariba and then the Kapi Kulus. This 
encouraged its insubordinate members, the gorab, to assert themselves and to 
defy the governor publicly,
Three days after his entry to Damascus, Sulayman Pasha put to death
1
three insubordinate Beduin. Ho matter if they had committed crimes inside
or outside Damascus, this act might have helped to impress the Damascenes
and emphasise his authority. But it failed to drive the lesson a little
deeper, partly, as it seems, because they were Beduin and not Damascenes,
Nor was it followed by a further move in the same direction within Damascus*
In the words of his contemporary chronicler, Sulayman Pasha !left everything 
2
as it was1. This encouraged the insubordinate elements to make headway. 
Talcing advantage of the delay in the arrival of the firman confirming Sulay­
man Pasha in his governorship, they exhibited much lawlessness until it ar-
  3
rived on 4 Jumada II 1155/6 August 174-2. This was a challenge to his author­
ity because nothing was changed in his de facto status, and it was quite 
natural, after his confirmation, to take action against them. But the way 
he reacted was remarkable. On 22 JujJiada II 1155/24 August 1742 convoked
B^udayri, 2b; the term he used is salaba (crucified) probably meaning fixed 
them to poles, see above p,
I^bid.
^Ibid., f. 4a*
the religious officials and other dignitaries in a diwan and produced a 
Khatti sherif for the punishment of the zorab. Sixteen of them from the May- 1
.    in...  ■** <im ^  c* I
dan quarter were struck off the rolls and the Damascenes were exhorted to kill!
1 1 them* To make the dignitaries and the religious officials share with him
the responsibility for such an important decision was politically expedient, 
and consistent, at the same time, with his previous policy of attaching him­
self to these influential persons, Ihe crucial point, however, is that he 
did not follow this apparently daring but rather showy decision by a personal 
initiative to implement it. On the contrary, the decision against the zorab 
was reversed, also in a diwan which he convoked before his departure on the
pilgrimage in Shawwal of the same year, in spite of a Khatti Sharif to have 
2
them killed. Whether he was unable to punish then, which is very probable, 
particularly because such a reversal happened about four months after the 
first decision, or whether it was intended as-a gesture of good will on the 
eve of his departure which could help also to quieten things in his absence, 
the important thing was that he temporized and the zorab were appeased.
His further action in expelling from Damascus the remaining members 
of the dismissed Kapi Kulus, composed mainly of MawsiLTs and Baghdadis, who 
were accused of making trouble*, is a proof of the resurgence of the Kapi Kulu;; 
which was partly the result of his loose control. Their expulsion must have 
pleased the Yerliyya because it eliminated a latent enemy of theirs. However,, 
if the insubordinate Yerliyya remained relatively quiescent after that it was 
because they had other outlets as we shall see.
1 -  2 Budayri, f. 4a. Ibid., f. 6b.
3Ibid., f. 4&.
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Such a policy of reconciliation and appeasement by Sulayman Pasha 
had immediate and future consequences, Because of his leniency and probable 
acquiescence, speculation in the prices of essential commodities was stepped
up. The prices of foodstuffs soared, attaining their maximum in the month of
— 1 Bamadan, although there was no shortage in supplies. The usual high demand
and profiteering in such a month could have been partly responsible for this
rise, but not to the degree which astonished the chronicler of the time.
2
However, the ripe in prices persisted during his governorship.
Judged by previous examples such an economic situation provided, mater­
ial for a revolt. But against whom would it be directed and who would lead, 
or stage, it? Sulayman Hasha was not overtly marked out as responsible be­
cause he did not adopt a monopolistic policy. It is not known whether his
3
Immense wealth, which was confiscated after his death, was, at least, partly 
collected by illegal dealings. It is incredible that it should not have been
4
so, if only because he had tolerated the high prices to sell his own products- 
Moreover, his contemporary chronicler implicitly implicated him, in his general 
statement that the rulers (al-hukkam) were hoarding and the Damascenes were 
copying their example.  ^ He was also to blame for not taking action against 
the speculators. His mamluk Ibrahim, who acted as his mutasallim. exercised 
an arbitrary policy and exploited the Damascenes. If he could not, for in­
stance, bring a guilty person to account, he would use the occasion to hold
B^udayri, f* 5b. Ibid.. ff. 7b, 8a.
3 :See below p. it jr.
^As(ad Pasha had recourse to such a practice later, see below
B^udayri, ff. 5a, 7b, 8a.
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his relatives as collectively responsible and exact money from them. Al­
though Sulayman Pasha was indirectly responsible for his acts, particularly 
because he was his roamluk as well, he was not affected. He had other means 
at his disposal to make up for whatever blame he might have incurred,
Sulayman Pasha ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage from the Beduin . 
On one occasion it suffered heavily from the floods it encountered. But his
action in rescuing the goods of the merchants who accompanied it from the
2
threat of the Beduin earned him much praise. He could still draw credit 
from his pious works.in Damascus and from his abolition of many injustices 
during his first governorship**"' Nor had he now deviated from his policy of 
satisfying the Damascenes. In Jumada X 1156/June—July 1743, he reconstructed 
the banks of the QanawaA river in Damascus and regularised the rationing of 
its water among the people concerned - an act which was very much acclaimed..; 
The organized craftsmen and artisans who would be easier to rally in a revolt 
were appeased by Sulayman Pasha. He abrogated certain impositions known as 
shashiyya  ^and mashyakha, probably connected with promotions inside the 
crafts, as the terms suggest, which were enforced on them, presumably re­
spectively, once or tv/ice a year. The Quarters were also relieved ox a
certain tax known as card which was levied once or twice a year. The mill*
7
tant solidarity of the quarter which bad proved decisive in the past0 must
^Budayri, f. 7a.  ^f bid, y * ^See above p.
^Budayri, ff. Sb, 9a.
^It seems that the term shashiyya was^used in a different sense^on other 
occasions. According to Shi Nab, Lubnan, I, 134, a tax ox two piastres im­
posed by Amir Tus’uf al-Shit&>i in 1197/1782-3 on every adolescent male, was
called shashiyya.
D l M k ..............................................
6Budayri, f. 10a. It is assumed that the impositions mentioned by^ the^chrom-i
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have been mitigated by the new measure. We have already seen that Sulayman 
Pasha associated himself with the religious officials and. other dignitaries 
by convoking them in drwans. That they were strong and active was apparent 
when they assembled themselves in a diwan, took over de facto authority in 
the city and appointed a deputy for Sulayman Fas ha after his mutasallim, 
Ibratiim Agha. was killed by the Beduin.^
On the occasion of the circumcision of his son, Ahmad, in early Rabifc 
? —I 1156/late April 1743~j Sulayman Pasha exploited the event • to the full and 
staged public rejoicings which-lasted for a fortnight. Damascus was decor­
ated and its streets illuminated. Religious officials, Yerliyya chiefs, and 
other notables were among the guests he entertained. The poor were parti­
cularly favoured also. Sons of some poor families were circumcised on the 
occasion and were offered clothes, food, and money. Such an act was not the 
first of its kind. The new thing, however, was the publicity and lavishness 
exhibited. Perhaps Sulayman Pasha intended to divert the attention of the 
Damascenes, particularly the poor among them, who suffered, most from the 
high prices ?  Certainly he wanted also to impress the people by emphasizing 
his growing prestige.
Responsibility for the high prices rested not with a single person 
but with a wide cross-section of Damascenes who were tolerated and encouraged
l-cont.) cler are in the same order and relationship with the organizations 
affected.
B^udayri, ff. 7b, 8a; cf. Muradi, III, 141.
B^udayri, ff. 6b, 7a. 
^Budayri, ff. 8a, 8b.
X^bid., f. 8a; Muradi, I, 166,
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by the Inactivity and, probably, the example of the governor. Those who 
dealt with foodstuffs, such as wheat merchants, millers, bakers and shop­
keepers, took advantage of the loose control of the governor and enforced the
prices they liked. Some prominent members among the Yerliyya benefited from
9 , 3the situation.~ Several millers were members of the Yerliyya- corps. So
long as their interests were safe they had no reason to complain, and seem to
have restrained the insubordinate members of their corps from causing trouble
which could jeopardise their interests.
Only the poor, who suffered most from the high prices, were restless.
Their dissatisfaction, if adequately exploited by organised militant groups,
could be effective. But such groups were either appeased by the governor or
were benefiting;; from the situation. Hardly had two months elapsed after
the previous celebrations staged by Sulayman Pasha, in which the poor were
generously favoured when they revolted in protest against the high prices.
4- I
They attacked the law-court , expelled the judge and looted the bakeries. 
Although the judge was responsible for inspection and the enforcement of the : 
Sharp a. he was devoid, at the time, of any practical authority. To revolt 
against him was in line with previous practice and was Illustrative of the 
spontaneous action of those who revolted and their inability to reckon with 
more responsible and implicated persons. Sulayman Pasha intervened and ord­
ered the bakers to provide food at reasonable prices. But this was a tempor­
ary remedy.
Budayri, f. 9a. Ibid.y f. 14b.
3Ibn Kinan, II, f. 117a. ^Budayri, f. 9a.
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This policy of compromise and appeasement pursued by .Sulayman Fas ha 
in Damascus was expedient as far as its short term results were concerned, 
mainly in keeping things going without magior upheavals. In the long run it 
proved disastrous because the insubordinate elements had been lulled rather 
than suppressed. The ' situation played into the hands of Fathi al~DaftarT, 
who profited from the mild rule of Sulayman Pasha. He rallied the dis­
satisfied and the insubordinate persons to his side, and through their sup­
port he asserted his authority in Damascus. Had it not been for the skill 
of As4 ad Pasha in eliminating Fathi^ later, he could have gained further prest­
ige in Damascus.
The Prominence of Fathi al-Daftari.
The grandfather of Fathi Efendi al-Falaqinsi migrated to Damascus from
Falaqins, a village near Hims in central Syria. He stayed in the Qaymariyya
1'quarter and took up the trade of weaving. Members of this family distin­
guished themselves as officials in the state treasury in Damascus long before 
FattiT was appointed daf tardar. According to Ibn Kinan, Muhammad al-Falaqinsi 
became daftardar in Damascus sometime in the first quarter of the 18th cen- 
tury, Muhammad’s brother, sAbd a1-Mu4ti, was appointed to the office of ac­
countant in the state treasury, and assumed other fiscal duties connected wiUI
waqf. He acquired high prestige particularly with the tUlama;, and in 1112/
31701-2 built a 1-Dhahabiyya bath near the IJmayyad Mosque. Thus the stage was 
set for Fathi, and he mobilised all his efforts and the credit of his family
^Muradi, X, l67;_AyyubT, f .5. The branch of trade in which he was engaged 
was called alalaja, which was an expensive striped Damascene cloth, see 
Qasimi, I, 39; cf. Gibb and Bowen, I.i. 296 n.3.
2 Ibn Kinan, I, f. 181a. 3MuradI, III, 135, 136.
to acquire prominence in Damascus,
In 11/8/1735-6 Fathi was appointed daftardar of Damascus, and in 1151/
o
1738-- he was chosen by Husayn Pasha as his mutasallim. The fact that he 
- 3
was a sharif seems to have helped In initiating him to the religious public
and in gaining him at the beginning the support of the Ashraf who played an
_
Important, although not very distinguished, role in Damascus. He exploited 
this asset to the full and strengthened it by different works. In 1150/ 
.1737-3, Fathi reconstructed the two minarets of the Sulaymanivya Mosque -
an act considered by the chronicler Budayri as the most important of his
A 5achievements. In the same year he built a qa*& , probably a hall in his
house which he had built in 11/1/1728-9He paved the road leading to
^ ry
galihiyya in 1155/17/2-3, and this must have won him special religious ere-
— — 8dit because of the predominantly Sufi aspect of this quarter. He followed
this in 1156/1743-"/ by reconstruction work in the Umayyad Mosque.^ In this
10same year,-he built a madras a in the Qaymariyya quarter, and assigned to it
^See above p., 16 f. %ee above p. ir!6 ; cf, Ibn Kinan, II, f.80a.
%ost sources mention this. Baytimani, Diwan. f. 52a, addressed Fathi In 
one of his poems as, Ya nasi al-nabi (0, descendant of the Prophet).
M^uradi, III, 280; Ayyubl, f. 2/5;_Sa4id al-Samnian, Diwan. MS. Berlin Gat.
80/0, Sprn 112/, f. 3/h; Budayri, f. 18a.
S^amman, f, /lb.
(ll)
A^broad a 1-Man ini, Diwan, MS. Berlin Cat. 8039. He/ 153, ff. 67a, 103b.
7 — rt
Budayri, ff. /a, 18a. °See above p.
A^. al-Kaywani, Diwan, Damascus 130l/l383~4, pp. 182, 183, Diwan, MS. Berlin 
Gat. 80/1, 8163, We. (ll) 202, f. 66a.
10MurIdI, .II, 143, III, 280; Ayyubi, ff. 45, 245; Jjkilbi, f. 58b.
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icertain waqfs to provide, inter alia, for the upkeep of students and other
2 3
residents. He was also in charge of several waqfs. Such works undertaken
by Fathi were usually performed by governors. Hardly any daftardar of
Damascus did anything comparable. This partly explains the interest and
admiration which many Damascenes showed towards Fathi1s works. Poets of
religious standing dedicated many poems in his praise. The names of Alimad
al-Baytimani, Ahmad al-Manini,5 Ahmad al-Kaywani, 4Abd al-Rahman al-
~ 7   p ,
Bahlul, and Mustafa al-4Alwani° are but few examples. By far the most out­
spoken and devoted among them was Sa‘ id al-Samman who was particularly 
favoured by Fathi, He choBe him to act as Imam (leader in prayer) and 
khaihib (orator) in his madrasa. In gratitude Sarnman compiled the bio­
graphies of the literary men, Damascenes and others, who praised Fathi, in 
a book entitled: a 1-Bawd al-nafih fima warada 4ala * 1-Fath minc.al mada* ih.^
^Budayri, f. 18a. %'Iuradi, II, 2/0.
3Ibid., Ill, 280, ^Ibid.
3See his diwan. MS. Berlin Gat, 8039. We (II) 153, ff. 67a, 103b,
6 — —
He was a prominent member of the Yerliyya corps, see Muradi, I, 97-107,
Matmah, ff. 72b-73b.
7Muradi, II, 310, 3H. 8Ibld., IV, 142, 152.
S^ee the biography of Sa4id al-Samman in Muradi, II, 1/1-1/9; _y^ yyubi, 
ff. //, /5; a^sibi, f. 58b; see also, Muradi, III, 280; Ayyubi, f. 2/5. 
In the Berlin Collection there_exists a shortened MB of this book entitled 
Mukhtasar a l-ihawd al-nafih fima warada ‘ala. ' 1-Fath a1-Falaqins 1 min. hl_
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The relation between Fathi and the militant Yerliyya was very strong
at the time. The conciliatory policy of Sulaynian Fas ha towards- the zorab
confirmed them in their self-confidence, and they found a powerful protector
in Fathi; each serving the interests of the other.^ It seems that as an
expression of this fraternization between Fathi and the Yerliyya. parti-
2
cularly the zorab. the majority of whom lived in the Maydan quarter, he 
built in 1153/1745-46 & bath in the Maw^ili street in the iJaydan^  which is
still extant.^ * He also built a coffee-house in the same quarter^ '.
M
The prestige which Fatpl had acquired^ made his contemporary chroni-
7
cler describe him as being *the Sultan in Damascus1. J Probably as a result
of this wide popularity, what seems to have been the original form of his
- $ _ 9 - . _
names Fath Allah,' sometimes Abd al-Fattah,was shortened into Fathi
which was easier to handle, particularly in poems,and also as a sign of 
favouritism. The form al-daftarl, from daftardar. does not have special 
significance because it had already been in use.
Having satisfied the essential power groups among the Damascenes,
Fathi seized on the occasion of the marriage of his daughter to his nephew 
to assert his prestige publicly. Was it a pure coincidence that this event
Muradi, III, 286, 287. S^ee above p./<n;see below p,219.
^Muradi, III, 280; Budayri, f. 18a,
•^S. Munajjid, 1 Ha mma ma tD ima s hq1, a 1-Mas hr iq, 4-1 (194-7) pp. 4-0 1-425, P. 422.
^Budayri, f. 18a. M^uradi, III, 280. 7BudayrI, f. 10b.
SMuradi, II,JU3, 314-5 Kaywanl^ Diwan. MS. Berlin, f. 66a, Diwan. Damascus, 
p.. 182; Hasibi, f. 58b; Ayyubi, f. 45'*
9 _ —
Baytimani, f. 52a.
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took place in the month of Rabd? I 1156, a few days after the celebrations
staged by Sulayman Fas Via to mark the circumcision of his son? The timing
was remarkable and of no less significance was the lavishness exhibited by
Fathi and the programme he arranged. He preceded his celebrations by a
tahliia (a Sufi practice) to which he invited the shaykhs of the various
turuq. Probably he Tvanted by this act to dismiss any ill-feeling that might
have arisen towards him among members of the turuq as a result of the asso-
— 1 'ciation of his name with Husayn Pasha who had earlier banned the tahliia.
action _
But the immediate aim behind his'/was more important. Nearly every balim
in Damascus belonged to one tariqa or more, and every one of the latter had
2
a shaykh (head) of its own* It was not necessary that only the shaykhs of
^  > "3
the turuq were invited* but other Sufis who were also called shaykhs might 
have been entertained as well. The close link between the turuq and the 
crafts^ must have been very much in the mind of Fathi also.
He followed this by seven days* rejoicings, every day of which was 
assigned to a group of people, Among those invited, besides the*Ularna^  ,
S^ee above p.
^See for example, Muradi, I, 5; Ayyubi, f. 86; Ibn Junfa, 59.
C^f. Suwaydi, f. 94b*
C^f, Budayri, ff. 7b, 8b, 22a, 39b; Mu^ibbi, IV, 145; Suwaydi, ff. 93a,
93b; F. Qudsi, ‘Notice sur les corporations de^ Damas* (in Arabic), pub­
lished by Carlo Landberg in Actes du VXe Gongres des Orientalistes,
Pt* II, Leiden, 1885, pp. 10-14.
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the military chiefs and the merchants, were the governor, Sulayman Pasha. 
Christians and Jews, peasants and, on the last day,' prostitutes* Each group 
was entertained on a separate day. It is no wonder that Sulayman Pasha 
should have been entertained on the first day. But the remarkable thing is 
that, by his attendance, he was promoting the standing of Fathi before the 
people and endorsing his growing prestige* Members of the Christian and
Jewish communities seem to have been useful to Fathi as financial and coramer-
1 2 
cial agent's. After all, Sulayman Pasha, himself, had invited them before.
That the peasants should have been invited, at all, shows the popular as­
pect of the rejoicings, and perhaps the economic relations between them and
  • 3
Fathi, in spite of the prevailing contempt for them which even he had ob­
served by entertaining them on the penultimate day of the rejoicings. The
invitation of prostitutes, strange as it seems, illustrates their growing 
numbers^ and was probably Intended to add colour to the occasion. Indeed
—  Z
their presence betrays the character of Fathi. Of more importance, however, 
was the close link that existed between the prostitutes and the insubordinate
persons who were protected by Fathi, and who, one would suppose, were In
,, . 6 their company.
Such a close succession of events and the wider cross-section of 
groups entertained by Fathi if compared with those invited by Sulayman Fasha
 ^See above p.
B^udayri, f. 8a. S^ee above p ..!£■$; ^See below p.2*f$.
5See Muradi, III, 286, 287.
6Cf. Muradi, III, 280, 286, 287; cf. Budayri, f.* .2]La.
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suggest outwardly the growing prominence of Fathi and inwardly his deter­
mination to rival the €&ms, If relations between both were up till now 
amicable on the surface, it was because they were more apparent than real. 
Four months later, Fatlii publicly asserted his enmity to the * Asms after 
Sulayman Pasha* s death.
The Policy of Sulayman Pasha outside Damascus.
Sulayman Pasha resumed his policy of strength outside Damascus and
exhibited much vigour and determination particularly against Zahir al~sUmar.
However, his campaigns against the latter reached no clear-cut success and
eventually ended Jby his death.
After his appointment to Damascus it took Sulayman Pasha two months 
1
to enter the city. During this period he made preparations in the Biqa
to attack the Druzes of Mount Lebanon. Before serious fighting started a
compromise was reached between the parties according to which Sulayman Pasha
2received a large sum of money. Sulayman Pasha might have been responding to
an appeal  ^made by his nephew, Ibrahim Pasha, the governor of Sidon at the
time, to help him obtain the taxes due from the Druses V  But he was parti-
5
cularly infuriated at the Druses1 attack on the Bifla6 . Probably he was
1
See above p.
2Budayri, f. 2a. The amount__is not specified but, according to this chroni­
cler, it was a large sum (mal c azim) .
O _ _ - 1
■'’For a similar appeal by Ibrahim Pasha to Sulayman Pasha see A.N.B 1025s 
Sidon, 10.11.41V
^The governors of Sidon showed weakness, at the time, in dealing with their 
vassals, see, A.H.B^ 1025s Sidon, 11.4 .40* Sidon, 19.3.40.
^The Lebanese chronicles are extremely confused as regards the dates^and the 
names of the governors of Damascus. Shidyaq^ p. 419 mentioned a skirmish
between the governor of Damascus and the S.hihnb amir which corresponds to the
(cont.)
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encouraged also by a precedent, from his first governorship, when he pre­
pared for an attack against the Druzes and then called it off after he re-
1
ceived a considerable amount of money. The analogy between the events is 
relevant, and so were the similar subsequent steps. As before, the next 
expedition by Sulayman Pas ha was directed against Zakir al~£Umar. This was 
a resumption of the hostilities that had started earlier, at the end of his j
2 i
first governorship in Damascus. But now the struggle assumed wider dimension! 
and a more forceful aspect.
Zahir was arousing the anxiety of Sulayman Pasha on two major issues. 
Firstly, he had become the most militant multazim in the §afad region and was 
well fortified in the fortress of Tiberias. His brother Said was guarding 
the second important fortress of Dayr Hanna." Apart from the concern with 
which Sulayman Pasha had viewed the growing power of Zahir on the periphery 
of his province, the latter1s encroachment on the district of Nablus, which
A
was under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus, was a casus belli. 
Such an act if passed, unpunished by Sulayman Pasha would impair his prestige 
in the dependent parts of his province and help to reinforce the power of 
Zahir. Also, any toleration of Zahir1 s aggrandizement ..would subject the miri 
revenue to dangerous dislocations, the more so should he occupy further 
territories in the province of Damascus. Secondly, Zahir was principally 
answerable to the governor of Sidon by virtue of the territory he held. His
(cont.) right date, 17-41* but the name of the governor of Damascus which he 
gave is erroneous, and the particulars he mentioned are not precise.
See above p. S^ee above p. /7*f-
^Budayri, f. 4b; cf. A.N.B1 978; Acre, 30.1.49.
4*'A. al-Sabbagh, f. 7b5 M. al-Sabbagh, 51* 52.
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delay In paying the mini dues was the responsibility of the latter except 
in so far as the "territoryof the province of Damascus was concerned. More­
over, Sulayman Pasha was interested in the affairs of Zahir on two further
points« The governor of Sidon in 1741 was Ibrahim Pasha al-sAzm who was suc-
1
ceeded in the same year by As ad Pasha al~ Asm, both nephews of Sulayman 
Pasha. In 1742 a certain Yatf qTub Pasha was appointed to Sidon for the second 
time, as successor to As&ad Pasha. But it seems that his term in office did' 
not last long,-5 and he was replaced by Ibrahim Pasha a I-5 ilzm, who was deposed 
in 174/- The family link be Ween Sulayman Pasha and his ne chews, the gov­
ernors of Sidon, encouraged them to ask for his help in their struggles with 
the tax-farmers in their province, ‘The matter was not only a family col­
laboration. The miri revenue collected by the Governor of Sidon was needed
6to finance the Pilgrimage and the jarda. On this issue the Sultan could 
not help standing aloof, particularly at this time. The persistent demands 
by Nadir Shah to have a separate Persian Pilgrimage as a matter of prestige 
and allegedly to ensure the security of the Persian pilgrims, w,Cre still 
great obstacles in the negotiations that were going on,at the time,between
7
him and the Sultan. The Sultan, himself pressed for-money for his military 
1 1
A.N.B 1025: Sidon, 10.11.41.
h.N.B1 1026s Sidon, 7.3.42, Sidon (?) .4.42; cf. Tabbikh, III, 335.
%uradi, IY, 237, did not mention this second governorship .of Xa6qub Pasha
(his first was In 1739, cf. A.N.B^ 1026j Sidory) probably because of its
short duration, 7,3*42
4&.H.B 1026s Sidon, 25.5.44.
h.K.B'1' 1025s Sidon, 10.11.41. hbid.: A.H.B^ 1025: Sidon, 6.2.41.
?R0. S.P. 97/31: Istanbul, 30.1.41, Istanbul, 8.5.41, Istanbul* 8.4.42
Istanbul, 3*3.42; cf. Y. Minorsky, E.1. 1st ed.*j s.v. Nadir Shah, pp.811,312
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preparations on the Persian front,'*' could not tolerate any diminution in
2
the local resources of the Pilgrimage, and hence any risks in its opera­
tion'. which might play into the hands of Nadir Shah and further strengthen 
his cause. Moreover, Zahir was considered a rebel at Istanbul,  ^and a rather 
dangerous one, near the Pilgrimage route. This prompted the Sultan to Issue 
orders to Sulayman Pasha to suppress him.^
On 3 Pa jab 1155/3 Sept. 174-2, Sulayman Pasha left Damascus at the 
head of a large army composed mainly of Dalatiyya to attack a^hir al-*Umar 
in Tiberias. Gunners and sappers dispatched from Istanbul accompanied him.5
This was a further proof that the campaign was premeditated and ordered by
  6
Istanbul. Sulayman Pasha was helped in the siege of Tiberias by the Druses
because Amir Mulhim was on good terms with the 4Azins at the time. On 30 Nov.
1741 Amir Mulhim paid a friendly visit to Astfad Pasha who was governor of
7 _  —
Sidon. The inhabitants of Nablus also helped Sulayman Pasha because they
were subjected to the encroachments of Zahir. The deputy-governor (nay ib)
of Jerusalem, Khalil Agha, came to the help of Sulayman Pasha. So did the
-  . SSakhr and the Saqr Beduin who were on bad terms with Zahir. Such an assort­
ment of forces might look Impressive but they lacked cohesion and discipline. 
The mercenary troops of Sulayman Pasha devastated the neighbouring villages, 
and this alienated the inhabitants. The commercial activities were inter-
^PRO, S.P. 97/31s Istanbul, 8.5.41*
2 1 3 1 
Cf. A.N.B 1026? Sidon, 19.9*42. A.N.B 4-20? Istanbul, 1.5*43.
^A.N.B1 1026: Sidon, 19.9*42. B^udayri, ff. 4a, 4b. ^Ibid.
'A.N.B1 1026; Sidon, 30.1.42, Sidon, 22.12,41 (Extrait des Registres).
B^udayri, ff. 4a, 4b. /a.N.B1 1026s Sidon, 19.9*42.
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rupted as a result of these ravages and of the insecurity of the roads.
In spite of the fierce attack on Tiberias and its siege on all sides , in­
cluding that on the lake by boats carried on camels’ backs, Zahir offered a
2
staunch resistance and was able to receive smuggled supplies. The siege
lasted for about three months, the time of the dawra, after which both sides
were interested in bringing it to an end. Sulayman Pasha was due to command v.
the Pilgrimage and Zakir*s power was almost exhausted, A compromise was
3
reached between the parties.
On 4 ShawwaI/2 Dec. of the same year, the day before Sulayman Pasha 
arrived in Damascus, he officially announced to the Damascenes the conquest
of Tiberias, and celebrations were staged.^ It was rumoured In Damascus
—- 5
that Zahir1s son was taken as hostage.
To say that he had conquered Tiberias was a sheer piece of propaganda
to hide his military failure. It is true that Zahir*s strength was strained
almost to the extreme, but it was to Sulayman Pasha’s peace delegation rather
6 -
than to his armies that Zahir opened the gates of Tiberias. Had Sulayman
Pasha really subdued Zahir militarily he would have, at least, dismantled
his fortifications, of which action there is no proof. All other sources
agree that he did not conquer Zahir militarily.? Even Budayri doubted the..
1 1" A.N.B 1026s Sidon, 19.9.42, Sidon, 29.9-42, Sidon, 12.11.42 (dispatch No.
4 under this date), Sidon, 15.3.43.
1026s Sidon, 19.9.42; Budayri, f. 4h. ^Budayri, f. 5b.
^Ibid. ^Ibid.. f. 6a. ^$bid., ff. 5b, 6a.
Ta.N.b1 1026s Sidon, 5.4.43; Barik, 11; tfA. al-§abbagh, f. 8a; cf. Ibn 
Jum*a, 69; Hasselquist, 158, mentions, perhaps by mistake, the name of 
the governor of Sidon in place of that of Damascus.
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1
authenticity of the account he gave. Moreover, Sulayman Pa^ sha had to lead 
a second expedition, about a year later, to try to subdue Jahir.
In the meantime, gahir was strengthening himself militarily, and poli­
tically. His relations with the local French merchants and officials had been
2
on a purely personal basis until now because generally they were not yet sure
of his ability to maintain his position. The trading and religious concerns
of the French w e r e at stake. Their relations with the amir of Mount Lebanon,
for example, were amicable and they gave him every assistance possible because
theydoiew that his office was more stable than that of Zahir, and because he
3 —was safeguarding their religious and commercial interests * To back gahir
without being sure of his intentions or ability to survive would alienate
Sulayman Pasha who represented established authority and was personally more
amenable* During the previous expedition, the French Gonsul made overtures
to Sulayman Pasha to extend his protection to the French merchants at Acre,
and to the Terre-Sainte convents at Naaareth and Mount Carmel.^ This was ac-
5
cordingly granted by Sulayman Pasha * The welfare of the religious orders in 
Damascus necessitated also that the French should be on good terms with the 
Governor of Damascus* The French, however, were anxious to acquire Zahir1s 
friendship to safeguard their commercial interests. ;,Ih thighs ear ch for sup­
porters ^ahir approached the French Gonsul in Sidon who wrote to ask the 
French ambassador at the Porte to accord Zahir his protection and to obtain 
for him a firman which would confirm him in his position, and prevent Sulay- 
min Pasha from attacking him. The ambassador reasoned that the friendship of 
Sulayman Pasha was more beneficial for the protection of the religious orders. 
■^ BudayrX, f* 6a. ^Cf, *A. al-§abbagh, f. 8b.
3A.N.B1 1026: Sidon, 30.1.42, Sidon, 22.11.42 (Extrait des Registres).
TLbid.s. Sidon, 19.9.42, Sidon, 26.5.43. ^Ibid.: Sidon, 12.11.42.
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Besides, he could not talk the matter over with the Ottoman officials be­
cause of their declared enmity to $ahir and also because certain French mer­
chants were accused of having supplied Zahir with powder and bullets. He
counselled, however, that Zahir should keep an agent at the Porte to take
1
care of his interests, and he would help him secretly,
At the start of his second expedition against jahir, Sulayman Pasha 
took precautionary measures to safeguard the villages, of Hawran, probably 
because he ms.afraidliof a possible reprisal by the Zabid Beduin. Apart from 
the 300 Yerliwa troops whom he asked to join him, he. requested the Yerliyya 
chiefs to deploy what remained of their forces in Hawran to ensure Its pro­
tection* He also ordered that every village around Damascus should choose
ten of its inhabitants, apparently to keep watch with the Yerliyya and pro-
2
bably to guard against their insubordination. This would also serve as an
outlet to the Yerliyya and could be regarded as a further precaution against
their possible insubordination in Damascus in his absence*
The second expedition against Zahir differed from the first both in
scope and tactics. The governors of Sidon and Tripoli and the deputy-gov-
ernors of Jerusalem, Gaza, Ramie and Irbid we£e ordered by the Sultan to join
Sulayman Pasha. He set out to conquer the fortress of Dayr Hanna which was
3defended by 5ahir!s brother, Sa*d. Such a plan of attacking the less im­
portant strongholds of the Ziya&ina, if successfully carried out, would cut 
off the supplies of Tiberias, and exert a psychological pressure, as well,
on its defenders. However, the sudden death of Sulayman Pasha in the village 
of Lubia, near Tiberias, around 4 Rajab 1136/25 August 1743,^ disputable
5
though its causes remain, brought relief to Zahir.
420s Istanbul, 1*5-43. B^udayri, f* 9b.<ffi/7a?lbid., ff. 9a, 9b* 
4lbn Junfa, 69 $\ * A. al-§abbagh, f. 9a; cf. al-Qari, 78.
^Budayri, f. 10a5 Muradi, III, 184; M. al-§abbagh, 62, 63? Barxk, 11.
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The events that ensued in Damascus after the death of Sulayman Pasha
confirmed the weakness of his policy of appeasement and oortended the diffi­
culties which his successor would encounter. Shortly after his death the 
Yerliyya arose and killed some members of the Dalatiyya. The situation 
played also into the hands of Fathi al-Daftari. He assumed de facto author­
ity, sequestrated the property of Sulayman Pasha and arrested his siMhdar 
(sword-bearer), his Rhazrnedar (treasurer) who was his cousin, and his wakil
* — ........... ii i. n i i«-_r ni.n-iT.iri * I him mm i »•< I" ■*
al-Hharj (superintendent of expenditure), together with their retinue, pend-
-  1ing the arrival of an order from the Sultan who was duly informed by Fathi. 
The fact that Fathi acted ’authoritatively11 on his own initiative illustrates 
his latent enmity to Sulayman Pasha and his bid for political power. If he
was expecting to be appointed governor, then he was twice disappointed,
firstly, because another governor was appointed and, secondly, because this
governor was a nephew of the late Sulayman Pasha. In spite of this, Fathi
spared no time and efforts to make the most he could of the new situation.
The Governorship of As* ad Pasha al-sAzm.
    —
On 14 Sha6ban 1156/3 Oct. 1743, it was learned in Damascus that As6ad
2
Pasha was appointed as governor. sAli Agha, the mutasallim of his prede­
cessor, acted for him in the meantime.  ^ On Sunday 24 Sha6ban, As*ad Pasha 
entered Damascus.^
1 —Budayri, f. 10a.
2 —
rbid., erroneously gave the name of the month as Ramadan.
^Ibid5 Dhikf man tawalla, f. 115a; Risala* f. 14D.
4lbn Jum*a, 69. This date was preferred to that given by Budayri, f. 10b,
as Saturday 25 5ha*ban because Sunday coincides with 24 Shafcban.
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Askad Pasha was thirty nine years old at the time. He started his
administrative career as mutasallim for his father, Isma'il Pasha, in Ma'arra
and Hamah.^ Toxrards the end of 1741 he succeeded his brother, Ibrahim Pasha, 
2in Sidon, and remained in this office until about the beginning of March
3
1742, during which time his rule ms generally acclaimed. Shortly after- 
v/ards, he x*as appointed governor of ij&rnah. Through money and the help of 
Bakr Pasha, ex-governor of Jedda, he was granted the malikane of gamah as his 
own/ It seems that partly through the intercession of this very influential 
person who was a son-in-law of the Sultan,^  Ah4 ad Pasha was appointed to Dam­
ascus,
There x^as nothing at the time to discredit the *Agms at Istanbul .There 
was also no radical change in the administration in Istanbul such as happened 
after the revolution of 1730 and as a result of which the ‘A^ms x^ ere eclipsed 
albeit temporarily. As4ad Pasha disposed of the principal means of obtaining 
governorship, namely, money and strong backing, furthermore, he had exper­
ience in the affairs of the Pilgrimage having commanded the larda in 1153/ 
1740-1.^ Given the safety x^ hich his uncle had ensured for the Pilgrimage and 
his oxm experience, As* ad Pasha would then be expected to maintain a similar 
record.
The appointment of As*ad Pasha to Damascus \-ras the only instance of 
tx^ro *Azm governors succeeding each other in Damascus. Such an event had pre­
viously occurred in Tripoli and Sidon. But it acquired an added importance, 
in this case, because Askad Pasha*s rule lasted, without interruption, for 
about fourteen years - a unique example in the history of Ottoman Damascus.
We may note three phases in the governorship of As4ad Pashas
labbakk. Ill, 334. 24.N.B1 1025s Sidon, 10.11.41; cf. Tabbakh, III, 334-
3A.H.B1 1026s Sidon, 7.3.42. ^abbakh, III, 334. 5Hammer, XV, 10.
6 —
^abbakn, III, 335* 7See the list of the Ottoman Governors of
Damascus in Wulat Rimashq
1. The dominance of the Yerliyya and FathU al-Daftari, 1156-8/1743^5.
Us*ad Pasha*s attitude in Damascus during this period was character­
ized by passivism and inactivity. In fact he could not do otherwise at 
this stage because the forces he encountered were strong and also because 
he had other more urgent duties, at the time. On 5 Ramadan/23 October, ten 
days after his entry to Damascus, he left for the dawra. Far from resuming
the past policy of Sulayman Pasha in bringing Zahir to . ■- heel; , As*ad Pasha
reached an accommodation with him through the intercession of FatHi al-
Daftari. This was the first sign of his future policy of 1 peaceful co­
existence1 with Zahir. His determination to secure his position in Damascus, 
during these trying days, might have worked towards this reconciliation, but 
it does not follow that when his former aim was achieved his attitude towards 
Zahir was reversed.^
Already before his entry to Damascus, the Yerliyya exhibited much 
insubordination and clashed with the Dalatiyya. The absence of Ascad Pasha
on the dawra played into their hands. Under Fathi!s protection and nerhaps
2
encouragement, their lawlessness surged unabated. The intolerable sta,te of 
insecurity which resulted and the intimidation caused by certain followers 
of Fathi to some highly respected ‘Ulamaf , urged the plaintiffs to act.
In the'second half of Ramadan 1156/first half of Nov. 1743, a certain 
Lasfa§a, attached to FatHI, insulted 6 All Bfendi al~‘Ajlani, Naqib al-ilsh- 
raf,^ and Sayyid cAli Efendi al-Muradi, father of the biographer Khalil al- 
Muradi and a prominent person in Damascus (rails)t an(^ threatened them with
t* ~ " T  T- 1
a firearm.-* On 25 Ramadan/l2 Nov., the Aslyaf demonstrated against Fathi anc 
the _
/shops closed, The notables assembled themselves in a diwan and issued a
\see below p. M^uradi, III, 280, 286.
I^bid., 111,207. ^Ibid. B^udayri, f. 11a.
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fatwa authorizing the killing of La4fa.§a who took refuge in the house of
Mustafa Agha b. Khudari, a chorbaji^- in the Yerliyya corps, in the Maydan.
Undeterred, Laufasa finally fired on 4JLli Efendi al4iuradl, This daring act
prompted, the notables to reckon directly with Fathi who protected La4fasa.
_ *
Together with certain Ottoman officials such as the gurra emini and the 
Balta.jis who were in Damascus at the time, they assembled in the law-court 
in the presence of the judge and drafted an appeal to the Sultan against
—  Q
Fathi and his followers. Although they changed their minds the next day,
the mere fact that they assembled in protest against Fathi was remarkable.
By this act, they were able to din the responsibility overtly on Path! and 
/ /
his proteges. A sharp line was tlmsi drawn between the insubordinate ele­
ments, Yerliyya and otherwise, with Fathi at their head, and the notables of 
Damascus. As6ad Pasha was still not directly implicated because these things 
happened in his absence. It was to hisadvantage that attitudes should thus 
have crystallized.
On 7 Shawwal 1156/24 Bov. 1743, three days after his return from the 
dawra. As6ad Pasha convoked the notables in a diwan and fixed the prices of 
wheat and bread.^ Although this proved to be a temporary and an ineffective 
solution, it gained him much credit in Damascus. On 15 Shav/wal he left for 
the Pilgrimage. In his absence two developments occurred in Damascus. The 
price of wheat went up again and this sharpened the complaintof the populace.
1 2
See above p. go* See above p. /<>$.
B^udayrT, f. 11a, ^Ibid., f. lib.
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Stricken by plague, at the same time, the exacerbated poor arose and stoned 
1
the law-court '. On 23 Shawwal, a week after the departure of JLs6ad Pasha,
—  2a salakhtSo? (courier) arrived from Istanbul with orders to confiscate the 
property of Sulayman Pasha al-£Azm. By threat and imprisonment, the places 
where the money was hoarded were known. Immense amounts of money, valuables 
and wheat were confiscated, not to mention what had already been expropriated 
by Fathi. The Damascenes who had suffered from high prices under Sulayman 
Pasha, came to know now, rightly or wrongly, where their money had finally 
gone, • The Sultan sent further orders to tighten the measures taken against 
the family of Sulayman Pasha and against his retinue. More wealth was con­
fiscated and a lot of injustices were committed in the operation.^
On the return of As£ad Pasha, he convoked a diwan which was attended 
by the Sultan1s official who carried out the confiscation. The latter pro­
duced the firman by which he was authorised to do so, and As0 ad Pasha did 
nothing, iffter his purpose was served, the Sultan pardoned those implicated. 
What remained of the estate of Sulayman Pasha was sold to As4ad Pasha."
The confiscation of Sulayman Pasha1s property would cause no surprise,
even if there were nothing In his record to necessitate or justify it. This 
_ _  „ — —  — —  —  — _ ~
Ibid., ff. lib, 12b, The plague which spread in Damascus appeared also in 
the Syrian coast and in Aleppo, see, A.N.B 1026s Sidon, 25.5.-443 Rad cliff e 
papers, 664.5/5 s Aleppo, l6.4-.4-3> Aleppo, 24,5*43* 6645/3$ Aleppo, 2.4-4-4-.
It was also reported in Istanbul at the same time, see PRO, S.P. 37/32* 
Istanbul, 12.8.4-4-•
2 -''This is a corruption of the Turkish term Silihgun.., see Gibb and Bowen,
I.i. 87 n.5.
^Budayri, ff. 12a, 12b, '^Ibid., f f. 13a, 13b.
5Ibid., f. 13b.
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was a well-known practice In the Ottoman Empire, The Sultan was bard
1
pressed for money to provide for his wars with Persia and for his other
expenses* In Istanbul he was confiscating at random. Wealth and old age
2m  a candidate for an office were welcomed. But the impact of this confis­
cation on the Damascenes who saw in it an insult to As6ad Pasha, was far- 
reaching.
The Ottoman official left Damascus for Istanbul unmolested by As6ad 
Pasha to the surprise of the Damascenes. Nor did Asfiad Pasha make any move 
against Fathi, who was considered to be behind this affair. At the end of 
Jumada II 1157/9 August 174-9 Path! was ordered by the Sultan to leave for 
Istanbul. His absence provided an opportunity for the notables of Damascus 
to make a. second appeal against him. But Its outcome was no better than the
o
first.-3 This was probably because some of the notables either panicked or 
were attached to FathT; one such was the well-known Sacid al-Samnian, who, 
with his friends,^ might have sabotaged the resolution from within. How­
ever, those who were staunch opponents of Fathi did send a protest against 
him.'* The Sultan, it is alleged, wanted to kill Fathi because of his mis­
deeds in Damascus. In fact, he thought he had killed him when he put to
_  6
death another man who was introduced to him as Fathi. If this story is un­
true, it still reflects the importance attached to Fathi in Damascus where 
it was rife. If it is true, as is probable, it shows an expedient policy of
kliO, S.P. 97/32! Istanbul, 12.8.43, Istanbul, 7.9.43, Istanbul, 27.12.43, 
Istanbul, 14.1.44-, Istanbul, 10.2.44; cf. Budayri, f. 10b.
2 o
Hammer, XV, 75, 76. B^udayri, ff. 13b, 14a.
kee above p. 10 0. M^uradi, III, 287; cf. Budayri, f. 14a.
f .
^Budayri, f. 14a.
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dispensing with a person after he had served his purpose or at least a con­
siderable part of it. Of more importance, however, were the means through 
which Fathi had extricated himself. Apart from the use of money', his attach­
ment to the powerful Kigslar Agha, B^ shir^ ", enabled him to return safely to 
Darnas cus.^
The victorious return of FathT gave an impetus to lawlessness. He
3 / fstarted by taking vengeance on those who pleaded against him. His proteges 
were openly insubordinate. They used, for instance, to go to the orison and 
set free whom they liked without being molested. Although this was in utter 
disregard of Ascad Pasha's authority, they went even further by intimidating 
him personally. The Damascenes were alarmed at the indifference of As4ad 
Pasha, whose attitude encouraged the scrub, and they nicknamed him 3qcdiyya 
kadxnl
So far As* ad Pasha did not interfere effectively because the powers 
he encountered were not easy to curb. His prestige was greatly diminished 
not for what he had done but for what he was unable to do. The hate towards 
Fathi and his lawless followers was a potential asset if he tried to exploit 
it. kany notables had openly declared their enmity to Fathi, though they 
lacked decisiveness and unanimity. The Damascene poor who were the hard core 
of the mob were restless at the increase in prices, Their discontent if
Muradi, III, 287; see above p. t$1- Muradi, III, 287; Budayri, f. 14a. 
%uradl, III, 287.
i?or this, state of affairs, see ibid; Budayri, ff. 14a, 16a;, kadin is a
Turkish term which means woman. The change of Asead's name into the 
feminine form, Sa‘diyya., is a further insult.
218
they coaid be adequately recruited and an enemy marked for them, might well 
be decisive.
If non-interference by As*ad Pasha was dictated so far by necessity,
he seems to have changed it now into a useful oolicy. . He needed, should he
decide to act, to whin up the hate of the mob not so much directly against
Fathi, who was still strong, as to create through them a feeling of crisis
which would facilitate the implementation of his pending plans* He permitted
tension to heighten and worked to discredit any other possible saviour except
himself. When the demonstrators came to him protesting against the increase
in food prices, he sent them to the judge. The latter, taught by experience
to guard against such recurrent events, ordered his guards to fire at the
demonstrators. Many casualties occurred on both sides and the judge fled.
Later on, he was recompensed by the notables and reinstated in the law-court.
His successor entered Damascus escorted by armed followers - ’an unprece-
1dented act1 in the words of his contemporary chronicler* The rising proved
2abortive and the prices were still high. The exacerbation of the populace 
reached a high pitch and they had no other to pin their hopes on fbub. As*ad 
Pasha, It was then that he decided to put his plans Into action.
2. The Victoryof As*ad Pasha over his opponents, 1159/174.6*
As*ad Pasha started first with the suppression of the zorab who dom­
inated the Yerliyya corps and were the backbone of Fathi’s power. Orders to
3
this effect were obtained from Istanbul. Through his private troops, the
^Budayri, f. 15a. Ibid.* f. 14b*
^Muradi, III, 287.
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Dalatiyya, numbering about four hundred, he occuoied the citadel, which was 
in the hands of the Yerliyya, on 22 Safar 1159/17 March‘174.6. Their main 
power, however, was centered in the two quarters of SarSja and the 
Maydan, which were outside the gates of the city. The Yerliyya alerted 
their forces and assembled in Bab al-Jabiya which leads to the Maydan. Asfad 
- Fas ha deceived them by attacking the other less important and, now, less 
guarded quarter of $uq Saruja • His artillery stormed it, burning its houses 
and opening them to the ravages of his troops. Ahmad al-Qaltaqji and cilbd 
Allah b. Hamza, the prominent Yerliyya- chiefs of this quarter, managed to 
escape. After pacifying it, the troops of Ascad Pasha prepared to attack 
the second and more important stronghold, the Maydan quarter. There, Mustafa 
Ajfha b. Khudari, with the rank of chorbaji, was the leader of the zorab.
He went to the extent of calling himself Sultan a1-Sham. Other prominent
mJ M IJi j M L|^   L,   X
chiefs of the zorab were Ahmad Agha and Khalil Agha described as awlad al— 
Durzi} The successful attack on guq Sraruja shocked the Yerliyya as much as 
it encouraged As*ad Pasha. When he ordered that the guns be directed against 
the Maydan, its chiefs fled without putting up any resistance. The troops
p
then destroyed and looted about five hundred houses*''
Having pacified the strongholds of the Yerliyya. As£ad Fasha started 
the suppression of the insubordinate enclaves in other quarters. He threat­
ened the shaykhs and imams of these quarters with financial penalties if they 
failed to co-operate in the arrest of these persons. Through their help many 
were seized and out to death. Their mutiliated bodies were exhibited in
B^udayri, f. 15b. They might have been Druzes because Budayri on another 
occasion, f. 24a, used the expression, awlad al-Durzi, in referring to the 
Druzes.
^Budayri, f. 15b* al-Qari, 79.
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front of the governor’s headquarters. 1
Five members of the house of Hasan al-Turkomani were killed - ’the
2
worst calamity to hit a single family1. This also marked the military
eclipse of this family whose members, relatives, and dependents comprised,
3
at one time, about one fourth of the Yerliyya corps. Those who fled took
refuge with the neighbouring rulers and used their territories as bases for
the attack oil Damascus. Awlad al-Durzi. Ahmad Agha and Khalil Agha, with
their followers took refuge with the Kulayb Beduin.^ 4Abd Allah b. Hamza
and his followers went to Zahir aI-4Umar, and Ahmad al-Qaltaqji and his fol-
w 5
lowers sought asylum with the Druzes of Mount Lebanon. -Because the Yerliyya
lived in quarters and had family connections, many innocent persons were
killed or suffered in one way or another as a result. This did not, however,
detract from thb satisfaction and relief felt by the majority of the Damas-
6cenes at the restoration of order. As4ad Pasha exploited this victory to
the full. The city x^ as illuminated and the guns kept firing twice daily for
7
two months- as a sign of joy. The Sultan bestox*/ed on As4 ad Pasha much hon-
3our. His brother Sa‘d al-DTn Pasha was raised to the rank of wazir at this
9 10 time, and was appointed, shortly afterwards governor of Tripoli.
^For more details about these events see; Budayri, ff, 15a-l6a; al~Qari, 79; 
cf. Muradi, II, 63, III, 287, IV, 173,
B^udayri, f. 16a, M^uradi, II, 63.
L 5See above p. Budayri, f, 17a,
I^bid.., f. 16b; Kaywani, Diwan, Damascus, 1301A333-A, pp. 172-3.
B^udayri, f. 16a. I^bid., ff, 16a, 16b.
^Ibid,, f. 16b; cf. Tabbakh, III, 392.
^Budayri, f, 19a5 A.N.B 1118s Tripoli, 10.10.46; see below p.
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To guard against any resurgence of the insubordinate Yerliyya and per­
haps also as a gesture of loyalty to the Sultan, As4ad Pasha asked for and
1
was granted the dispatch of an orta of Kapi Kulus. Thus these troops were
reinstated, in Damascus after they had been dismissed from it during the gov­
ernorship of 4Uthman Pasha a1-Muhas§ilA
So far Fathi al-Daftari had weathered many attempts aimed at dislodg­
ing him. On 15 Jurnada II, 1159/ 5 July, 17^ 6, he was finally put to death by 
As4ad Pasha. The suppression of the zorab crippled his local support In 
Damascus. &t the same time he lost his strong protector at Istanbul, the 
Kislar Agha, Bashir,^ The letter’s death on 1 Jumada I, 1159/22 May, 17^ 6 
and the struggle of the Grand Vezir to regain his power^ made It difficult 
for Fathi to accommodate himself to this change in so short a time. Further­
more, he found a personal enemy in the Grand Vezir Hasan Pasha, a relative • 
of whose, Ahmad Agha, had been appointed agha of the Yerliyya in Damascus and 
had eventually been expelled through the efforts of Fathi, Hasan Pasha con­
firmed the Sultan in his suspicions already aroused by Ascad Pasha against
Fathi, With the collaboration of Khalil al-Bakri al-Siddiqi and other not-
— 5
ables, As4ad Pasha informed the Sultan of the injustices committed by Fathi, 
The role played by Khalil al-BakrT al-Sid&Iqi who was appointed judge of Jeru* 
salem in 1158/1745-46 and happened to be in Damascus at the time,^  Is remark­
able. It is In line with his previous attitude when, as mufti of Damascus, h< 
~
See above p,6811, 5 '“See above p.1 8 7 ,
M^uradi, III, 287; Budayri, f. 14a,
A?B0, S.P. 97/32; Istanbul, 24.5.4 6, Istanbul, 18.7.46; Hammer, XV, 105-107. 
M^uradi, III, 287. %bid, II, 8 4.
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led the Damascenes against the awantyya of Abu Tawq. The Sultan seems also
to have been tempted by the pledge of As*ad Pasha who guaranteed to nay him
one thousand purses from the fortune of Fathi should he be killed.^ Fathis
body was mutilated, and dragged in the streets for three days. Members of his
family were humiliated and their wealth was confiscated. 3 His retinue-, were
either killed or managed to escape.^ '
After the elimination of Fathi, the office of daftardar lapsed into
political insignificance. His successor Muhammad Ffendi b. Raja.b, known as
Ibn Farrukh, remained daftardar of Damascus for thirty successive years. 3
His long term in office could be partly explained by his abstention from
active politics,
3. The Aftermath of Victory 1159-1170/174.6-1757.
This phase of As*ad Pasha*s governorship was characterised by major 
developments both within Damascus and in the neighbouring regions. The 
power -vacuum created after the suppression of the gorab and the execution of 
Fathi was partly filled by the reinstated Kapi Kulus. partly by the increas­
ing number of private troops, and above all by the much enhanced authority of 
As6ad Pasha. Such a situation, in which many power groups existed, necessi­
tated a political ability in the governor to keep things under control. As6ad 
Pasha did not lack-such a quality and was able to keep a balance among these
S^ee above p.f/5- M^uradi, III, 287.
3Ibid., I, 163j II, 220, 221* AyyubI, ff. 199, 200.
^Muradi, III, 287; Budayri, f. 17a.
3Muradx, IV, 385 cf. Budayri, f. 19a; see above p.
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groups. Having destroyed the local checks on his power, he enforced an econ­
omic policy aimed minly at augmenting his own wealth. Since the military 
initiative was taken from the hands of the Damascene Yerliyya no matter how 
insubordinate some of their members had been, the Damascenes were subjected 
now to the insubordination of alien troops. The social conditions and the 
security of Damascus were deeply affected as a result*
The new shape of the power groups in Damascus.
Far from being resigned to their fate, the fugitive zorab were mak­
ing plans to infiltrate into Damascus and take revenge on their enemies. To 
avert this danger at a time when many troops were occupied outside Damascus 
with the Pilgrimage, Musa Kahya, the mutasallim, re-employed at the end of 
1159/17S6 the dismissed ^bd Allah al-Turk, an agha of the Dalatiyya. and 
increased his troops. Being cavalry,^ * the Dalatiyya were entrusted with keep' 
ing watch around the city to forestall any attack by the zorab. The lufenq- 
.jis (musketeers) with Mahmud Agha, al-Baghdadi as theix chief patrolled the
2 Isuburbs of Damascus. It seems that some Yerliyya in Damascus were either { 
encouraged by the manoeuvres of their expelled colleagues and tried to as­
sert their power, or that they were considered potential enemies whose pre- ' 
sence could not be tolerated. On his return from the Pilgrimage ad Pasha 
put to death two of their members, *Ali b. al-Hadid (or al-Haddad) and rAli 
‘Ahbar.^
The Dalatiyya who were called on to preserve the law against the zonal
-^See above p. 2Budayri, f, 19b; cf. Barik, 15.
3Budayri, f. 20a. :
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proved no less insubordinate. They devastated the villages and committed 
many atrocities which made the people protest to As*ad Pasha against them. 
Although he was authorised by Istanbul to have them annihilated, all he did 
was to fix a three-days* time limit for their corrupt members to leave Damas­
cus. By not specifying these members but merely asking them for a self- 
imposed scrutiny of behaviour which might well end with their death, As*ad 
Pasha seems to have been not so much interested in suppressing the Dalatiyya 
as in placating the plaintiffs by a threat which he was unable and perhaps 
unwilling to implement. A few days later the Dalatiyya publicly appeared
unmolested.1 However, an outlet for their insubordination was provided by
2
As “ad Pasha*s campaigns against the Druses# The inefficiency they exhibited 
in the fighting and the inability of As* ad Pasha to get rid of them pegce-
3fully, made him resort to the employment of the Magharlba to balance them. 
Thus, As6ad Pasha reinstated the Maghariba In Damascus after they had been
T> /expelled by the Damascenes during the governorship of Husayn Pasha. r The re­
action of the Damascenes towards the re-employment of the Magfeariba was one 
of indifference, partly perhaps because they felt that their presence would j 
neutralize that of the Dalatiyya who were getting out of control, and partly j 
also because the chief opponents of the I^ghariba, the Yerliyya. were tamed. ;
After the purge that took place in the ranks of the Yerliyya. they 
became more docile as a whole and the governor relied, on them in his cam- i 
paigns. In his expedition against the Druses In Jumada I, 1160/Hay-June
^udayri, f* 20a. 2see below
^Budayri, ff. 21b, 2/4a. S^ee above p.(go*
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174-7* they accompanied As* ad Paste, together with other recruits such as the
1
Sipahis and some levies from the villages. The presence of the Yerliyya on 
the expedition is remarkable. Theoretically their duty was to guard the fort­
resses along the Pilgrimage route.2 It seems that with the increase in their 
insubordination they became reluctant to take part in the expeditions of the * 
governors as they used to in emergencies. As*ad Pasha rightly described them 
when they accompanied him on the expedition as volunteers. He praised their 
dedication'and gallantry in the fighting, in contrast to the Dalatiyya and in 
spite of what they had suffered at his hands.^
The authority of the agha of the Yerliyya was enhanced as a result of
 ht ■ ■■■mil
the suppression of the sorab and it seems that it contributed also to the doc­
ility of this corps. In 1157/1744--5 DarwTsh b, 6Abd Allah was appointed agha 
of the Yerliyya. He was on good terms with Asfia& Pasha and the notables of 
Damascus* particularly al-Sayyid 6Jill Efendi al-MuradT* whose wife was his 
niece.The fact that Darwish Agha had survived the suppression of the zorab 
shows that he had approved of it. No matter how much say he had in the af­
fairs of the corps after this event* his self-assertion was only temporary.
h^e return of the ICapi Kulus was by far the greatest single factor that 
kept the Yerliyya in check. Their presence* on the other hand* and the chal­
lenge they offered to the Yerliyya, crystallised the latter*g enmity towards 
them and accelerated their revival, The Kapi Kulus reoccupied the strategic 
positions in Damascus* i.e. the citadel and the gates. Their agha was In-
S^ee below p. mg- 
^Budayri * f. 21b,
S^ee above p. 6S}Van al-§iddlq,f.29a. 
4Muradi, IX, 107, 108, 111.
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strueted by As"ad Pasha not to permit any* Damascene to enrol in his corps.
By keeping the ICapi Kulus immune from such penetration, they would remain a
2
distinct alien group, more effective in balancing the Damascene Yerliyya. 
provided they did not join the crafts as their predecessors had done. This, 
however, would make rivalry between the Kami Kulus and the Damascenes more 
acute. The ban on the Damascenes joining them seems to have been strictly ad­
hered to by the Kapi Kulus themselves who did not want local recruits to share 
with them their privileges. On one occasion they revolted because a person,
presumably a Damascene, enrolled in their corps, and it was only after he was
3 Ldismissed and the responsible oda bashi deposed that they calmed down*
If the presence of the Kapi Kulus was intended to balance the Yerliyya.
they went further than ensuring this. They became the dominant party and
their power was still in the ascendant. But they were not unchallenged.
Naturally enough, the inefficient challenge they encountered from less nower-
ful groups enhanced th©ir prestige still further.
The Ashraf came now to assume part of the role of the Yerliyya in an-
tagonizing the Kami Kulus. incapable though they proved to be. When the
Yerliyya were trying to assert their supremacy during the first quarter of
«  5
the 18th century, they concerted action with the Ashraf. With the dominance 
of the Yerliyya later, the Ashraf were no more needed as supporters. However, 
the Ashraf did not become inactive, but were merely over shadowed * While there 
was no share dividing line between the Yerliyya and the Ashraf, in the sense 
that they were Damascenes and many members of each group appertained to the 
other, a distinct organization existed, however, for. each group. The Ashraf
■^ Budayrr, f. 16b. c^f. Ibid. f, 29a.
3chief of the barrack-room, see Gibb & Bowen, I.i.319* 
B^udayri, f, 4^ a. 5See above
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*“ 1 had a naqib. special privileges and certain other distinctive features, '
Certainly their organisation was looser than that of the Yerliyya but it 
nevertheless existed. Disturbed security encouraged local groupings of var­
ious kinds and degrees, such as quarters, crafts, military corps and religious 
organisations, each of them defending the rights of its members. Because of 
the common denominator most of these groups shared, i.e. local origin and in­
terests, they very often concerted action, as happened in the fight against
p
Busayn Pasha.~
When the Yerliyya corps became dominated by its insubordinate members, 
particularly at the time of lathi al-Daftari, the Ashraf rose as a group 
against the zorab who insulted some of their members; but their action 
proved abortive.^ With the disciplining of the Yerliyya under As*ad Pasha, 
the Ashraf. came to the fore. So far their military power was untried in­
dependently. When they assumed responsibility to oppose the Kapi Kulus, 
they proved a poor substitute for the Yerliyya.
At the end of Jumada II ll6l/2 6 June 174$ the first in a series of 
clashes took place between the Ashraf and the Kapi Kulus. A sharif was test­
ing a firearm, which he had bought from another sharif in al-khandaq, probably 
the moat of the citadel/' at a spot near enough to awaken the agha of the 
Kapi Kulus from his sleep. Both were arrested, beaten and intimidated, which 
upset naqTb al-Ashraf. Hie next day the Ashraf assembled and attacked the 
Kapi Kulus. In the fighting three dshraf were killed and many Injured. The
I See above p. S^ee above p. lit*
^See above p.
LfCf„ J. Sauvaget, 'La Citadelle de Damas', Syria, XI (1930), pp. 59-90, 
216-241, see p. 6 4. Around the walls of the city there was also a moat, 
see, J. Sauvaget, 'Esquisse1, p. 4 7 1.
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shops closed and As* ad Pasha called for a diwan which decreed the payment of
1
an indemnity by the Kapi Kulus, For the agha of the Yerliyya to punish the 
fishr§£ J^ ight be explained by his alarm at the violation of order* But to 
do so because he was awakened shows his growing self-assertion and contempt 
even of these respected persons. The forceful retaliation of the Ashraf, as 
a whole, to avenge their fellow-members instead of appealing to the governor 
to take action, is illustrative of their self-confidence and determination 
to take things into their own hands. The fact that they were forcefully re­
buffed demonstrates their inability to stand up to the Kapi Kulus. This was i 
a victory for the latter and led to further trouble in the future, A sharif j 
who took part in the previous fighting, Sayyid Muhammad b. al-Dahhan, was 
killed, later, by the Kapi Kulus. Having been worsted in the previous battlej;
Ashraf appealed to As* ad Pasha to take action. He asked for witnesses 
but no one dared to turn up because of the fear of antagonizing !some 5,000 
malicious persons'.^ This figure, given by the chronicler, might not repre- ! 
sent the real number of the Kapi Kulus because it was used in the context of j 
justifying the reluctance of the witnesses to testify against these strong 
troops. But the point of comparison was certainly relevant in that the Kapi | 
Kulus were having the upper hand.
The attitude of As*ad Pasha during these events X'jas one of reconcili- j 
ation, aimed chiefly at appeasing the Kapi Kulus. In fact he went to the 
extent of making the ‘Ulamaf and other notables acknowledge their superiority 
in a dTwan which he convoked for this purpose. Further events worked also |
B^udayri,ff. 24b, 25a. ^Ibid., f. 25a.
3Ibid.■ ff. 25a, 25b.
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in favour of the Kapi Kulus, Around the end of Shawwal ll6l/second half of
October 174-8, the expelled zorab infiltrated into the Maydan seeking vengeance
on their enemies. At their head was Ahmad al-Qaltaqji, and they were accom-
_  1
panied by a group of Druses estimated at 60 persons fron the Talhuqs. The 
Talhuqs gave asylum to some of the fugitive zorab and were interested in the 
fighting because some Druzes, captured by Ascad Pasha during an expedition 
against them, were still under arrest in Damascus, The muiasaHim, Musa Xahya, 
led a force composed of Kapi Kulus, Dalatiyya and Tufenq;,iis to combat them.
He ordered the religious officials to declare them khawari.i (schismatics),
I?and to call for volunteers to support him, 1or three days the zorab and the 
Druzes had the uoper hand, and the troops of the mutasallim suffered many 
casualties. It was only after he brought reinforcements from the villages
i
and the Sakhr Beduin that he was able to defeat them. Some of the invaders 
were killed and the majority managed to escape. The inhabitants of the Maydan 
and its southern extremity, the Qubaybat, of Bab Mu§alla and Suwayqa, which 
were outside the gates, suffered heavily in the fighting, particularly from 
the ravages of the mutasallim1s troops, Bearing further disorders, these 
inhabitants moved inside the gates. Although the Kapi Kulus and the other 
private troops xvere unable at the beginning to stand up to the challenge, they 
emerged victorious in the end. On the testimony of the Kapi Kulus, many per­
sons accused of aiding the invaders were put to death. The occasion x^as used 
by the mutasallim to purge suspected persons and by the Damascenes to settle 
personal enmities. It was apparent, nevertheless, that the zorab enjoyed a 
strong support particularly among their fellow-members in the Maydan. Byen
^See below p.
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government officials, such as Isma6il Agha b. al-Shawish who was a sabashi
in certain villages around Damascus, were accused of helping them and conse-
1
quently imprisoned* This X'jas the first and last attempt by the expelled 
zorab.to cause serious trouble in Damascus during the governorshio of As6ad
Pasha. Their members were either arrested and later out to death by the
2 3 —governor , or were pardoned by him. -Some were killed by Zahir al~4Umar who
was anxious at the time to improve his relations with the Ottoman authorities.
He sent their severed heads to the Governor of Sidon who in turn forwarded
them to Istanbul with a request that the territory of Tiberias, which was
under the control of Zahir, be excluded from the dawra.4
The crimes which the ICapi Kulus continued to commit in Damascus passed
5 (unpunished or punished0 according to circumstances. Their antagonism to the 
Ashraf was by no means mitigated, and the Kapi Kulus went on molesting, even 
killing; the Ashraf.^- At the end of Jumada II 1164./25 May 1751, the Kapi
^  whmiil — ■ * 1 1 .
Kulus were reinforced by the arrival of an orta. at the demand of As6 ad Pasha.
—  u
Fellow members, Dalatiyya and Tufenq.iis went out to welcome the new-comers.
They entered in a magnificent procession 1which surpassed that of the Pil-
grimage1. 0 The absence of the Yerliyya from this ceremony was in line with
^For a detailed account of the fighting see, Budayri, ff. 26b-28a.
Ibid., ff 29a, 29b, 31b. 3Ibid.. ff. 30a, 35b.
Ibid., f. 30a; it is not known if Tiberias, which was a component part of
the t^ anjaq of §afad and, as such, under the jurisdiction of the governor of 
Sidon, was at the time under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus., 
Gf. A.H.B1 4.28; Istanbul, 16.10,4-9 (translation of a letter sent by the 
Grand Vezir to As4ad Pasha)* It might be that Zahir was referring to those 
territories in the province of Damascus which were near Tiberias and under 
his control.
3Budayri, f. 29a. 6Ibid,. ff. 32a, 36b.
7Ibid. 8Ibid.. f. 37b.
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their enmity to the Kapi Kulus. and further illustrates their isolation.
Ike Ashraf became less self-assertive after the reinforcement of their
enemies. As4ad Pasha put to death Sayyid Hasan who was shaykh shabab (chief
youth) of Bab Mu^ alla, for an unknown reason, without any retaliation on the
— 1part of the Ashraf. The authority of As’ad Pasha was so well established 
by then that he could act against any dissident member belonging to any 
group without being affected.
The Profiteering Policy of As’ad Fa,sha.
¥ith the consolidation of his power, As4ad Pasha embarked on a policy 
aimed chiefly at enriching himself. The attitude of the Damascenes towards 
profiteering by the governors differed according to the methods used by 
these governors in enforcing such policies. Some governors, such as Abu 
!Jawq and Husayn Pasha, alienated the effective power groups, were revolted 
against and eventually deposed. Others, like Isma*il Pasha al-^ A^ m, tried 
to win certain groups to their side and through their help or acquiescence 
carried out their extortions. The policy of As‘'ad Pasha in this respect 
differed from the raonopol&ic policy of his father in that it was less ob­
vious and more flexible. It was at the same time more enterprising and 
daring than that of his uncle Sulayman Pasha. The political situation in 
Damascus, which was mainly shaped and controlled by As4ad Pasha, facilitated 
the implementation of his policy.
The rise in prices between 1156/l743“4 and 1159/1746-7, the period 
in which As*ad Pasha was not the actual master of the situation, 
could be blamed on the continuation of former practices.
That such a state of affairs subsisted after 1159 /3'H*
iBudayri, f. 41a.
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&N& when As4 ad Pasha was the effective ruler was to a large extent his 
immediate responsibility.
Except for the excessive spread of locusts in the Damascus region in-
  'I
eluding Hawran between Jumada 11159/May-June 1747 and Jumada II 1160/June- 
o
July 1748*' no natural calamity took place to account for the constant in­
crease in prices. Two attempts were made to suppress the locusts. The-first 
was of a superstitious nature sponsored by the §ufis, and its only effects 
were to increase the excitement of the people and encourage complacency among 
them. An old belief subsisted that if a certain kind of water was brought 
from a spring, between Ispahan and Shiraz, It would attract a special kind 
of bird called Samarmarwhich would devour the locusts.-^  On 12 Ha jab 1159/ 
31 July 1747 this water was brought to Damascus amid the rejoicings of the 
turuq followers, and was fixed in as high places as the minarets of mosques 
to attract the samarmar,^ Other §ufi practices such as the dawsa (a Sufi 
shaykh riding a horse and treading over the bodies of Sufis who believed thev 
would thus obtain his blessing) and visits to shrines were no more effective. 
The only measure that was practical and load some chance of success, if judged 
by the standards of the time, was the enforcement by As4ad Pasha on every ;
i
village of a special quota of locusts to be collected by its inhabitants. 1
B^udayri, f. 16b, ^Ihid., f. 21a.
 ___ l
3Muradi, III, 214; cf. A.N.B Bis Aleppo, 21.5.29, this source gives the 
place of the water as near Ankara in Anatolia. On the superstitious aspects: 
of the Sanarmar water, its Ineffectiveness and Its_exploitation later by the 
Bektashi darwishes to exact money see, K. al-Gfaazzi, 111, 26l, 262.
^Budayri, 1. lob. 5Ibid.. ff. 20b, 21a.
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The amounts gathered and buried in the ground were immense but could hardly
1
eliminate all the existing locusts.
The danger caused by the locusts was of a passing nature and does not
2seem to have been very grave. The real and permanent causes behind the in­
creasing rise in prices were due to the neglect of what the chronicler
- 3called the rulers, (al hukkam), who benefited economically from the situation 
in cooperation with other speculators. Ascad Pasha tolerated the high prices 
in order to sell his abundant suoplies of wheat accruing from his malikane 
of Hamah. He allied himself with the chief of the millers (shaykh al- 
tahhana), and enforced prices that were beneficial to both.-' On one occasion, 
in Jumada II 1162/flay-June 1749* Ascad Pasha personally intervened to pre­
vent a reduction in the price of bread after the harvest, which was demanded
by the populace 1  As6ad Pasha and his entourage were openly accused by
7the Damascenes of profiteering. Those who exploited the situation to en~
6
rich themselves included merchants and other prominent persons such as the
mufti? Hamid Efendi al-sImadi, who was accused of hoarding wheat to benefit
9
from the rise in prices. Other notables, who were not implicated, kept
10silent about what was happening.
B^udayrl, ff. 20a, 20b. ^Ibid., f. 16b.
3lbid., f. 18b, cf. f. 22a. S^ee above p. zri,
 ^ — - .Budayri, f. 22a. For the practice of hoardingjvheat by the millers which
resulted in an increase in prices see, Ibn Kinan, II, f. 117a.
B^udayri, ff. 29b, 30a. Ibid., f. 44a•
ibid. .f.36a ■ Ibid., £. 29b.
10Ibid.. ff. 38b, 4.0a.
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The poor tried to revolt but were violently suppressed. Those who
1
revolted were tortured, and some were put to death. Gertain measures were
taken, however, to mitigate the harsh effects of the high prices. One of
2these was the debasement of the currency, ‘ Such a measure seems to have
3created temporary relief, but its effects in the long run were disastrous 
because the prices, in the absence of any effective check, tended to rise as 
a result.
A more beneficial, though less durable/* measure for combatting specu­
lation was to fix the prices of commodities. About two months after his
appointment to Damascus, As4ad Pasha summoned a diwan which fixed the prices
5of wheat and bread. This was at a time when he needed to appease and im­
press the inhabitants while establishing his position. But he was not con­
sistent in enforcing this price control because it was not in his economic 
interest to do so, and also because this would alienate the merchants and 
other vested interests with whom he cooperated. On another occasion in Sbaw- 
wal 1165/August-September 1752, his mutasallim. Ahmad A,glia, applied this means 
once more. Some merchants whose interests were damaged as a result resorted
to hoarding. Charcoal disappeared from the market and only the strong such
- 6as the KaoitKulus and the Dalatiyya had access to it.v
The flourishing trade of Damascus during this period, helped in reliev­
ing the general economic situation of the Damascenes, although it played into
Budayri, f, 22a. ^Ibid.4 cf. ff. 24-b, 35a, 4-la.
%bid., f. 4-la. T^bid., f. lib.
5Ibid. 6Ibid.. f. 4-0b.
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the hands largely of merchants and business men. The Pilgrimage was a great fac
tor in promoting commercial activity in Damascus, and a wide cross-section of
1
its inhabitants usually benefited from it. Of more importance were the grow­
ing trade relations of Damascus both with the French merchants in the province 
of Sidon, and to a lesser extent with Baghdad.
The French merchants, as we have already seen, were forbidden by their au-
2thorities to reside in Damascus. Fear of political upheavals and reprisals 
against the French for acts for which they had no responsibility (as still a 
major impediment. The absence of French merchants and of a consul from Damas­
cus did not affect, however, the continuity of commercial relations between the
3
French and the Damascenes.
The growth in the silk and cotton manufactures of Damascus caused heavy
demand for the spun cotton of Sidon and its dependent parts to an extent that
decreased the French supplies.^ From Beirut, Damascus was provisioned with the
- 5silk of Mount Lebanon, particularly al-Shuf. On the other hand, Damascus was
6the principal centre for the consumption of French goods. These were sold in
it either directly on behalf of the French merchants, through their local ag-
7 8
ents, or by the native merchants.
9The continuous decline of English trade in Aleppo played into the hands 
of the French and benefited Damascus as well. The recurrent Ottoman-Persian
1 2
Budayri, f. 38a. See above
^A.N.B1 978: Acre, 30.1.49; A.N.B 1026: Sidon, 2.1.45; A A b 1 1031s (Sidon) 
Jaffa, 3.4.56, Sidon, 11.5.56, Sidon, 2.7.56, Sidon, 9.8.56$ Masson, 517,518.
^A.N.b !  1026s Sidon, 12.11.42.
5A.N.B1 432: Istanbul, 15.11.53; of. A.N.B 1030: Sidon, 13-4.53; Masson,519. 
^A.N.B1 1029s Sidon, 6.12.52; A.N.B1 978: Acre, 30.1.49.
7See letters written to JancS. Marun,. French agent in Damascus, A.N.B 1030s 
Sidon, 27.3.53, Sidon, 30.3.53, Sidon, 31.3.53.
%.N.Bl 1029. Sidon, 6.12.52. p^rq.S.P. 97/34: Istanbul, 22.2.49.
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wars blocked the way of English commerce to the markets of Persia.^ Even after
— — 2 the declaration of peace between the Ottomans and Nadir Shah in late 1746,
English trade still suffered from other impediments. The internal anarchy in
- 3
Persia after the death of Nadir Shah in 1747 hindered trade relations. Inse­
curity of roads between Aleppo and its port, Alexandretia,^ * arbitrary measures 
exercised by the powerful governors of Baghdad against English trade, chronic 
lack of cash, and the growing rivalry of the native merchants who traded with
Baghdad and Basra, besides the usual competition of French cloth in quality
5and design, were major obstacles.
French trade, on the other hand, endured the strain caused by the English
6
blockade to its ships during the x-jar of the Austrian succession (1740-8). This
did not, however, seriously affect trade in southern §yria. After the treaty
7
of peace, French commercial activity ms in full sway once more.
Damascus benefited from this activity and by implication from the decline 
of Aleppo. Caravans carrying local and French goods from Damascus to Baghdad and 
bringing back mainly Indian products continued their progress undeterred by the
Q
attacks of the Beduin along the desert route. Chief among these were the ‘Anaze,
Beduin who were roaming in the Syrian desert and threatening the safety of the
9 10'Pilgrimage. The French planned also to send their trade to Aleppo via Damascus;
^i^ dcTiffelpapers, 6645/6: Aleppo, 25.8.43* 6645/5: Aleppo,. 17.11.43*
Aleppo. 20.1*44*
^rbidvE i$^ ppo, 1.11.46, galata, 1.11.46; V. Monorsky, E.I,. 1st ed., s.v.
Nadir J|ha,h, p.812;: Hammer,XV, 117; PR0,S.P. 97/32: Istanbul, 17.12.46.
3Masson, 521; cf. PRO.S.P. 97/33: Istanbul, 29.3.47, Istanbul, 22.9.47.
84: Aleppo, 14.2.43; A.N.B'*' 85: Aleppo, 24.5.47, Aleppo, 19.11.48, 
Masson, 522* Charles-Roux, 70-3.
^Badcliffe papers, 6645/3: Aleppo, 21.4*44* 6645/5: Aleppo, 3.11.42, Aleppo,
25.6.39, Aleppo, 1.11.49,Aleppo,17.1.50,Aleppo,6 .7.51* Aleppo,16.5.53;Masson, 521.
^Badcliffe papers, 6645/5: Aleppo, 8.6.44, Aleppo, 24*8.44, Aleppo, 18.3.45, 
Aleppo, 1.11.48; Oharles-Roux, 57, 58.
XRadcliffe papers, 6645/5: Aleppo, 17.1.50, Aleppo, 24.3.50.
A.N.Bl 1030: Sidon, 24.6.53; M. Niebuhr, II, 179; The desert route to India, 
rted, by Douglas Garruthers, London, 1929,-p. 34; Budayri, f. 9b.
%iebuhr, II, 179. 10 A.N.B 1030; Sidon,. 1.7.53.
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This growing commercial activity in Damascus was probably responsible
for the establishment by As6 ad Pasha in 1166/1752-3 of his famous khan  ^in
the Bzuriyya place near his residence. It took him one year to buildand
3
by its fine architecture it stands unique among Its kind in Damascus.
The wealth of As4 ad Pasha swelled enormously after the penal confis­
cations he enacted against his enemies both inside and outside Damascus, and 
also as a result of his speculation in the market. Immediately after the 
suppression of the zorab. and the elimination of Path! al-Daftari, JLscad 
Pasha transformed most of his property into waqf ahli^ to the benefit of his 
children and grand-children. The waqf act was properly registered in the law- 
court on 21 Rajab 1159/9 August 174-6. The confiscation by the Sultan of 
his uncle’s property, at the start of his governorship, seems to have served : 
as an ominous example to As4 ad Pasha. The step he had taken was certainly 
the best means to ensure that his property would remain in his family.
At intervals, later, As4ad Pasha gave further proof of his accumulating
6
wealth. In Il62/l748“9 he bought houses, orchards and wheat mills. The ac-j
quisition of the mills seems to have enabled him to tighten his control over :
the prices of bread, and this explains, among other things, his cooperation ;
7with the chief of the millers.
1 ? —See above B^udayri, ff. 4-lb, 42b.
Ibid.; Barik 18; N. al-Qasatli, al-Rawda al-ghana7 fi Dimashq al-fayha*, 
Beirut 1879, p. 110. “ ~ ~  —  - “ j
%t means family foundation and is different from al-waqf al-khayri which 
is a foundation for public benefit.
^Budayri, ff. 18b, 19a. 6Ibid.. f. 29b. Rbid., f. 22a.
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In 1163/174.9-50, As6 ad Pag ha started building big famous palace,'*- The site 
be chose was in the traditional centre of Damascus near the Umayyad Mosque, On 
the same spot once stood part of the temple of Jupiter, and, alter, a palace 
which seems to have been dar al-dhahab« built by the Mamluk governor, TenldLz,
It was alleged also that the palace of the Umayyad Caliph, Mu'awiya, was built 
on the same site. The palace was built in two stages* During the first stage, 
the haramlik (family residence) ms completed in one year,^ The second stage, 
begun in 1164/1750-1^ and probably finished in the same year, was described as 
an enlargement on the first, and seems to have been concerned with the building 
of the section reserved for public life, known as the salamlik. As*ad Pasha 
mobilized all the useful resources and skills available in Damascus and else­
where for this purpose.^ Architecturally the palace embodied the various feat-
7ures of Damascene art at the time. During the French mandate it was bought by
the French who made it the centre of the Institut Francis dfArcheologie et
g into
d*Art Musulmans. It has been made recently a museum*
9The poetical verses inscribed on various parts of the palace contained
\ ’he local chroniclers called It dar. bavt. both meaning house, or a sarava j
(officially the headquarters of the governor), probably in the sense that It j 
was as large and esteemed as the headquarters of a governor. The building 
was commonly known, later, by Orientalists and local writers alike as a qa^r 
(palace), although it does not fit into the western concept of the term*
Ecochard, ,Le Palais^ Azern de Damas1, pp* 230 , 231; Salim * A. * Abd al-Haqq 
and Khalid Ma* ajjh. Mas ba hid. Dimashq al-athariyya, Damascus, 1950 (loosely 
numbered).
B^udayri, f. 32b; cf. Muhibbi, IV, 172*
4-BudayrI, f .  35a; c f. MtirSdi, Matmah. f .  151b. Budayri, f .  37b.
&For a detailed description of its building sees Budayri, ff. 32b-34&, 37b,
,
T^or a description of its architecture see Eeochard, *Le Palais Azem de Damas*
J. Sauvaget and E. de Laurey, *Le Palais Azem a Damas/, La Revues de Paris,VI 
March 1926, pp. 443-8, *Abd al-Haqq and Ma‘aj|h, Mashahid. S. Munajjid, fQa§r 
As*ad Dasha1. al-Adib. Sept, 1946, pp. 37-44.
^Sauvaget and de Laurey, 447.
9Ibid.. p. 444. Ma‘luf, *Qa§r As*ad Baslm1. al-Mashriq. 24 (1926)  ^pp# 15-6 ,
many a wish for the continued rule of As*ad Pasha. The degree of its splendour 
was certainly out of all proportion to any other family residence of any govern- 
or in Ottoman Syria, except perhaps for the residence of Amir Bashir II in 
Bteddin, Lebanon, which was anyway in a different category. It represented the 
zenith at which As*ad Pasha*s: prestige had arrived.
I-t seems that the cost of this building - the wages of the workers alone 
are estimated at 400 purses - did not greatly reduce the wealth of As*ad Pasha. 
The same year in which he enlarged his palace, he bought more property consist­
ing of orchards in the suburbs, and of a whole suq (market) in the centre of 
Damascus for the building of his khan, already referred to. In 1162/1748-9 
As* ad Pasha reconstructed the upper rooms in the school which was built by his 
father, Ismael Pasha, in Jjuq al-Khawatin. regularized the reading of the
2
Qur'an in it, arranged for its expenses, and built a mosque to the south of it. 
On 11 Shaqwal 1165/22 August 1752, he made a waqf act by which he dedicated 
several works, dealing with jurisprudence, ^adith and other related subjects to 
the use of the school. In 1163/1749-50, As*1 ad Pasha showed interest In the 
well-being of the Umayyad Mosque and gave instructions for its decoration.4- The 
year 1165/1751-2 witnessed an unusual building activity by As^ad Pasha, mainly
of a religious nature. He ordered the repair of the road leading to the Maydan,
^ 5
between Bab Mu^alla and Bab Allah, which was used by the pilgrims on their way tci 
the Holy Cities. This would also facilitate the dispatch of troops to the Maydan, 
the subdued stronghold of the Yerliyya,should any disorders warrant thair* pres­
ence* Purthei’more,food supplies and other commodities from Jjawran and the south
would/
1'See above B^udayri, f. 31a.
Kitab waqf As*ad Basha al-'Agm, ed. by S. Munajjid, Damascus, 1953, p. 25.
^Budayri, f. 34a. 5lbid.. f. 39b.
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be more easily carried to Damascus. As* ad Pasha built also a large edifice
around the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab - an act which was very much acclaimed^
particularly by members of the turuq who used to visit the place on various 
o
occasions. In the same year, he enlarged the bridge of al-Kiswa, a suburb”
3
an village, Two years later, in 1167/1753^ 4-? tie reconstructed a mosque 
opposite to the Huzayzatiyya coffee-house.^ The year after, he redecorated 
the Umayyad Mosque and assigned waqfs for its upkeep. Ah the same time he
ordered a wealthy man from his entourage to pay for the repairs of the
_  _  6
Yaghushiyya Mosque in Damascus.
The public works of As‘ad Pasha were not confined to Damascus. When 
he was governor of Hamah he built there a large khan.^ A government resid-
ence in it was attributed to him, as well as other khahs in Ma*arra and Khan
— 8 - 
Shaykhun, both on the main road between Aleppo and Hamah. This building
activity by As* ad Pasha was a salient feature of his rule. It was, however,
in line with similar activities performed by other governors, *Azm and other­
wise, But the long duration of his rule - about fourteen years - enabled him 
to contribute more than the others, and the refinement of his establishments 
focused attention on his works*
It is significant that most of As5ad Pasha1s public works in Damascus 
tool, place after the building of his palace. This seems to have been more 
than a giere coincidence an^emains insufficiently explained in the general
B^udayri, f. 4-0a. K^bid., f, 20b.
Q _ —
Anon. Dhikr wulat a 1-baklarbakiyya, MS, Zahiriyya Library, ‘am 4-681, f.lOb.
^Budayri, f* 43a. I^bid.. f, 4-4-a.
6Ibid., f. 4.5a* S^uwaydi, f, 80a.
%'Ja4luf , 'Qasr As6ad Has La al- 6 Azm', p. 7; Suwayd.1, f. 79a, mentions that
* 0  Wil H l M ^  f  /  ,1, .
(cont.)
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context of a building activity by As* ad Pasha during this period. Certainly 
his wealth had very much increased by then, and it enabled him to provide for 
these various projects, religious and otherwise, ifter seven years rule, 
rarely achieved, before, he seems to have felt a comforting security in office 
which made him build his palace and what followed it. The large amount of 
money he spent on the building of his nala.ce, the many requisitions and con­
fiscations he made, and the damage caused to many inhabitants as a result, 
brought hiim much discredit. Also, such a tangible proof of wealth confirmed 
the poor in their suspicion that JLsfiad fas ha was really benefiting, from the 
rise in prices. Perhaps to erase any such ill-feeling and to balance his 
private establishments by others of a more public nature, As*ad Pawha started 
his pious works immediately after his palace X\ras finished. This by no means 
implies that had he not built his palace, these works would not have been 
constructed. Other governors, particularly 5Asms, constructed similar works* 
But the timing and sequence of the works of Ascad Pasha suggest that he was 
primarily interested in emphasizing his prestige and appeasing the Damascenes. 
In fact his pious works won him much support particularly among the *Ulama*
With regard to the Pilgrimage As* ad Pasha could also claim much credit.
He commanded it fourteen times, and it suffered no major attacks except in 
1
1165-6/1752-3, The only other dangers it encountered were caused by natural 
factors such as excessive heat,^  floods,"^  or lack of w a t e r F o r  its further
(cont.) the khan he saw in Ma* arra on 15 Ramadan 1157/22 October 1744- was 
built by Murad Chelebi, according to an inscription on the door. It might 
be that As6ad Pasha built a kVia 11 in it, later.
■^ Budayri, f, 41a* ^Ibid., f. 45b.
3Ibid., ff. 24b, 35b. hbid.. f. l£h.
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safeguard and the convenience of the pilgrims, he built a fortress in al-
Mada^n on the Pilgrimage route, where none existed before. Even his sup-
2
pression of the zorab, won him religious credit.'' As* ad Pasha was, further-
3
more, on good terms with the religious dignitaries. Nothing is more illus­
trative of this than the. attitude of Khalil al-Bakri al-§iddlqi, who was 
appointed to the office of judge in Damascus in 1165/1751-2.^ Although he 
had formerly championed the cause of the Damascenes against exploitation,^  
he did not now make any effort to stop exploitation and profiteering, pro­
bably because of the big names and vested interests involved. His attitude 
ran contrary to the expectations of many Damascenes who were delighted at 
his appointment t[linking it would bring strict inspection and cause many
changes. Others, probably benefiting from the prevailing situation, were 
6
upset, lest he would live up to his past career in dismantling corruption. 
It may be said in general that As4ad Pasha encountered no strong opposition 
to his policy of profiteering thanks to the power he displayed, the policy 
of religious appeasement he practised, and the commercial activity from 
which the Damascenes benefited.
Social Conditions and Public Security in Damascus.
The strengthening of the alien troops enabled As*ad Pasha to keep the 
Damascene power groups in check and to enforce a policy aimed at enriching 
himself. So far as these objectives are concerned he was successful. But
■^ al-Qari, 79; see below Appendix II,P.HH- ^Budayri, f. 16b.
C^f, Ibid., ff. 34a, 39a. i^uradl, II, 8 4.
5 6 ~See above pp. IIZj 2ZI* Budayri, ff. 38b, 39a.
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the danger of this policy was that these troops, in the absence of effective 
restraints, became insubordinate*!
There was a very close relation between the increase in disorderly 
behaviour, and the growing dominance of the troops in Damascus. When the 
zorab had the upper hand prostitutes increased in number and began to appear 
publicly. One of them went to the extent of insulting the judge, on one oc­
casion* This drove the judge to act against them, and in Muharram 1157/
Feb.-March 1744 he concerted action with the mufti and others, and forced
the prostitutes either to flee the city or to go into hiding. The one who
2insulted him was put to death. Such a measure drove them underground and 
failed to eradicate the deeper evils on which prostitution prospered, namely 
the insubordinate soldiery. S hor tly:f afterwards they appeared openly. 4Abd 
Allah al-Suwaydi, who stayed in Damascus between 22 Sha* ban and 20 Shawwal 
1157/30 Sept. and 26 Nov. 1744? was extremely surprised at the large number 
and bold attitude of the prostitiibs who appeared in the company of lawless 
persons and broke the rules of Ramadan. During this time the prostitutes 
used to assemble near the Konliyya Mosque.
With the suppression of the zorab. the Dalatiyya figured in the com­
pany of the prostitutes.^ The latter went to the extent of organizing a
5
public ceremony on one occasion without being molested by the authorities. 
When Ascad Fas ha was approached by the notables of Damascus to put an end to 
the problem of the prostitutes either through restricting their residence
O
Budayri, ff. 19b, ZQ'a, 26a, 37b, 43a. Ibid.. ff. 12b, 13a.
3SuwaydI, f. 94b. ^Budayri, f. 21a.
%bid., f. 25b.
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or having them deported, he replied rather piously that he would not do any­
thing of the sort lest they curse him. 1 While his proclaimed reason is dif­
ficult to believe , it seems that he was rat hex" anxious not to antagonize his 
troops who enjoyed their company. Another reasons was apparent in the atti­
tude of his mutasallim who instead of implementing a decision he had taken 
for their expulsion, found, it more profitable and expedient to tolerate 
their presence and tax them.
If widespread lawlessness caused concern on the part of many Damas­
cenes, others more directly Involved either committed suicide because they
3 L . 5were frustrated, or killed the violaters, or were killed while defending 
their honour. Although such an abnormal upsurge In moral corruption was 
very remarkable, refined pleasures, on the other hand, were not lacking,
A Jewish musical band came from Aleppo to Damascus and played in the coffee­
houses.^ The coffee-houses seem to have been much in demand and, In one 
year only, 1169/1755-56, three such places were opened.?
Thefts and murders, ’even suicides, were as much the result of the
fluid security conditions as of the deteriorating economic situation of the 
3lower classes. Mosques and religious shrines were not spared by thieves, 
and many valuables were stolen from them. Other persons pressed by rising
c
debts preferred to commit suicide leather than resort to these unlawful means
Budayri, f. 29b. '"Ibid., f. 31a* ^I.bid . , f. lib.
hbid., f. 36a. ■ 5Ibid.. f. 34b, 6Ibid.. f. 21b; see
„ above p.i?2 ,
'Ibid.. f. 4.5a. bCf. Ibid.. ff. 11b, 31a.
Ibid., ff. 4-Oa, 41b.
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The growing number of prostitutes may also be ascribed to economic need,
among other things. The fact that the majority of these crimes and thefts
1
passed unpunished helped to increase their number and encouraged many per­
sons to settle accounts with their enemies. Between 21 and 25 Ramadan 1161/ 
14 and IB Sept. 174&, ^or example, three persons were murdered in different 
places in Damascus, and in one case only was the murderer arrested.^
The attitude of the governor was to act when he deemed it necessary or 
profitable to do so. When the Kapi Kulus were newly reinstated, As* ad Fas ha 
was in need of their support, and he therefore tried not to -alienate them.3 
Later, when his authority was well established he was no longer compelled 
to ignore the crimes of the Kapi Kulus. particularly against the Ashraf.^'
If the culprits did not belong to a powerful group, and the governor deemed 
it necessary or profitable to have them put to death, he did so, although 
their crimes, mainly thefts, were not comparable to others he let pass un­
punished. ^ When the alien troops quarrelled with each other, As6 ad Pasha 
kept aloof, probably because these struggles would weaken his political en­
emies and eventually enhance his authority, or for fear of being embroiled ii
6them, which would gain him the enmity of at least one party.
The role played by Musa Kabya^ who acted as mutasallim for As* ad 
■’•Budayri, ff. 25b, 39a, 40a, 42a, 43b, 44a. 2Ibid.. f.26b, of. f. 42a.
3Cf. Ibid.. f. 25a. ^Ibid.. ff. 32a, 32b.
3Ibid.. f. 31b. Ibid.. f. 44a, cf. ff. 34b, 35a.
Because of the ambiguity in the account by Budayri on the identity of Musa 
Kabya, a few remarks need to be made here. It seems that there did exist 
two persons, who worked forJlsSad Pasha and other * Aijm governors before him, 
each of whom was called Musa Kabya. The one who died in 1164/1751 (Buday­
ri, f. 37a) ms buried in the cemetery of Bab al-§aghir, and there is no 
evidence that he died after a fight. The one who died in 1170/1257, and 
with whom we ar&, concerned here, was buried in the cemetery of Sidi^ 
Khamimr, Budayri, f. 4 b^J Muradi, II, 61. The statement by al-Qan, 80,
that this Musa was buried in Bab al-Saghir seems to have been
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deserves special mention here because of the stringent measures he took to
ensure security. Until 1159/174-6-7, by which time As*ad Pasha had suppressed
zorab. Musa iKyha did not play a prominent role, partly perhaps because
As*ad Pasha!s fortune was at stake and the initiative was his. When As*ad
Pasha established his authority, Musa Kahya had more say in the affairs of
Damascus. During the periods when he deputised for the governor, Musa Kahya
1
exhibited much vigour in suppressing the lawless persons. In 1163/1750, he
imposed a night curfew in Damascus and made inspection tours in the city - lta
o
unprecedented measure* - in the words of his contemporary chronicler  ^ When 
As* ad Pasha was on the Pilgrimage in 1160-3/174-7-3, Musa Kahya released cer­
tain Druze prisoners on the orders of the Sultan after As* ad Pasha had defieq
3 -
more than once similar orders. In all these measures Musa Kahya proved to
be more radical than As*ad Pasha. But like him, he made no effort to check 
profiteering. Indded he encouraged it. On one occasion he raised the priced 
of foodstuffs after they had decreased because he was bribed by those inter­
ested in keeping prices high.^
The measures which Musa KSfrya took reveal the seriousness of the deteriorat­
ing security, as well as illustrate his ability to respond to it effectively 
The volume of his actions was out of all proportion to the short duration anc. 
temporary nature of his rule. No other mutasallim during the period under 
study attained such a stature.
The policy of As*ad Pasha outside Damascus.
There were three power groups with which As*ad Pasha had to deal outside 
Damascus. These were: the amirs of Mount Lebanon, IJahir al-*Umar, and the Bed­
uin in the Hawran and along the Pilgrimage route.
(cont.) mistake arising from the similarity in their names, which confused al 
Qari writing about a century late. The violent death of the second Musa is 
confirmed by various sources,_see_below_p. £77'
"^ Budayri, ff. 31a, 31b, 34b; see above p* B^udayri, f. 34b.
3Ibid.. £. 24a. 4lbjd.. f. 22a.
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In the period between 1156 and 1159 A.H, when As* ad Pasha was busy- 
consolidating his power within Damascus, these power groups were free from
his military intervention. On one occasion only, in 1158/1745, he was or-
_ Pasha
dered by the Sultai* together with the governor of Tripoli, to join ‘Ilthman 7~
1 _
al~Muha§§il, governor of Sidon, in an expedition against Amir Mulhim, who
was accused of arrears in the miri dues. After a brief raid on the Druse
2
country, a settlement was reached whereby the arrears were to be paid. Some 
sons of certain Druze notables seem to have been taken by Asead Pasha, to Dam­
ascus as security for the payment.-^  It seems also that this settlement broughJ 
about a change in the government of Ba£lbak which was under the jurisdiction 
of the governor of Damascus. Amir Mulhim was in charge of its tax-farm, and 
he appointed his brothers, Amir Ahmad and. Amir Mansur, to govern It jointly, 
During the campaign, Ascad Pasha dismissed theseamirs from Ba4 ibak and ap­
pointed Amir Baydar al-Harfush, a member of the old dominant Matawila family 
of the region, who sided with him, as its governor. Amir Mulhim was able, 
later, in the absence of As*ad Pasha on the Pilgrimage, to dismiss Amir Hay- 
dar and to appoint the latter1s brother, Amir Husayn, who was on his side, 
as governor of Bafclbak.
The powerful position which As* ad Pasha acquired in Damascus after 
1159/1746-7 enabled him to devote more attention to external problems. The
_  _ _ _ _ _  . ™  _  _  -  _ 3 _
A certain 6Ali Pasha was appointed to Sidon around May 1744, see A.N.B 1026; 
Sidon, 25_.5 .4 4. Around July 1745 £Uttonan Pasha, most probably al-Muha§§il 
(of.* Shihab, Lubnan, I, 39 and. Muradi, III, 159) was appointed to Sidon, see 
A.N..B1 1026s Sidon, 24.7.45.
A^.N.B^ * 1026s Sidon, ‘22.10.45. B^udayri, f. 22b.
^Shidyaq, A.%1 422; Shihab, Lubnjn, 1,34, 35; Nuzha, MS. Paris, ff. 37a, 37b; 
Shihab, Nuzha, MS. 0amb. ff. lSb, 19a. The Lebanese chroniclers are very 
confused and misleading in their accounts as regards the course of events, 
the dates and particularly the names of the ‘Azrn governors. Nevertheless, 
some Information may be accepted after comparison with other accounts.
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initiative in the previous expedition was apparently not his, but the course 
of the fighting enabled him to gauge the power of the Druses, and the pros­
pects of victory were encouraging. Moreover, the expedition created further 
complications which embroiled him with the Druses, His first action after 
the suppression of the zorab was to dispatch a strong contingent of troops 
to Ba* lbak, at the end of Rabi* II 1159/May 1746, to kill Amir Husayn al-
Harfush, The latter managed to escape but other persons were brought to ac~
■)
count. It seems that the Druzes retaliated against this attack and the pre­
vious one by attacking certain regions in the Biqa* which were under the jur- 
isdiction of the governor of Damascus, The refuge of some of the fugitive 
zorab into the Druze country and their continued threats to Damascus,3 which 
eventually ended in its invasion with the help of the Druzes,^ further wor­
sened the relations between the parties. It is no wonder, therefore, that 
the bulk of As*ad Pasha1s military operations were directed against the Druzes 
On 16 Jumada I 1160/26 May 174V As* ad Pasha left Damascus to attack the 
Druzes. Although the declared reason for the campaign was the Druze raids in 
the Biqa*, its occurrence at the time of harvest seems to have been more than 
a mere coincidence. Militarily it is advantageous to destroy the supplies of 
the enemy. But if we link the timing of the expedition \^ ith the sending of 
wheat and other products confiscated from the Druzes to Damascus and their 
sale at high prices, it may be concluded that the time of the campaign was 
not so much accidental as it was calculated for profiteering purposes, Muh­
ammad Pasha, governor of Sidon, tried to mediate and counselled As*ad Pasha 
to spare the villages from the ravages of his troops, but in vain,^  As*ad
1Budayri, f. 16a. 2Ibid., f. 22b, jlbid,-. ff, 19a, 19b.
^See above p. B^udayri, ff. 21a-23a.
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dealt a heavy blow to the Dimes. But far from subduing them, the 
ravages and devastations of his troops brought about a counter attack by 
the Druzes.
The mediation rather than the assistanoeof the governor of Sidon gave 
As* ad Pasha the opportunity to ask the Sultan to appoint a brother of his, 
Mu^afa Pasha al-"Agm, as governor of Tripoli. As* ad Pasha*s pretext was 
that this appointment would enable him to tighten his grip over the Druzes .1 
But his demand was not granted.
Shortly af‘terwards, in Rajab 1160/July-August 1747 the Druzes retaliated 
by attacking and ravaging a number of villages in the Biqa*. Ba* lbak which 
seems to have had as governor Amir Kaydar al-Harfush. who was on the side od 
As*"ad Pasha, was besieged by the Druzes. On 7 Sha*baii/lA August of this 
year As*ad Pasha ordered his troops to march against the Druzes. Again, 
the Druzes were defeated and several of them were taken prisoners.^
Around the end of 1160/Nov‘.-Dec, 1747, ifisa Kahya, the mutasallim. re­
leased the Druze prisoners by the order of the Sultan. It seems that this 
gesture had the adverse effect of being considered by the Druzes as a vic­
tory. Around the middle of Il6l/l748 they attacked and looted the importani
  3
village of al-Zabadani which was near Damascus* This was a mere rehearsal
for the next direct attack by some Druzes, in alliance with the zorab. on
Damascus itself.^  There is no reason to believe that all these attacks by
the Druzes were engineered by the Amir of Mount Lebanon, or that they had
the approval of the whole community. In the last attack, for example,only
the Taltiuqs who gave refuge to some zorab joined them in the fighting.^ The
-^ Budayri, f. 23a.
^See above p.
2Ibid.. ff. 23a, 23b. 3Ibid.. ff.23b,24a,26a. 
^Budayri, f. 26b.
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attackers alleged that their aim was to secure the release of certain im­
prisoned Druzesl who were either captured in the previous attack on al- 
ftabadani or were not released previously with their colleagues. This might be
true of the Talhuqs, but the zorab had other accounts to settle. Furthermore
the Talhuqs might have been prompted to cooperate with the zorab in accordanc 
with tribal tradition because they were their hosts. It could be also that 
the territory of the Talhuqs, the Upper Gharb, suffered most from the incur­
sions of the Damascene troops in the previous campaigns.
The Lebanese chroniclers report a rift between Amir Mulhim and the Talhuqs 
l 2and Abd al-Maliks because they protected some of the zorab like Ahmad al-
Qaltaqji and his friends, and concerted action with them in the attack on
Damascus. On the demand of the governor of Damascus, Amir Mulhim ordered
these Wo families to expel the zorab and, on their refusal, he attacked thei
3
villages and drove them out .'altogether. If this was true it shows that 
Amir Mulhim did not back the Druze attack on Damascus. That the governor
of Damascus asked Amir Mulhim to expel the zorab rather than attack
them himself, and that Amir Mulhim went further than that by expel­
ling their hosts as well, may show the desire of both sides for cooperation,
1
BudayrJ., f, 27a.
n
It is to be noted that the district of al-Jurd which was governed by the ' Al 
al-Maliks bordered on the Upper Gharb, the district of the TaJ.huqs, and this 
may have contributed, among other things, to their joint action in protect­
ing the zorab. see Shidyaq, 27, 28, 206. Moreover, the two families belong­
ed;; to the lazbaki faction (for this faction see below p. £<f^  ), Shidyaq, 1£ 
183. In fact some Lebanese chroniclers mention that the zorab took refuge
with the lazbakiyya, see Munayyir, al-MasJhriq. 48 (1954) , 679.
^Shidyaq, 203, 423; Nuzha. MS. Paris, ff. 37b, 3&a; Shiriab Buz ha. MS. Gamb.
ff. 19b, 20a; Ta*rikh Jabal al-Duruz, MS. Berlin, ff. 7b, 8a> Dibs, VII, 37^
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or at least for the cessation of hostilities. The opposite may be true
moreover., in that the governor of Damascus had made his demand to Amir
Mulhim to embarrass him and to use that as a pretext for an all-out attack
on him. But the fact remains that Amir Mulhim tried to be on good terms
with Ascad Pasha.
Until the/end of the governorship of Ascad Pasha no major clashes
took place between him and the Shihabs , Several factors contributed to this
relative calm. It is true that the affairs of Ba(lbak, which embroiled the
in struggles earlier, had remained unsettled, but they developed now into.
1
squabbles of local nature between ins and outs of the Karfush family. As‘ad
Pasha had demonstrated his strength against the Druses and they against him
in different proportions but with no cle'.r-cut victory for either. After
Il63/l749”50, he became more interested in augmenting his prestige in Damas
cus and in building his various establishments. The Beduin in Kawran and
the neighbouring regions were becoming more insubordinate, and As£ ad Pasha
had to send nunitive expeditions against them. His desire to have his
brother Mustafa - another brother, Sacad al-Din, was governor of Tripoli -
appointed to Sidon in order to tighten his grip 011 the Druses, was not real
3
iaed until 1755, a short time before his deposition; In the meantime, a ce
terms with Amir Hilhim^ This was militarily disadvantageous to As‘ad Pasha
 ^Budayri, ff. 37a, 38a. 44b.
 ^See below
^A.N.b1 1030s Sidon, 10.4.55* Sidon,11.4.55; cf. Budayri, ff. 42a, 44a.
-■ A.N.B1 1028: Siaon> 4 .4 .50, B1 1029* Sidon, 30.3.52. Probably he_was tfc
one mentioned by the Lebanese chroniclers as Mustafa Pasha al-Qawwas, see 
Shidyaq, 4^ 4, Shihab, Lubnan, I, L2.
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Amir Mulhim, on his part, was occupied with other problems, such as 
the acquisition of Beirut, struggles with the Matawila and, more import­
ant,, the split within his rallies.
Several factors contributed to the acquisition by Amir Mulhim of the 
iltlaam of Beirut, and, in effect, its governorship. There was at first the 
need by Amir Mulhim for new resources. The expeditions by Ascad Pasha again 
him were apparently caused by his failure to pay the taxes in full. Such a 
disturbed situation, however, was not new in the relations among the amirs c 
of Mount Lebanon and. the governors of Sidon and Damascus. But whereas the 
predecessors of Amir Mulhim managed to keep things going either by exact pa^  
ment of taxes, usually made by force, or by compromise, mainly after an un- 
successive disciplinary expedition against them, or by acquiring the iltizaxfi 
of Jabal eAmil and §afad, which increased their resources, Amir Mulhim was i 
a disadvantage. Zahir monopolised the iltiaam of Safad, the Matawila grew 
stronger and, worst of all, Amir Mulhim1s authority among his people was be 
coming undermined. The only way to meet his financial obligations, when hard
pressed, was to resort to additional taxation. But the local chiefs in Mo up
.  1  Lebanon^growing more self-assertive^opposed such a thing. The acquisition
of the iltizam of Beirut could bring him, therefore, new resources, partleu
larly at this time when it was taking the initiative in commerce from Sidon
Beirut was the usual market for the silk produced in Mount Lebanon and for
which there was a high demand in Damascus and Egypt, and which was bought a
"Shihab, Lubnan, I, 1,1.
1029s Sidon, 23.2.53 (Extrait des ftegistres), Sid-'n, 7.S.53; Masse
51S.
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i
well by the English and French merchants. By* acquiring its iltizam Amir 
Mulhim could control this trade, enforce the prices beneficial to him, and 
maintain his prestige vis-a-vis his countrymen, ?§hir al-*Umar, the Matawila 
and the neighbouring governors. $ahir had acquired the iltizam of Acre in 
1746^ so why should Amir Mulhim not do a similar thing? In 1749 Amir Muljim 
managed to acquire the iltizam of Beirut from the governor of Sidon*^ fhis 
acquisition later embroiled Amir Mulhim*s successors in grave struggles with 
the governor of Sidon, A^mad Basha al-Jazzar, because of their inability to 
defend Beirut.5
In 1163/1749-50 Amir Mulhim was embroiled in a dispute with the Matawila. 
As a sign of the future changes in the local power groupings, some of ?5hir's 
sons, probably with the acquiescence of their father, helped the Matawila in 
the fighting.**
Amir Mulhim had to impose extra taxes on the people to meet his financial 
obligations. But they were reluctant to pay, and their chiefs assembled in 
a dlwan and repudiated his monetary demands, which he eventually withdrew.
So long as he was unable to uphold an unchallenged authority he had recourse
n
to the expedient but risky policy of 1 divide and rule1 • Such a policy war­
rants a special strength and experience in the ruler who has recourse to it. 
Any weakening on his part makes him its victim rather than its master. When
■'i.N.B1 10301 Sidon, 13.3.53; A.N.B1 432: Istanbul, 15.11.53; PBO, S.P.37/34: 
Istanbul, 22.2.53; Masson, 519.
Masson, 518. %ee below p*
Shidyaq, 423,* Dibs, VII, 379,- Shi tab, Lubmn. I, 40. The date of 1163 A.H. 
given by the last tallies, to a certain extent, with that given by Shidyaq 
and Bibs. Shitiab1 a other statement (p* 37) in which he gave the date as 
1161 A.H. seems an erroneous anticipation; Of. A.N.B 1030s Sidon, 13.3.53.
^See below p.frrt.^ Shihab.Lubrxan.1.41: Nuzha, MS. Baris, f .38a; Budayrl,f.35a. 
Tghitib, Lubnan. I, 41; Nuzha. MS. Gamb., f. 20b.
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Amir Mulhim fell ill in 1754, the occasion was exploited by the local chiefs 
to assert their power. They encouraged two brothers of his, Amir Mansur and 
Amir Ahmad, to rule jointly in his place. Unable to resist them, Amir Mul­
him abdicated in their favour and retired to Beirut. His later manoeuvres
to dislodge them with support from Istanbul proved abortive, and he died in 
1
1761. The Amirate, weakened and divided as it had become, mirrored a cor­
responding division among the notables of Mount Lebanon and, in turn, served 
as a focus to the new groupings that were beginning to emerge. Two major 
factions were taking shape at the time. The Janbalati faction headed by ‘Ali 
Janbalat, and the Yazbaki faction headed by ‘Abd al-Salam al~cIraad^  and so 
called after his ancestor Yazbak.^ The old %ysi-Yemeni factionalism was 
almost dead after the elimination of thecAlam al-Dins in cA^n Dara.^ Partly 
as a result of this the Qaysis began to split and they polarized around 
these two factions, Ihis internal split among the Qaysis undermined the 
authority of the amirs of Mount Lebanon and had deep repercussions on the 
balance of power in the region*
After had survived the attacks of Sulayman Pasha his prestige
soared. The increasing demand by the French and other merchants for the
products (chiefly cotton) of the regions which Zahir dominated, encouraged
5
such trade and, more important, played into his hands.
of Sidon _ _ ^
In 1746 ihe governor/gave the iltizam of Acre to a^hir* Acre had re-
S^hihab, Lubnan, I, 43 , 44, 49; Shidyaq. 425-7; Nuzha,MS. Paris,ff.38b,39a. 
^Shidyaq. 182, 183, 427; Shihab, Lubnan. I, 49; Nuzha.MS. Paris, f. 39a. 
3Lammens , II, 101. ^See above p. 167,
^A.N.B1 1027: Sidon, 26.1.48 (Memoire concernant le commerce de l^chelle 
d*Acre); A.N.Bl 1028: Sidon, 28.1.51, Sidon, 7.12.51.
^A.N.B1 1027: Sidon, 12.11.46; A.N.B1 978: Acre, l8.ll.46 (Memoire); cf, "A 
al-Sabbagh, f. 9b and M, al-SabbSgh, 41-3. The statement by Volney, 250
1 (cont.)
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vived as a result of the growing commercial activity and, as a sign of this, 
the French had a vice-consul in it* The French fears of the consequences of 
this action were confirmed when Zahir practised extortion on the French mer- 
chants who resided in Acre. They appealed to their ambassador at Istanbul 
to use his influence to remedy their injustices. The English vice-consul 
in Acre, Mr. bsgate, who was the only English merchant in this place, and 
w}io took care at the same time of the interests of Holland and Venice - an 
example of the small volume of trade of th£se nations - suffered from simi­
lar extortions and appealed, in turn, to his ambassador at Istanbul.^ The
combined efforts of these ambassadors failed to bring other than unheeded
3
recommendations by the Grand Vezir to Zahir and to the local governors.
The attitude of As * ad Pasha towards the growing power of Zahir was ap­
parently one of indifference.^* It is true that As*ad Pasha was, at the be­
ginning of his governorship, occupied with the internal situation in Damas­
cus but his passive attitude towards Zahir, later on, freed the latter*s 
hands. As*ad Pasha commanded and sent more than one expedition against the 
Druzes, but nothing similar against Zahir. Several factors prompted him to 
attack the Druzes, as we have already seen, not the least among them the
relative military ease of doing so. The Druzes were a community living in
£cont.) that Zahir took hold of Acre 1 vers1 1749, which was copied by 
later writers,is contradicted by this evidence.
•'a .N.B1 1027s Sidon, 4.11.4.3, Sidon, 19.7.49, Sidon, 28.10.49.
ibid.s Sidon, 11.9.49; PBO, S.P. 97/34* Istanbul, 24.10.49 (dispatch No.2
under this date); ef. Charles-Roux, 82.
3Cf. A.N.B 1028s Sidon, 4.3.50, (Sidon) Istanbul, 15.7.50, Sidon, 25.9.50
(Extrait des Registres); *A. al-Sabbagh. f* 9b.
^0f. A.H.B1 1030; Sidon, 1.5.54 (Arabic text of a letter by Zahir to the 
French Minister of State dated 8 Rajab 1167), BudayrT, f. 39b.
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a comparatively large area. To attack a village inhabited by Druzes or to 
devastate their countiyside was considered a campaign against the Druzes no 
matter whether it•encountered resistance or not. But in the case of Zahir 
the military situation was quite different. The Ziyadina were not a community 
like the Druzes, but were a family, members of which had distinguished them­
selves rather recently, and whose military power depended largely on fort­
resses. To lead an expedition against Zahir it must necessarily be directed 
against his stronghold of Tiberias or the less important one of Dayr Hanna. 
Both, and particularly Tiberias, were very much strengthened after the at­
tacks of Sulaynian Pasha. It seems that As*ad Pasha was afraid of a military 
failure which might damage his prestige and perhaps affect his administrative 
pareer. Of more importance, however, ms the change in the attitude of Ist­
anbul towards $ahir.
As a result of the representations made by the French and English ambassa­
dors to the Porte and because of the inability or rather unwillingness of the
2
governor of Sidon to remedy their injustices, the Grand Vezir requested the
3governor of Damascus to intercede on their behalf. As* ad Pasha did not 
take any military action, pretending that he wanted stronger orders from Ist­
anbul. Indeed he did not receive a firman from the Sultan to combat |ahir 
but merely recommendations in the form of friendly letters from the Grand 
Vezir/' After all, it was the infidels who were suffering extortion. Be­
^Hasselquist, 15$$ cf, Poeocke, II.i,6S.
2A.H.B 1027: Sidon, 19.7.4.9* Sidon, 11.9.49; cf. A.N.B1 1028: Sidon,25.4.50.
3 iA.N.B1 4-2$: Istanbul, 16.10.49 (translation of a letter written by the 
Grand Vezir to As*ad Pasha); PEO, S.P. 97/34* Istanbul, 24.10.49.
'h.N.B1 428: Istanbul, 16.10.49.
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sides, Zahir was keen at this stage not to make any arrears in his finan-
cial obligations to the state so as not to incur the anger of the Forte. He
pretended also to be law-abiding and in 1162/174.8-9 be killed some of the zoxa
2
who were expelled from Damascus. It might be true from the probing which the 
French ambassador had made at Istanbul that the authorities there \jere unable 
to send an expedition against $ithir because of the expenses it would entail
3
and also because of their occupation with other more pressing problems.
The French felt, at last, that SJahir was strong and that it was in their
interest to be reconciled with him. In 1753 they reached an accommodation
4
with him concerning trade. The change of heart on the part of Zahir towards 
the French was caused to a large extent by his anxiety to safeguard his com­
mercial interests, and also by the obliging letters which he had received froii
~ 5
the Grand Vezir, the daftadar of Istanbul, and the Heis Efendi. Thus the
rebel* g favour was courted by top officials at Istanbul.
In a letter to the French Minister of State for the Marine dated 8 Hajab
ll67/l May 1754*5 ?ahir revealed that Jaffa, which was under the jurisdiction
6
of the governor of Damascus, was *sous mon pouvoir*. One source states that
— . H —
i^ s iltizam was given to him by As*ad Fasha. £ahir was also able to obtain
A.. al-§abbagh, f. 9b. Budayri, f. 30a; see above p.1%0*
^A.N.B1 1028; (Sidon) Istanbul, 15.7.50, Sidon, 23.9.50.
^JLN.B1 1030; Sidon, 12.7.53 (Articles d,accommodement entre M. de Verrayon, 
Consul de France a Seyde et le Ghek Daher el Omar Commandant d’Acre),
A^.N.B^ * 4-32; Istanbul, 6.10.53.
^A.N.B1 1030; Sidon, 1.5.54* (the Arabic te$t of the letter carries the date 
of 8 Bajab 1167, and the name of ?ahir is given at the end; the French ver­
sion carries his signature and titles in Arabic, which suggests that it was 
written or perhaps translated by one of his secretaries who knew French).
C^f. *A. al-Sabbagh. f. 9b.
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the iltizam of other regions which were under the jurisdiction of the gov­
ernor of Damascus, These included certain villages in the region of Nablus,
1
in bilad Haritha (Mount Carmel and the adjacent territories to the south)
—  2and in Jabal tfAjlun. His most important acquisition, however,’ was Acre,
3where he resided* But responsibility for its defence was great. Its im­
portance to Zahir is apparent in the titles he assumed, such as dabit *Akka 
wa-blladiha ^ or dabit 4 iUcka wa-bilad al-Jalil,
The third group with x^ hich As4 ad Pasha load to deal were the Beduin. In 
the province of Damascus, particularly in bilad Hawran and along the Jordan 
valley in the direction of Nablus, there existed several tribes, some of wh^m 
received garr from the governor of Damascus for facilitating the passage of
6 ry
the Pilgrimage, while others paid dues to him,' The governor of Damascus 
had to deal also with other tribes outside the confines of his province, 
along the Pilgrimage route.
The attitude of As*ad Pasha towards the Beduin was interesting. While 
tried to be on good terms with the big tribes such as *Anaza and garb, he 
tightened his hold over the small and less militant ones. The danger of th|Ls 
policy was that while the big tribes were appeased, the small ones x^ ere inf 
iated at their humiliation and, very often, retaliated by counter attacks. 
Immediately after his triumph over the zorab. As* ad Pasha sent troops
icfPoliak, 59. al~§abbagh, ff. 9b, 10aj M, al-gablJagh, 4 6.
%ee Hasselquist, 151* ■
Rossi, !Due letters Di pahir, SignorfiDi S. Giovanni d!Acri il, Gran 
Maestro Di Malta (1752)*, Rivista Degli Studi Oriental!, XIV, (1934), 62.
^A.N.B1 1030s Sidon, 1.5.54; A.N.B1 1029s Sidon S.10.53 (the text of a let­
ter sent by £ahir to the Prench Minister of State for the Marine, dated 
15 Dhu 'l-gijja 1166).
.^ See above C^f. Seetzen, 2$9*
le
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against unidentified Beduin in the vicinity of Damascus. Their property was
1
looted and the heads of several Beduin were brought to Damascus, Other ex­
peditions were sent against unidentified Beduin in the vicinity of Damascus.
On 2 Rajab 1166/5 May 1753 As6 ad Pasha led an expedition against the Beduin
of Balqa? whose prominent chief vas Ibn * Adwan, and defeated them.^ In
1167/1753-4. Asfiad Pasha sent troops against the Beduin of al-Jabal, probably
Jabal Hawran,^ and inflicted heavy casualties on them.^ In Rajah 1168/April
May 1755 he sent an expedition against the Fa<Jl Beduin of Hawran who were
7also worsted in the fighting.
These campaigns against comparatively small tribes might have been nec-
8essary to discipline them. Indeed they occupied territories vrhich affected
the supplies of Damascus and the safety of the Pilgrimage, In such campaigns
looting on both sides was not an unusual practice. But if we notice that t’pe
Beduin were almost always defeated and that their sheep were sometimes sold
9by As ad Pasha at high prices, one wonders if the aim of profiteering was
not a strong factor behind these expeditions.
In Il60/l747 news arrived in Damascus of a big fight which took place
10between the ‘ilnaza and certain Beduin called Has ha. Both suffered heavy 
casualties but the latter were worsted and their property looted. It was 
rumoured that As6ad Pasha helped *the Beduin1, most probably the *Anaza
-^Budayri, f.l6a. %>ee for example, ibid.. f.29a. C^f, Seetzen, 296,297. 
#0f. Seetzen, 296, 297; Budayrl, f. 41b. 50f. Muhammad Adlb, 43.
^Budayrx, f. 43a. ^Ibid.. ff, 44a, 44b. C^f. ibid., ff. 26a, 29a*
%bid.. f. 26a.
-^ Budayri, f *. 20a. It seems that the word Has ha was a corruption of Shrasha, 
with the first letter dropped from the Arabic pronunciation. If this is 
true then they seem to have represented that section of the §akhr who wer^ 
led by Shavkh al-Shresha; the" remaining §a^ lp? were led by Ibn Fa* iz, cf. 
Seetzen, p. 287. The subsequent fight between the Sakhr and the*Anaza 
lends truth to this explanation.
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because they were victorious and also because the looted sheep were sold in
Damascus. In % jab/July-August of the same year, the^Anaza came to blows
with the §akhr Beduin in bilad Hawran.^ The summer season during which this
fight took place coincided with the yearly expansion of the ‘Anaza towards
the cultivated regions where the Sakhr predominated. Since the tfAnaza were
masters of the Syrian desert it was desirable for the governor of Damascus tc
be on good terms with them to safeguard the Pilgrimage and the trade cara-
3
vans that crossed the desert between Damascus and Baghdad.
Another strong tribe with which As*ad Pasha compromised was the Barb, 
The territory controlled by this tribe extended between Mecca and Medina. 
Since the Pilgrimage passed through this territory, the governors of Damas­
cus had necessarily to deal with the garb.^ * In 1169/1755-56 the Harb quar­
relled with the authorities of Medina and besieged it. The Sultan, alarmed 
at this threatening state of affairs in such an important place, sent order 
to Ascad Pasha and to his brothers, Mustafa Pasha and Sa‘ad al-Din Pasha, 
to march against them, and appointed the last governor of Jedda apparently 
to tighten the grip on the garb. Instead of fighting them, in compliance 
with the Sultan’s orders, As* ad Pasha paid a hundred purses to this tribe 
and brought about a reconciliation between them and the authorities of Med­
ina.^ Phis was an expedient measure, but the peace it brought about was of
1 o
Budayri, f* 20a. "Ibid.. f. 23a.
3cf. Niebuhr, II, 180. %. Schleifer, E.I. 1st ed. s.v. Harb.
5Budayri, ff. 44b, 45a. °Ibid.. f. 45b.
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■;.a temporary nature because the Harb were bought off rather than subdued.
Shortly afterwards they resumed their insubordination and the governor of
— 1 Damascus, ‘Abd Allah Pasha . ■Dhata.ii, subdued them by force. So long as
As6 ad Pasha was governor he was able to manage these various tribes. But
the policy he adopted towards them had disastrous repercussions under his
successors *
The Vicissitudes of the *Agm Governors.
With the death of Sulayman Pasha, the second generation of 4Azm' 
governors, all of them sons of his brother, Ismacil Pasha, came to the fore 
One of them, Ibrahim Pasha, fell into oblivion after his deposition from Si£i<
in 1744*^ and eventually died In Hamah In 1159/1746-7 without acquiring the
—.i 3 —
rank of wazir. His brother Sa*d al-Din Pasha, who stayed in Damascus with
his brother As£ad Pasha, was promoted in H 59/1746 to the rank of wazir.^
5
the same year he x^ias appointed governor of Tripoli. Apart from the usual
Ii
procedures for obtaining governorships, it seems that the satisfaction of th< 
Sultan at the actions of Ascad Pasha, who suppressed the insubordinate per 
sons in Damascus and reinstated the Kapi Kulus, contributed much to this ap 
pointment of Sacd al^Din Pasha, While governor of Tripoli Sa‘d al-Din con^ 
manded the jarda for four successive years betx^ een 1160 and II64 A.H. In 
1164/1750-1 he was appointed governor of Aleppo.^ In his new governorship
^See belox^  p. 1026s Sidon, 25.5*44-*
^Tabbakh, VI, 48I. ^Budayri, f. l6b,
^Ibid., f. 19a; A.N.B1 1118: Tripoli, 10.10.4 6.
l _
Budayri, ff. 24b, 31b, 36a.
Gf* a *N-b1 Aleppo, 15.1.51*
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Sae d al-Dih Pasha exploited his appointment as commander of the .jarda to 
practice extortions. The Aleppines revolted, the Friday prayer was suspendei
and many casualties occurred. The Aleppines appealed also to the Sultan
1 9against his injustices. However, he commanded, the .jarda that year" and \-ias
3
subsequently deposed, to their relief. It seems that he was appointed to
A £Sidon in 1752, and in 1753 he was transferred to Tripoli,'5 where he seems t
have stayed as governor until April 1756,^  In 1166/1752-3 Mustafa was
granted two tugs, apparently without being appointed to a governorship, and
was asked to coperate with his brother Sa€d al-Din Pasha in commanding the
7 ___
jarda. In the middle of Jumada I 1168/around the end of February 1755*
Mii^ tafa Pasha was appointed governor of Sidon*^ Thus, the three governor­
ships of Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon were in sAsm hands as in 1730.^ This 
was certainly a great honour to the tfAzm family and particularly to Ascad 
Pasha who towered high over his brothers and sponsored their appointments. 
But this situation did not last long* Around Jumada II 1169/March 175& the 
three eAzm governors were ordered by the Sultan to proceed to Medina and re­
lieve it from the Harb Beduin who besieged it. Satfd al-Din Pasha was ap­
pointed governor of Jedda on the occasion.^ This appointment did not mater
, _ 11 
ialize, however, and Sa d al-Din Pasha was appointed governor of Sidon
budayri, f. 38a; A.N.B1 86s Aleppo, 20.9.51. budayri, f. 38b.
A.N.B1 86s Aleppo, 20.1.52. Hbid.: A.N.B1 1029s Sidon, 30.3.52.
5A.N.B1 1030s Sidon, 7.5.53.
^A.N.B 1119s Tripoli, 5.4-.56, Tripoli, A.5.56; Budayri, f. 45a.
^Budayri, f. 42a, cf, f. 42b.
SIW., f. 44a; A.N.B1 1030: Sidon, 10.4.55, Sidon, 11-4.55.
%ee above p./¥ 5' *^ See above p. Z&Q* (cont.)
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in place of his brother Mustafa Pasha who was deposed by the end of 1169/ 
Sept. 1756 and was appointed to Adana.^
On 27 §afar 1168/13 Pec. 1754 Sultan Mahmud I died in Istanbul and his
t _ 2 
brother, TJthman III, was proclaimed Sultan, This event entailed large
changes in the administration both at Istanbul and in the provinces. As*ad
Pasha became anxious when the firman of his confirmation did not arrive by
mid-Jumada-I of that year, the date 011 which his brother Mustafa was appoinl 
3ed to Sidon, and the usual time for its arrival. Although the appointment 
of his brother was comforting and he himself received his confirmation in
4 4mid-Rajab, a rather late date in his case, As ad Pasha had reason to feel 
as he did because of his unusually long tenure in office and, more import­
ant, because of certain manoeuvring  ^against him in Istanbul of which he 
seems to have been aware.
After the death in 174t> of Kizlar Agha Bashir, who wielded great
5
authority in Istanbul, his successors struggled, not always sue-
6 — 
cessfully, to maintain the same authority as the kizlar Agba Bashir
had exercised. Shortly after the accession of Sultan (Uthman III,
the prestige of the office of the Kizlar Agha revived. Its occup-
ry
and Ahmad Aboulcouf (sic) worked to discredit As*ad Pasha. It was alleged
that this Kialar Agha, while on his way to Mecca in 1754* was not given due
(conO ,
ffA.lT.B1 1031s Sidon, 12,10.56 (Depenses faites,* en suite de l*emeute a
Jaff e) *
1 -Budayri, ff. 45a, 45b.
P^RO, S.P. 97/38: Istanbul, 13.12.54; A.N.B1 433: Istanbul, 16.9.54;
Hammer, XV, 276, 278* Budayri, f, 43h,
%udayri, f. 44a. 4cf. Ibid., ff. 24b, 42b, 44h. %ee above p.
H^ammer, XV, 106, 111; PRO, S.P. 97/33: Istanbul, 29.8.47; S.P.97/34: 
Istanbul, 21.11.49; S.P. 97/35: Istanbul, 23.7.51, Istanbul, 24.10.51, 
Istanbul, 21.3.52, Istanbul, 20,6.52, Istanbul, 4*7.52, Istanbul, 21.8.52; 
7S„P. 97/38* Istanbul, 16.9.55.
Hammer,XVI,14,gave his name in this form; cf, PB0,S.P,97/39tIstanbul,25.4*5
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honour by As* ad Pasha - a contrast with the friendly attitude of Husayn Bey
■v 1  Pb. Makki, the governor of Gaza, towards him. Through the support of the 
Kizlar Agha, Husayn Bey was granted two tugs and appointed, around Rabi* II 
1169/January 1756, governor of the province of Jerusalem which was carved out 
of that of Damascus. He was authorized to collect the revenue of the dawra.^  
The limits of this province caused a controversy in the French Consulate in 
Sidon. If it was restricted to Jerusalem then the present the French would 
offer to Husayn Pasha would be less than if Ramie, which was important to 
French trade, were added to it.^ It turned out, however, that the new pro­
vince of Jerusalem included, besides the nahiyas (districts) attached to it,
5Gaza and Ramie as well. The point to be stressed here is that the prestige 
and the resources of As*ad Pasha suffered as a result of this dismemberment 
of his province. More important were the factors that brought about this 
change in Istanbul.
Muradi, II, 61.
2S. Lusignan, Letters addressed to Sir William Fordyce. 2 vols., London,
1762, II, 226-7; Volney, 316-7.
3 — 1
Budayri, f. 44b; A.N.B 1031s Sid on ,^ 16.1.3 6 (Extrait des Registres); 
Volney, 316-7. The statement by Muradi, II, 61, that As*ad Pasha made gusayn 
Bey his deputy-governor in Jerusalem in which position he stayed until 1169 
A.H,, might have been true, see S. Lusignan, Letters. II, 226. But at this 
date he was appointed by the Sultan governor of the province of Jerusalem, 
as Muradi (II, 61) himself, asserts.
JL
^A.N.B 1031: Sidon, I6.I.56 (Extrait des Registres).
^Ibid.. Sidon, 4-2*56.
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Husayn Pasha remained governor of Jerusalem for nine months after which 
he was deposed. He returned to his former governorship of the §anjaq of
”T ”
Gaza. Jerusalem then reverted to the jurisdiction of As*ad Pasha, and its
2governor was once more known as his mutasallim. Apparently this was a set­
back to the Kizlar Agha and his protege Husayn Pasha. It was also a challenge
to which the Kizlar Agha responded successfully by procuring, shortly after-
3wards, the governorship of Damascus for Husayn Pasha.
As*ad Pasha managed to retain Jerusalem partly, it seems, through the
manoeuvres of his agent in Istanbul.^ * On 13 Rabi4 I 1170/5 January 1757,
about two months before his deposition, As4ad Pasha was honoured by a
5
gift from the Sultan* This was apparently an expression of satisfaction at
1 „ 1
Budayri, f. 44b; A.NJS 1031s Sidon ,_Jlu9* 56 (Extrait' des Registres), Sidon, 
20*9.56 (Extrait des Registres); Muradi, II, 61* The statement by the last 
that Husayn Pasha was deposed by As4 ad Pasha is not to be taken literally 
because As* ad Pasha did not appoint Husayn Pasha to Jerusalem and also be­
cause Budayri made it clear that Husayn Pasha was deposed by the Sultan.
It might mean, however, that this was done at the demand of Astfad Pasha.
2A.N*B1 1031s Sidon, 17.G.£6 (traduction d*une lettre ecritte par Assad
Pacha gouverneur de Damas a Monsieur Bourguignon Proconsul de Prance a 
Seyde, dated 13 Shawwal, 1167/16 July 1756); cf. 1031: Sidon,
4 *6 .56, Sidon, 1 0,6*56, Sidon, 12.6.56.
3 —Muradi*s statement In II, 62, that Husayn Pasha was appointed governor of 
Sidon before his appointment to Damascus is not substantiated by any other 
source,
il.N.B1 87s Aleppo, 22.3.57.
5Budayri, f* 45b.
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his achievement of a reconciliation between the Harb Beduin and the authori- 
1
ties of Medina. Ascad Pasha still enjoyed much credit at Istanbul. Would 
this credit stand the test?
_ ii
At the end of Rabi£/ 1170/21 January 1757* its * ad Pasha was deposed
2from Damascus and appointed to Aleppo. This was attributed to the success­
ful manoeuvres of the Kizlar Agha, Aboukouf, who was anxious to promote his
s j — 3
protege, Husayn Pasha b. Makki. Raghib Pasha of Aleppo, who was appointed
to Damascus,was made Grand.Vezir before he assumed his new governorship.^
On Friday 15 Jumada I 1170/5 February 1757 As*ad Pasha received the firman 
which appointed him to Aleppo, and he left Damascus three days later for 
his new governorship.^
In Aleppo, As*ad Pashals suspicions of the intentions behind his de­
position from Damascus began to be confirmed. Opposition, to him in Istanbul
was gaining momentum because he incurred also the enmity of the new Grgnd 
Vezir, Raghib Pasha, who had denounced him as !fallah ibn fallah1 (peasant 
son of a peasant) in the wake of a deal that failed between them.^
As‘ad Pasha started his rule by lowering the price of grain
and by supplying the city from his own granaries - an act which won him the
7
admiration of the Aleppines. Although he still benefited by selling his
Budayri, f. 45h; see above p. %€o* Budayri, f. 46a.
^Hammer, XVI, 155 PRO, S.P. 97/39s Istanbul, 3.12.57; A.N.B1 435: Istanbul, 
26.11.57.
^Budayri, f. 46a; Hammer, XV, 304; PRO, S.P. 97/38: Istanbul, 15.1.56; 
Russell, I, 404-5 n.30; Radcliffe papers, 6645/5i Aleppo, 24.1.57.
^Budayri, ff. 48a, 46b.
R^ussell, I, 404-5 n.30; see above p./2/, R^ussell, I, 405.
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grain, the reduction in prices was a glaring departure from his policy in 
Damascus, Such a gesture seems to have served several purposes. The ex- 
actions made by his brother, Sacd al-Din Pasha, a few years earlier, had 
provoked the Aleppines to revolt against him.^  Ascad Pasha might have been 
anxious to allay their fears. As a new governor who was exploring the situ­
ation in Aleppo, and who was still suspicious of the intentions of Istanbul, 
such a paternal approach could win him needful popular support.
On 26 February 1757 Ascad Pasha was appointed governor of Egypt.''
The shops in Aleppo were closed in protest, and the Aleppines demonstrated 1 
the streets expressing their desire not to part with As‘ad fiisha. They ap-
3
pealed, also to the Sultan to keep him in Aleppo. Was this a spontaneous 
move on the part of the Aleppines or was it arranged by As6 ad Pashd? On his 
deposition from Damascus no such demonstration took place in his favour. Ir; 
spite of his extortionate policy there which had alienated a large section 
of the Damascene poor, he could still have arranged a demonstration had he 
wanted because many vested interests were on his side. That he had com­
manded the Pilgrimage fourteen times provided him with powerful religious an 
political assets. In Aleppo, however, the situation was different. Pro­
bably he thought he might settle there for a similar long period, and per­
haps ultimately return to Damascus, For the Aleppines to forget so easily 
their hard time under his brother and to be whipped up to such a frenzy in
"4>ee above p " T A . W . B ^  87: Aleppo, 10.3.57.
^A.N.B^ 87s Aleppo: 22.3.57, Aleppo, 26.3.57; A.N.B^ 4-35s Istanbul,
30.4*57; Budayri, f. 47a.
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so limited a period makes it incredible that their action was simply spon-
n
taneous. ertainly the religious prestige of As* ad Pasha counted for much. 
But it seems also that the reduction in prices which he introduced was de­
liberately planned with the collaboration of certain merchants in the city. 
The merchants,who could count on, if not be sure of, a future reversal of 
this policy when the time was ripe, seem to have incited the demonstrations. 
After As* ad Pasha1 s death they were arrested and fined. Nor was As*ad 
Pasha resigned to his fate. He approached the foreign consuls in Aleppo to 
write to their ambassadors in Istanbul on his behalf, and particularly re­
quested the French Consul to do so in order that the French ambassador 
might concert action with As*ad,s agent at the Porte to ward off his deposi­
tion.2 In the meantime, As6ad Pasha was alarmed lest the attitude of the 
pooulace should harm his case. He pretended to comply with the order for
his deposition, but did nothing to quieten the people. On the 9th of May
3
he was confirmed in Aleppo.
That As*ad Pasha, weathered the storm, and his successor-designate 
was appointed to another province after the Aleopines had turned away his
T Amutasallim, was an example of the weakness of the government in Istanbul.
The forceful demonstrations'of the Aleppines were a further proof of the
^A.N.B^ 88; Aleppo, 4.11.58.
2A.N..B 87s Aleppo, 22.3.57* Aleppo, 26.3.57.
3A.N.B1 87: Aleppo, 14.5.57.
/+PR0, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 2.5.57.
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1
loosening control of the central administration over the provinces. For 
a time it appeared as if the *Azms were still in favour. Sa*d al-Din Pasha.
_  2
was appointed to Mar* as_h and his brother Mustafa to Mosul.
On 25 Sept. 1757, Asfiad Pasha was deposed once more and appointed to
~ 3 ISiwas. The Aleppines rose again in protest.+ During this time sums of
money were.sent by As*ad Pasha to Istanbul.^ Although it is not known 
whether this money was part of the revenue to the Imperial treasury or was 
sent to his agent to work him up, the fact that it was made at all at this 
time is remarkable. Contrary to the advice of his supporters and of his 
brother Sa*d al-Din Pasha to send large:, sums to Istanbul to buy off his
deposition, or to augment his forces and to put up resistance, or to pur­
chase his retirement, As* ad Pasha chose to submit, and. he left Aleppo after 
a long delay during which every pretext for staying was exhausted.^
In trying to ascertain why As*ad Pasha failed to put up military re­
sistance when the Aleppines were apparently supporting him, a survey of his 
administrative career is useful. -Curing his fourteen years' tenure in Dam­
ascus, As*ad Pasha was forced by events to adopt a clear attitude towards 
the power groups there:.. His strengthening of the alien troops, particularly
1 —In 174&, for example, the Sultan was forced, to appoint Sulayman Pasha,
Kahya of Ahmad Pasha of Baghdad, as governor of this province after his •
nominee was driven out, see P^ O, S.P. 97/33i Istanbul, 28.3.48,1 Istanbul,
24.10.49.
^Budayri, f. 47a5 Tabbakh, III, 329; cf. A.N.B3* 87i Aleppo, 30.8.57.
3Tabbakh, III, 335; A.N.B1 87: Aleopo, 7.10.57.
4-A.N.B1 87: Aleppo, 7.10.57. 5pro, S.P. 110/34: Aleppo, 5.10.57.
Russell, X, 405, 406; A.N.B-'- 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
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his reinstatement of the Kapi Kulus. was primarily intended to put an end 
to the growing prominence and insubordination of the Yerliyya» But it seem: 
that the reinstatement of the Kapi Kulus. at the demand of As*ad Pasha and 
certainly to the satisfaction of the Sultan, was played up in Istanbul in 
As6 ad Pasha* s favour and contributed, among other things, to the prolongatio 
of his tenure.
Asfiad Pasha was a typical example of the governor who was interested in 
the furtherance of his prestige and his fortune within the *Establishment*. 
During his rule in Damascus he did not try to exploit military power to re- 
tain his post in defiance of the Sultan's orders. In Aleppo, however, he 
became conscious of the intrigues directed against him in Istanbul but 
could do nothing to halt them. He remained true to his past career of gov­
erning with the Sultan's acquiescence. His background and the origins of 
his power had shaped his decision. The Aleppines had demonstrated in his 
favour, but could such a popular upsurge of a momentary nature help to sus­
tain his authority for a longer period and in defiance of the Sultan's 
orders? Aleppwas within easy reach of the Sultan's troops. Furthermore, 
any trouble there would not be tolerated by the Sultan especially because 
it would endanger his military position on the Persian front. When As* ad 
Pasha accepted his deposition he did not know that he was moving towards hi 
doom. Around the beginning of §afar 117l/second half of October 1757, the 
Pilgrimage was almost annihilated by the Beduin. Towards the end of Sha4ba 
1171/beginning of May 175^ , news of the decapitation of As6ad Pasha arrived 
in Syria, and soon after followed the confiscation of his property. The re 
lation between these events will be discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter - 6 27 1
THE PROVINCE OF
I* Internal disorders and the^attack on the Pilgrimage 
under Husayn Pasha b. Makki.
i . f  ‘ i i i j BM. i  bt.ti" m  , i w  k.ii1, m  u ,a sr ~ c r r g -  u  n .n u w r a e M T  t h i  la a ^ c a
IJusayn Pasha entered Damascus as governor on 5 Jumada II 1170/25 February
1 o 31757, His grandfather was a native of Gaza^ and one of its merchants* Thi$
local identification made Barlk describe Husayn Pasha as of the second group
of awlad al-* Arab who became wazirs in 1 our country (biladina) *. as he put i'^
$usaynls father, Muhammad, acted, at one time, as kahva for As*ad Pasha,  ^and
in 1155/174-2-3, he was given bilad Gaza (probably the ganjaq of Gaza) as
malMmne.^
On the entry of Husayn Pasha to Damascus, amid the customary procession 
in which the notables of the city figured, a crowd assembled and shouted 
against the tyranny of the notables and against the high prices, A more darl­
ing event occurred the next day, when the religious officials and the notable* 
came to the sarava to greet him, A crowd intercepted them, labelled them wit 
disgraceful titles such as munafiqin (hypocrites) who helped the rulers in
7
their oppression of the poor, and went even to the extent of stoning them.
Such a tangible complaint at the start of his rule prompted Husayn Pasha to
tighten inspection measures, and bread prices were reduced by about one halif.
8
But this was of temporary duration and prices went up shortly afterwards.
The change of the governor played into the hands of the Xerliyya who
were trying to restore their prominence. Before his departure from Damascus 
As* ad Pasha counselled the members of the Xerliyya and the Kapi Kulus to
■^ Budayri, f. 46b. B^arik, 36. ?MuradI, II, 60.
4'Barik, 3 6. The first group, according to this chronicler, were the ‘A^ms, 
see ibid.
5lbid.: Muradi, II, 60, 61; cf. Baytimani, Diwan, ff, 4&a, 49b.
%uradl, II, 60, 61. 7Budayri, ff. 46b, 47a; Muradi, II, 61.
^Budayri, f. 47a.
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come to terms. He also released many prisoners, some of whom had 
been in prison for about ten years. 1 This seems to have increased ex­
citement in the city. Immediately after his departure signs of unrest be­
came apparent. Insubordinate members of the Xerliyya from the Maydan 
quarter began to assert themselves, but they were temporarily restrained by 
their superiors. The Kapi Kulus, apprehending reprisals by the Xerliyya, 
vacated their houses in the quarters and took refuge in the citadel. Many 
shop-keepers moved their goods to safer places. Rumours were rife in Damas- 
cus, at the time, of an impending invasion by the expelled zorab. In fact, 
the latter after their abortive attack on Damascus in 1161/174$ were either
d
killed, or pardoned, or had lost interest or sympathy after a period of
twelve years. Their surviving chief, Ahmad al-Qaltaqji,was on good terms
with Husayn Pasha, and Instead of attacking Damascus as It was rumoured he
would, he offered to mediate in the dispute between the Xerliyya and the
Kapi Kulus.^ In such a disturbed state of affairs and among such fear-
stricken inhabitants, every rumour of a violent nature gathered momentum
very easily. It was only after the mutasallim of Husayn Pasha put to death
an insubordinate person from the Suwayqa quarter that the anxiety of the
5
people somewhat subsided.
Pasha
Between 5 Jumada II 1170/25 February 1757, the date on which Husayn/ 
entered Damascus, and 1 Sha(ban/21 April of the same year, when he went on 
the dawra, direct clashes between the Xerliyya and the Kapi Kulus had not 
yet started. But public security was disturbed by the insubordination of the
1 ~ 2 ^‘ Budayri, f. 46b. Ibid, ^See above p. 23<J.
^Budayri, f, 49b, ~^Ebid.., f, 46b.
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Maghariba, who had enjoyed a privileged position under As*ad Fasha. On 20
Rajab 1170/10 April 1757 they attacked the governor and fired on a crowd,
killing about ten persons and burning many places. In the same month they
clashed with the Kurdish Lawatrd . About fifteen persons were killed on both
sides. As a further sign of the general deterioration In security, six per-
sons were found murdered in various places in Damascus in this same month of
Rajab - an unusual thing, according to the chronicler. On the 27th of it/
_  y
17 April Husayn Pasha put to death a murderer from the Maydan.
Before leaving for the dawra Husayn Pasha appointed as mutasallim
- ^ 2
Husayn Agha. the alaybeyi of the Sipahis. This seems to have been an ex­
pedient choice because this corps did not take part as such in any of the 
previous troubles, and also because any person appointed to this office from
the Yerliyya would alienate the Kapi Kulus and vice-versa. But his choice
— .  u
of Mustafa Agha., a prominent Kapi Kulu , to act as Tuf eng;] i bashi (roughly
chief of police) after he had guaranteed to maintain order,^  seems to have 
alienated the Yerliyya who were not given any similar influential office and 
who would be coerced as a result.
On IS Ramadan 1170/6 June 1757, in the absence of Husayn Pasha, the 
first in a series of clashes took place between the Yerliyya and the Kapi 
Kulus. The rise, at the time, In the prices of foodstuffs created further 
complication. The price of bread, for example, rose from three misriyyas 
for the rotle in Rajab, when the governor enforced inspection,^ to twelve
1 -Budayri, 47a.
3Ibid., f. 4-7b.
2Ibid.
Hbid.j f. 47a.
migriyyas for the rotle in Ramadan of the same year without any apparent
change in the value of the currency. This situation brought the poor into
the scene, and they fought on the side of the Yerliyya because of the common
interests they had with them. The Kapi Kulus marshalled all the non-Damas-
cene troops to their side, such as the Dalatiyya, the :#krad., the Ida ws ills anc 
  2
the Baghdadis. A sharp division was thus drawn between Damascene and non-
Damascene forces. In the fighting many casualties occurred on both sides,
-  3
and it was at the intercession of Haqib al-Aghraf, Sayyid Hamza, and other
dignitaries that the hostilities were brought to a halt.^ On his return fron
D
the dawra on 20 .Ramadan/ 6 June, Husayn las ha showed ho concern at what had 
happened.
In the first half of Shawwal 1170/second half of June 1757, Mustafa 
Agha al-Hainawy was appointed agha of the Yerliyya.5 His predecessor, Darwist 
Agha. who had occupied this office since 1157/1744-5* was on good terms with 
Ascad. Pasha and the notables of Damascus.^ With the deposition of As*ad 
Pasha and the growing insubordination of the Yerliyya. Parwish Agha was afrai< 
of being attacked by the lawless members of his own corps. He therefore ap­
pealed to Husayn Pasha to relieve him of his office and to write to Istanbul
7 -to this effect. His wish was finally conceded. Mustafa Agha was no strang­
er to Damascus, His father 6Ali, a native of Hamah, was daftardar of Damas-
g_________________ _
cus between 1129/1716-7 and 114.6/1735-6, He was also a sharif on the mater­
^BudayrI, f. 47b. ^Ibid, $ Muradi, II, 61. . . .^ Cf. Muradi ,111, 207,.
‘^Budayri, f. 47b$ Barik, 44; Gf. Muradi, Matmah, f* 39b.
B^udayri, f. 47b. S^ee above p. M^urqdi, II, 107-112.
g
See above p.
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nal side. Although the agha of the Yerliyya was still appointed from Istan­
bul, he was chosen by then from among Damascene or Damascenized persons. This 
tended to make the corps more homogeneous but failed: to make the leadership 
more effective.
h^e Yerliyya were determined on a decisive clash with the Kapi Kulus.
On the surface the struggle was for military supremacy, but behind it lurked
the economic rivalry between Damascenes and non-Damascenes because the lattei
were indulging in business activities. Moreover, the non-Damascene troops
and in particular the mercenaries,were creating much disorder and practising
extortion, which infuriated the Damascenes.
Before the departure of Husayn Pasha on the Pilgrimage on 19 Shawwal
2
1170/7 July 1757, the Damascenes arose as one demanding the expulsion of 
^ie ,ghurabaJ (aliens) from the city. The governor issued orders to this ef­
fect, and some aliens left.^  Literally the 'aliens1 should have included th< 
Kapi Kulus alongside the mercenary troops. But the order of Husayn Pasha 
seems to have affected the mercenary troops only, the majority of whom kept 
living in Damascus after they had been dismissed from service, and continued 
causing trouble. It should be recalled here that many aliens who came to
Damascus on the occasion of the Pilgrims.ge stayed In it for one reason or
another.^ * Husayn Pasha tried to reconcile the Yerliyya and the Kapi Kulus 
before his departure, and a hpj-ja (written ruling) was promulgated in the
1
Muradi, II, 111, III, 209*
^BudayrT, f. 48a (cjamat a hi a 1-Sham bi-sawt wahid).
3 / ___
Ibid., f. 48a, cf. f. 47b. Bee Muradi^Matrnah, f. 43a.
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presence of the judge and other dignitaries which decreed heavy penalties : 
on any who violated its terms.^
Such conciliatory measures postponed the clash but could not prevent' 
it. The atmosphere was so tense that the least pretest would disturb it. On. 
13 Dhu 51-I[ijja 1170/29 August 1757, in the absence of Husayn Pasha, a Kurd, 
who had been in the service of As*ad Pasha, arrived in Damascus. His past V 
record in terrorising the Damascenes made them demand his expulsion. But the ! 
Kapi Kulus gave him asylum in the citadel, and this resulted in the resump­
tion of hostilities between them and the Yerliyya. Some unidentified Druzes
2
came to the help of the Yerliyya. This action on the part of the Druses
causes no surprise because earlier the Druze Talhuqs gave asylum to some
3
fugitive zorab, and took part with them in the invasion of Damascus. The
shops of Damascus closed, and the ‘Amara quarter, near the citadel, where
many Kapi Kulus lived, was sacked by the Yerliyya^ in repx*isal for an attack
5
on their Darwishiyya quarter. A diwan was summoned by the notables which
decreed the expulsion of the Kurd, together with other aliens, from the city.
6
Those who were expelled committed many atrocities in the countryside.
In spite of a series of earth tremors in Damascus, which started on
7.22 Dhu *1-Hijja 1170/7 September 1757, and of the appalling news about the 
disastrous attack on the .iarda and the Pilgrimage, fighting between the Yer-
-^ Budayri, ff. 47b, 4$a.
I^bid., f. 48a; cf. Shihab, Lubnan, I, 45j; _Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 4& (1954) 
p., 683 described these Druzes ap Tmin ahali jabal al-shuf * .
^See above p.£<2*7* B^arik, 45. B^udayri, f. 48a.
6Ibid., f, 48b. 7Ibid., f. 4Sa; Muradi, III, 61.
2 t~ )
( i
11wa and the Kapi Kulus continued intermittently. The Kapi Kulus living
outside the citadel were forced to take refuge in it, and the Yerliyya domin-'
1
ated the rest of the city,
The attack on the tarda and the Pilgrimage.
On 27 Dhu *l-Hijja 1170/12 September 1757 news arrived in Damascus of
an attack on the jarda by the Sakhr Beduin, on 20 Dhu ?l-gijja, in a place be-
_ _ 2  _
tween Qatrana and Ma*an. The commander of the jarda, Musa Kahya, governor
of Sidon, was badly injured, and died a week later, A second .iarda was dis- 
patched from Damascus but its commander panicked at the news of an impending 
attack by the Beduin, and did not proceed further than Balqa* On the arri­
val of the Pilgrimage at Tabuk, its commander, IJusayn Pasha, learned of the 
intention of the Sakhr1s chief Qa*dan a1-Fa?is to attack it. He tried to buy 
him off but failed. Pressed by hunger and frustration at the absence of the 
iarda, the Pilgrimage moved on and was consequently attacked in force by the 
Sakhr in a place between Tabuk and Dhat Kaj j. Muhammad Adib gave the name 
of this place as manzal Qa? al-Basit or al-Saghir A  Many pilgrims were 
killed and many more died later as a result of the misery that befell them*
5
Among the dead was a sister of the Sultan,
Estimates of the size of the Pilgrimage and of the number of casualties
6and of attackers varied considerably. But there is no mistaking the volume
“j m
Barik, 45* 49; Budayri, ff. 49a, 50a; al-Qari, SO,
B^arik, 45• Budayri, f. 4&b$ al-Qari, 79.
B^udayri, ff. 43b, 49a; al-Qari, 30* A.N.B1 1033s Sidon, 16,7,63 (Bulletin), 
^Muhammad Adib, 49, 50; see Appendix^£ 4/f.
^Budayri, f. 50a; Muradi, III, 132-3; il.N,B^  37s Aleppo, 24*12,57.
S^ee above p. 42.
278
of tnis calamity and the consternation it caused,, particularly in Damascus
and Istanbul which were as much indignant as aggrieved. Is soon as the news
of the attack on the Pilgrimage reached Damascus on 17 Safar 1171/31 October
1757, a crowd started stoning the headquarters of the governor because the
mutasallim, Husayn Agha, did not go to the rescue in time. However, a re-
*
lief party, which included the mu a 11 inn left Damascus on 21 Safar to sal­
vage what remained of the Pilgrimage. Husayn Pasha managed to escape to 
Gaza, and he never returned to Damascus as governor. The Mahmil, which was 
taken by the Beduin, was later ransomed and brought to Damascus in a shabby 
condition.'*'
An investigation of the causes of the attack.
It was not unusual for the Beduin to attack the Pilgrimage, But this 
attack was carefully planned because the Beduin isolated the Pilgrimage by 
first attacking the .iarda. The Sakhr were designated as the authors of this 
act. Other tribes such as the Sardiyya, the Bani Iiulayb and the Ban! ‘Aqil,
For further details on the attack see, Budayri, ff. 48b-50a; Barik, 45-7; 
al-Qari, 79-81$ Muradi II, 61, 62; PHD, S„P. 97/39: Istanbul, 3.12,57,. Is tan- 
bul, 23.12.57; A.N.B 435: Istanbul, 26.11.57; Porter, Observations. 25-9; 
Volney, 316-7; Mariti, III, 117-120: Hammer, XVI, 15-7. The statement by tb 
last that the attackers were the Ilarb Beduin is erroneous. Apart from the 
fact that no other source agreed with him, he himself refuted this statement 
when he mentioned on p. 33 that the Sakhr with their chief Qacdan al-Fa?is 
were responsible for the attack. It is significant that not all the Leban­
ese chroniclers who were near-contemporary to the event mentioned the attack 
on the Pilgrimage, Munayyir, al-^ashriq, 48_(l954)> 682 seems to^have been 
the only exception. Again, of the two gabbaghs, only M. al-Sabbagh, the 
less reliable, mentioned this event, see pp. 75-80, in which Zahir was im­
plicated.
279
who seem to have been related to the Sakhr, were alleged to have taken part 
2
in the attack. Ostensibly, the reason for the attack was the reluctance of 
Husayn Pasha to make the customary payment (parr) to the Sakhr and probably 
to those of their allies who used to receive it regularly.^ When he foresaw 
that the danger of being attacked was imminent, he tried unsuccessfully, at 
the last moment, to buy them off A  It is stated that the Sakhr were deter­
mined to attack in revenge for their suoersession as conductors of the Pil-
5
grimage. Apart from the prestige of this function, it was a source of Income
6as well. With the advance of thecAnaza into Syria early in the 18th century,
7they took part In the transport of the Pilgrimage, and thus became rivals to
the Sakhr. Ascad Pasha, as already pointed out,^ had tightened his hold over
the small tribes while he compromised with the strong ones. This made the
small tribes await the right opportunity to react. They may also have been
Influenced by the belligerent attitude of the Harb who the year before had
9
besieged Medina, and had been bought off by As* ad Pasha.
The Beduin along the Pilgrimage route had suffered from natural cala­
mities in the year which preceded the attack. The excessive heat towards the 
end of 1169/August 1756, particularly in the region of Abar* al-Ghanam,^
kalabala, II, 509, III, 493; of.SSatzen, 237, 288; Budayri, ff. 16a, 41b.
M. al-Sabbagh, 78, 79; of. Barik, 45-6; al-Qari, 80.
3M. al-^abbigh, 75-8; PRO, S.P. 97/39; Istanbul, 3.12.57; cf. Seetzen, 288;
see above p./a#,
^Barik, 5 al-Qari, 8 0. P^RO, S.P. 97/39s Istanbul, 23.12,57.
6See above p. 7Cf. Suwaydi, f. 114b; see above p.^n*?See above p.
9See above p. Zfo, 10See Appendix
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1
caused several casualties among them and a decrease in the number of camels.
A severe frost in the winter of 1170/1756-7 affected the flocks and caused
2mortality among the Beduin. These calamities may not have directly affected
the Sakhr, but their impact on other neighbouring tribes must have caused a
dislocation in the economy of the desert. The Pilgrimage was on its way back
carrying goods which seem to have made the attack more tempting. In fact all
3
the goods were plundered. Furthermore, the fact that the attack took place 
in autumn, in which season the powerful eAnaza usually withdrew from their ad­
vanced penetration in the direction of a region extending between Aleppo and 
Hadiyya into the interior is important.^ This not only offered more breath­
ing space to the smaller semi-settled tribes on the periphery of the culti­
vated regions such as the Sakhr. but enabled them as well to manoeuvre more 
freely.
The administrative career of the commander of the Pilgrimage, Husayn 
Pasha b. Makki, should be taken into account. Save for a short period when 
he became governor of the province of Jerusalem, Husayn Pasha was a deputy- 
governor of Gaza and Ramie, and, as such, subordinate to the governor of Dam­
ascus. In 1169/1 7 5 5 -6  he was granted two tugs on the occasion of his ap-
pointment to the province of Jerusalem,  ^and about a year later he was pro-
—  6mo ted to the rank of wazir and appointed to Damascus. But he proved, in-
7
capable of discharging the duties of this office. The fapt that the regions
“^Budayri, f. 45b. ^Ibid,, f. 46a.
3Ibid., f.. 49a: Barik, 4 6; al-Qari, BO; M. al-§abbagh, 78.
4-Cf. Seetzen, 282. M^uradi, II, 61.
6PR0, S.P. 97/398 Istanbul, 3.12.57; see above p. 4 *4',
/sf. MuradT, II, 61.
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he had governed before his appointment to Damascus were within the range of 
the Sakhr seem to have made him acquainted with’ the Sakhr long before the 
attack on the Pilgrimage. Nothing is more illustrative of the ill-feelings 
that existed between him and his neighbours than his expressed determination,
after his appointment to Damascus, to resume possession of the regions whose
— — . 1 ~
iltizam was usurped by Zahir al-*Umar. This being the case Zahir might, as
2
has been alleged, have encouraged the Beduin to attack the Pilgrimage. In 
fact, the Beduin sold almost all their booty to Zahir/ The allegation can, 
however, be neither substantiated nor rejected.
The connection between As*ad Pasha1s death and the attack 
on the Pilgrimage.
It has been alleged that Ascad Pasha encouraged the Beduin to attack 
the Pilgrimage, and that he was put to death and his property confiscated as 
a result of his complicity/1' A recapitulation of events is illuminating at 
this stage. Between roughly 20 Dhu ?1-Hijja 1170/5 September 1757 and 10 
Safar 1171/24 October 1757, the .iarda and the Pilgrimage were at tacked. Around 
11 Muharrum 1171/25 September 1757, it was known in Aleppo that Ascad Pasha
was deposed from its governorship for the second time/ Around the middle
C fy ~  —  6of October 1757 As ad Pasha left Aleppo for his new governorship of Siwas.
eA. al-Sabbagh. ff. 10a, 10b, al-Sabbagh, 79, 80.
^Ibid.; Yanni, 322.
■Wrlk, 59; Tabtakh, III, 335; A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 19.10.58; Hammer, XVI,
17i Volney, 317, besides others who copied them.
5A A b 37: Aleppo, 7.10.57; Tabbikh, III, 335.
^.N.B1 87: Aleppo, 24.12.57.
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In the second half of March 175$ orders were sent to Siwas for his ar­
rest and exile to Grete on charges of complicity in the attack on the Pil­
grimage. On 5 Shac ban 1171/14 April 1758 he was killed while on his way to
2 oexile, and his head was sent to Istanbul.5 News of his death spread in
Syria towards the end of April 1758, and immediately followed the confis­
cation of his property.^
Of the two contemporary Damascene chroniclers, BarIk mentioned that
the execution of Asead Pasha was the result of his complicity with the Bed- 
5
uin* Budayri, on the other hand, mentioned no accusation; he may have 
heard and tacitly rejected it. Barik simply related what was reported.
Barik always drew ethical conclusions, and in this case the accusation pro­
vided the missing link for interpreting the calamity that befell Ascad 
Pasha. Outside Damascus the contemporary Aleppine chronicler Ibn Miro men­
tioned the accusation.^
The jarda was attacked on 20 Dhu Sl-Hijja 1170/5 September 1757, be­
fore Assad Pasha received the news of his second deposition from Aleppo. It 
could be argued that he might have learned of his deposition long before news 
of it reached Aleppo, probably before the attack on the .jarda took place, 
and that he Incited the Beduin well in time, ^hile this is mere conjecture, 
it would not have been easy for As£ad Pasha to incite the Beduin at such
Tabbikh, III, 335; PRO, S.P. 97/4-0: Istanbul, 17.4-.53.
O 1
TCabbakh , III, 335, gave the place of his death as Ankara; A.N.B 88: Al­
eppo, 1.5.58, states that he was killed near Smyrna.
3
PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 3.5.58. 
tl.N.B1 83: Aleppo, 1.5.58, Aleppo, 31.5.58; Budayri, f. 51b; Barik, 59. 
Barik, 59. 6ICurd ‘All, II, 292.
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short notice, furthermore, what purpose would this incitement serve? If 
As£ad Pasha had thought of exerting pressure at Istanbul to retain Aleppo, 
it would have been beneficial for him to resort to more immediate means such 
as buying off his deposition or fomenting a revolt in Aleppo, as he was ad- 
vised by his friends to do. Furthermore, during his governorship of Damascus 
As6ad Pasha was not on friendly terms with the Sakhr and other small tribes,
i
and he suspended the customary payment made to them on the occasion of the 
1
Pilgrimage. Also, to incite the Beduin to attack the Pilgrimage was in­
compatible with Ascad Pasha's administrative career. After his second de­
position from Aleppo, he had not opposed the orders of the Sultan at a time 
when he could have offered more than a token resistance. Certainly the 
calamity that befell the Pilgrimage was as much a setback to Husayn Pasha 
as it was indirectly beneficial to Asead Pasha. For fourteen years, before 
this attack, Ascad Pasha had almost always ensured the security of the Pil­
grimage by force, money and diplomacy. This stands in glaring contrast to 
its unfortunate lot under his successor and focuses admiration more sharply 
on the past record of Ascad Pasha.. But it is doubtful if this could have 
raaterizlied to his benefit in Istanbul. The authorities there reacted 
otherwise and condemned Ascad Pasha to death.
There were, rather, other causes which brought about the death of
Ascad Pasha. On 16 Safar 1171/30 October 1757 the death of Sultan cUthman 
III was announced, and his brother. Mustafa III, was proclaimed Sultan.?
P^orter, Observations, 26; see above p. if'*?,
^Radcliffe papers, 6645/3: Aleppo, 31.3.56.
%>R0, S.P. 97/39t Istanbul, 20.10.57, Istanbul, 30.10.57, Istanbul, 17.11,5 
S.F. 105A£4: Aleppo, 3OJU0.57; Hammer*. XV, 307-9; J.H.Kramer, E.I. 1st ec 
s.v. gOilman III; Budayri, f. 50a; Barik, 49.
7
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The accession of the new Sultan entailed great changes among officials both 
in Istanbul and in the provinces. On 24 Safar 1171/7 November 1757, only 
eight days after the accession of Sultan Mustafa III, the powerful Kizlar 
Agha, Ahmad/ftoukouf, was exiled to Rhodes, Of no less Importance was the 
confirmation of the Grand Vezir Raghib Pasha who had assumed his office about
six months before the death of Sultan *Uthman III and held it until he died
, 1  2 
in 1763* The power of the Kizlar Agha was already in decline, and the
initiative was taken now by Raghib Pasha, who was described by Hammer"’ as the 
last Grand Vezir of the Ottoman Empire (of course until the end of the period 
on which he wrote, that is- the beginning of the last quarter of the 18th cen­
tury) to merit the title of 1 GrandXA
News of the attack on the Pilgrimage reached Istanbul shortly after the
— - 5 faccession of Mustafa III. The people therevere already restless at the rise
,j
in the price of bread and the rarity of meat and other necessities. The 
lack of security in the Anatolian countryside and the rapacity of the pro­
vincial governors, besides other reasons, caused thousands of Anatolians to 
swarm into Istanbul. Here they contributed to the heightening'of social 
•%£>, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 17.11.57; Hammer, XVI, 12-15.
H^ammer, XVI, 163. 3XVI, 38-90. 4Cf. Ibid.. XVI, 163-187.
It seems that the news of the attack.reached Istanbul not earlier than the 
latter part of Nov. 1757, cf, A.M.B. 4-35* Istanbul 26.11.-57; PRO, S.P. 
97/39s. Istanbul, 3.12.57; Hammer, XVI, 15, 16 mentions that news of the 
attack on the Pilgrimage reached Istanbul one month before the death of 
Sultan 1 Uthman III. This is erroneous because the latter died on 30 Oct. 
1756/16 Safar 1171, according to Hammer himself, and the attack on the Pil­
grimage took place about a week before. Damascus itself knew of the attack 
on 17 §afar/31 Oct. It is possible, however, that the news of the attack on 
'fcNe .iarda and not the Pilgrimage reached Istanbul one month before his death 
because this attack occurred on 20 Dhu 'l-Hijja 1170/5 Sept. 1757, and this 
allows reasonable time, about 25 days, for the news to reach Istanbul.
2 8  5
tension. There ms nothing particularly new about such a situation except
perhaps the rising crescendo of public dissatisfaction and the equally high
expectations of the people after the accession of the new Sultan. On top of
this came the disquieting news of the attack on the Pilgrimage. Many goods
2carried by the Pilgrimage and destined for Istanbul were lost. Of more im­
portance was the religious implication of the attack and the arrival of its 
news at an awkward time. Certain sacred relics awaited from Mecca, to be 
displayed on the occasion of the mawlid (the Prophet’s nativity) on 12 Rabi4 
II/24 December, did not arrive, and this aroused the frenzy of the populace. 
The new Sultan could not disregard the growing discontent. The people had to
be appeased. Many changes of officials were made, and continuous diwans
3
and consultations were held. The Sultan ordered an amnesty for the persons 
imprisoned on account of debt.  ^ However, the Kizlar Agha, Aboukouf, was 
the first to pay for the disaster that befell the Pilgrimage. On 15 Rabi4 
I 1171/27 November 1757 he was killed and his head was exhibited to the 
people in front of the seraglio (the Sultan1s residence) with an inscription 
asserting that Vie was the cause of the ruin of the Pilgrimage. He was ac­
cused of having caused, through venality,.. the deposition of the strong gov- 
ernor of Damascus, As4ad Pasha, and the appointment of his protege Husayn 
Pasha who was an obscure man neither loved nor feared by the Beduin . The 
sentence was legitimised by a fatwa issued in a diwan specially summoned by 
the Sultan to discuss the affairs of the Pilgrimage.^
1PBD, S.P. 97/391 Istanbul, 16.6.57. 2PRO, S.P. 97/39! Istanbul, 23.12.57.
'IPB0, S.P. 97/39s Istanbul, 3.12.57, Istanbul, 22.12.57; PRO, S.P. 97/40:
Istanbul, 16.1.5^3 Porter, Observations, 27-9.
'^A.N.B^  435: Istanbul, 26.11.57.
5Ibid. PROS S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 3.12.57: Porter, Observationsr 25-8*
' ________________  Hammery AV1, 15-7 .♦ -
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It seems rather surprising that Husayn Pasha b. MakldL, whose death
was expected by foreign observers in Istanbul for his failure to ensure the
1security of the Pilgrimage, should remain at large, and indeed be offered
the standards of the time such an attitude in the authorities of Istanbul 
was not surprising because expediency and vengeance were dominant. The Kialar 
Agha had been deposed on 24 Safar/7 November, most probably before the news 
of the attack on the Pilgrimage had reached Istanbul, and anyway his deposi- 
tion came primarily as a result of the changes that took place after the ac­
cession of the Sultan. Baghib Pasha, the Grand Veair, was determined on a 
bid for power. The deposition of his strong rival, the Kialar Agha, thus 
becomes understandable. There were rumours at the time, that the Kialar
3Agha was arrested after large amounts of money had been found with him. It 
should be emphasised here that his deposition was followed by his exile, 
while his arrest followed later, when the authorities intended to confiscate 
his property. This took place before the affair of the Pilgrimage was seri­
ously discussed.^ The accusation of having been responsible for the dis­
aster of the Pilgrimage was a convenient way if not of justifying his death 
to the public, at least of finding a scapegoat.
As;ad Pasha did not profit from the fall of the Kialar Agha. Raghib
5Pasha, who was a declared enemy of his, had his authority very much enhanced 
at the time. To state in the accusation against the Kialar Agha that through
2other governorships later, while the Kialar Agha paid with his head. By
bRO, S.P. 97/395 Istanbul, 23.12.57.
3
PR0? S.P, 97/39: Istanbul, 17.11.37.
2,'See below p.
^Radcliffe papers, 6645/3: Aleppo, 31.3.56; see above
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his venality As4ad Pasha was removed from Damascus, suggests that the de­
position of As6ad Pasha was regretted. The accusation, however, was no 
more than a pretext to get rid of the Kialar Agha* and does not necessarily 
imply that As* ad Pasha was at all favoured at Istanbul. The demonstrations 
which the Aleppines had staged In protest against the first deposition of 
As* ad Pasha from Aleppo could not be viewed with indifference, particularly 
by Baghib Pasha. A second and successful attempt to denose him was made 
three months later. Thus the enemies of As* ad Fas ha had their own way.
Six years after the attack on the Pilgrimage a French source In Sidon state
,* * t \
that *le detroussement de cette caravane importante et venerable a tous leq 
turcs, donna occasion aux ennemies d'Essad Pacha de I'accusefc d'en etre 
la cause1
Disposing of a person to obtain his money was not'an unusuaj- practice 
in the Ottoman Empire. A newly-appointed Sultan particularly needed money.
On the occasion of his accession, Mustafa III doubled the pay of the janis-
2 -saries. In spite of the economizing measures taken by Baghib Pas ha, such
as reducing the expenses of the Sultan1s household and diverting the money
3
to public services - a move which further weakened the influence of the 
Kizlar Agha - there was in 175& a great scarcity of provisions in Istanbul 
as in other parts of the Empire. The populace in Istanbul stormed the bak­
ers1 shoos and became almost mutinous.^ Any source of money was therefore
^A.N.B^ 1033* Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
h ’RO, S.P. 97/39: Istanbul, 17.11.57.
3PR0, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 4.1.58.
hbid.. Istanbul, 16.2.58, Istanbul, 17.3.58, Istanbul, 3.5.58, 
Istanbul, 17.5-5&.
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welcome to the Sultan, and no re important, any further whipping up or tne 
latent memory of the unfortunate Pilgrimage would be immediately rewarding, 
in the sense that the Sultan would appear as still concerned about this 
affair.
The desire to confiscate As4ad Pasha*s property was attested by a
1
foreign observer in Istanbul. In fact, before As(ad Pasha*s death on 5 
Sha6ban/14 April, an envoy of the Sultan left Aleppo on 1 April 1758 on his 
way to Hamah to arrest the agent of As4ad Pasha there and confiscate his
9 c —  3property.^ The wealth of As ad Pasha which was confiscated from Hamah and
/ i
Damascus prompted the Sultan, among other things, to revalue the currency.'
The occasion of the death of As4 ad Pasha was also utilized by the Sul­
tan to confiscate the property of some merchants, with whom As4ad Pasha had I
6 7 I
relations, at Aleppo and possibly at Damascus. But there is no suggestion 
that those merchants were in collusion with the Beduin.
It is significant that the tfAzm governors were not held collectively 
responsible. Of the two brothers of Astfad Pasha, Saed al-Din Pasha and
PRO, S.P. 97/4.0: Istanbul, 17.4-.53. 
l.U.B 88: Aleppo, 1.5.58. 3Ibid
Budayri, f. 51b; Barik, 59, 60. The total amount of cash confiscated was
estimated by one source (PRO, S.P. 97/40? Istanbul, 16.8.58) as above
50.000 purses* Another source (A*N.B 88: Aleppo, 31.5.58) put it at
70.000 nurses, and still another (BariR, 60) at 100,000 purses. When this 
wealth was transferred to Istanbul, eyery governor along the way was in 
structed to ensure its safetjr within the limits of his orovince, see 
A.N.B 88: Aleppo, 11.12.58.
5PR0, S.P. 97/4.0: Istanbul, 14..8 .58; cf. Hammer, XVI, 25, 26, n.l.
A 1 
A.N.B 88: Aleppo 4.11-58.
S^ee Muradi, IV, 209 , 210 for the arrest of eAbd al-Karim al-Safajalani. 
Members of this family were noted merchants in Damascus, see above
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Mustafa Pasha, only the last was discredited and deprived of his tugs at
the time, although it is not clear that he was accused of complicity, and,
1besides, there is no evidence that his wealth was confiscated. Sa6d al- 
Din Pasha, who was governor of Sidon at the time, was not disgraced,^ but
Q
he took precautionary measures to ensure his security.
As for Husayn Pasha, he was back in favour four years later, and in
1762 he was appointed governor of Marcash.^ He remained in this office for 
$
about one year, after which he returned to his native place, Gaza. Event­
ually he was killed in a fight with the Sakhr and the Wahidat Beduin on
-  6 
25 Rabic I 1197/30 March 1783.
tt Restoration of Order by ‘A M  Allah Basha Chata.ii.
In the assembly convoked by Sultan Mustafa III to deliberate on the
affairs of the Pilgrimage, fiAbd Allah Pasha Chata.ii was appointed governor
8 9of Damascus. He assumed his governorship on 27 Babi II 1171/S January 175^
^A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
2A.R.B=L 1032: Sidon, 8.4.58.
1033: Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
/ibid.; A.H.ll 88: Aleppo, 3.9.62; Muradi, II, 62.
/a.N.B^ 89: Aleppo, 17.1.645 MuradT, II, 62. M^uradi, II, 62.
^Given sometimes as eAbdi (al-Qari, Si, S3) which seems to have been a 
shortened form of sAbd Allah.
H^ammer, XVI, 16, 17.
9The date on which he arrived varied_among the chroniclers. Two agreed on 
the above one (al-Qari, Si, and Barik, 49) although the last wrongly gave 
the date of 27.12.57 as equivalent. Budayri, f. 5>0a, gave the date as 
2S Rabic II. Two other sources, Dhik'r man tawalla, f. 115a, and Risala, 
f. 15a, gave it as IS Rabic II. ”
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4Abd Allah Pasha b. Ibrabim was born in the city of Jarmak (written 
also Jarmaka), in the province of Diyar Baler, in 1115/1703-4^  He distin­
guished himself in the Ottoman army in the wars against Nadir Shah and else- 
2where, and acquired the title of Ohataji (leader of the vanguard) for his
3
bravery. He was appointed to various governorships, and before his appoint 
ment to Damascus he was governor of Aleppo.4' His appointment to Damascus 
was due largely to his ability.to restore order and ensure the safety of
5 ~the Pilgrimage. cAbd Allah Pasha lived up to this expectation. His entry
6into Damascus was impressive militarily. Forty bayraqs of Dalatiyya. fifty 
bayraqs of Lawand and twenty bayraqs of Arna*ut (Albanians) accompanied him. 
Soon he was confronted with two immediate tasks! the elimination of the 
disorderly troops in Damascus and the pacification of the Pilgrimage route.
\al~Wakil, Tarwih, f. 5b; Muradi, III, 81.
2 -al-Wakil, ff. 59-13a; Volney, 317-9 substantiates this general picture, 
but the particulars he gave are doubtful.
3 4 $
Hammer, XVI, 16, translated the term as ’general des tirailleurs1,' al-
Wakil, f. 10b, explained the term chata.ii as mighwar (he who raids).
^al-Wakil, f, 12a; Muradi, III, 81, mentions that he was appointed to Alepp 
In Muharram 1172/Sept.-Oct.- 1758 before his appointment to Damascus.. 
Tabbakh, III, 337 and K, al-Ghazzi,-III, 301 copied him. This date Is errc 
neous because 6Abd Allah Pasha succeeded Asead Pasha In Aleppo. On 10 
Eabic II 1171/22 December 1757 sAbd Allah Pasha left Aleppo for Damascus, 
see A.N.B1 87s Aleppo, 24..12.57.
hl-Wakil, ff. 14a-14b, 15b, 16S; Muradi, Ma^in-gth, f. 39b.
6 _
Literally bayraq means standard. According to Ibn Kinan, I, f. 72b, writ­
ing in the first half of the 18th century, the bayraq consisted of about 
fifty persons. On this basis, the total number of the troops that accom­
panied cAbd Allah Pasha amounted to about 6500. This is somewhat substant:. 
ated by another source* After the deposition of Abdullah Pasha from Dam­
ascus he was reported, on his arrival to Aleppo, to have with him from sev­
en to eight thousand troops, see A.N.B'*' 88s Aleppo, 1.3.60. Volney, writing 
in the last quarter of the 18th century, states, however, that the bayraQ 
(drapeau) consisted of ten men. His estimate seems to have been true of 
his time because it is substantiated by a contemporary French source, see
(cont.)
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In the interregnum between the flight of Husayn Pasha to Gaza and 
the arrival of sAbd Allah Pasha , the Kapi Kulus clashed anew with the Yer­
liyya on 5 Kabi* II 1171/17 December 1757, undeterred by the surrounding 
misery and grief that resulted from the attack on the Pilgrimage.^ cAbd 
Allah Pasha tried to purge the ranks of the Yerliyya of the insubordinate
members. Aware of this impending danger, the Yerliyya began to marshal
2their forces and defy the governor. He asked to meet a group of them, and 
on their refusal, he ordered the inhabitants of the quarters where they 
lived to vacate their houses. He then summoned a dlwan, probably to make 
the notables share in the responsibility for his action. At the head of 
his troops, cAbd Allah Pasha marched against the Yerliyya who gathered in 
the Maydan. The Yerliyya suffered heavy casualties, and many were cap­
tured. Those of them who fled into the countryside were chased by his 
troops. Although cAbd. Allah Pasha prevented looting, many atrocities were 
committed. The contemporary chronicler, perhaps using a cliche, considered.
— 3the event the worst since that of Timur.
This was the second suppression of the Yerliyya in a relatively 
short time.^ It is true that there were many zorab among their ranks, but 
it is important to notice that very often the disciplining of the zorab 
was used as a pretext for disciplining the whole corps. This created a
(cont.) A.N.B1 1036; Sidon, 28.2.74 (Bulletin) which mentions 1un secours 
de '150 bannieres (environs 1500 hommes)1. Volney may have based his in­
formation on this French source.
VBudayri, f. 50a.
1BudayrI, f. 50a; Barik, 4-9. 2Budayri, f. 50b.
3 Ibid., ff. 50b, j?la; Barik, 50, 51,* Muradi, Matmah, f. 33b; cf. Kurd eAli 
II, 296-7; Shihab, Lubnan. I, 45; Shihab, Nu.zha,HIS. Camb. f. 24a; 
Munayyir, a1-Mashriq, IB (1954)y 682,
^See above pp !L\2$.
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feeling of solidarity among its members. Much depends, however, on know­
ing why a yerli was regarded as a zorba. and by whom he was so regarded* 
Very often the Damascene power groups, notably the Yerliyya. the Ashraf 
and the *Ulama? , concerted action against a common enemy such as an offen­
sive governor, a mercenary, or a regular alien military group. Given the 
self-assertion that developed among the Damascenes and particularly the 
Yerliyya * it was not unusual for some of the latter to be corrupted and to 
get out of control. However, if pile looks at the actions of the zorab and 
tbe Yerliyya in general from the point of view of the Damascenes, it becomes 
apparent that the Yerliyya were defending the interests of the Damascenes 
against alien groups. Seen from the point of view of the Ottoman authori­
ties, the Yerliyya were considered unruly and insubordinate. It is true 
that their excesses affected,not unnaturally, some Damascenes. But the vol­
ume of their danger to the Damascenes was in no way comparable to the dan­
ger of the mercenary troops. It is significant in this respect that the
term zorba was borrowed by the Arab chroniclers from Turkish. Muradi re-
1
ferred to the zorab as rn*ac- (rabble) - a designation which cut across
2military and civilians alike. However, the terms zorab and ru a were 
usually dropped in the writings of the Damascene chroniclers when referring
to a joint Damascene action against an alien group. Instead,these chroni- 
usually _ _
clers/used the term abna* al-Sham or Dimashq. The suppression of the Yer­
liyya implied, therefore, a weakening of the Damascenes1 self-assertion and
ISilk. II, 61, Matmah, ff. 38b, 39b; cf. al-Wakil, ff. Hb, 15a.
2See above p.
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consequently of their ability to guard against extortion. It is no wonder
that the contemporary Damascene chronicler had referred to 6&bd Allah on the
occasion of his recompense by the Sultan for having suppressed the Yerliyya as
1
haV-iag conquered (fatah) Damascus. The Arabic connotation of the term is 
stronger than its English translation because It conveys the meaning of a fresh 
Ottoman conquest, In other words the re-establishment of Ottoman authority 
against Damascene predominance.
After the Yerliyya were subdued, the Damascenes were subjected to a ser­
ies of molestations. Some of the governor's troops practised extortions on 
them both when they were on service and after they were discharged. The vil­
lages in the vicinity of Damascus suffered most from the insubordination of
2 ~ 
these troops. On more than one occasion #Abd Allah Pasha and his entourage
levied money from the Damascenes.3 Yet he tried to relieve them by forcefully 
curbing the lawlessness of his troops/* Furthermore, he paid his troops with ■ 
a certain kind of coin received from Istanbul, which was not at that time cur- i 
rent in Damascus. To avoid being compelled to accept it, the Damascenes closed 
their shops until cAbd Allah Pasha went on the dawra-? A shortage of food sup­
plies affected Damascus at the time, and prices went up, Crowds gathered out­
side the bakers' shops and beggars increased considerably.  ^The shortage seems
to have been due largely to a widespread bad harvest which caused famine in
_  -  —  —  —
Bar lie, 52. Budayri, f. 51a.
o _ L  —
Ibid., f. 5lb5 Barik, 52. Budayri, f. 51a.
B^arfk, 52, 53.
^Ibid., 52. 53, 53; Budayri (ff. 51a, 51b) described the miserable state of 
theTcrowd outside the_bakers' shops in these words, tasma* lahum huka? wa- 
na hib Ju£a11i6 a1-qulub wa71-akbad.
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-  1 
such places as Mosul, Diyar Bakr and as far as Istanbul. The disastrous
blow dealt to the Pilgrimage a few months earlier, apart from causing the lc
of many goods, discouraged many persons from going on the Pilgrimage the fol
2
lowing year, and this affected the economy of Damascus. On the other hand
the trade of Sidon, to which the trade of Damascus was linked in many ways,
was suffering a relapse^oartly because of the extortions of the governor,
_ 3
Sa(d al-Din Pasha al-'A^ m, partly because of the interruption of French tra
in the Mediterranean owing to the Seven years’ War^ (1756-63) and partly als
because of a decrease in the price of local commodities in Marseille.
With the Yerliyya suppressed and the economic situation looming over
them, the Damascenes could do nothing to check the excesses of 4Abd Allah
Fasba and his troops. They tried on one occasion to ward off by force the
6evils of his troops but failed. The Damascenes lacked a leader. The *Ulama
were unable to give them a lead because they x^ ere not spared the molestation
— 7 -
of 4Abd Allah Pasha and. many were arrested by him. He exiled Naqib al-Ashrs
g — ^
Hamza Efendi, for an unknown reason, and had him succeeded by illi nfendi al -
4 A; j la nl. ^ On the other hand, 4 Abd Allah Pasha was not without admirers among
the GUlama? . He was a man of letters'^  and enjoyed the company of many liter
/pRO, S*P* 97/4-0s Istanbul, 16,2.53; Barik, ; 53,59.
■h.N.B1 38: Aleppo, 1.5.53. ^A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 18.1.59.
hbld.. Sidon, 10.3.59.
^Radcliffe papers, 6645/7? Aleppo, 2.2.59; Masson, 512, 513, 513, 519.
ry O _
^Budayri, f, 51a. Muradi, Matmah, f. 33b. Budayri, f.51a.
% ‘luradT, III, 206-3.
10He composed a work entitled Anhar al-Jinan fi ay al-Qur*an, Muradi, I, 93; 
Hammer, XVI, 57.
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i
ary figures in Damascus, some of whom dedicated many poems in his praise.
2
The safety lie ensured for the Pilgrimage raised his credit'with the religious
people. His policy of not alienating all the Damascenes made him lend his ear
to the advice of ‘Ali al-Muradi who was most outspoken in reprimanding him for
3
his injustice and that of his soldiery.
. 4
Abd Allah Pasha had a mandate from the Sultan to do what he pleased.
Stringent security measures were taken by him to keep things under control.
The Tufenqjis kept a close watch in Damascus during the night, and 4Abd Allah
Pasha frequently made inspection tours incognito. There was also much spying
on the people. The judge acted as muhtasib and toured the market, punishing
6those whose weights were defective, and recompensing the honest. Such meas-
7
ures helped to stamp out corruption. But, with the Damascenes subdued, a
. _  8
favoured group, known as the 4awaniyya. gathered, around the governor and
9 _
practised mischief blatantly, as in the governorship of 4Utliman Pasha Abu
10
Tawq.
Towards the end of his governorship, Damascus suffered from a series of
earthquakes. Already on 14 Dhu *1-Hijja 1170/30 August 1757, severe tremors
11
load shaken the city. But these were in no way comparable to the later
/?ee Muradi, I, 93; Matmah , f. 73b; al-Wakil, ff. 59a, 62b, 64a.
2See below p.
%uradT, Matmah, ff. 38b, 39b, 40a, cf .E£5W5bT31b. V  YBudayi’W  JW 5.3®*
B^arik, 66; of. Budayri, £„ 52a; Muwaqqi*, al-Barq, f. 251a.
Budayri, f. 52a. 7lbid. See above p. lo^ n-l-
nB^arTk, 61. ^See above Budayri, f* 43a.
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earthquake which occurred on Tuesday 8 Rabi* I 1173/30 October, 1759. It 
was followed by another severe earthquake on Sunday night 5-6 Rablc 11/26-27 
November, of the same year. The resulting damage was startling. Several 
casualties occurred, and many buildings collapsed. The Umayyad Mosque was 
badly damaged. The calamity was not restricted to Damascus. The whole re­
gion extending between Aleppo and Antioch in the north and - i Arish in the 
south, suffered in varying degrees. Damascus, however, seems to have been
most affected.-^  *Abd Allah Pasha dealt severely with the malefactors who
2
took advantage of the situation.
cAbd Allah Fastens forceful policy outside Damscus. !
After pacifying Damascus, fiAbd Allah Pasha left for the dawra. He tried 
to make his tour look as impressive militarily as his entry to Damascus had 
been. Two big guns which bad, for many years, flanked the gate of the cita­
del^  were taken with him. Gunsof another kind, known as shawahi which pro-
< '■L'iUH.H i . ... I. i ^
vided more flexibility in firing by turning to the sides, were adjusted to
camels1 backsWhile on the dawra. eAbd Allah Pasha occupied the fortress
5of al-Karak and fortified it. Al-Karak, like the nearby al-Shawbak, was
- i
"Por detailed accounts on these earthquakes see; *Zilzal sanat 1173 A.H.1, 
al-Mashriq, 42 (1948) pp. 333-47, edited by Muhammad Ahmad Dahman; see also 
Budayri^ ff. 52b~53a; Barik, 68, ; al-Qari, 82, 83; A.N.B  ^1032; (Des
Jardins de Sevde), 22.12.59, 28.12.59, 4*1-80; 27.3.60 (as is apparent the 
consul took shelter outside Sidon); A.N.Bl 1120: Tripoli, 4 .2.60, Tripoli, 
12.8,60; A.N.B1 88s Aleppo, 11.12.59, Aleppo, 24.12.59, Aleppo, U.1.60;
PRO, S.P. 110/36; Aleppo, 22.12.59; A.N.B1 436; Istanbul, 29.12,59; Hammer, 
XVI, 49, 50.
2Barik, 70. C^f. Egmont and Heyman, II, 253.
B^udayri, ff. 51a, 51h; al-Qari, 82..
a^l-Qari, 82.
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1
under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus. The fortress of al-
Karak was, at the time, in a dilapidated condition and used by the Beduin
2 — hfor shelter. Since it was about three hours walk from Qatrana, near the
place where the jarda and the Pilgrimage were attacked the year before, its 
fortification was of strategic importance. Furthermore, it was in the re­
gion frequented by the Sakhr Beduin. By asserting his authority over it
£ c , -and manning it with Yerliyya, Abd Allah Pasha was taking precautionary 
measures to ward off any future attack on the Pilgrimage by the Sakhr-. By 
sending the Yerliyya to keep watch in it, he was reminding them of their 
official duty,* and this in turn served as a safety valve for their possible 
resurgence and insubordination in Damascus.
It seems that the show of force which cAbd Allah Pasha exhibited on the 
dawra eliminated any chances of possible resistance. No clashes were re­
ported between him and the Druzes or Zahir al^Umar, possibly also because
6 —of the internal preoccupation of the latter. Besides, cAbd Allah Pasha was
not of local origin nor had he occupied any of the local governorships of 
Damascus, Sidon or Tripoli; hence he was not entangled in local rivalries or 
prejudices.
While he was on the dawra, the mutasallim in Damascus, presumably Sulay- 
man Agha, resumed the policy of force initiated by cAbd Allah Pasha. He 
hanged one person, for an unknown reason, and put to death a sharif who was
1 £
Muhammad Adib, 45; Ayn-i Ali, 274*
a^l-WakTl, f. 44a; cf. Muhammad Adib, 45.
%luhammad Adib, 45. a^l-Qari, 82; cf. al-Wakil, f, 44a.
-  6 
5lbn al-Siddiq, f. 29a; see above p. See below pjJ i t ■
7cf. Budayri, f. 52a.
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accused of having fought on the side of the Yerliyya. If the accusation was
untrue, it is illustrative, nevertheless, cf the common interests between the
_
Yerliyya and the Ashraf vis-a-vis the governor.
The second and major taskof £Abd Allah Pasha was to ensure the safety
of the Pilgrimage. On 24. .Ramadan 1171/12 May 1758, he returned from the
dawra, and on 17 Shawwal/2A June, he left with the Pilgrimage accompanied by
1
a large number of soldiers. Shortly before, possibly when he was on the
dawra, sAbd Allah Pasha, dispatched troops against the Sakhr, who were worsted
2in the fighting that took place. This seems to have made them more amenable 
to reason. They were satisfied, at the moment, to present cAbd Allah Pasha 
with a petition asking for their customary §arr. But 4Abd Allah Pasha ig- 
nored their demand. On his arrival at Medina, the Harb asked also for 
their sarr, threatening, otherwise, to block his way to Mecca. Using this 
as a pretext to discipline them, £Abd Allah Pasha attacked the Harb and in­
flicted a heavy defeat on them. Among the dead was *Id, the belligerent 
chief of this tribe. cAbd. Allah Pasha then, with the help of the Sharif of 
Mecca, installed the uncle of cId, Khusac b. Madian as shaykh of the Harb. 
Khuza* was more dedicated to peace and undertook to ensure the safety of the 
Pilgrimage provided the usual §arr were paid. This was granted by cAbd Allah
Pas Via /h The triumph of *Abd Allah Pasha caused much relief. The Medinese
-5scholar Jaefar al-Barzanji wrote a treatise entitled al-Mafh al-faraji
B^udayri, f. 5lb5 Barik, 59} al-Wakil, f. 44*3-*
2al-WaHl, ff. 43b, 44a. Ibid.. f. 44b.
4-Ibid., ff. 45b-50b-: al-%ri, 82; Budayri, f. 52a; Muradi, III, 81; Hammer,
XVI, 32; cf. A.N.B 88; Aleppo, 26.10.58.
K______________________________
"Tor his biography see Muradi, II, 9 .
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T 1fl ? 1-fath al-_. J.ataji, to commemorate this victory. The Saltan also gained
in prestige locally. The assembled muftis of the four Sunni schools in Mecca
decreed that the title of Ghazi should be added henceforth to the Sultan's
2other titles in the Friday prayer.
The Sale hr who had been rebuffed by cAbd Allah Pasha tried to take ven­
geance on the jarda. This was conducted by ‘Abd al~Rahman Pasha, governor
3
of Tripoli, who also refused to pay them the §arr, and eventually came to 
blows with them in the plain of Tab out-K o ur ous i^  (another name for al-Hasa)? 
cAbd Allah Pasha concerted action with ‘Abd al-Rafyman Pasha and defeated the 
Sale hr. ^ Hammer alone mentions the capture and decapitation by ‘Abd Allah 
Pasha of the chiefs of the three tribes of Sale hr, ‘Anaza and Babhan,7
— O
Damascus celebrated the triumph of ‘ Abd Allah Pasha over the Beduin>,,
Its prominent ‘UIamaJ such as Ahmad al-Manini, 4 Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani and
- —■ . 9Sa‘id al~Samman, dedicated many poems to 6Abd Allah Pasha on the occasion.
In addition to ensuring the safety of the Pilgrimage, ‘Abd Allah Pasha de­
corated thei 1-iahmil, which was shabby after having been captured. This also 
earned him credit, particularly among the pious in Damascus.^
M^uradi, III, $2. H^ammer, XVI, 32, 33.
9cf. al-Qari, 82.
'^Hammer, XVI, 33; PRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 17.10.38, Istanbul, 4.11.58; 
A.M.B 88: Aleppo, 28.8.58; cf. al-Wakil, f. 57a.
Kin^j^.f iSitirefprred to P^jRO, S.P. 97/40: Istanbul, 4*H*58.
it as TalSut' Qara§i.
7XVI, 33. Barik, 59.
9al~Wakil, ff. 19b-24a, cf. ff. 57b, 59a, 62b, 64a; cf. Ahmad al-Kaywani, 
Diwan, Damascus, 1301, p. 168,
^al-Wakil, ff. 65a, 65b.
300
On 16 Shawwal 1172/12 June 1755 ? 6 Abd. Allah Pasha commanded the Pil­
grimage for the second year running. Sacd al-Din Pasha al-cAzm, who had
1
been deposed from Sidon in early March of the same year, accompanied the
t  2
Pilgrimage to his new governorship of Jedda. The combined forces of the 
two governors deterred the suppressed Beduin from any intended retaliation.
6Abd Allah Pasba, acting on the orders of the Porte, deposed the Sharif of
_ — 3
Mecca, Musa6 id b. Sa6id, and appointed his brother, ^a6far, in his Diace.
6 Abd Allah Pasha*s deposition was attributed to his deposition of the
Sharif of Mecca, Musa6id b. Sacid.^  This Sharif had many supporters in
Mecca, among whom were the muftis. After the departure of 6Abd Allah Pasha
with the Pilgrimage, Sharif Musa34 regained power and appealed to Istanbul
against his deposition * Tito assemblies were held at the Porte, which con-
— 5firmed him in power and deposed Abd Allah Pasha. It is ironical that this
should have been the main reason for the deposition of 6Abd Allah Pasha be­
cause he was acting on the instructions of the Porte when he deposed Sharif
—  6 _
Musa6id, Apparently, the deposition of 4Abd Allah Pasha served to save the
face of the Porte. But the fact that 6Abd Allah Pasha had won many victories
7
both in Damascus and outside it, and that his personal prestige had grown
1 1
&.N.B 1032s Sidon, 9.3.59? cf. Sidon, 5-4*59.
^Ibid., Sidon, 26.9.59; Budayri, f. 52a; Tabbakh, III, 329.
H^ammer, XVI, 47, 48; Muradi, III, 81; Budayri, f. 52a,_note the discrepancy
in the dating at this juncture, see&feotyw P* fO ? al-JJari, 82, the sequence 
of his events at this point Is erroneous-
f*
Murad!, III, 81. H^ammer, XVI, 47, 48.
6Ibid.
H^is protection of the Pilgrimage was particularly acclaimed, cf. Hammer,
XVI, 57.
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seem to have been further considerations which brought about his deposition. 
His subsequent appointment to the governorship of Diyar Bakr seems to have 
been welcome to c Abd Allah Pasha in the sense that it was his native land, 
and as far as the Sultan was concerned, he might again be of use in the re­
gions which bordered on Persia, where he built up his military career. While 
governor of Diyar Bakr, cAbd Allah Pasha died, probably in the month of Rabic 
II 1174/Nov.-Dec. 1760.
HE h^e Governorship of Muhammad. Pasha Chaliq.
2
Before his entry into Damascus on Monday, 1 Ha jab 1173/18 February 1760,
Muhammad Pasha appointed, on 15 Jumada Il/3 February, Mustafa, Agha of the
3ICapi Kulus, as mutasallim. Muhammad Pasha was governor of Tripoli before 
his appointment to Damascus, and in this capacity he commanded the .jarda in 
the second Pilgrimage of e Abd Allah Pasha ChatajiA
Yerliyya did not cause any trouble after the deposition of ‘Abd 
Allah Pas ha partly because they had not yet recovered from the blow which 
they were dealt by the latter, and partly also because of the disastrous im­
pact of the earthquakes. By contrast, the ICapi Kulus. not having as many 
vested interests as the Yerliyya, seem to have been Idss affected by the 
earthquakes; hence probably their ability to maintain their dominance. It 
is no wonder, therefore, that Muhammad Pasha appointed the agha of the ICapi 
Kulus as mutasallim.
^Hammer, XVI, 57; cf. A.W,B^  88s Aleppo, 2 8.1 .60, Aleppo, 1,3.60; Muradi1s 
statement, II, 81, that ‘Abd Allah Pasha died in Jumada (?) 1174, at the 
earliest, 9th December 1760 is erroneous because news of his death reached 
Aleppo on 4 Dec. 1760, cf. A.N.B1 882 Aleppo,_l8.12.60. It could be, how'- 
ever, that the news reached Damascus in Jumada.
^Budayri, f. 53a; al-Qari, 83. %j-sala, f. 15a; Dhikr man tawalla,f .H5a.
Aa.N.B^ 1120? Tripoli, 4*2.60; A.N.B*^  88; Aleppo, 28.1.60; Hammer, XVI, 4*7? 48.
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The plague which followed the earthquakes confronted the new governor on
his arrival. The first symptoms of the disease in Damascus became apparent in
Jumada II 1173/Jan.-Feb. 1760. It seems that the plague started in Safad,
1
controversial though this remains, and, with the dispersion of its inhabi-
2
tants by the earthquakes, spread to other places. The next city to be at-
3 Atacked was Acre, and from there it spread to Sidon. From the region of Acre
5
it penetrated Damascus. Within a short period it engulfed a region extend-
6ing between Antioch and Smyrna, in the north, and Gaza, in the south. The
earthquakes made conditions favourable to its spread. The degree of havoc
caused by the plague differed from one place to the other, and it seems that
7
Aleppo was slightly affected. Damascus was the worst hit and, according to 
various accounts, about one thousand persons died there every day, probably 
at the peak of the epidemic which seems to have lasted about a week, around
the end of Ramadan 1173/middle of May 1760. The plague lasted for about six
9 -nmonths, two thirds of the term of Muhammad Fasha. Further sporadic outbreaks
occurred in the following year, but were not as serious^? Apart from the
PRO, S.P. 97/41: Istanbul, 18.6.60.
1032: (Des Jardins cle Seyde), 22.12.59.
^Ibid.(Des Jardins de Seyde), 28,12,59.
T^bid. (Des Jardins de Seyde), 4 *1 .6 0. B^arik, 70.
J^-bid.; A.N.B^ 1032s (Des Jardins de Seyde)-, 27.3.60; A..W,B^  1120: Tripoli, 
4.2.60; FRO, S.P. 97/41* Istanbul, 18.6.60, Istanbul, 4-7.60; Mariti, I, 
283-94,
7PR0, S.P.. 110/36: Aleppo, 26.4.60.
a^l-Qari, 83; Budayri1s statement, f. 53b, which implies that about 1000 fun-
~1    _ . _ J_ -O     J- if-v X* J- h  *  a  -i -t-Ti* *4 m  A vi i*i-i-i -1 1—. I r* Vi /-I i—* «"%' >4- In m  *t* /-i
mean
Qaltaqji, Budayri, f. 53b. (cont.)
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plague, a severe frost affected the crops, and prices of foodstuffs increased 
considerably.^
The Sultan shewed much concern about what happened, particularly about
n
the damage that befell the Umayyad Mosque and the citadel. On 22 Rajab 1173/
16 March 1760, a deputation, headed by Mustafa Sabanikh-Zadb and including a
° 3chief architect arrived in Damascus to start reconstruction. The Sultan con­
tributed a large sum of #oney for this purpose,^ £ther sums were assigned in
the wills of deceased persons, the majority of whom seem to have been victims
5
of the plague, for reconstruction. Work continued until.the second year of
£ **"  ^ 6 the governorship of Uthman Pasha.
After one dawra, and one Pilgrimage, both of which went fairly smoothly,
  ry
Muhammad Pasha was deposed from Damascus on 2? Rabie I 1174-/6 November 1760,
8
to the relief of the Damascenes. Apart from his arbitrary rule, the people
9considered his governorship an omen of bad luck.
(cont.) n
9BarTk, 70; A.W.B"1 1032t_Sidon, 16.9.60; PRO, S.P. 110/36: Aleppo, 30.6.60, 
Aleppo, 10.7.60; al-Qiari, 83 states that the plague stayed in Damascus for 
four months.
'-Budayri, f. 54b, cf. Muradi, III, 87.
B^udayri, f. 53b. 2al-Qari, 83.
B^udayri, f. 53b; Muradi, Matma.li, f. 67b; Hammer, XVI, 50.
'^Hammer, XVI, 50. M^uradi, III, 82.
B^udayri, f. 54a; cf. Muradi, Matmah, f. 67b.
^Budayri, f. 54a. B^arik, 71; al-Qari, 83.
$al„Qari, S3.
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Chapter 7
THE GOVERNORSHIP OF ‘UTHMAH PASHA AL-KPRJI, 1760-71.
c
The background of ‘tlthman Pasha and M s  connection with the *Agms. 
vUthman Pasha was appointed to Damascus on 27 Rabl* 11174/6 November 
1760.^ Before he entered it on 3 Jumada I 1174/11 December 176©, 2 he ap­
pointed a certain Sulayman Bey as mutasallim.^
Nothing is known about the early life of ‘Uthroan Pasha b. ‘Abd AliahA
5 *»save that he was of Georgian origin, and a mamluk of As4 ad Pasha al-^A^m,
The term mamluk does not imply here a member of an established power group, 
as was the case in Egypt and in Baghdad at the time. It rather signified a
master-slave relationship. ‘Uthman Pap ha was not the only mamluk of Asead
— ! 6 
Pasha. Other mamluksare known to have been in the service of the latter.
Again, As4 ad Pasha was not the only to have mamluks in his service.
Sulayman Pasha al-^A^m, for example, had at least one mamluk. ^ Nor were the
g „
‘Ai^ ms the only family to have mamluks during this period. The Maydanis who 
■^ Budayri, f. 54a-. %faradT, III, 161; cf. al-Qari, S3.
^Risala. f. 15a; Dhikr man tawalla. f. 115a.
^The ambiguous name ‘Abd Allah (slave of God) was usually used by devshirme 
recruits and Caucasian tribute-children, see P.M.Holt, *The exalted lineage 
of Rijwan Bey*, BSOAB, XXII, 3, 1959, 225. It was very often used to •iden­
tify1 * mamluks wh’ose~ f at he r s were not known or perhaps whose names were em­
barrassingly non-Muslim,particularly after they had acquired a high position 
which necessitated their being known with a matching, albeit ambiguous, Mus­
lim name; cf. Muradi, IV, 245; cf. MufclbbT, III, 299.
^Barik, 71, referred to him as 4Uthman Pasha al-£urjT.
6gee the list of Yerliwa officers on the back of the front cover and in 
f. lb of the MS. of Ibn al-§iddlq.
TBudayrI, f. 7a. aCf. Muradi, IV, 215; Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 96b.
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— 1 were merchants in Damascus had mamluks of their own. A certain Hasan
Efendi al-Daftari (killed in ^ aroah in 1106/169A-5) is stated to have had
•* 2 forty mamluks.
The relationship that existed between such mamluks and their masters did 
not present insurmountable barriers in the face of the prominence of these 
mmluks. Yusuf b* *Abd Allah, for example, who was originally a mamluk of 
the Maydanis, figured among the a*ran of Muradi.3 Sometimes, a mamluk might 
be entrusted with administrative work, depending of course on the status of 
his master. ‘Uthman Pashaf for one, acted as mutasallim for As*ad Pasha in 
garaah,^  presumably during the period when the latter was governor of Damas-
_  5 r _
cus, because Hamah was given to him as malikane. Such mamluks -were admitted 
also into the Yerliwa corps and some of them held high ranks in it. For, 
once they were initiated into public life, it was easy for them to continue 
on their own. Former mamluks of Aswad Pasha figured in the Yerliwa corps 
around 1185/1771-2,^ It should be noted however that not every governor of 
Damascus had mamluks because these were not so much necessitated by his of­
fice as they were basically dependent on his economic and social status. No 
mention has been made of a Damascene governor, at least during the period 
under study, who raised mamluks for military purposes. The private or mer­
cenary troops were quite different in recruitment, organisation and status
"Wadi, IV, 245, 246. ^bid.. II, 31-33.
3Ibid.. IV, 245, 246.
4ibid.. Ill, 161; Barlk, 71; A.H.B1 88: Aleppo, 28.6.60.
5?abbSkh, III, 335.
6s<ee back of front cover and f. lb of the MS of Ibn al-§iddlq.
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from the Mamluk troops.
A decisive turn in fUthman Pasha1 a administrative career came about
after As4ad Pasha's death and the confiscation of his property. On 22 Rajab
117l/l April 175S, about a fortnight before the death of As*ad Pasha, the
Sultan's emissaries left Aleppo for Hamah to arrest As*ad Pasha?s agent there
1
and to confiscate his property. It seems that this agent was *Uthman Pasha
o
who, in spite of rumours about his escape, was arrested and taken to Istan- 
bul to render an account of the fortune of As* ad Paaha. According to Muradi 
providence helped *Uthman Pasha to extricate himself, and he was appointed 
governor of Damascus with the rank of wazir A  The latter statement is erron­
eous because *Uthman Pasha was appointed first to Tripoli and not to Damascus 
*Uthman Pasha was said to have divulged information to the Sultan about 
the places where As*ad Pasha hid his money, and for this reason he acquired 
the surname of al-gadiq (the Truthful)*^ It seems that this cooperation on j 
the part of *Uthman Pasha brought him a promise of an administrative office 
and, In early 1760, he was appointed Governor of Tripoli.^ A rumour was cur-' 
rent in Aleppo where he was at the time of his appointment to Tripoli, that 
the Sultan had elevated him to this office so as to be able eventually to 
confiscate the wealth he was suspected of having retained*
Between the arrest of *Ut_hman Pasha and his appointment to Tripoli in
1A.N.B1 88s Aleppo, 1.5.58. 
%urac]i, III, 161.
2Ibld.
%bld.
^Muuaqqi* , f. 251b.
^A.N.B1 88s Aleppo, 28.1.60; A.H.B1 1120s Tripoli, 4.2.60, Tripoli, 17.4.60. 
7A.N.B1 88s Aleppo, 19.2.60.
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Jumada I 1173/January 1760, nothing is known about his whereabouts except
that he was in Aleppo at the above date,1 On 16 February he left for Tripoli
o
amid a superb procession which surprised the Aleppines. In Tripoli he suc­
ceeded Muhammad Pasha Ohalia who was appointed to Damascus.^ While governor 
of Tripoli, ‘bthman Pasha commanded the .iarda in Dhu ^-Hij ja 1173/JuIy- 
August 1760. He showed much seal in this commission and awaited the Pilgrim^
age in Hadiyya,^ a long way towards Mecca, which no commander known to Bud-
£
ayrl had done before. Furthermore, he performed many acts of charity, and, 
according to the previous source, news of this reached Istanbul and as a re­
sult he was appointed to Damascus,^ probably with the rank of wazir as well.7
ftHis son, Muhammad Pasha, replaced him as governor of Tripoli? For, once 
*Uthman Pasha was initiated into government service it was not difficult for 
him to learn *the rules of the game* and to reach higher ranks.
The appointment of 4Uthman Pasha to Damascus does not represent a con-
Q
tinuation of 4 A^ rn rule. Rather, it continued the break that began with the 
fall of As4ad Pasha. It was through the ‘ Aijms that 6Uthman Pasha was intro­
duced into the administration as mutasallim. It was largely because of his 
cooperation with the Sultan against the ‘A^ms that he later acquired the
88s Aleppo, 28.1.60. ^Ibid.. Aleppo, 19.2.60,
^Ibid.. Aleppo, 28.1.60; A.N.B^ 1120s Tripoli, 4*2,60,
^See Appendix, n:, P- 4 / * < ^Budayri, f. 54a.
6Ibid.s cf* A.N.B1 1120s Tripoli, 12.1.61.
7Cf. Muradi, III, 161. When he was appointed to Tripoli he held the rank 
bevlerbevi. see A.H.B1 1120s Tripoli, 4*2,60, cf. Tripoli, 12.1,60.
^A.N.B1 1120s Tripoli, 12.1,61,
% t  has been suggested, see Gibb and Bowen, 1.1.221, that with his appoint­
ment the regime was restored.
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governorship of Tripoli. The mutasallim he appointed before his entry to 
Damascus was Sulayman Bey, who seems to have been the same person who acted
for him later as kahva. and who was originally a mamluk of Sulayman Pasha
.  - 1
al- Ai$m. This indicates that those who were dependent on the A^ms came 
now to assume their place* But it is erroneous to conclude that 4Uthn£n 
Pasha represents the ‘A^ms, let alone that he was a ‘Ajm. Jabarti refers to 
‘Uthman Pasha on the occasion of the Mamluk intervention in Syria as fTJthman 
Bayk ibn al-* Aijm, fcfeli al-Sham. Jabarti may have been reiterating here a 
common belief arising from the early association of *Uthn£n Pag ha with the
A^ijms. As a former Biamluk of this family it was not unusual for ‘Uthman
3Pa.§]aa to be identified with his famous, masters. But the^A^ms did not con­
sider <‘bthman Pasha as their representative nor did they try to rule through 
him. On the contrary, the appointment of one of their mamluks to Damascus 
was a challenge to them and it increased their efforts to have one of their 
members appointed to Damascus or another Syrian province. In fact this was 
all the more challenging because the ‘A^m family was by now well established
Budayri, f* 55a.
^Jabarti, I, 309. Earlier Jabarti referred^to Sulayman Pasha al-'Agm on his 
appointment as governor of Egypt as Sulayman Pasha al-Shami al-sbablr bi— 
ibn al~*Azm, see I, 150, see above p./*7£ . Jabarti's other statement, I, 
351 that righting took place in Syria between the %mluk troops and hukkam 
al-Sham wa-awlad al-*Agm, is misleading. He did not explain whom he meant 
by awlad al-Agm and, furthermore, there is no evidence that a ‘A^m govern­
or clashed with thejSamluk troops. On another occasion, I, 41&, he referred 
to a certain Mu§Jafa Pasha al-Habulsi as min awlad al-*A<jm (probably * A^m) 
and as being appointed governor of Egypt. Again, there Is no evidence that : 
a *A§m was appointed governor of Egypt at this time, nor does the term 
■lilabulsi1 fit with that of ‘A$m.
%ufcibbi mentions a certain^Ibrahim b* *Uthman, one of the alvan of Damascus^
as being known as ibn Kaywan because of the association of his father with 
the famous Kaywan, see I, 30, cf. Ill, 299.
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in Damascus.'*' Rumours were rife in Aleppo in late 1760 that Sa*’d al-Din
o
Pasha al-*Agm had been appointed to Damascus. This was not so, but it 
indicates the efforts made by the ^A^ms and the popular expectations. Further­
more, because of the jealousy with which the ’^A^ rns regarded their former mam­
luk:. *Uthman Pasha, the latter tried to discredit their only governor, Muham­
mad Pasha of Sidon, by fomenting trouble in territories under his juris- 
3diction, Muhammad Pasha considered the governorship of Damascus as an 
appanage of his family.^
The prestige of the * family was dealt a heavy blow with the death 
of As4ad Pasha. His brother, Mu^afa Pashaf died sometime between 1757 and 
1763.^ Another brother, Sa*d al-Din Pag,hay died of plague on 11 Dhu *1- 
Qa*da 1175/3 Tune 1762.^ With the disappearance of the second generation of 
*A§m governors, a third one came %rbo the fore. Its representative was Mujji* 
ammad Pasha al-’A^m. From the outset he was at a disadvantage. Apart from
the humiliating end of As* ad Pasha, he was relatively young at the time when
— 7* Uthman Pasha was appointed to Damascus and had not yet entered an admini­
strative career. The worked hard to acquire the governorship of Dam-
ascus for him, but he t*as appointed to Sidon around March 1763. It was not
1A.N.B1 1033s Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin). ^.K.B1 88s Aleppo, 13.9.60.
A^.Ii.B1 1033s Sidon, 28.9.67. ^Ibid.
5lbid.. Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
6Ibidt Tabbakh. Ill, 330. In Budayri's MS. f. 55a_the name of As‘ad Parian
erroneously appears in place of that of Sa*d al-Din PasJoa.
^He was born in Damascus on 10 Shawwal 1143/lS April 1731, Muradi, IV, 97,
98; cf. A.h .B1 1033J Sidon, 23.S.63.
^.N.B1 1033s Sidon, 7.3.63j Sidon, 23.8.63; cf. Muradi, IV, 98.
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till 1185/1771 that he was appointed to Damascus. The governorship of 
Sidon cost him 4-000 purses, in addition to the recommendation made in his
favour by the mufti of Damascus and the effective help he was given by a cer-
* 2 tain Janim Agha, who was an influential person in Istanbul. Another favour­
able gesture on the part of the Sultan was the restitution to Muhammad Pasha
3 4
of a good part of the property of As* ad Pa.&ba, and Sa*d al-Din Pas&a.
Muradi states that the death of Sa*d al-Din Pasha had gained Muhammad Pasha 
the sympathy of the Sultan.** But by the time Muhammad Pasha was appointed 
to Sidon, *Uthman Pasha had become established.
It is clear, therefore, that the ‘A^ms did not consider *Uthman Pasha 
as their representative. In fact, his former connection with the ‘A^ms 
contributed to the-increase in hostility between them. It remains to be 
seen, however, in what respects developments begun under the ‘A^ms continued 
during the governorship of *Uthman Pasha, in other words, how his admini­
stration contrasts with that of the ^A^ms.
It is possible to detect certain resemblances between the rule of *Uth- 
man Pasha and that of the tfA^ms. His lengthy tenure of a b o u t ' e  ar s 
rahlcs second after that of As*ad Pasha in the history of Ottoman Damascus. 
The reasons behind this and other similarities become;' apparent during the 
study of 'Uthman Pasha15 policy inside and outside Damascus.
The Policy of *Uthman Pagha in Damascus.
There was a marked contrast between the policy of conciliation and 
-^See below p. ? 6 q . ^.N.B1 1033* Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
%uradl, IV, 9S. 4-A.N.B1 1033s Sidon, 16.7.63 (Bulletin).
^Muradi, IV, 98.
311
appeasement pursued by *Uthman Pasha in Damascus and Ms high handed policy 
outside it, particularly against 4ahir al-*Uraar and the rural population.
His policy, in this respect, was more similar to that of Sulayman Pasha al- 
*Azm than to the policies of Isma*Tl Pasha and As*ad Pasha, the 6 Asms, cUth~ 
man Pasha seems to have been conscious of his humble origin and of the im­
portance of the governorship he was occupying. Already before his appoint­
ment, when he commanded the jarda, his acts of charity as concerns the Pil­
grims were largely intended to gain credit in Damascus and in Istanbul, This
was further illustrated after his appointment to Damascus when he immediately
1
lowered the prices of bread and other essential commodities. On the occasion
2of the birth of a prince to the Sultan on 24 Dec.- 1761 orders were dispatched 
to Damascus, as to other places, to celebrate the event for seven days. *Uth~ 
mah Pasha took great care to excel in the festivities and he exploited them 
to the full to acquire prestige. The artisans paraded in the streets with 
their colourful costumes and then visited the saraya and received gifts and
money from *Uthan Pasha. The chroniclers of the time were agreed that this
was a most splendid occasion. What seems to have pulled them, however, was 
not the reason beliind the celebration, nor the frequency of similar events.
It was rather the fervour which *Uthman Pasha showed and the type of people
he particularly favoured. The artisans could be strong supporters.^ Further-
a^l-Qari, 83. Budayri, f. 54b took no notice of this reduction. He rather 
considered the prices of some foodstuffs as still high. But the unusual 
absence of the price of bread from his list probably indicates a reduction.
SPB0, S.P. 97^41t Istanbul, 5*1*62. This prince later became Sultan Selim
III, cf. Muradi, III, 161.
3 —
Budayri^ f. 54b; al-Qari, 83, Muradi, III, 161; The statement by the last
which suggests that the celebrations as well as the birth took place in
1174 is erroneous and should be in 1175.
he statement by Budayri, f. 54b, suggests that the artisans were armed.
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more, being the first ceremony after the recent calamities that befell Damas­
cus, its impact on the Damascenes was great*
Ho serious clashes seem to have taken place between the Yerliwa and- 
the Kaoi Kulus during the governorship of ‘Dthman Pasha. This does not nec­
essarily mean that they were reconciled. The Yerliwa had been twice suppres­
sed within a relatively short period, and they do not seem yet to have re­
covered their strength. The Kaoi Kulus maintained their ascendancy. As for 
the mercenary troops, they found outlets for their insubordination in the 
campaigns of "Uthman Pasha outside Damascus, the first of which was directed
against 5&hir al-* Umar hardly three months after the appointment of *hthman
1
Pasha to Damascus,
The absence of serious troubles in Damascus was an important factor 
which contributed to the lengthy rule of *Uthman Pasha. While it enabled 
him to direct his attention outside Damascus, this did not prevent him from 
courting the favour of the Damascenes. He cooperated with the Mufti cAli
al-Muradi in abolishing certain arbitrary regulations imposed on the Damas­
cenes. Former governors of Damascus used to levy a tax in kind on barley, 
flocks and certain commodities, which was enforced on nMa merchants as well 
as on the poor in Damascus. On the initiative of *Alx al-Muradi and with 
the collaboration of *Hthman Pasha, a firman was obtained from Istanbul and 
duly registered in the law-court which ended this practice. Another firman,
^Budayri, f„ 54b.
^Muradi, Matmah* f. 42a, his statement reads, rafa* al-tarh minal~ 
s ha" ir wa'l-mawaahl wa-ghayr dhalik al-ladhic^na yutrah ^ ala^l^Fuj jjr 
wa* 1-fuqara* bi-Dimashq min .iihhat al-hukksm.
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also obtained at the initiative of the mufti and with the collaboration of
*Uthman Pasha, decreased the percentage of a tax known as m l  al-badal !
1
which was collected in lieu of service from the holders of %i*amets and timara 
In 1133/1769-70, <Uthman Pasha built a pool in the court of the Umraayad 
Mosque and water was supplied to it from the Qanawat river. Much money was 
spent on this project but no less credit ’was gained. His works in Damascus 
are Significant if compared with those of the *A§m governors. The latter 
were much interested in promoting the prestige of their family in Damascus. 
However, ‘Uthraan Pasha showed more interest in the welfare of the Pilgrimage 
route. He built and reconstructed several fortresses and reservoirs along 
this route.^ He also decorated the Mahmil improving on the decoration made 
earlier by * Abd Allah Pasha Chata.il.^  Furthermore, he ensured the safely 
of the Pilgrimage all through his governorship.
The policy of %tfaman Pasha outside Damascus.
Si the period between the death of Sulayman Pasha al-*A§m and the ap­
pointment of tUthmah Pasha to Damascus, no governor of this province made 
any serious attempt to subdue $ahir. ^he governors of Sidon were also los­
ing control over the miiltazinB in their province. Nothing is more illustra- 
tive of this than Sa*d al-Din Pasha's unfulfilled threats to send punitive 
expeditions against a^.hlT and the Matawila. Their only effect, however, was 
that $ahir strengthened the fortifications of Acre, and the Ifeliwila looked 
for allies. The governors of Sidon could theoretically still exert press-
^Muridx, Matmah i . 42b; see above p| f o % . M^uicadi, III, 161; al-Qari, S3,
^luradl, III, 161, Matmah. f. 62a; al-SiarT, 83. For particulars see,
Muhammad Adib, 51, 54> 57, 53.
^al-Qarl, 83. S k . h . B 1 1032J Sidon, 8.4.53, Sidon, 19.10.58.
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sure on their multazims by obstructing or withholding the renewal of their 
. . - 1iltizam. but this had become by now a mere ceremonial act. Partly because 
of the impotence of the governors of Sidon and partly also because of Tahir's 
encroachment on certain territories in the province of Damascus, actual re­
sponsibility towards Zahir was thrust on the governors of Damascus.
6Uthman Pasha assumed the governorship of Damascus at a critical time.
The earthquakes and the ensuing plague had caused much dislocation in the
2
economic life of the country. This, in turn, affected the political be­
haviour of the rulers. Jahir tightened his grip over the French merchants
3
at Acre to make up for what he had lost. His simultaneous encroachment on 
territories under the jurisdiction of the governors of Damascus constituted 
a political as well as an economic threat which 6Uthman Pasha did not toler­
ate. About two months after his appointment to Damascus * Uthman Pasha left 
for the dawra. He conquered the fortress of Tartura^ which was under the 
control of Zahir. Although Tartura belonged to Damascus, the immediate rea­
son for this occupation was the incursion by Zahir1s sons on the territory 
of the province of Damascus in an attempt, as it seems, to gauge the power 
and reaction of ‘Uthman Pasha.J However, r.?ahir reoccupied Tar^ura after
‘Uthman Pasha withdrew.^ In the following year, 1175/1761-2, ‘Uthman Pasha
— . 7  —
conquered the fortress of §ahyun, probably from Zahir. A more daring act
■H/ith regard to Zahir see, A.N.B 1032: Sidon, S.4 .58; with regard, to the 
Matawila, see ibid., Sidon, 9.3.59.
9 1A.N.B 1032: (Des Jardins de Seyde), 22.12.59, according to this dispatch
Safad was *entierement detruit1, (Des Jardins de Seyde), 27.3.60; PRO, S.P. 
27.3.60; PRO. S.P. 110/36: Aleppo, 22.12.59, Aleppo, 2.4.60; Mariti, 11,122
^A.^.B^ 1032: (Des Jardins de Se5?-de), 22.12.59.
%or its location see attached maps. ^A.N.B^ 1032: Sidon, 6.6.61; Budayri,
f. 54b.
Budayri, f. 54b. 'Ibid.
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on the part of * Uthman Pasha was his attempt to take control of gaifa which 
was basically under his jurisdiction but held by ?ahir in iltizam. By vir­
tue of a firman obtained from Istanbul by ‘Uthman Pasha, Abu Tawq and 6All 
Agha Hammud some forty or forty-two years earlier, the iltizam of Ik if a had 
been attached to that of Acre ever since.’*’ With the growing commercial im­
portance of ilcre, Haifa benefited as well because it was more suitable for
2 —anchorage than the former. ~ After * Uthman Pasha had obtained from the Sul­
tan a firman ordering the separation of the iltizam of Haifa from that of 
Acre, he dispatched a force of Kaghariba to capture its fortress. The force 
left Beirut by sea on 20 May 1761 as passengers on board a French vessel 
which was on its way to Jaffa. On its arrival at Haifa on 2lv May, it was
-  3 _defeated by Zahir1s forces. In addition to this success by Zahir, the
collusion of the Governor of Sidon with him,and the efforts of Zahir1 s j
6 —agents at Istanbul, Zahir bad another project; he approached the French 
Consul in Sidon as well as Mr. Usgate, the English vice-Consul in Acre,'
to write to their ambassadors at the Porte to help him reverse the firman
_ 6 
which authorised the separation of the iltizam of Haifa from that of Acre.
While attempts for a reconciliation between Zahir and ‘ Uthman Pasha ’were
under way, the latter dispatched another force which occupied the fortress
of Haifa in late 1761. To counterbalance this move gahir conceived a scheme
1032; Sidon, 30.5.61 {Copie d'une lettre ecritenpar les negocians 
d^cre a M. de Glaii’ambault Consul de Seyde); cf. A.M.B 978; Acre, 12.10,25
2
Charles-Roux „ 6.
^A.N.B1 1032; (Sidon), 2^ .5.61, Sidon, 30.5.61, Sidon, 1.6.61 (Extrait des 
Registres); cf. Charles-Roux, 69.
tuN.B1 1032s Sidon, 6.6.61. 5‘A. al-§abba£h, ff. 10b, 11a.
( - 1For the letters sent by Zahir to the French Consul in Sidon, see, A.N.B
1032: Sidon, 30.5.61.
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for enlarging the harbour of Acre* He also besieged the fortress of gaifa
1
and threatened its garrison with starvation until it finally surrendered.
The various attempts by 6Uthman Fasha to subdue Zahir had failed. Several 
factors contributed to this failure. £ Uthman Pasba was at a disadvantage mili­
tarily because Haifa was far from his centre of power and near Zahir1s. The 
territory through which he had to send his reinforcements was-, interspersed
with local chiefs who were not all loyal to him. Furthermore, the governor of
2 °
Sidon, Nu* man Pasha (1760-3), did. not provide eUthman Pasha with any effect­
ive help against Zahir, in spite of the instructions by the Sultan, but 
rather communicated to IJahir the plans of Uthman Pasha. Nu£man Pasha was 
anxious not to alienate Zahir who could jeopardize his task as governor by
withholding the payment of the nixri dues already in gross arrears.^ Nucman
— £!
Pasha was also known for his jealousy towards ‘Uthman Pas-ha.
The relations of £ Uthman Pasha with the amir of Mount Lebanon were 
friendly at the start, partly because of internal struggles among the Druses 
and partly also because Zahir*s belligerence dominated the scene. This, how­
ever, did not prevent 6 Uthman Pasha from attacking in 1761 Amir Ismac il, the
_ 6 
Shihab governor of Ha^ bayya, which was under the jurisdiction of Damascus,
- 7and destroying the Banyas fortress which he had reconstructed. This action
by £Uthman Pasha was necessary to safeguard his lines of communication.'
Between roughly 1762 and 1770 the various power groups in the provinces 
of Damascus and Sidon were more concerned with internal struggles. The
-A.N.B-*- 1032 
•-A.N.B1 1033
Sidon, 25.5*62.
Sidon, 7.3*63; cf. A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 15.9.60.
Sidon, 6,6.61. ^Ibid., Sidon,25.3.62, cf. Sidon,15.9.60.
^Ibid.. Sidon, 6.6.61. _
6thejd istricts of Ha^bayya and Rashayya were jointly known under the name of
Wadi *1- Taym, see Lamrnens, JI. 97. Their Shihab amirs were kin of those rul 
ing Mount Lebanon. Amir Isma*il was cousin and son-in-law of Amir Mansur, ;
A.NJ31 1033: Sidon, 11.11.66 (Extrait des Registres). ^
Bar%72; Shii£b, Lucian,1,53,54;0f.A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 23.4.67? Sidon,II. W--
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splits that occurred in the ranlcs of the Druzes, of. the Matawila and of the 
Ziyadina brought about new alliances which cut across religious and tradi­
tional barriers. For his part, 4Uthman Pasha was also occupied with troubles
in the rural parts of his province. His intervention, however, in the in­
ternal struggles of these power groups further complicated the political 
picture.
The abdication of Amir Mulhim and the accession of his two brothers,
1
Amir Man§ur and Amir Ahmad, to the paramountcy in 1754* brought into the
open the discord within the ruling Shihab family and the Druze community
in general. After his abdication, Amir Mulhim manoeuvred against the two 
ruling amirs by encouraging his nephew, Amir Qasim b. 6 Umar, to contest
— Q —  —their rule. With the death of Amir Mulhim in 1761, Amir Qasim lost support
and eventually failed to attain the paramountey.3
The removal of the enmity of Amir Qasim encouraged dissension between 
the two ruling amirs. For it was apparent ever since the accession of Amir 
Mansur and Amir Ahmad that their appointment reflected a split among the 
communities of Mount Lebanon. Any struggle between the Janbalatiyya and 
the Yasbakiyya, each of which was attached to, indeed represented by, one 
amir or the other, was bound therefore to affect the relations of these
amirs. In 1177/1763, for example, discord broke out between Shaykh 4Abd al-
Salam al-‘Irnad, head of the Yszbaki faction, and Shaykh ‘All JFanbala^ ., head
of the Janbalati faction, and this in turn embroiled the two ruling amirs, .
T ~ ™ " —
See above p, Shidyaq, 4-27; Lamrnens, II, 100,
%hihab, Lubnan, I, 43, 44, 50-2; Shidyaq, 426 , 426-9; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 
4S (1954)", PP. 663, 666.
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each of whom tried to rule independently, Amir Mangur had been communicating 
with the Porte, through the governor of Sidon, Nu*man Pasha, to acquire the 
paramountcy for himself. It was on the orders of the Porte that the then 
governor of Sidon], Huframmad Pasha al-6 Agin, came to the help of Anar Mangur 
against Amir Ahmad, The latter^ main supporters panicked before the swol­
len power of Amir Mangur, and eventually changed sides# Amir Afcmad then gav<* 
up the struggle and his share in the government, and Andr Mangur became sole
q
ruler, after about nine years of dual rule (1754~63). Talcing advantage of
his reliance on Muhammad Pasha al-'Agm, governor of Sidon, Amir Mangur an-
4
tagonized the chiefs of his country. The removal of Amir A^ anad did not do 
away with factionalism. This haddeeper roots, It is true that his removal 
had caused a dislocation in the grouping of the two factions, but another 
focus was soon to be found in a claimant to the paramountcy, Amir Yusuf, 
nephew of Amir Mangur and son of Amir Mulhim, Amir Yusuf was supported by 
the Janbalafi faction and by the spiritual chief ofb.the Druzes, Shaykh 
Israeli Hamza.^
These political developments in Mount Labanon had important repercuss­
ions on the balance of power in the provinces of Damascus and Sidon, While 
Amir Mangur invoked the help of Muhammad Pasha al-*Agm, Amir Yusuf relied 
on * Uthman Pasha in his groping for power. Such a choice of allies set a
•^ Shifciab, Lubnan. I, 59; Shidyaq, 429. A.N.B1 1033* Sidon, 1.10.63.
3Ibid.; A.N.B1 1120j Tripoli, 10.5.64 (Bulletin); gkitiab, Lubnan. I, 59-60; 
Shidyaqr 4^9* 430$ Munayyir, al-JMashriq. 48 (1954)9 6^7, 688.
^Shibab, Lubran. 1, 60-1; Shidyaq, 430-1; A.N.B1 1033* Sidon, 1.10.63.
5Shihab, Lubnan. I, 62; Shidyaq, 431-2; Munayyir, al-Maghriq, 48 (1954), 
688, 689*
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pattern to which both amirs adhered* In fact the attitude of Amir Mangur
towards his opponents was determined to a very large extent by the support
2
he had from Muhammad Pasha. The enmity which existed between Muhammad Pasha 
and ‘Uthman PashaP widened the gulf between the two amirs. Any radical change 
in the fortune of these governors was bound, therefore, to have repercussions' 
on their fortune. When the son of 6Uthman Pasha was appointed governor of 
Sidon in 1770 the consequences for Amir Mangur were serious.^
The occupation of the Druses with their factional struggle provided a 
relative respite for their traditional enemies the Matawila of Jabal ‘Amil. 
But this relaxation in the pressure of the Druses encouraged an internal 
split among the Matawila. The paramount Shaykh Hasif al-Na§§ar (of the 
§aghir family) was opposed by his uncle, Shaykh Qablan, whose party was in 
the minority. The Matawila benefited from the commercial revival of south-
5
ern Syria, particularly after they had acquired in 1759 the iltizam of Tyre, 
Their economic prosperity during this period lent much strength to their
internal rivalry.6 The upsurge in Zahir1s power, in contrast to that of
_ 7
the Shihabs, attracted the Matawila into the orbit of his influence.
q ’ *     ~ IT “ il ' V 1 *
On the cooperation between Amir Man§ur and Muhammad Pasha see, A.N.B 1120:
Tripoli, IO.5 .6 4 (Bulletin); A.N.B'*' 1033s Sidon  ^15.5.66, Sidon, 31.5-66. i
On the cooperation between Amir Yusuf and * Uthman Pasha, see, A.N.B-** 1120: j
Tripoli,_10.5.64 (Bulletin); Shihab, Lubnan. 1, 63; Shidyaq, 432• Munayyi:;
al-Mashriq., 46 (1954)? 689.
2 — —
"Shihab, Lubnan, I, 64; Shidyaq, 433; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 46 (1954)? 689.
■^ A.N.B^  1033s Sidon, 12,10.67. ^See below, p. 32JL
 ^A.N.B'*' 1032: Sidon, 9.3.59; Charles-Roux, 66; bias son, 289.
6Mariti, II, 207, 208, 211; of. A.N.B 1032s Sidon, 9.3.59, Sidon, 26.9.59; 
A.N.B 1033: Sidon, 23,4,67; cf. A.N.B'** 1036: Sidon, 30.11.73 (Appendix 
No. 13 attached to this dispatch); M. al-§abbajgh, 39.
'cf. A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 25.3.62.
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In the meantime Zahir was threatened with fresh attempts at revolt by
1some of his sons, Several factors contributed to this situation. The ab­
sence of effective military action by the Ottoman Governors against £ahir 
had caused a relaxation in solidarity among the Ziyadina. After cUthman
Pasha*s failure to bring Zahir to heel, he concentrated, instead, on foment-
— 2
ing discord between IJahix* and his sons. The latter had been appointed local 
—  . 3
governors by Zahir, but far from being appeased, they aspired for more 
power. Jgahir's policy of marryipg his sons into local families of 
notables and Beduin chieftains to x^ in their support,^ - wise enough 
provided other conditions obtained, had the adverse effects of frag­
menting loyalty tox^ ards Zahir in favour of his sons. Furthermore, the 
territory acquired by £ahir had expanded to an extent that encouraged his 
sons to covet its rule. Rivalry and jealousy among £ahir*s sons, very often
■m. jr
caused by their descent from one wife of Zahir or the other, or by Zahir*s
\*or an account of these revolts., in the *sixties see, 1032: Sidon, i
22.9.61, Sidon, 25.3.62; A.N.B'1' 1033: Sidon, 15.5.66 (Bulletin Sidon,
10.5.66), Sidon, 23.4*67, Sidon, 25-10.67 (Bulletin, Sidon, 25.10,67)> M. 
al-§abbogh, 87-9.
2A.N.Bl 1032s Sidon, 22.9,61, Sidon, 25.3.62; M. al-Sabbagh. 87-9. ,
al-Sabbagh. f. 10a; M. al-Sabbagh. 51? A.N,13 1^036: Sidon, 30.11.73 |
(Appendix No.13 attached to this dispatch); Yanni, 321.
4 *
M, al- a^bbagh. 53, Yanni, 321.
1032*. Sidon, 25.3.62.
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support of a particular son, complicated the struggle. The corresponding 
split in the ranks of the Druses and the Matawila made one faction or the 
other among these groups rally to the support of either £ahir or his sons, 
depending on the interest of each group,^
Towards the end of 1767 there was a relaxation of tension between Zahir 
and his sons. Zahir was also reconciled with Shaykh Na§If and was on good 
terms with Amir Man§ur. This reconciliation among the three groups continued 
for several years, and with ?ahir and Shaykh Na§if it developed into an al­
liance. But tension between Zahir and t Uthman Pashas was gathering momentum
at the time. * Uthman Pasha was contemplating an attack on IJahir to'wrest
3
from him those jJarts of his territory which he had usurped. Two main reaso: 
were holding * Uthman Pasha from launching his attack. Firstly, no authoriza­
tion was given to him by Istanbul to make this attack. It was alleged that 
the point of view at the Porte was that Jahir had become redoubtable and any 
attempt to antagonize him would cause further difficulty to the state which 
was engaged, at the time, in a disastrous war with Russia.^ * Secondly, the 
appointment of 'Uthman Pagiha1 s son to the governorship of Sidon to enable him 
to tighten his grip on Zahir, was not realized until 1770*
In the meantime, * Uthman Pasha was faced with a series of revolts in thj 
rural regions of his province. In contrast to his conciliatory polieyin Dam­
ascus, 'Uthman Pasha tightened his hold on the rural population and exacted
1A.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 25.3.62} *A.. al-§abbagh, f. 10a; M. al-Sabbagh, 51.
^I.N.B1 1032: Sidon, 25.3.62} A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 15.5.66 (Bulletin. Sidon,
10.5.66), Sidon, 23.4.67, Sidon, 29.9.67 (Bulletin, Sidon, 20.9.67)* Sidon, 
22.12.67.
3A.N.B1 1033: Sidon, 12.10.67. ^‘A. al-§abb$gh, ff. Ua-14a.
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money from them. Exacerbated by his exactions and those of his deputies and
their ‘ awanjyya. the inhabitants of Ramie - described by * Uthman Pasha as 
— 1
tos malikane - and of Jaffa revolted in 1767. Other revolts had preceded
2
and succeeded this one in these as well as in other places. A statement by 
the French merchants in Ramie tends to confirm that ‘Uthman Pasha practised 
vexations in all *Falestine!,^  hence one would assume that the revolts were 
not restricted to these places. The atrocities of 'Uthman Pasha, particular­
ly against the ‘Ulama* of Gaza were later referred to by ‘All Bey in his 
manifesto to the Damascenes.^ ‘Uthman Pasha subdued the insurgents by force, 
and, on one occasion, he invoked the help of the ‘Ariaza Beduin.-* It is sig­
nificant that the leaders of the revolt in Ramie, the hfofti. the judge and a 
certain Mahmud Agha. should have sought asylum in Acre. Zahir had sent a
considerable amount of gun-powder to the insurgents of Ramie so as to dis- 
—. 6
credit ‘Uthman Pasha. The influence of these revolts on the attitude of
the rural inhabitants in the coming struggle between 'AH Bey and ‘Uthman
7Pasha was decisive.
Around the end of September 1770, Darwish Pasha, the son of ‘Uthman
8
Pasha, was appointed governor of Sidon, in place of Muhammad Pasha al-'A^m.
1 1
A.N.B 1033s Ramie, 28.10.67 (attached to the dispatch from.Sidon, 21.12.67),
^For further details see A.N.B'*' 1033s Jaffa, 6.6.67 (attached to the dispatch 
from Sidon, 30.6.67), Sidon, 30.6.67, Jaffa, 18.10.67, Jaffa, 19.10.67 (the
last two are attached to the dispatch from Sidon, 26.10.67), Sidon, 26.10.6'/’
Masson, 290; cf. Barlk, 90.
3 1
A.N.B 1034: Ramie, 9.11.70 (attached to the dispatch from Sidon, 15.11.70); 
cf. Muradi, III, 134-
^See below p. -’A.N.B'** 1033s Sidon, 26.10*67. ^Ibid.
,7 See below p 1 
8A.N.B 1034: Sidon, 6.8.70, Sidon, 4.9.70, Sidon, 15.11.70; A.N.BX 1121: 
..Tripoli, 29.10.70.
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This was a great success for ‘Uthman Pasha, partly because of his enmity to [
Muhammad Pasha al-'A^m and particularly because his other son, Muhammad Pastel
1 —  -
was governor of Tripoli. The appointment of Darwish Pasha cost ‘Uthman
2 * '•*Pasha much money at Istanbul. * Uthman Pasha could claim now a prestige
comparable to that of the ‘A^ms when they concurrently governed all three
provinces. But the price of responsibility was high. Immediately after the;
appointment of Darwish Pasha. ‘Uthman Pasha wrote an insulting letter to
^ahir stating that he would pass by Acre, after he finished the dawra in
the region of llablus, on his way to Sidon to take care of its affairs.^
It was quite natural that ^ahir's anxiety should be heightened and that he
should take military precautions on the mere appointment of Darwish Pasha
because it was apparent that ‘Uthman Pasha would dispose the affairs of his j
son.4 IJahir had already started making new fortifications in Acre, and he
5
mobilized its inhabitants. • In October 1770 it was believed by observers
— — 6 that a clash between ‘Uthman Fas ha and was imminent. In November the
threat subsided because ‘Uthman P^ sfea had returned to Damascus after the
failure of his military operation against a principal shaykh in the region
of Nablus. Nevertheless ?ahir continued his military preparations and his
sons rallied to his support. Darwish Pasha had not yet arrived at Sidon and;
was still in Damascus. At this time rumours were rife in Sidon that ‘A H  Beyl
1See above p. tyoT.
2,A. al-§abtia,gh, f. Hbj PBO, S.P. 110/40: Aleppo, 17.11.69.
3*A. al-§abbagh, f. 14b} A.H.B 1121: Tripoli, 29.10.70.
•^A.N,B^ 1034s Sidon, 15.11.70. %bid.. Sidon, 4-9.70.
6lbid.. Sidon, 18.10,70.
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of Egypt x*as preparing troops to take hold of Gaza which was under the 
jurisdiction of Damascus, The rumours continued, and on 28 November 1770 
news reached Sidon that the troops of * All Bey were advancing on Gaza? On 
4 December it was known in Sidon that Gaza and Ramie were occupied.^- Short­
ly afterwards the troops of Jahir joined those of *Ali Bey.5
The Mamiiik intervention in Syria.
The Causes i The military intervention by ‘All Bey of Egypt in Syria 
weakened the jpsifeion of6 ITthman Pasha and eventually brought about his de­
position. It also revealed the weakness of Ottoman administration as well 
as caused a radical change in the balance of power in the provinces of Damas­
cus and Sidon which prepared the way for the emergence of Afymad Pasha al-
Jazzar. Various factors brought about this intervention. A mamluk of Cir- 
6
cassian origin, All Bey acquired prominence in Egypt, and in 1764 he com­
manded the Egyptian Pilgrimage to the ijijaz. There, he was embroiled in a
- 7dispute with the commander of the Damascene Pilgrimage, c Uthman Pasha. The
8
latter exhorted the opponents of *AlI Bey in Egypt to expel him. In his
1A.N.B1 1034* Sidon, 15.11.70. 2Ibid.. Sidon, 24.11.70.
3Ibid.. Sidon, 2S.11.70. %>id.. Sidon, 4 .12.70.
'’ibid.. Sidon, 20.12.70.
%uradT, Matmah, f .__39a. On the history of ‘Ali Bey see, P.M.Holt, ‘The 
Gloud-catcher, 'All Bey the Great of Egypt1, History Today. January .1759, 
pp. 48- 58. The articles on fAli Bey in the old and new editions of R.I.«
by N. A. Koenig and G* Wiet respectively drew heavily on largely unreliable 
sources5 hence their lack of precision and erroneous statements.
^Holt, * The Gloud-catcher*, 52; JabartT, I, 253; *A,. al-Sabba^h, f. 15b;
Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 2b.
8Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 2b.
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struggle with his opponents, *Alx Bey was forced to flee to Gaza around the 
end of Ramadan 1179/first half of March 1766.*** cUthman Pasha ordered his
mutagalliifl in Gaza, Ibrahim Agha. to expel #Ali Bey who, on learning of this,
2 ■ - — >
fled back to Egypt. Between 1767 and 1769, tfAli Bey overpowered all his
enemies in Egypt and became shaykhral-balad (premier amir) and qa*im maqara 
(acting governor). His name was mentioned in the khutba (the bidding prayer 
recited in the Friday congregational devotions) and inscribed on the coinage, 
both of which were prerogatives of a Muslim sovereign. In Shawwal 1182/ 
February 1769, ‘All Bey complained to the Sultan against ;Uthman Pasha whom 
he accused of giving asylum to fugitive Egyptians, and asked for his depo­
sition.^ This may have been a genuine complaint or a mere pretext, but 
there were other more important reasons which made *Ali Bey invade Syri§.
It is to be recalled here that the revival of Mamluk power in Egypt 
which reached its peak under €AlI Bey was not something accidental. It haA 
been building up ever since the Ottoman conquest.^ Haying secured a domin- 
ant position in Egypt, *Ali Bey looked abroad for expansion. The outbreak 
of xrar between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1768, which lasted until
1774, provided i All Bey with a favourable occasion of whose value he was
6
ax^ are. It is stated, furthermore, that *Ali Bey concluded a treaty with
Comte Orloff, the Russian Commander in the Mediterranean, in the last quart-
7
er of 1770, whereby the latter would offer rAli Bey military assistance.
1Jabarti, I, 255; Hammer, XV, 158. 2Ibn al-§lddiq, f. 2b.
%olt, 'The Oloud-cateher', 52-5; Jabartl, I, 258, 308-9 , 334--7; Ibn al-
Siddlq, £f. 3a-5b; PEO, S.P. 97/44* Istanbul, 2.1.68, S.P. 97/46; Istanbul,
3.7.70.
^Holt, 'The Cloud-catcher', 49. 5A.N.B 334* Cairo, 3.12.70.
6Bruce, I, 110, 111. (cont.)
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But there was no conclusive evidence that such an assistance was offered 
to *Ali Bey until May-June 1772.^ An opportunity for ‘Ali Bey* s expansion 
arose when the Sultan asked him, allegedly, to settle a dispute between two 
contenders for the post of Sharif of Mecca* fiAli Bey could win from this 
intervention religious prestige as well as economic resources, by taking 
control of the Porte of Jedda. After his successful campaign in the EELjaz, 
whose objectives, nevertheless, had not been maintained,^*Ali Bey started 
his invasion of Syria in alliance with IJahir. The appointment of * Uthman 
?a,gha,s son, Darwish Pasha, to the governorship of Sidon in September 1770,
had aroused the apprehension of ^ahir and seems to have determined him to
•in _
throw/his lot with ‘All Bey. But there is evidence of earlier cooperation 
between *Ali Bey and ijahir. In early 1770, 5 All Bey supplied 2ahir with
3
money to raise troops for him.
In his self-imposed task, expounded in his manifesto to the Damascenes,^ 
‘Ali Bey declared that his intention was to purge S y r i a  from the tyranny of 
‘Uthman Pasha. ‘All Bey was acquainted, no doubt, with the injustices com­
mitted by * Uthman Pasha and his deputies against the rural population, 
possibly through his short refuge in Gaza, and also through the appeals 
allegedly made to him by the inhabitants of Gaza.^ It is not unusual for an 
invader to set himself the disinterested task of relieving the inhabitants
„(cont.) I
Holt, *The Cloud-catcher*, 57; Hammer, XVI, 351, 352; of. PHO^S.P. 97/47s 
Istanbul, 4.2.71. Por information on the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean 
see, E.G.Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant. 1559-1353. Liverpool, 1952.
1 "
See below
^Holt, *The Cloud-catcher*, 55, 56; Jabartl. I, 350, 351; Ibn al-§iddlq, 
ff„_bb-7b, 19a, 19b: Volney, §1 . The Sharif installed by^the trqbp s of 
#Ali Bey was *Abd Allah, the last governor of Dhawu Barakat, see, G. Eentz, 
E.I.. new ed., s.v, Barakat. (cont )
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so as to camouflage his real aim. *Ali Bey intended to restore the old
Mamluk Sultanate composed of Egypt and Syria. When the Mamlulc commander,
Abu* 1-Dhahab. later took the declared pledges of 'ATI Bey at their face value
to justify his withdrawal from Damascus, maintaining that he had accomplished
his task by expelling cUthman Pasha, *Ali Bey was deeply disturbed because
2
his grand scheme had misfired. The suggestion by some contemporary foreign 
sources, that *Ali Bey aimed from his intervention in Syria to make Zahir 
its master and to grant independence to the Druzes and the Matawila so as 
to interpose a barrier which would safeguard his rule in Egypt from an Otto­
man attack by land, does not seem to have been foremost in the mind of *Aii
Bey.3
The military operations in Syria by Isma*Tl Bey and Zahir.
In mid-Rajab 1184/early November 1770, *Ali Bey started his intervention
in Syria by dispatching a force to eliminate the rebel chief of the Gaza 
Beduin, the Salrt, which was achieved.^ - This seems to have been a precaution 
aiy measure to safeguard his lines of communication. In the second half of 
Rajab, an expedition commanded by Isma*il Bey left Cairo for Syria. Another j
5 1left Damietta by sea at about the same time. The number of troops, probably
6
those sent by land, was^  estimated at between fifteen and twenty thousand. 
£cont.)
A^JJJ.B1 1034* Sidon, 2.3.70 (containing copies of four letters), Sidon,
6.3.70, Sidon, 20.3.70.
^See below p. 332. _ %uradi, I, 54.
_ Z 2 ^
Jabarti, I, 381$ fA. al-Sabbagh, f. 15b. Shihab, Lubnan, I, 89.
^A.N.B^ 440* (1779) Compte rendu de la mission secrete du Baron de Tott,
118 pages, pp. 52-3.
^Jabartl, I, 351. Ibid.
^A.N.B1 1034t Sidon, 20.12.70; cf. Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 8b.
3 2 8
The first target, Gaza, capitulated without resistance. The inhabitants of 
Gaza, long oppressed by the vexations of ‘Uthman Pasha, welcomed the invaders
i
and their mutasallim fled. By Nov. 30 Ramie was occupied as well without
any resistance. The newly-appointed Mamluk governors of Gaza and Ramie2 an- !
nounced the abolition of the mirl tax, until then collected by the governor 
of Damascus, for the period of four years.^ Such a benevolent move designed 
for propaganda purposes did not fail to encourage other places to defect. In 
fact, many villages, alienated by the extortions of ‘Uthman Pasha, declared 
for ‘All Bey.^
So far, the troops of Jahir did not link up with those of Isma‘il Bey.
*Uthman Pasha was notified of the invasion, after the occupation of Gaza, by
Ibn Jarrar,^ the paramount chief in the region of Nablus, who held the fort- ,
ress of Sannur. He hurriedly collected whatever troops he could muster and
marched towards Jaffa, which was not yet occupied by Isma* Tl Bey, but which
was not loyal to * Uthman Pasha either. Its inhabitants were more disposed
towards * iili Bey,7 and * Uthman Pasha had to enter the city on 12 Sha6ban/
1 Dec. by force. Isma^ll Bey was at the time in Ramie awaiting the troops
of 2ahir, An exploratory force which he sent to meet them was surprised
by the troops of *Uthman Pasha and almost annihilated. Although
this victory was obtained in a surprise attack, it provoked Isnia* ll
^Ibn al-Siddlq, ff. 8b, 9a.
2See A.N.B^ 1035s Sidon, 4*2.71 (Extrait des Registres, Sidon, 30*1-71).
A^.N.B^ * 1034* Sidon, 432*70. It is understood from PRO, S.P* 97/47: Istanbul 
4.3*71 that this applied to all •Palestine*.
^Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 11a, lib, 17a.
^About his origin and power see, Ihsan al-Nimr, Ta*rikh Jabal Nablus, pp.
123, 130, 131; also, Poliak, 59; al-§abbagh, 49, 50c tv.-* p,
6Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 9a. 7lbid.. f. 10b.
8Ibid.. f. 12a; A.N.B1 1034s Sidon, 20.11.70; A.N.B3- 441s Istanbul, 4.3.71
(attached to a dispatch from Sidon, 20.11,70).
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Bey rather than frightened him. 4Uthman Pasha exploited this victory to
the full, particularly for his credit with the Sultan, to whom he dispatched
1
the severed heads of the victims. The momentary confidence which this
victory instilled in the troops of 4Uthman Pasha was dissipated after the 
_ _ _ Bey.
arrival of Zahir and his troops at the camp of IsmaHl/ $ahir made it clear
to the emissary of 4Uthman Pasha who came to enquire and threaten that he
c —  2was acting on the orders of Ali Bey and that war was inevitable.
*Uthman Pasha decided to withdraw to Damascus to make further prepara­
tions. He decamped on 20 Sha*ban/9 December* and arrived in Damascus nine
3
days later and twenty days after he left it. After his withdrawal Jaffa 
was occupied by the joint troops of Isma4il Bey and Zahir.^ Its occupation 
was of great importance because reinforcements sent by sea from Damietta 
were disembarked in it as well as in Acre.
Between 29 glia4’ ban/lB December, the date on which 4Uthman Pasha returned 
to Damascus, and mid-Shawwal/end of January 1771, when the Pilgrimage was 
threatened by Isma4Tl Bey and his allies near MuzayrTb, no direct clashes 
occurred. This lull in the fighting could be attributed to several reasons. 
On 26 Sha4ban/15 December Zahir returned ill to Acre. How-
ever, some of his sons and troops remained with Isma4il Bey. It
1. - 1
Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 12b, 13a, 14a; A.N.B. 441* Istanbul, 4.3.71
(attached to a dispatch from Sidon, 20.11.70).
^Ibn al-§iddTq, ff. 14a, 14b; 4A. al-$abbagh. ff. 16b, 17b,
Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 16a, 16b, 17a, 17b, 18a; ‘A. al-§abbagh, ff. 17b,
18a; PRO, S.P. 97/47s Istanbul, 4.3.71.
h.N.B 1034s Sidon, 20.11.70; A.N.B 441, Istanbul, 4.3.71.
5 1
A*N.B 441* Istanbul, 4*3.71.
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seems that the latter was afraid lest JJahir might die, and consequently
his support be withdrawn. On the other hand, gahir was determined to have
the upper hand in the conduct of the campaign and it seems that Isma*Il Bey
was discouraged from advancing without him. This might explain why Ismacil
Bey remained quiescent from about 15 Bee. to 27 Jan*, during which period 
— 1Slahir was ill* It is true that there was much hatred among the rural popu­
lation towards * Uthman Pasha* and this would surely be a great asset to 
Isma^Il Bey should he decide to continue his advance. But there were other 
considerations which seem to have withheld him f r o m  doing so. The professed 
aim of Isma4 il Bey to which he clung till the very end, was to eliminate 
6Uthman Pasha, thus taking the words of * All Bey to this effect at their 
face value. So far, Isma4!! Bey had gained a foothold in the southern ex­
tremity of the province of Damascus which ensured his lines of communication 
with * All Bey and ?ahir and cut a large part of the revenue from i Uthman 
Pasha. He also acquired the prestige of having caused *qthman Pa&ha to re­
treat. It seems that he was not interested at the time in spending energy 
conquering adjoining territories and concentrating on towns and fortresses 
like Jerusalem and Sannur which were loyal to 4Uthman Pasha, because this 
might present frustrating obstacles and consequently risk failure in his 
major aim of toppling 4Uthman Pasha. Strategically, these conquests were 
not so necessary nor urgent because these places were more defensive than 
offensive, and did not necessarily obstruct his way. Furthermore, any such 
expansion, even if successfully achieved, would strain his man-power because 
he had to garrison the conquered places* It is true that if he extended his>
^A. al-Sabbajgh, ff. 18a, 18b.
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occupation, he would deprive * Uthman Pasha of a large part of revenue. But 
*Uttpan Pasha was unable, anyway, to collect the revenue at the time. Ism- 
ma‘il Bey was also waiting for the effect of the manifesto addressed by 
Bey to the Damascenes, who received it in December. Contrary to what is 
stated by the Lebanese Chroniclers and those who copied them, that this mani­
festo was later sent to the Damescenes by Abu 71-Dhahab when he was in the
1
vicinity of Damascus, rather, it seems certain that it was sent at this tim€(
o
after the occupation of Gaza and Ramie.
1 —  -  -  -  -  „
See, Shihab. Lubnan. I, 83-5$ Shihab. Ta* rikh Ahmad ffasha al-Jazzar, e&. by
Shibli and Khalifa* Beirut, 1955, pp* Al-As™Shtfeffb. Nag ha, MS.’ Camb.. ff. 
44a-45b; Nuzha. MS. Paris, ff. 43b-45a$ Munayyir, al«4k|shriq 49 (1955), 261 
262. These works give the text of the manifestos; Among other works which 
refer to the manifesto on this occasion, but do not give its text, are thos 
of Tay rikh Jabal al-Buruz» MS. Berlin, f. lib and Shidvaq. 434, 435. With 
the exception of Shidvao. who mentioned the manifesto under the year 1768, 
all the other works place it under 1184/1770 which is true. But neither ti^ e 
occasion on which they mention it nor the date of the attack of Abu '1- 
Dhabab on Damascus fall in this year. Contemporary Damascene chroniclers 
such as Barik, Muwaqqi*, Muradi and Ibn al-Siddiq, did not mention such a 
manifesto. The last two, however, did mention, I, 54; ff. 18a,_l8b, re­
spectively, the arrival of a letter (maktub or khitab) from i All Bey ad- ^  
dressed to the notables of Damascus and handAd to the Mufti *Ali al-Muradi 
on 4 Ramadan 1184/22 December 1770* That not all the Damascene chroniclers 
referred to this letter, which probably was the manifesto in question, may 
be explained by the efforts of the governor or the mufti not to publicize ijt 
so as not to arouse the Damascenes against the governor. The biographers of| 
§Ihir, *A. al-$abbagh and M. al-$abbagh;did not refer to such a manifesto. 
Jabartl did not mention it either. The text of the manifesto and a French 
translation of it are attached to dispatch A.N.B1 91s -jAleppo, 6.7*71. A 
French translation is also attached to dispatch A.N.B 1121s Tripoli,
12.6.71.
o
This is clear from the^date and title of the manifesto. The Arabic and 
French titles in A.N.B 91* Aleppo^ 6.7.70, reads 1gurat faraman al-ladlS 
arsalahu * Alx Bayk ila aha.li al-Shamt 11841. 1 Commanclement S *Aly Bey Caxm 
ma caB de 1 ‘Egipte, adress6 au peuple de Damas, apres la prise de Gaza et de 
Rame, donn^ dans le mois de cheval 1184.1 The title of the French trans­
lation in A.N.B1 1121s Tripoli, 12.6*71 .is1 Traduction d'une lettre d'haly 
Bey aux grands de Damas.* In * Relation de ce qui passe en Syrie1, attached 
to the,last dispatch, a statement reads* 'Osman Pacha gouvemeur de Damas 
ayant ete chass^ de la Palestine en Decembre dernier par un corps de troups
(cont.)
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In his manifesto, *Ali Bey* presented himself to the Damascenes first as 
a former commander of the Pilgrimage and then as qa^im maqam in Egypt. Al­
though this shows that he had not revoked the sovereignty of the Sultan, his 
reference to his title of Commander of the Pilgrimage was opportune, parti­
cularly because he expressed his intention, in the manifesto, of appointing 
a commander for the Damascene Pilgrimage. He also justified his military 
intervention by his desire to put an end to the injustices of *Uthman Pasha, 
and he quoted from the Qur*an to legalize his self-imposed task. 'All Bey 
referred to JUthman Pasha's mal-treatment of the Pilgrims and the merchants, 
which shows, irrespective of whether the accusation was true ox* not, his 
awareness of the importance of these two groups in Damascus. To frighten
the *Ulama> of Damascus away from * Uthman Pasha, rAIi Bey mentioned his
—  1atrocities against the iUlama; of Gaza. After referring to the endorse­
ment by the four Sunni schools of his use of force against 4Utliman Pasha, 
which may or may not have been true but was certainly advantageous, *Ali 
Bey asked the Damascenes to co-operate with him and to expel 4Uthman Pasha. 
The terms he used contained implicit threats, and he made it known that his 
troops were proceeding against 6Uthman Pasha anyway.
The manifesto created a sensation among the officials in Damascus. The
Mufti *Ali al-Muradl, to who$ it was handed, conferred with *Uthman Pasha in
(cont.) d'haly Bey joint a celle du chek Daher d'Acre, il ne s'est rien 
passe de consequence jusqu'au depart de la caravan© de la Mecque. Nous avons 
attribuy cette tranquilite apparente au peu d'effet qui paraissait avoir 
produit la lettre qu'il a ecrit aux grands de Dams', cf.Volney,8l. It is 
apparent also that the manifesto was sent to Damascus before the departure 
of fUthman Pasha with the Pilgrimage. Otherwise, the statement by ‘Ali Bey
—iwfcui  w v T
in his manifesto that he would appoint the commanderjDf the Pilgrimage,and 
the consequent interception of the Pilgrimage by Isma* il Bey, would be un­
justified. Furthermore,the date on which the letter arrived in Damascus,as 
given by Muradi and Ibn al-Siddiq, was 4 Ramadan 1184/22 Dec.1770. Ibn al- 
Siddiq states that cAli Bar requested the Damas cene s in his letter ^ not to s^ ndth 
Pilgrimare with * Uthman Pasha, because he (* Ali Bey) had appointed Isma xl
Bey as its commander. ______ „ ‘ ‘
1 Gf. Muradi, III, 134*
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an assembly which was attended by the judge and other notables. It was
decided to inform the Sultan of ‘All Bey's intentions,1 and this was 
2
duly done.
On 8 Shawwal 1184/25 January 1771 *Uthman Pasha left Damascus with the 
Pilgrimage, after appointing Musfa fa Agha of the Kaoi Kulus as his muta-
4vSallim. Rumours about an impending attack on the Pilgrimage were rife in 
Damascus, and precautions were accordingly taken.5 However, the attack did 
not take place. Isma* il Bey opposed JJahir's plan to attack * Uthman Pasha, 
because this would involve the pilgrims and consequently nrovoke the wrath 
of God.^
That Isnia* il Bey was reluctant to attack ‘Uthman Pasha for fear of in­
juring the pilgrims, was not incompatible with what amounted to his treason
to 6 Ali Bey later when he worked on Abu ? l-DJaahab to give up the conquest of
7 _ ___
Damascus. The divergence in views between ?ahir and Isma*il Bey did not
develop into a rupture in their relations. It indicates, however, that 
2ahir failed to take the initiative in the conduct of the campaign-. He re­
ported the unyielding attitude of Isma*il Bey to fcAli Bey who prepared for the
8
dispatch of fresh troops. In fact, preparation of troops had not ceased in
XCf. Ibn al-§iddlq, ff. 18b, 19a. 2Xbld.. ff. 27a, 27b.
3Ibid.. ff. 21a, 21b. icbld.. f. 22a.
5lbid., ff. 21b-24b.
6A..N.B 1035s Sidon,_4-2.71; Ibn al-giddTq, ff. 24b, 26a^ _ 29b, 30a;
Bar He, 94, cf. Muradi, Majraah, ff. 39a? 39b $ Shihab, Lubnan. I, 80.
S^ee below p.
^Shihab, Lubnan, I, 80$ Munayyir, 49 (1955)? 259-60.
Egypt ever since the first ex|>edition m s  sent and particularly after the 
surprise attack by the troops of ‘Uthman Pasha on the forces of Isma* Il Bey I 
in the vicinity of Jaffa*1 On learning of this attack and of the losses 
which his forces had sustained, ‘All Bey dispatched in the middle of Dhu *1- 
Qa‘da 1184/beginning of March 1771, another expedition composed of 4000 troops 
to occupy Muzayrib and take control of the Pilgrimage, presumably on its re­
turn, by forced This explains why Isma'Il Bey and his allies occupied 
Muzayrib after the departure of the Pilgrimage for the §ijaz.3
In the meantime, $ahir tried to take hold of the revenue of Qunayfra 
and to occupy Irbid,^ both of which were under the jurisdiction of the gover­
nor of Damascus. U s  troops looted the Nu‘aym Beduin in the region of Jaw- 
ran."5 At the same time, Jahir m s  embroiled in a struggle with the §aqr
Beduin,^ who were providing help to ‘Uthaian P&pha.^  The Sardiyya Beduin
8 1
seem to have been hostile to Jahir as well.
Oh 18 Dhu al-Qa*da II84/5 March 1771, the governor of Tripoli, Mujammad |
9 |
PagJia, son of ‘Uthman Pashaf arrived in Damascus, accompanied by about 1800 |
soldiers,10 to command the jarda. Rumours of an impending attack on the
^See above p.
2 Jabartl, I, 351; A.N.B 334* Cairo, 4.3.71; cf. Ibn al-§iddlq, ff. 19b, 20a.
3lbn al-§iddlq, ff. 31a-33a, 35b; A.N.B 1035* Sidon, 2.5.71.
4-ibn al-§iddTq, ff. 26b, 27b. 5Ibld.i cf. Seetzen, 291; see above p.U5.
6Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 23a. 7*A. al-$abbigh. ff. I6b-17b.
8Ibn al-§lddlq, f. 30a. Ibid.. f. 27b.
10A.N^B1 1121s Tripoli 12.6.71 (Relation de ce qui passe en Syrie).
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Barela by Isma* il Bey and his allies were rife in Damascus, and Muhammad 
Pasha tried to increase his forces. The Yerliwa whom he approached to 
accompany him refused to do soi,: on the pretext that they were not required 
by regulations to do so. The ICapi Kulus made their departure conditional on 
receiving orders from the Sultan or from their agha (presumably the agha of 
the janissaries in Istanbul), The Zu^ ama made it known to their alavbevi 
that they would go only if the other two corps agreed to go - a stipulation 
characteristic of their lack of initiative. As the time for the departure 
of ’kbe -iarda was overdue, Mujammad Pasha, after much procrastination, left
3
Damascus with no conspicuous forces. Through the help of the shavkh of 
the Sardiyya Beduin he was able to avoid the usual passage through Muzay- 
rTb and followed instead the route of al-Liwa, in the region of Bo§ra, which 
eventually linked him with the main Pilgrimage route in al-Zarqa*
Of the three wazirs dispatched by the Sultan only those of Aleppo and
5 • -Killis arrived in Damascus. Nu’man Pasha the Governor of Urfa, who x*ras
appointed governor of Fgypt and garifaskar (commander-in-chief), was still
preparing to leave for Damascus. The arrival of these troops in Damascus
„ Bey
had a great effect in frightening away Isma*xl/and his allies. Already, 
there had been divergence in views between Isma*xl Bey and #ahir over attacking
1Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 28a, 28b. 2Ibid.. ff. 23b-29b.
3Ibid.. ff. 35a-36a.
4-Ibid.. f. 36a; A.N.B1 1121} Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation de ce qui passe 
en Syrie); A.N.B 1035s Sidon, 2.5.71. For the location of al-Zarqa' on 
the Pilgrimage,.route see Appendix,IT,
^Ibn al-Siddiq,B$. 33a, 36a-37a; cf. A.N.B 91s Aleppo, 12.4.71, Aleppo,
29.4.71, A.N.B11035 * Sidon, 2,5.71, PRO.S.P. 110/39, Pt. I; Aleppo,
13.4.71.
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4Uthman Pasha with or without the pilgrims. Although Zahir1 s plan for 
attacking him irrespective of any consideration had failed when the Pil­
grimage was on its way to Mecca, it seems that he had his own way, later, 
when his troops took the initiative in occupying Muzayrib* But the ;jarda 
managed to pass safely. To keep holding Muzayrib, awaiting the return of 
“Uthman Pasha with the Pilgrimage, would possibly renew the controversy 
between Isma<'il Bey and Zahir about the implications of attacking it or 
not and would also endanger their chances of victory after the arrival of 
the relief troops to Damascus. Consequently, Isma*Tl Bey and his allies 
withdrew from Muzayrib, The Malawila went to their country, Zahir re­
turned to the region of Safad, and Isma4il Bey x^ ent to the region of 
Mablus to besiege Ibn Jarrar. This does not mean that the Allies1 had
split; they had simply dispersed because no joint action x^as expected 
3
at the time. It was'apparent, however, that the political initiative 
slipped away from Zahir1s hands. If it is true that he had reported the 
unyielding attitude of Isma*Tl Bey to 4Ali Bey, who consequently sent more 
troops, then it is ironical that Zahir1s supremacy should have been over­
shadowed as a result.
The campaign of Abu * 1-Phahab and the occupation of Damascus.
On 4 Muliarram 1185/19 April 1771 Abu * l-Dhahab left Cairo for Syria 
a 5at the head of/large army. JrwGunsrwere 'carried' on /camels, 'and1' other pro-
1A„N.B1 10358 Sidon, 2.5.71.
2 — -
''Ibid,; about Isma4il Bey1 s occupation of the village of Qabatya and the
submission of certain shaykhs to him in the region of Nablus with the ex­
ception of Ibn Jarrar, see A*N.B 1035s Sidon, 3.5*71; Ibn al-Siddio^ , 
off. 37b, 38a*
3A.N.B 1035^ Sidon,2.5.71, cf. B 1034* Sidon,15.11.70; Shilmb.Labnan.I.Sl. 
4lbn al-Siddiq, f.38b.
E^stimates on the siae of his army ranged, between 12 and 40 thousand, see 
ibid.; *A. al-i3abbfgh, f. 18b; 97/47*. Istanbul, 3.6.71; A.H.B-1-
1035: Sidon, 3W5.71; A.N.B1 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71.
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fw* 1
visions were sent by sea to Damietta. For the latter purpose 4 All Bey laid
an embargo on vessels.^ On 2 Safar 1185/17 May 1771 Abu f 1-Dhahab arrived in
Ramie .3 This was a decisive event, which affected JJahir* s' ascendancy but not
his committed policy towards *Ali Bey. 2lahir did not go in person to meet
Abu > 1-Dhahab but was satisfied to send the eldest of his sons. In the word
of a contemporary source, Zahir *n*a pas voulu aller se presenter au devant
du general d^gipte1. This was in glaring contrast to his personal welcome
to Isma'il Bey. £ahir busy at the time strengthening the fortifications
of Acre,5 He had reason to fear an Ottoman disciplinary attack, particularly
because the arrival of Abu ; 1-Dhahab would give the struggle a sharper turn.
Such a threat, had always been imminent but the Sultan was still busy in his
war with Russia. Moreover, the strengthening of an ally should have been
comforting to Zahir* In spite of that it appeared !qu*il est dans quelques 
6craintes1. It seems that IJahir began to be apprehensive of the increasing 
power of the troops of * All Bey. However, 55hir*s forces, commanded by his 
sons, and not, significantly, by himself as previously, fought alongside
those of Abu '1-Dhahab.
_ _ 7
Shaykh Ha§if presented his allegiance personally to Abu ^1-Dhahab. His
reasons for doing so are understandable; not the least among them was the
fact that his leadership among the Matawila was still challenged by Shaykh
•‘•Jabartl, I, 364-365. ^PBO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 3.6.71.
^.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71; Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 14a.
^A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 31.5.71. 5Ibid.
6Ibid. 7Ibid.
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Qablan, who was secretly communicating with Par wish Pasha in Sidon. The
immediate objectives of Shaykh Na§if were to assure his supremacy among
-  1the Matawila and to acquire the governorship of Sidon*
* Uthman Pasha, managed to conduct the Pilgrimage safely that year and
2
he returned to Damascus on 8 gafar/23 May. The occasion was celebrated with
3 Lrejoicings in Damascus, as well as in Tripoli and Sidon*
The advance of Abu *1-Dhahab on Damascus put the military power of & Uth-
Eian Pasha, and indeed of all the troops sent by the Sultan, to the test.
5
Joined by Isma*£l Bey and the troops of §ahir and the Matawila, Abu i 1-
Dhahab reached Sa4 sa4, a village on the outskirts of Damascus, on 18 Safar
8
U 85 /2 June 1771, without encountering any resistance. Before discussing 
the military confrontation that took place, an examination of the power 
potential of both sides is useful at this stage.
9
The number of troops defending Damascus amounted to about18000. They
seemed invincible to the Damascenes, and. as such disastrously encouraged
10
complacency even in *Uthman Pasha. The troops were composed of several
h.N.B1 1035! Sidon, 31.5.71.
2Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 40a; A.N.B 91: Aleppo, 1.6.71.
3Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 40b. h.N.B 1121; Tripoli, 12.6.71.
5A.N.B1 1035:,- Sidon, 31.5.71; Ibn al~§iddiq, f. 42a.
Ibn al-SiddTq, f. 42a. In 989/158I Sa* sa5 was described in the Ottoman
documents as an isolated halting-place near Damascus, on the road to Jeru­
salem. In that year it was made a village at the suggestion of a former 
judge of Damascus, see Reyd, 101.
7Muradi, II, 128. 8A.N.B 1035s Sidon, 1.6.71.
%his is based on Information given by Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 28b,- 36a, 37a, 41sq,
41b, 42a, 110b5 A.N.B 1121 j Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation de ce qui passe 
en Syrie); A.N.Ir-91: Aleppo, 23.5*71.
10Ibn al-Sidcliq, f. 41b, cf. ff, 36b, 37a.
339
corps which were conscious of their separate identities and more apt to 
take to rivalry than to cooperation. The Yerliyya. long used, to factional 
struggle and wry rarely to punitive expeditions against neighbouring forces, 
were subjected now to an external pressure of which they had no experience.
If the number of esands (certificates of pay) coincided with the actual
membership of the Yerliyya corps, then there were 1950 Yerlis at the time
1 2 of the attack.”’ But not all of them were fit for fighting, nor were all
even theoretically available, because their primary task was to garrison
the fortresses along the Pilgrimage route. Furthermore, the agha of the
Yerliyya. Yusuf b. Jabri, was suspected of secret communication with the 
3
Mamluks.
In 1184/1770-1 the Kapi Kulus numbered no less than two thousand.4 But
their duty was to guard the citadel and other strategic points in Damascus;
hence, they were not of much help on the battle-field. As for the feudal
forces, Zu*ama and Timariots. they were, like the Yerliyya. concerned with
safeguarding their local interests. Militarily they were not of much value.
The private or mercenary troops were aliens having no substantial local
interests to safeguard; their chief impetus for fighting was pay and booty, j
Even these inducements were not enough at times of imminent danger. During
the attack of Abu * 1-Dhahab on Damascus, the La wand and the Dalatiyya were ;
6
driven out from their lodgings into the battle-field with sticks. On learn­
ing, earlier, that Abu ?1-Dhahab had reached Gasa, the Lawand exploited the 
situation to practise extortions on the villagers. Partly as a result of
hbn al~§iddiq, f. 110b. 2Ibid.. ff. 16b, 17a, 110b.
3Ibld.. ff. 29b, 35a, 35b, 40a, 40b; see below p. tlbid.. f. 28b.
5Ibid.. ff.43gft,25b, 30b. Ibid.. f. 43b.
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this and partly also as a result of the impending threat of Abu *1-Dhahab«
the majority of the inhabitants of Wadi al-6Ajam (a region in the vicinity
] _
of Damascus) took refuge in Damascus. The swarming of the inhabitants of
2
several villages to Damascus increased tension in it. Undeterred by the 
danger of the troops of *i\li Bey, the Dalatiyya quarrelled with the Yerliyya 1 
The arrival of the relief troops in Damascus, although comforting, was 
disquieting to many Damascenes because they had to provide for their upkeep. 
However, when news of the arrival of Abu * 1-Dhahab in Gaza reached Damascus, 
many of the janissaries from Aleppo, Killis, r A in tab and Antioch fled..^
Apart from their lack of homogeneity and discipline, the troops in Damas­
cus lacked a unified command. The commander-in-chief, Hu*man Pasha. had
5
not yet arrived. Of more importance was the fact that their allegiance was 
at variance. Since they were not fighting an infidel, there was no feeling 
of Islamic solidarity and of jihad. The enemy here was Muslim, and although 
the Matawila were Shi* is this did not account much because of their small 
number vis-a-vis their Sunni allies, and also because they were qpite fami­
liar to the Damascenes. Furthermore, &Al! Bey had not revoked the sovereign­
ty of the .Sultan. His proclaimed aim of relieving the inhabitants of the 
injustice of Uthman Pasha, in accordance with the precepts of the Qur'an,
^Ibn al-giddiq, f. 41a-. %uradi, I, 55. %bn al-§iddiq, f. 17b.
4
Ibid,, f. 4'la. 
c 1
Ibid., f. 41b; A.N.B 91s Aleppo, 29.4.71, Aleppo, 16.7.71, Aleppo, 
27.9.71; PRO, S.P. 110/39, Pt/i* Aleppo, IS.5.71.
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could not fail to lull the Damascenes, as it had the rural population.
Against this background of confusion the attack of Abu * 1-Dhahab took 
place. The forces he commanded were in a better position than their oppo­
site numbers. The troops that accompanied him from Egypt were numerically
1
larger than those gathered in Damascus. He had at his disposition also a
2
large number of guns, which proved decisive in the fighting. Abu 91-Dhahab
- 3was the commander-in-chief of all the troops of 4 Ali Bey and of his allies.
Moreover, the hard core of his troops was composed of Mamluks who were so
far loyal to ‘All Bey .A Ho matter how faction-divided were the Mamluks, the
fact that they were in alien land could help to keep them together. Besides
the Mamluks, therejwere other types . of troops on the expeditions dispatched
by *'Aft'Bey such as Mafihariba. Turks, Indians and others^ who seem to have
been mercenary troops like their opposite numbers in Damascus. But unlike
them, they were less insubordinate, apparently because they did not have
the upper hand. Bather, they gravitated around the hard core of Mamluks, the
like of whom did not exist in Damascus. Obviously, the troops of * Ali Bey
had the advantage also of having been successful when put to the test in
their campaign in the IJijaa;, significantly under the command of Abu ' 1-
Dhahab. and this must have gained him and them much experience as well as
confidence*
4he number of troops that accompanied Abu 7 1—Dhahab was estimated by Ibn 
al-§iddiq, f. 38b, at 30^000, and by another source, A.N.BX 1035s Sidon,
31.5.71, at 4.0,000. Muradi, I, 54 estimated the total number of troops 
. under his command at 4^,000.
2See, Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 42b; Muradi, I, 54; A.N.B: 1035: Sidon, 345.71.
3Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 43a; A.N.B1 334* Cairo, 24.6.71 (Bulletin).
4-Cf. Jabartl, I, 365. 5Jabartl, I, 364.
6Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 47b, 46a.
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On the other hand, the troops of Zahir, largely* cavalry, were more ac­
quainted with the geography of the country than their Mamluk allies who were 
anyway no worse in this respect than the bulk of their adversaries, notably 
the relief troops• Zahir had scores to settle with i Uthman Pasha, and as 
this was apparently the immediate objective of ‘All Bey, alliance between 
them was still maintained, Jgahir's 30113 were no less dedicated to the fight­
ing because it served both as an outlet to their pent-up forces and inso facto 
as a realization of their schemes for expansion.
The Matawila were also acquainted with local fighting. After a long per­
iod of intimidation, largely at the hands of the Druzes they were anxious to 
score a resounding victory. Their participation on the side of ?ahir and 
Abu * 1-Dhahab might gain them Sidon from Darwish Pasha who was, more irri­
tatingly, backed by their enemy, Amir Yusuf.
On 17 §afar/l June, a letter in the form of an ultimatum from Abu ?1~
Dhahab was received by * Uthman Pasha. Abu 91-Dhahab stated in it that ‘Ali
Bey had appointed him governor of Damascus and that he (* Uthman Pasha) should
1leave immediately to spare the inhabitants any injury. I his was the first 
indication of the real expansionist policy of 4All Bey which transcended his 
avowed claim of merely eliminating * Uthman Pasha. On receiving the letter 
* Uthman Pasha sent it to Nu*man Pasha as a strong reminder urging him to 
come to Damascus. In the meantime, ‘Uthman Pasha began mobilizing his forces 
Assured that Abu ' 1-Dhahab had camped in Sa*sa‘, he ordered 6Abd al-Ralyaan 
Pasha and Deli Khalil Pasha to march out with their troops and take posi­
tions in Darayya. Apart from the many advantages which Abu * 1-Dhahab en­
joyed, he proved to be well versed in military tactics as shown in the de-
^bn al-Siddiq, f. 4-lb.'
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ployment of his troops for the battle. Provoked according to a fixed plan 
by the vanguard of the army of Abu * 1-Dhahab, the troops coming out from Dam­
ascus were defeated before their preparations were completed. The date was 
Monday 19 Safar 1185/3 June 1771.^
It is interesting to note that ‘Uthman Pasha, whom one would expect to 
lead this conglomeration of troops, remained behind in Damascus.^ The fugi­
tives soldiers tried to return to Damascus through the Maydan quarter but its 
inhabitants, together with those of the Qubaybat quarter, fearing their plund­
er and ravages, closed the gates in their faces and frightened them away by 
firing at them. The troops of Urfa fled in the direction of the suburban 
§ali)iiyya quarter, plundering wherever they went*. The inhabitants of this 
quarter exhibited much vigour in restraining them.^ Nearly all the relief
troops bad fled.^ Deli Khalil Fas ha left for Killis on 20 §afar/4 June,^
— 6 and ‘ Abd al-Rahman Pasha followed him the next day, arriving in Aleppo on
n
26 §afar/lO June.
The battle now centered on Damascus proper and the Damascenes took the
"Sror a detailed account of the battle see Ibn al~§iddiq, ff. 4^b-44a; an£ 
other-,reliable, and in some parts rather detailed, account is given in 
A.N*B 334i- Cairo, 24j6.71 (Bulletin) j see also A.N.B 91s Aleppo, 1-1.6.71; 
Barik, 94, 95; al-Qari, 84.
2 ___
Muradi^ statement, I, 54* that all four governors went out to combat him 
is ambiguous and not substantiated by any other source, not even his other 
statements,
3Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 44a-45a, A.N.B 91s Aleppo, 11.6.71.
1
*Tbn al-Siddiq, £. 45a; 0f. Muradi, I, 54; A.H.B 1121s Tripoli, 12.6.71
(Relation) *
'’A.N.B1 334* Cairo, 24*6.71 (Bulletin): cf. Muradi, I, 54* 55*
A.N.B'1' 334* Cairo, 24.7.61 (Bulletin).
Ta.N.B1 91: Aleppo, 11.6.71; of. A.N.B1 1121: Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation:).
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initiative in defending their city. Once more awlad al-Sham came to the fore.
The vanguard of Abu 91-Dhahab. composed of §afadiyya, Matawila and Ma^jmiiba.
1
converged on the Maydan quarter on Tuesday 20 §afar /4 June, Through the 
help of some deserters from the troops of * Uthman Pasha, they penetrated in­
to the %ibaybat and the Maydan by al-Qa4a street where defence seems to have 
been neglected. A house-to-house battle was then fought. Between Tuesday 20 
§afar/4 June and Thursday 22 Safar attacks and counter-attacks; took place, 
with the troops of Abu * 1-Dhahab penetrating to Bab al-Jabiya, only to be
pushed back by the Damascenes. The Maydan quarter was badly affected as a 
p
result. Two facts emerge from this confused situation. Firstly, Abu *1-
Dhahab did not launch so far an all-out attack on Damascus. Secondly, rumours
— 3were rife in Damascus of a revolt being planned against 4Uthman Pasha. See­
ing that the situation was getting worse and fearing lest the Damascenes turn 
against him if only in a bid to disarm Abu * 1-Dhahab of his avowed aim to el­
iminate him, 4 Uthman Pasha fled from Damascus on Thursday evening, 22 gafar, 
and made for gim§.^ Contrary to the expectations of the Damascenes, Abu > 1- 
Dhafaab did not attack on Friday. This might be a calculated plan on his part 
designed to lull religious opinion on this special day, as indeed his act was 
interpreted in Damascus, It seems also that Abu * 1-Dhahab wanted to provide 
a breathing space for the conciliatory elements in Damascus to approach him
■*Tbn al~§iddiq, ff. 41a, 41b. Ibid.. ff. 45a-48b.
^Ibid.. f. 46b.
^Ibid,. ff. 4&a, 4§bj cf. A.N.B 334* Cairo, 24.6.71 (Bulletin). Muradi, I, 
55, is somewhat confused in his dates.
5lbn al-§iddiq, f. 48b,
3 4  5
i
because he was aware of the flight of * Uthman Fagba. In fact the notables 
sent him a letter on Friday corning querying him on three points: if he de­
sired to occupy Damascus then he should make it knotjn to them; if he wanted 
to get hold of * Uthman Pasha then they were to inform him that he had fled to 
an unknown destination; and, finally, it was for him to decide if he merely 
wanted to pillage Damascus. It is important to note here that in their 
letter the notables still retained the initiative as to their final decision. 
In his reply Abu * 1-Dhahab assured them and the Damascenes of safe-conduct 
and asked to receive a deputation from them. A three-man delegation, com­
posed of * A l l Efendi al-Taghis tan!, As* ad Sfendi al-Bakri and Muhammad Efendi
  ____ _ 3
al-*Ani, went to see him in his headquarters in al-‘ Assail, outside Bab Allah. 
Their task was difficult because they feared to alienate the Sultan and * Uth- 
man Pasha. They were also worried lest the city be plundered.^ On hearing 
from Abu > 1-Dhahab that he was obedient to God and to the Sultan and that he 
had no intention of plundering Damascus, the delegation demanded safe-conduct 
in writing for all the Damascenes, who would then deliberate on the attitude
5
they would take. The conciliatory words of Abu * 1-Dhahab were not compli­
mentary but they really marked a change of heart on his part.
During the consultations held in Damascus the Yerliyya and the Kani Kulus
asserted their determination to resist.^ However, the apfta of the Yerliyya.
1Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 50b.
3lbid.. ff. 4.9a, 4-9b; cf. Muradi, 1, 55. ^Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 49a.
3Ibid.. ff. 49b-51b. 6Ibid.. ff. 51a, 51b.
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iusuf b. Jabri, who agreed to resist, apparently under duress, changed his
mind later, and left Damascus on Friday night. Did he panic or was he bought
over by Abu y 1-Dhahab as many Damascenes suggested?. When pressed to give his
reasons for leaving, Ibn Jabri bluntly stated that the situation was hopeless
1and that he wanted to save his own skin. Although it is difficult to accuse 
him with certainty of being bought over by the Mamluks, his attitude, never­
theless, remains questionable, Muradi on one occasion denied that Ibn Jabri
had betrayed the Sultan or was bought over by Abu * 1-Dhahab. but on another j
3 The accused him of doing so. It seems that ibn Jabri was trying through any 
means to be appointed governor of Damascus. The Sultan divulged later that 
Ibn Jabri had approached him to be appointed governor and that he was granted 
three tuSs for a fixed sum of money. But there was no promise or any indi­
cation that he was to attain the governorship of Damascus.^ It seems also
that tfUthman Pasha was aware of the attempt made to this end at Istanbul by
—  _  ' 5
Ibn Jabri and this explains why * Uthman Pasha tried to have him killed. It
is probable that Ibn Jabri, after seeing that the Sultan did not seriously
consider granting him the governorship of Damascus, had turned to the Mamluks
to achieve his aim. But Abu ’ 1-Dhahab does not seem to have been well dis-
posed towards him, and this may explain why Ibn Jabri did not go to him
after his flight from Damascus. He went to the Druzes instead,1 probably to
^Ibn al-§iddxq, ff, 51b, 52a. 2II, 164.
56. ^Tbn al-Siddiq, f, 95b; see above
M^urad?., Matmah, f. 37b.
^See his comment on Ibn Jabri in Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 50a.
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await the result of the straggle* Whatever his motives, it is apparent that 
Ibn Jabri and ‘Uthman Pasha were at loggerheads and that each of them worked 
to eliminate the other.
The flight of Ibn JabzT encouraged others to follow suit* The mufti* the 
najib al-Ashraf. As* ad If end! al-Bakrl, and other notables panicked and fled 
on the same night. On learning on Saturday morning 24 §afar/ff June that many 
of the notables had fled, the determination of the Damascenes to resist peter­
ed out and chaos swept in. The bakeries, the barometer of public unrest, 
closed, and the poor and hungry, with their numbers swollen by the uprooted j
j
refugees from the villages, strained the situation still further. The M s k  \I
lulus withdrew to the citadel to put up resistance there. Under these circum-
I
stances, the remaining notables decided to surrender to Abu 11-Dhahab the cityj 
with the exception of the citadel over which they had no authority. A second
I
delegation composed of* 111 Ifendi al-fighis,pni, the Shafl* I Mufti Muhammad 
al-GhazzI. the orator of the Uraayyad Mosque Sulayman al-^abasini, and the
I
scholar Khalil al-lEmilT, informed Abu ' 1-Dhahab of this decision on Saturday ; 
24 §afar/8 June.1 A decree of safe-conduct granted by Abu ' 1-Dhahab to the 
Damascenes was publicized by a crier in the city, and shops, wheat-mills and j
I
I
bakeries were ordered to resume business as usual. The troops of Abu '1- j
I
Dhahab swarmed into the city, and, abiding by his strict orders, no encroach?- |
i
ment on their part nor any reprisals on the part of the Damascenes took place* j
2 j
Their presence, in fact, revived commercial activity in Damascus. j
1
■4bn al-§iddlq, f. 52b; Muradi, I, 55; AJI.B1 334* Cairo, 24.6.71 (Bulletin); j 
A.N.B1 1035* Sidon, 28.6.71; PBO, S.P. 97/47* Istanbul, 3.7.71; A.N.B 1121;j
Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation) gave the date as 7 June. J
%bn al-§iddiq, ff. 52b, 53a, 56b, 58b, 59a; Muradi, I, 55| Barlk, f5. j
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As concerns the administration, Abu * 1-Dhahab was satisfied to appoint 
as deputy mufti. Ibrahim al-Ghazzawi. and as agha for the Yerliwa a member 
from their ranks, Amxn Agha. He retained the deputy judge Shakir Efendi.
This took place before an assembly of notables whose suggestions as to who
1
should be appointed were taken into consideration by Abu * 1-Dhahab. The im­
portant facts which emerge from these appointments are that the opinion of 
the notables had prevailed and that Abu '1-Dhahab ftasl&nkious not to violate 
j^lie Shari*a. If 'this attitude in Abu * 1-Dhahab is linked with other epi­
sodes to follow, then his change of heart towards ^Ali Bey becomes more ap­
parent.
No punitive measures were taken by Abu * 1-Dhahab against any of the
- 2
Damascenes. He confiscated, however, the belongings of the fugitive wazirs. 
He ordered * Uthman al-FalaqinsI, the accountant in the Treasury, to render
3 __
an account on the fiscal affairs of Damascus. Although the sarava resumed
its functions,^ Abu '1-Dhahab does not seem to have made it his headquarters ,
probably because he did not intend to remain in Damascus and probably also
5
for fear of the neighbouring citadel. The refusal of the Kaoi Kulus to 
surrender the citadel was a major obstacle to Abu ' 1-Dhahab. Mustafa Ajjba^
1
Ibn al-Siddiq, ff._53b-55a; Muradi, I, 56 was not precise when he men­
tioned that a mufti and a judge were appointed because, although this was 
contrary to the Shari* a. as the notables argued before Abu * 1-Dhahab. the 
names of these persons do not ajgpear in the standard lists of the muftis. 
and judges of Damascus, see Risala. ff. 26a, 32a.
2Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 56b; A.N.B1 1035* Sidon, 28.6.71; cf. A.N.B 91s Aleppo, 
11.6.71; PBO, S.P. 97/4.7s Istanbul, 3.7.71.
Muradi, III, 149. ^Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 56b.
5Cf# IbicL, f. 57b; Yanni, 377 states that Abu , 1-Dhahab stayed in dar al- 
wizara *
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commander of its garrison, made it known to Aba ' 1-Dhahab that he received
his orders from the Sultan only. The resistance of the citadel d is quietened
1
the Damascenes as much as it decided Abu * 1-Dhahab to reduce it by force.
He ordered his gunners to bombard it after warning the neighbouring inhabit­
ants to evacuate their houses. Out of 29 balls (aanabir) fired on the cita­
del, according to one account, only three hit it directly. Most of the rest 
strayed into the neighbouring houses and two of them hit the Umayyad Mosque. 
Partly because of the display of the ganjaq (the holy standard) by the be­
sieged lapi Kulua. partly because of the representations made by the ‘Ulama* 
who were particularly infuriated at the damage done to the Umayyad Mosque,
and partly also because the bombarding did hot achieve positive results,
2
Abu ' 1-Dhahab gave orders to his gunners to stop bombarding it.
The occupation of Damascus brought jubiliation to Cairo and confusion 
to the other Syrian provinces, and above all to Istanbul. 6All Bey received 
the news of the victory of his army in Barayya on 11 June, and of the surren­
der of Damascus on the 15th#c Celebrations were ordered in Cairo as
well as in other cities of Egypt for three consecutive days starting with
3 4
17 June . More troops were prepared for dispatch to Syria.
In Sidon the repercussions were of a different nature. While its gov-
|
ernor Darwish. Pasha was preparing to defend it against the threats of Shaykh j
iSflf and fahir, news of the surrender of Damascus and the flight of its
Xbn al-§iddiq, f. 57a,
2Ibid., ff. 58a, 58b; of. Muradl, I, 55, 56; al-Qarl, 84? Barik, 95. 
^A.N.B1 334s Cairo, 24.6.71. (Bulletin); of. Jabarti, I, 365. 
Ajabarti, I, 365; PRO, S.P. 97/47* Istanbul, 17.9.71.
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governor decided him to flee instead, 2!ahir and the Matawila then took 
control of Sidon. This endangered the position of Amir Yusuf who waw 
actually the dominant figure in Mount Lebanon although he did not yet 
acquire the paramountcy, He therefore expelled the representatives of 
JJahir and the Matawila from Sidon, and his supporters took control of it 
pending the arrival of a governor for the Sultan. 1 t^ seems that gahir 
and the Matawila were not in a position to hold out in Sidon, probably 
because the bulk of their forces were still with Abu ; 1-Dhahab, Of more 
importance, however, was the unexpected retreat of Abu ' 1-Dhahab from Dam­
ascus on 18 June which frustrated Zahir.
In Tripoli, the janissaries immediately took up arms and became mutin­
ous. Brigands made headway and a rebellion seemed imminent. The notables, 
in the absence of the governor, Muhammad Pasha, assembled in a dTwan to 
deliberate on the situation and were able to foil the attempted revolt.
Hews of the surrender of Damascus was announced from the saraya in 
Aleppo in the evening of 11 June, one day after the return of *Abd al-Rahman
3
Pasha. In spite of many fugitive troops which passed through Aleppo,
*everything seemed quiet. This might be partly explained by the fact that 
the Aleppines were used to the sight and behaviour of similar troops which 
on many occasions passed through Aleppo to and. from the Persian front. But 
once the Aleppines recovered from the shock, a great fear dawned on them be­
cause they knew, not without historical sense, that the second major target
1035s Sidon, 11.6»t71, Sidon, 18v»,6. *71, Sidon, 13.6.Y1, Sidon, 28.6. *71 j 
A.H.B1 91s Aleppo, 6.7.71.
^A.H.B1 1121s Tripoli, 12.6.71 (Relation); of. Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 60b.
A.W.B-*- 91s Aleppo, 11.6.71.
T^?R0, S.P. 110/39, Ft. I; Aleppo, 25.6.71.
351
of £M ±  Bey would be Aleppo. Several contemporary sources conceded that this
could happen. In fact *Ali Bey had ordered Abu ' 1-Dhahab to carry his con-
quests las far as he liked*. Furthermore, Aleppo was an integral part of
the old Maniluk Sultanate x*/hich *Ali Bey was trying to resurrect. .Troops and
2
munition were being prepared in Cairo for this purpose. No wonder, therefore
that Aleppo should start now taking precautions for defence. The governor
3held several councils for this purpose.
A lot of confusion reigned in Istanbul at the time, as a result of the 
war with Russia. The occupation of Damascus aggravated the situation. The 
Reis Efendi was reported to have confessed that his head was so much confused 
after the occupation of Damascus that he could not read his memorials*^ Fur­
ther reinforcements were ordered by the Sultan to proceed to Sftrria.
The withdrawal of Abu '1-Dhahab.i i ............ .mi. ...........  -.— ..in . —
At a time when the prospects for a further advance by Abu / 1-Dhahab were
bright, he sounded, instead, the retreat. On Tuesday 5 Babi* I 1185/18 ^une
1771, ten days after the surrender of Damascus, Abu * 1-Dhahab withdrew.
Nothing was more unexpected to his allies, adversaries and superiors.
Various explanations were given for his retreat and there seems to be
6some truth in all of them. It was stated that because'Abu *1-Dhahab was 
unable to conquer the citadel he gave up and retreated*^ Indeed his with­
1 p
JabartT, I, 365. Ibid.; PfiO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 17.9.71.
3A.N.B1 91* Aleppo, 16.7.71. T ’BO, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 3.7.71.
^Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 59a; Barik, 96, 97; Muradi, I, 56; A.N.B 1035: Sidon,
28,6,71; PHD, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 17.8.71.
6 7 _  _
Holt, *The Cloud-catcher*, 57. al-Qari, 8 4.
3 5 2
drawal came after a futile attempt to storm the citadel, but this does not 
mean that he would really be unable to conquer it in the long run. The ten 
days* period during which he was in Damascus is too short a time for us to 
Judge his determined military potential. Although the majority of the balls 
strayed outside the citadel, the aim could be adjusted, later on. Furthermon
]
it was on the representation of the notables that the bombardment was stopped,. 
Some say that this was done after the besieged displayed the holy standard.
It is true that an unsubdued citadel was a thorn in the side of Abu * 1-Dhahab 
and might serve as a central point for festering wider opposition, but such a 
danger did not seem imminent at the time when he withdrew.
Another explanation, given mainly by Lebanese chroniclers, states that 
Isma*il Bey insinuated to Abu *l~Dbahab the folly of his actions by threaten­
ing him. with the Sultan1 s retaliation after he had terminated his war with 
Russia, and by pointing out to him that the action of ‘ All Bey, and by impli­
cation his own, was a breach of the Muslim religion, partly because ‘All Bey 
had been a follower (probably meaning an ally) of the Empress of Russia, who 
was the enemy of the Muslim faith, and, as such, it was permissible for every 
Muslim to fight him. This explanation states also that IsmaAil Bey drew the 
attention of Abu * 1-Dhahab to the unyielding and treacherous attitude of Zahijr
and his sons, exemplified by the little respect which *AH Zahir showed to-
* 3wards him. Taking advantage of the presence of the §urra emini in Damascus 
both Abu * 1-Dhahab and Isma‘xl Bey intimated to him that they came contrary t\>  
their wish and that they x^rere decided to withdraw. He promised to use his
^Ibn al-ijiddTq, f. 53b. ^Shlhab. Lubnan. I, 35.
%br his function see above p
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good offices at the Porte in their favour.
Such advice by Isma* il Bey to Abu * 1-Dhahab was not incompatible with
the past attitude of IsJsafiil Bey when he rejected 5ahirfs plan to attack *Uth- 
—  ■ 2man Pasha for fear of molesting the pilgrims. There is further evidence
which confirms that Abu ^1-Dhahab did really meet the surra emini besides
3 "
other Ottoman officials. Volney states that an agent sent by *TF|ipan Pasha 
worked on Abu 71-Dhahab and alienated him fro® ‘All Bey.^ M. al~Sabbagh 
states that ‘Uthman Pasha presented to Abu *1- JJhabab a Khattl Sharif from 
the Sultan promising to appoint him in the place of *A£E Bey.**
There might be some truth also in the explanation given by Jabarti,
that Abu ? 1-Dhahab was tired of wars and that this feeling was reciprocated by
—  6 
the Mamluk amirs who were with him. The expedition into Syria followed so
soon after the one into the Hijaz.
^Shihab. Lubnan. I, 86, 87; Shihab, Tprlkh al-Jazzar, 45; Munayyir, al- 
Mashriq. 49 (1955). 263; Jabal al^urp. MTBerlin. f. 12a; luzha.
Paris, f. 45b. With regard to thefact that the account in luzha co­
incided, very often word fsr word, with that of Shihab in Lubnan. I, it is 
interesting to note here the divergence in the accounts of both works. Muz ha 
f. 45b, did not refer to the emphasis of Isma‘Il Bey in his advice to Abu *1- 
Dhahab on the treacherous attitude of $ahir*s sons nor to the statement that
^All Bey, by allying himself with the Impress of Russia, was committing a
religious offence, both of which points appear in Shihab1 s Lubnan. It is 
thus difficult to know which is the trastworthy^account. _J3ut it seems, from 
other sources which support the account of Shihab in Lubnan. that the account 
in luzha was probably deliberately presented in this form orobably because 
its author or perhaps copyist was sympathetic towards fahir and Russia.
2See above p I b n  al-§iddTq, f. 56a.
V  84. 5pp. 108-111.
^Jabarti, I. 365.
354
These explanations dwell on one main theme, namely that different ex­
ternal pressures worked on Abu * 1-Dhahab and decided him to give up the cam­
paign* That he responded to them positively implies a certain readiness in 
him to accept them* After knowing how he reacted, it remains to examine his 
real intention for doing so* Part of the answer lies in the later career of 
Abu * 1-Dhahab* But enough was known while he was still in Damascus to reveal
the reasons for his change of heart* Either on the day of his departure,'*'
2
whichtis more probable, or on the day before, Abu * 1-Dhahab addressed a let­
ter to the Damascenes in which he declared that the aiim; of his expedition 
was to expel *Uthman Pasha and that since this was done, his mission was over 
He pretended that had * Uthman Pasha come out to fight him (implying of course 
his liquidation) he would not have occupied Damascus. He alleged also that 
he had given up occupying the citadel after he was sure that * Uthman Pasha wab 
not in it. 1 For, according to him, Damascus and its citadel belonged to the
3
Sultan* If the contents of the letter were truly reported then Abu '1- 
Dhabab was using contradictory terms because he knew beforehand that cUthman 
Pasha had fled from Damascus before it surrendered to him. His giving up thei 
attack on the citadel was due apparently to other reasons, not the least among 
them was his determination to withdraw* Did Abu > 1-Dhahab really believe 
that the successive expeditions sent by tfAlx Bey were merely meant to get ric. 
of a governor who was by no means irreplacable?
1
Ibn al-§idd.iq, ff. 59a, 59b.
^duradi, I, 56. It is unlikely that Abu 91-Dhahab, who was in a hostile terri­
tory, would have given an early notice of his withdrawal for fear of attack 
on his troops.
^Muradi, 1,56; lanni, 377. ^ura&T, I, 56.
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If we survey the attitude of Abu 7 1-Dhahab before his withdrawal, a 
rather satisfactory answer explaining his retreat can be arrived at. When 
he marched on Damascus, Abu *1-Dhahab enjoydd a military reputation which 
perhaps surpassed that of his master, 'All Bey. It was under his command 
that the rivals of 'All Bey in Cairo were eliminated, that the red«wfyfable
*— — 1 VBeduin Shaykh Humam was defeated, and that the Hi jaa was conquered* let
he was subordinate to 'AlT Bey. Even before these glories Abu * 1-Dhahab
seems to have been conscious of his prestige, because on being emancipated
and made a bey in 1764, two years after 'Ali Bey bought him as mamluk, he
made the hardly precedented gesture of distributing a largess of gold on 
2
the occasion*. Given the immense prestige which Abu > 1-Dhahab had enjoyed 
in so short a time, he might be seen as a potential rival to *Ali Bey, as | 
events eventually proved him to be. The campaigns Into Syria were meant to 
serve, in a'way^ , as an outlet to the military prowess of Abu 7 1-Dhahab who 
could be dangerous if left comparatively idle, so to speak, in Gairo. But 
as things turned out these campaigns marked the beginning of a split between; 
him and 'All Bey.
• i
The advance of Abu >1-Dhahab on Damascus, unhampered by any resistance,
and his subsequent military victory in Darayya enhanced still further his
consciousness of this strength. In Damascus he felt free to do what he
liked. The stages which marked the change in his attitude could best be
illustrated by the changes, in the tone of his letters to the Damascenes and
others. In a letter addressed to 6Uthman Pasha, which arrived in Damascus
on 17 Safar/l June, Abu 31-Dhahab stated that fiAlI Bey had appointed him
3
governor of Damascus. One day before Damascus surrendered, Abu yl-Qhahab
•“■See Holt, 'The Cloud-catcher', 54, 56. 2Ibid.. 52; Jabarti, 1, 417.
%bn al-§lddiq, f. 41b.
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told a delegation of notables that he did. not come to devastate and plunder 
but he was obedient to God and to the Sultan, It is significant that he 
made no reference here to *Ali Bey. Aft^r the surrender of Damascus, a
_  p
crier referred to Abu ^1-Dhahab as Muhammad Bayic Sultan al»Barr.'“ No 
matter if this title was really assumed by Abu F1-Dhahab or bestowed on 
him by the crier, it was evident, by then, that *Ali Bey’s name was no 
more officially referred to by Abu '1-Dhahab. Later, Abu J1-Dhahab made it 
known to the surre-emini and other Ottoman officials, that he had appealed 
to the Sultan to appoint him as governor of Damascus promising that he would 
pay 3000 purses for it. He maintained, however, that if the Sultan did not 
agree to appoint him, then he should send another governor in place of * Uth-
3man Pasha. Naturally enough, Abu * 1-Dhahab ms opposed to the return of
* Uthman Pasha, if only to justify his own actions. On 1 Babi* l/l4 June,
Abu *1-Dhahab ordered another crier to assure the Damascenes of safety rin
accordance with the decrees of the holy law, of Muhammad Bayk. Mali a 1-Sham,
and of Sultan Mugtafa* Z1-
In a letter to the agcha of the citadel, Abu ; 1-Dhahab made it known, once 
more, that he had asked the Sultan to appoint him governor of Damascus, and 
if this was granted he would stay; otherwise he would leave. If Abu * l™Dha™ 
hab had really made such a demand could he have received an answer from 1st™ 
anbul by 5 Pabi* I, the date on which he withdrew? It is improbable that 
his request should have been made earlier than 20 Safar, the date on which 
he defeated the main army of* Uthman Pasha.■ For, to make such a request Abu 
y1-Dhahab needed to Impress the Sultan from a position of strength. Before 
the battle of Darayya Abu > 1-Dhahab was ootentia3-ly strong but from the 
point of view of Istanbul the forces assembled in Damascus might 
have been thought enough to defeat such a rebel,
Zcbn al-~Siddiq, f.. 50b; Muradi, I, 55._
2Ibn al-Siddlq, f. 53a. The term sultan al-barr was used earlier by 
Fakhr ai-Dih Ma£ n II, see *A. IsiiS1^ !, Le~Liban, I, 5&.
3lbn al~Siddiq, f. 56a. ^Ibid., ff. 56a., 56b. 5Ibid.. f. 57a.
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This fact and the probability that the Sultan was infuriated rather than 
impressed by Abu 7 1-Dhahab*s occupation of Damascus, explain why he did not 
appoint him its governor. Moreover, it is incredible that a request by 
Abu * 1-Dhahab to Istanbul and an answer could have been possible in such a 
short time. Other factors seem to have decided Abu * 1-Dhahab to withdraw.
That Abu >1-Dhahab became conscious partly through fear and partly 
through personal interest, of his allegiance to the Sultan and consequently 
disoxmed the expansionist policy of ‘Ali Bey, is almost certain. But it 
seems that he did not seriously believe that he would be given the governor­
ship of Damascus* His withdrawal came only a few days after his interview 
with the Ottoman officials and it is not improbable that their talks centred 
on his future role in Egypt rather than in Syria. *A. al-^abbagh asserted
that the reason for his withdrawal was treachery, in collusion with Isma*il
1
Bey, to *Ali Bey, with the aim of installing himself in his place. Natur­
ally enough, the primary field for the ambition of Abu > 1-Dhahab was Egypt, 
where he gained prominence and where it was not unusual, - in accordance with 
the prevailing Mamluk tradition of factionalism, to hope for a paramount
position. In Syria, Abu 71-Dhahab was uprooted, as were indeed the knmluks
2who accompanied him. He is alleged to have stated in his comnte rendu to
_ _ . . • 3
*Ali Bey, that he and the rest of the mamluks were in an alien country.
The dream of reviving the old Mamluk Sultanate does not seem yet to have
captured his imagination, given his subordinate position. Better, at first,
be governor in Egypt with the Sultan*s acquiescence, rather than a commander
1f 9 19a. 2Cf* J*abarti, I, 365*
^Ibid.; Shihab. Lubnan* I, 89.
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or a governor in Syria under a fellow-mamluk. Rivalry among th© Mamlute
was in its heyday at the time.
Mother factor which seems to have decided Abu * 1-Dhahab to withdraw wqs
his fear of further military clashes, especially because * Uthman Pasha was
not resigned to his fate and also because fresh troops,ordered by the Sultan,
were moving to combat him. When he later justified his withdrawal before
iAli Bey, Abu * 1-Dhahab gave as one reason the nearness of enemy reinforce- 
o
ments* It was true that Abu' 1-Dhahab should have been able to poant on
further reinforcements from 4 All Bey, and these were really in preparation,
3but they had not left Cairo by the time when he withdrew. In an interview 
with the mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad al-Taflati,^ in Ramie, Abu * 1-Dhahab. 
who was on his way to %ypt, purported to him that he was forced (implying 
by 4 All Bey) to make the attack, and criticised the folly of * A H  Bey, the 
cowardice of * Uthman Pasha and the deceit of Zahir.
The withdrawal of Abu 71-Dhahab from Syria had far-reaching repercussions 
there and particularly in Egypt. The balance of power in southern Syria was 
disrupted, and chaos prevailed for several years. In his attempt to re­
assert his authority outside Damascus, 1 Uthman Pasha failed and m s  eventual^ 
deposed,
*'Uthman Pasha returned to Damascus on 13 Rabl* 1/26 June, accompanied by
£
some fugitive notables. Three days later fresh Ottoman troops started to
^Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 6la, 6lby cf. Shihab. Lubnan. I, 87, 88.
2Shihab, Lubnan, I, 89. 3PR0, S.P* 97/47* Istanbul, 17.9.71.
4-See Murad I, IV, 102-3. ^Ibn al-§iddiq, ff* 101a, 101b, 102a.
^Ibid.. f* 6lby Muradi, I, 56, gave the date as Thursday 16 Rabi* I, which 
seems erroneous because the l6th was not a Thursday.
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arrive in Damascus. On 8 RabP 11/21 July a K&atti Sherlf was received in
w  * .~o
Damascus in which the Sultan thanked awlad al-Sham and particularly the mufti
3 —
for the role they played. It is not known if ‘Uthman Pasha was praised or
reprimanded by the Sultan, but it is significant that he was not deposed at- 
the time. The factthat he felt safe augmented his self-confidence.
Shortly after his return ‘Uthman Pasha killed Yusuf b, Jabri, the agha 
of the Yerliyya. He nominated in his place Sulayman Aaha . Kaliya of the 
Yerliyya The event was well-timed because * Uthman Pasha needed to re­
assert his authority in Damascus. He also needed the money of Ibn Jabri,
He confiscated. 300 purses,largely drawn from the revenue of his property, 
estimated, at 3000 purses, and then asked the Sultan to authorize its con­
fiscation. iUthman Pasha did not remain in office long enough to receive
the orders of the Sultan to this effect, and it was under his successor,
, 5
Muhammad Pasha al- Azm, that this took olace*. The reaction of the Damas-
0 *«iw» 0 7
—  6
cenes was generally favourable because of the lofty attitude of Ibn Jabri.
The Yerliyya did not show any sign of insubordination, probably because
they were convinced of the guilt of Ibn Jabri. The fact that Ibn Jabri
was a peasant by origin - a fact contemptuously invoked after his death -
might also explain the lack of sympathy for him among the townspeople.
^Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 6lbj cf, A.N.B^ 91s Aleppo, 6.7.71.
**This seems rather over-complimentary because the Mufti Husayn al-Muradi 
fled from Damascus and did not play a prominent role,
%bn al-§iddiq, f. 62a.
hbid., ff. 63a-64a; A.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 20.8.71. The statement by Shihab, 
Lubmn. I, 89, that ‘Uthman Agjfcja b. Shabtb became agha of the Yerliyya
seems erroneous. According to Ibn al-Siddiq, -cUthman Jfeha was appointed 
kahva of the Yerliyya in plaee of Sulayman Aa ha.
^Ibn al—§iddrq, ff. 63a-65a,
6ibid.. ff. 64a, 65a, cf. f. 65bj Muradi, II, 163, 164, Matmafr, f. 124b.
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The amounts confiscated from Ibn Jabri mitigated the excesses in the
1
extortions already started by * Uthman Pasha in Damascus, to finance his
military preparations and to regain part of the wealth he had forfeited.
Nevertheless, *Uthman Pasha stepped up his extortionate measures in Damascus,
2
shortly afterwards, to an extent that alienated its inhabitants.
* Uthman1 Pasha1 s self-confidence increased to a degree that bordered on
3
overweening arrogance and eventually endangered his balance of judgment.
On 19 Rabi Il/l August a Khatti Sherlf arrived from the Sultan, confirming 
i Uthman Pasha in his governorship, decorating him with a robe of honour and 
thanking him for his bravery against the inyaders.^ Officials and other not­
ables were decorated as well* It was not lost on the Damascenes that *Uth­
man Pasha had distorted the facts in his reports to the Sultan and had por-
c . ^
trayed his defeatism as bravery. Xet, fUthman Pasha was confirmed, his 
defeatism decorated and, more important, his dangerous haughtiness encouraged, 
Instead of reaching an accommodation with Deli Khalil Pasha over the
pay of his troops, *Uthman Pasha expelled him and his troops from Damascus
6 *__
at a time when the danger had by no means subsided. For, on 2 Jumada I'/
13 Ibn Jarrar, who had been besieged in the fortress of Sannur for
about a year, appealed to cUthman Pasha for help against an imminent attack
1 1 - 
A.H.B 1035:: Sidon, 10.7.71, Sidon 13.7.71, Sidon, 20.8,71; cf. Barik, 96.
^Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 65a. ^Gf. Ibid.
^Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 66a. His son Muhammad Pasha was confirmed at about the 
same time In the governorship of Tripoli, A.NJ3 1121: Tripoli, 26.6*71 
(Extrait des Registres). His other son, Darwish Pasha of Sidon seems also 
to have been confirmed because he was not deposed
5lbn al-§iddiq.], f. 66a, cf. f. 102av
^Ibid., ff. 65a, 65b; Deli Khalil Pasha was appointed to the governorship of 
Urfil in place of Nu*man Pasha, see 91s Aleppo, 27.9*71.
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by gahir and the Matawila, Again, the military ixnpreparedness or rather the 
over-confidence of 4Uthman Pasha were largely responsible for his subsequent 
defeat at the hands of Zahir.
c Uthman Pasha tried to fill the power vacuum created after the with­
drawal of Abu > 1-Dhahab. Although he appointed governors to the Biqa* and 
1
Qunaytra, his authority was by no means restored over all th© remaining
parts of his province. It is true that Zahir was politically and militarily
2
embarrassed after the withdrawal of Abu *1-Dhahab, but he was in communica­
tion with ‘All Bey who, acquainted with the betrayal of Abu '1-Dhahab, pro­
mised to dispatch fresh troops to Syria. The ease with which the conquest 
of Damascus had been achieved was certainly encouraging to 4All Bey.
The response of *Ali Bey was heartening to Zahir who consequently sent 
troops to take possession of Jaffa, so as to receive the promised troops of
3
*Ali Bey, In the wake of Abu ' 1-Dhahab*s withdrawal, Gaza, Ramie and Jaffa 
were left without governors. Their inhabitants were apprehensive of the re­
turn of * Uthman Pasha and the resumption of the old practices of exploita­
tion. The Beduin in their vicinity ran loose, communications were threatened 
and a severe blow was dealt! to commerce,^ With * Uthman Pasha determined to 
restore his authority over all parts of his province and §ahir encouraged 
by iAid Bey to stand firm, a clash between them became imminent• While Jaffa
1Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 64a.
^.N.B1 1035* Sidon, 28.6.71; Volney, 84; *A. al-§abbagh, f. 19a.
1
3pB0, S.P. 97/47* Istanbul, 17.9.71; A.N.B 1035s Sidon, 13.7.71, Sidon,
20.7.71, M. al-§abba£h, 111, 112.
^A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 10.7.71.
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was under the control of $ahir, the governorshipsof Gaza and Ramie changed
— 1 — 
from his control to that of * Uthman Pasha. Xn the meantime, !£ahir was try-*
—  2 —  
ing to subdue his enemy Ibn Jarrac It seems that ifahir was apprehensive of
the rise of Amir Yusuf to the paramountcy in Mount Lebanon in place of Amir
3 -
Mansur, who had been on his side. By subduing Ibn Jarrar, §ahir certainly 
hoped to deprive ‘Uthman Pasha of a powerful ally. He needed also to im­
press 4 Ali Bey with the continued invincibility of his military power so as 
to encourage him to dispatch troops. Furthermore, military action might 
keep his ranks closed and divert the attention of his sons from inter-rivalry 
The danger of 5ahir*s action was that it aroused 4Uthman Pasha, who responded 
to the call for help of his protegl Ibn Jarrar. It is true that 4 Uthman 
Pasha was planning to attack £ahir any way and that a clash m s  likely to
occur when fUthman Pasha went on the dawra because Zahir had taken control
of Damascus
of sevei*al regions in the province/ But this incident hastened the clash.
On Monday 22 Jumada I 1185/2 September 1771 a battle too]£ place between 4Uth
man Pasha and JJahir near Lake Hula. The army of 4Uthman Pasha was worsted,
the mjoritywwere drowned in the river Jordan while trying to escape, and
4 Uthman Pagha was lucky enough to be saved.^ He returned to Damascus on 6 
5September.
1 1
&.N.B 1035* Sidon, 20.8*71 (attached to it a dispatch from Ramie, 20.7.71)
2A.H.B 10358 Sidon, 20.8.71; Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 66b, 67a. _
3A.N.B 1035 s Sidon, 28.6.71, Sidon, 20.8.71; Shihab, Lubnan^ I, 88; Muz ha..
MS. Paris, ff. 46a, 46b; Shidyaq, 435~7; Munayyir, al-Mashriq. 49 (1955),
263. —  -----
%or an account of the^battle see, Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 69b-74bj &.N.E?* 1035* 
Sidon, 21,9.715 A.N.B 91s Aleppo, 27.9.71 (attached to it a dispatch from 
Sidon)5 PRO, S.P. 97/47* Istanbul, 4*11.71; ‘A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 19b-20b; 
v (cont.)
363
After his return to Damascus, 4Uthman Pasha was confronted with the ur
gent problem of preparing money and troops to conduct the Pilgrimage. He
started by confiscating the property of the persons who were killed in the
battle of Hula, and by making exactions. He also curtailed the pay to the
Lawand and the Dalatiwa because they were unreliable in fighting, and pro-
1 ~  —mised to raise other troops. In the diwan. which he convoked to deliberate
on the situation and to advise on how to report to the Sultan, 4 Uthman Fas list
was urged by those assembled to relate the truth* otherwise they would not
endorse his appeal. Accordingly, *Uthman Pasha informed the Sultan, without
extolling his oxai bravery, of the unreliability of his troops and of his need
2
for money and troops.
In the meantime security had reached a low ebb both in Damascus and in
the rural regions * Some Maghariba blocked the highways and Beduin in the
immediate vicinity of Damascus ran loose. The indecisiveness and loss of
3
control of ‘Uthman Pasha encouraged this state of affail’s. However, the
expected arrival of Nu*niah Pasha evoked a feeling of security among the Dam­
ascenes. But their anxiety x^as soon aroused on hearing how he was exploiting
4
the inhabitants on his way,
While 4Uthman Pasha had enough problems on his hands to cope with news
that Ms son Darwish Pasha was besieged in Sidon was received in Damascus on
5
11 Rajab/20 Oct. and caused much consternation and embarrassment. After his
victory over * Uthman Pa^ ha, gahir returned to Acre on 5 September and communi
—  —  6 
tedvfco 4Ali Bey the news of his victoryover Uthman Pasha. He then turned
his attention to Sidon. On 13 Oct. 2ahir sent an ultimatum to Darwish Pasha
(cont.) M. al-Sabbagh, 100-1$ Barik, 97$ Shihab. Lubnan. I, 89; Munayyir, 
al-Mashriq. 49 (1955), 262, 263.
5PR0, S.P. 97/47: Istanbul, 18.11.71,.____
1Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 74a-75a. ~ Sbid.. ff. 75a-76a. -^Ibid.. ff.79a,79b.
4lbid... ff. 78a. 78b. 8la. 5ibid.. f. 81a.
?§¥lb^l:4Ai!?'?2.,. 27-9-71; Sidon, 21.9.71; of. S.P.97/47s
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asking him to quit Sidon, which he did on the following day. Amir Yusuf, 
fearing isolation and a possible threat to Beirut by Zahir, persuaded ParwTsh 
Pasha to return to Sidon under the protection of his troops. 1 Thus Amir Yusuf 
committed himself militarily against Zahir and the Matawila, Several factors 
decided Amir Yusuf to act so quickly and decisively. His position in Mount
Lebanon was by no means 'Unchallenged, His retired uncle, Amir Mansur, was
2 *- —
manoeuvring to discredit him. Since Amir Man§ur had previously taken the
  *
side of gahir, it was to the latter1 s advantage ttaalj he should be reinstated.^
The Matawila also began to create trouble for Amir Yusuf by attacking terri­
tories under his Jurisdiction.^ ** Furthermore, Amir Yusuf was very much in need 
of a resounding victory, aftex* he was raised to the paramountcy,to establish
his prestige. On the other hand, *Uthman Pasha exempted him from paying the
  5
miri tax for two years, in accordance with a Khatti Sherif, and exhorted him
to fight the Matawila, In the' battle that ensued in Haba^iyya on 20 October,
between Amir Yusuf on the one hand, and the Matawila backed by Zahir, on the
other, Amir Yusuf was defeated. On 23 October Sidon was occupied by the
Joint forces of Zahir and the Matawila, which converged on it by land, and
1035: Sidon 9.11.71; A.N.B1' 91: Aleppo, 17.11.71 (Relation de la 
prise de Seyde); A.N.B-'-1-1- 90: Marseille, 29.1.72 (attached to it a dispatch
from Sidon, 30.10.71); Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. Sib, 82a, 87a, 87b.
M^unayyir, al-Mashriq. 49 (1955) > 265; of* Shihab. Lubnan, I, 92.
^A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 23.12.71.
S^hihab. Lubnan. I, 91; Shidyaq. 4-37; Nnzha. MS. Paris, f. 47a.
-’ibn al-Siddiq,,f. 82b. Shihab, Lubnan. I, 90 and Shidyaq, 439 mention that
Amir Yusuf was exempted from the miri tax for one year so as to guard Sidon. 
A.N.B1 1035r Sidon, 9*11.71, merely referred to a monetary arrangement be­
tween * Uthman Pasha and Amir Slsuf based on a Khatti Sherif. According to
4A. al-gabbaffh. f. 20b ‘Uthman Pasha drew the attention^ofJlmir Yusuf to the 
fact that he had already been exempted from paying the miri tax for three 
years.
S^hihab, Lubnan, I, 90-2; Shidyaq, 438; Munayyir, al-Mas.hriq 49 (1955), 264; 
Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 87a-89b; Barik, 97; 'A, al-§abba£h, f. 21a.
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those of Ali Bey, which descended on it from the sea. Other troops of
  2
'Ali Bey occupied Gaza, Jaffa and Ramie. An apparent calm prevailed in
Cairo at .the time, and hostilities did not break out between 'All Bey and
Abu ' 1-Dhahab until early Shawwal 1185/January 1772.  ^ This enabled 'All Bey
to send troops to Syria.
The Deposition of 'Uthman Pasha.
Amid this political turmoil ‘Uthman Pasha and his sons were deposed from 
their governorships of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli. News to this effect 
reached Damascus on 13 Rajab/22 Oct. through ‘Uthman Pasha*s agent in Istan­
bul.4' The Damascenes were doubly glad, firstly, because the recent calamities 
were associated with ‘Uthman Pasha, and, secondly, because a member of the
'Aigm family succeeded him. The contemporary Damascene chronicler, Ibn al-
of
§iddiq, referred, on the occasion, to the humble origin/Utbrian Pasha 
(qalil al-agl) in contrast to the dignified origin of Muhammad Pasha al-'Agm 
who became governor.^
1See A.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 9.11.71, Sidon, 30.4.72 (Bulletin); A.N.B1 91*
Aleppo, 17.11.71 (Relation de la prise de Seyde) t PRO, S.P. 97/4*7: Istanbul, 
17.12,71.
2A.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 9.11.71, Sidon, 23.11.71, Sidon, 10.2.72; A.N.B Alepoo, 
6.12.71; A.N.B1 334: Cairo, 5.12.71} A.N.B1 441* Istanbul, 3.12.71; PRO.
S.P. 97/4-7: Istanbul, 3*12.71. Jabarti, I, 363, dismissed the events of 
Rajab, Sha* ban and Ramadan of this year in a few words, and mentioned noth­
ing on the departure of these troops. The Lebanese chroniclers give con­
fused information, cf. Ibn al~§iddiq, ff. 79b, 60a, B$b.
^Jabartx, I,,363.
^Ibn al-giddlq, f. 83b. '
5 Ibid.
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Until his defeat near Lake Hula, *Uthman Paj3ha had been able to retain 
his governorship* Various factors helped him do so. Apart from the usual 
practice of keeping an agent at Istanbul, *Uthman Pasha adopted an expedient" 
administrative policy. He refrained from practising extortions in Damascus 
until his hand was forced after the attack by Abu*'1-Dhahab. There is no 
evidence that the Damascenes tried to revolt against him before this incid­
ent* In fact * Uthman Pasha was very cooperative with the Damascenes* The 
rural population, it is true, had suffered from his exactions, but they ex­
pressed their discontent in another way, by declaring for *Ali Bey. He also 
ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage;-all through his governorship and this 
gained him much crddit. Even after1the occupation of Damascus by Abu *1- 
Dhahab, * Uthman Pasha had been able to leather the storm. The Sultan, oc­
cupied in the war with Russia, was not duly informed about the real political 
situation in Syria* Nothing is more illustrative of this than the demand 
made on one occasion by the Reis Efendi to the dragoman of the English am- j
bassador at .Istanbul to supply him with the information which the latter had
1 :
received from the English Consul at Aleppo concerning the affairs of Syria*
A major factor which seems to have decided the Sultan not to depose 
sUthman Pasha while the troops of 6All Bey were still in Syria was connected 
with the Sultan’s prestige. It was publicly made known by *Ali Bey and his1
ERO, S.P. 97/4-8» Istanbul, 4.5.71.
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commanders that their aim was to purge Sftrria from the injustice of * Uthman
Pasha. The Sultan had been informed by the Damascenes of this claim as early
—  . 1 
as Ramadan 1184/December-January 1770-1, An appeal bad also been made to the
_   p
Sultan by *&li Bey and 2ahii* asking him to depose * Uthman Pasha," For the
Sultan to depose * Uthman Pasha vrhile the troops of *AlT Bey were still in
Syria, even if he was convinced of the validity of the accusations made by
4All! Bey against him, would be interpreted as giving way to the demands of tfAl
Bey, and this would augment the latter*s prestige. - After the withdrawal of
the Mamluk troops the Sultan was more free to act. The subsequent defeat of
fUthman Pasha near Lake IjEula, and his appeal to the Sultan for troops and
money increased the embarrassment of the Sultan because he was still emtrdiLed
in war with Russia. The Sultan may also have become aware of.the deceit of
* Uthman Pasha who was mainly interested in extolling his own courage. One
wonders also if the deposition of * Uthman Pasha was not implicitly intended
help _
by the Sultan to/ward off another attack by *Ali Bey, or at least to appease
Abu *1-Dhahab who had insisted on it before his withdrawal. The Ottoman of­
ficials who conversed with Abu * 1-Dhahab in Damascus may also have alienated 
the Sultan from 4Uthman Pasha. However, * Uthman Pasha was not completely dis­
credited. He was appointed governor of IConya in place of Muhammad Pasha al~ 
A^^ m, and his son Muhammad Pasha was appointed to Mosul, He was also de­
prived of the malikanes of Hamah, Hims, Ma‘arra and al-Hi§n, which were given 
to Muhammad Pasha al-*Agm in his capacity as commander of the Pilgrimage.^
1Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. I8a-19a. 2PR0, S.P. 97/4-9: Istanbul, 17.10.71.
3Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 83b; PBO, S.P. 97/4-7: Istanbul, 17.10.71: A.N.EL 44.I:
Istanbul, 25.10.71.
4Ibn al-§idd!q, ff. 102b-105a.
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Chapter &
THB FOURTH PHASE OF PULE IN DAMASCUS,
Between 1771 and 1733 the governors of Damascus gradually lost the
\
initiative in the bid for political power vis-a-vis the neighbouring power 
groups, The dominant role which the governors of Damascus had played ever 
since the elimination of Fakhr al-Dln II in 1635* in varying degrees from 
one period to the other, was completely reversed under *Uthman Pasha. The 
expedition of ‘Ali Bey exposed not only the weakness of Ottoman authority 
but,what most concerns us here, the inability of the governors of Damascus 
to stand up to this challenge and, more important, to regain their strength 
after this setback. Theirs was a supremacy adjusted to the local balance of 
power. Once it was shaken by the Mamluk intervention, they relapsed into 
military insignificance until Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar assumed the governorship 
of Damascus, Jazzar was essentially based on the province of Sidon and 
his acquisition of the governorship of Damascus was something subsidiary, 
although very much desired for its prestige. Under him the Damascenes were 
much humiliated and the hegemony of Damascus was surrendered to Sidon or 
rather to Acre,.
This chapter deals therefore with the sequel of Abu '* 1-Dhahab1 s with­
drawal and the inability of the governors of Damascus to adjust themselves 
to the changes that followed. Damascus witnessed three governorships dur­
ing this period of twelve years, two of which were assumed by Muhammad Pasha 
al-^A^m, who governed in all about eleven years. He was appointed to Damas­
cus at a time,when it was undersong a crisis in the struggle for supremacy,
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and he m s  unable to salvage it. Jazzar was moving on his track and, before 
he overtook him, Muhammad Pasha died.
To trace the vicissitudes of Damascus during this fourth phase of *A§m 
rule, the year 1775 is taken as a point of departure in the development of 
15olitibM^|)b^^aS concerns the relations of the governors of Damascus with 
their neighbours; this affected to some extent their policies inside Damas­
cus*
I. The province of Damascus between 1771 and 1775.
The First Governorship of Mufcammad Pasha al-*Agm.
On 13 Rajab 1185/22 Oct, 1771, the day on which * Uthman Pasha al-Kurji 
was informed of his deposition,**- a messenger dispatched by Muhammad Pasha
al-'Asgm arrived in Damascus and officially announced his appointment and
2.
that of Mustafa Agha of the Kani Kulus. as mutasallim. On 26 Rajab/4 
Uovember, Muhammad Pasha al-'A^m entered Damascus.^
Muhammad Pasha represents the third generation of #A^m governors who 
were appointed to Damascus. He was the son of Mu§Jafa b. Paris b, Ibrahim 
al-^A^m and his grandfather on the maternal side was Isma^il Pasha al-*A§m.
^Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 83a, 83b. ^Ibid.* 84b; cf. Risala. f. 15a.
3 - —
Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 86a, 93b; cf. Risala. f. 15a.
^Muradl, 17, 97; cf. ^ikha* il al-Dimashal. Ta^rikh t^awadith al-Sham wa-4- 
Lubnan. 1782-1841, Beirut, 1912; p.7; see the genealogical table of *A $m  
governors, AppendixThe statement by Gibb and Bowen, I.i.221, that Muham­
mad Pasha was descended from the *Azm family on the maternal side^ is mis­
leading because it seems to have been based on a statement by Muradi, IV, 
97, that the grandfather of Muhammad Pasha on the maternal side was the 
famous Wasir Isma‘il Pasha al-*A§m. Ihis seems to have been intended by 
Muradi to link Muhammad Pasha with this famous governor who was known to 
the Damascenes. Isma*il Pasha was certainly more famous than_any relative 
on the paternal side of Muljammad Pasha. The statement by Muradi does not
bear any implication that Muhammad Pasha was not descended froa the s Azms 
on the paternal side also.
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Since his first appointment to Sidon in 1763 Muhammad Fas ha load been ap­
pointed to other provinces. But for the larger part of the period between
,  1 
1763 and 1771 he held the governorship of Sidon intermittently. Before he
assumed the governorship of Konya to which he was posted, Muhammad Pasha was
2
appointed to Damascus. This appointment realised a long-standing desire by
the *Agras to have one of their members appointed to Damascus in place of the
- ' 3former mamluk of As* ad Pasha.
Uppermost among the difficulties that confronted Muhammad Pasha was the 
need to obtain enough money to finance the Pilgrimage. The methods he used, 
however, and the resources he tapped helped him to overcome this obstacle. 
Esther than enforce levies in c%sh and in kind indiscriminately on the Damas­
cenes he marked certain groups which were small in number and rich enough to 
contribute, such as the merchants and other wealthy dignitaries, and excused 
the mass of the people, who could be easily alienated and who were able to 
cause trouble.^ It might be argued that this would sharpen the protests of 
the non-exempted. groups who had the means to create trouble. But it seems 
that care was also taken not to include among them the militant groups, such 
as the Yerliyya. who could carry their complaints into' open revolt. Through
his intercession, * Uthman fAgha b. Shah lb was appointed agha of the Yerliyya
— 5
in place of Sulayman Agha, who was a puppet of the deposed * Uthman Pasha.
Before his departure for the Pilgrimage, Muhammad Pasha received a firman in
which the Sultan granted 120 esami to the Yerliyya corps, which swelled their
number to 2070. The aim behind this increase was to guard the fort­
1See Muradi, IV, 98-101. 2Ibn al-Siddiq, ff. 91b, 92a; cf. Muradi,IV, 101. 
hee above p.'iojf. ^Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 94b. hbid.» ff. 110a, 110b,
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resses along the Pilgrimage route* Muhammad Pasha handed the esami to the
agha of the Yerliyya and ordered him to confer them on able persons and not
1 — — 
on boys or elderly people. Such an increase in the esami could not fail to
win Muhammad Pasha much support among the Yerliyya. particularly because the 
person,' who xras authorised to distribute the esami was * Uthman Agha b. Sha- 
tiib. Muhammad Pasha was also on good terms with the a^ha of the Kani Kulus. 
and he appointed him for the second time, on the occasion of his departure 
with the Pilgrimage, as his mutasallim. Furthermore, a sense of religious 
responsibility prevailed, as the fate of the Pilgrimage was at stake* An­
other source of revenue which partly helped in relieving the Damascenes was 
the Sultans authorisation to the confiscation of part of the revenue of the
_  „ _ 2
malikanes of Hamah, Hims, Macarra and al-gi^n from *Uthman Pasha. *Uthman
Pasha was also ordered to surrender the money he had confiscated from Ibn
1 \ .
Jabri, and to hand the sums he owed to some Damascenes to Muhammad Pasha.
3 —Most of this was done.."^  What remained of the property of Ibn Jabri in Dam­
ascus was sold by the order of the Sultan.^
What aggravated Muhammad Pasha fs need for money was his inability to go 
on the dawra. According to Ibn al-Siddiq, Muhammad Pasha ascribed his in­
ability to go on the dawra to the lack of time before the Pilgrimage. In­
stead, he sent orders on 2f5 Sha‘ban/l6 December to the inhabitants of the 
region of Wablus urging them to pay the miri dues to Mustafa Bey ^ awqan whom 
he appointed mutasallim of ifiblus. This appointment alienated the Jarrar 
shavkhs. Hamdan, Yusuf and KhaHiIl, because they felt that they had been more
■*Tbn al-§iddiq, ff. 110a, 116b. 
3Ibid.. ff. 103b-105b.
''Ibid.. f. 105a, cf. ff. 102b, 103a. 
j[bid.. ff. 95b-97a.
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loyal to the governor of Damascus than the refractory Mu$$afa Bey Jawqan. 
Muhammad Pasha tried to appease them by appointing them governors of the 
rural region of Nablus. But this did not satisfy them, and jShaykh gaidan 
and Shavkh Yusuf went over to the side of §ahir.l Apart from its military 
drawbacks, their defection was, in economic terms, a further financial loss: 
to Muhammad Pasha, and partly explains.why he asked Mu§jiafa Bey to collect 
the miri dues for him.
To suggest, as Muhammad Pasha did, that he was prevented from going on 
the dawra by the lack of time, is not very satisfactory nor indeed repre­
sentative of the real situation, Muhammad Pasha entered Damascus on 26 
Rajab/4 November and, judged by precedent, he had enough time to go on the 
dawra and be back to lead the Pilgrimage in due time. As*ad Pasha al-*A^m, 
for example, entered Damascus, after his appointment, on Sha#ban 1156/ 
October 1743, left for the dawra on 5 Rama<Jan/23 Oct. and was back in
o
time to command the Pilgrimage* There were probably other reasons which 
prevented Muhammad Pasha from going on the dawra .as indicated, by the limita­
tion of his orders to the inhabitants of Nablus. At the time, many parts of 
the province of Damascus were either occupied by Mamluk troops or were under 
the control of rebel chiefs over whom Muharnmad Pasha had no effective author­
ity. Mamluk troops, as we have already seen, were in control of Gaza, Ramie 
and Jaffa, ^ahir dominated other regions. *Ali Zahir was usurping the re­
venue of other parts of the province of Damascus. News of his occupation of 
the fortress of Jibrin (between Ramie and Hebron) reached Damascus on 22 Sha*
1Ibn al-§lddiq, ff. 91b, 9Sa-99b, 100b, 101a, 107b-108a. 
^Budayrl, f. lObfc t***- d' 2.11 \> b--
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ban 1185/30 November 1771**^  Shortly afterwards, *Ali Jahir pushed his at­
tacks into territories in the immediate neighbourhood of Damascus and tried
“r -■ 2to collect the miri dues from their inhabitants. It was difficult, there­
fore, for Muhammad Pasha to tour these places as usual without provoking a 
struggle that might well be disastrous for him. In fact, he approached 
2ahir to sound him on his attitude if he went on the dawra. According to 
one source, gahir made it known, rather politely, that it was not necessary
for Muhammad Pap ha to leave Damascus for this sole purpose and that, instead,;
3 — 'he would dispatch the revenue of these regions to him. Barik, on the other 
hand, put it more bluntly when he stated that IJahir prevented Muhammad Pasha 
from going on the dawra.^  Still more humiliating, £ahir was reported to 
have permitted Muhammad Pasha to go on the Pilgrimage. This not only de­
monstrates the extent of 5ahir*s power and the fact that Muhammad Pasha be­
trayed sigiis of weakness from the outset, but it also throws much light on 
the loss of initiative that Muhammad Pasha exhibited during his tenure in 
Damascus which partly made possible the submergence of the hegemony of 
Damascus.
With the date for the departure of the Pilgrimage getting nearer, Mu£am--
mad Pasha felt pressed to raise the necessary money by a loan from the Dam-
XIbn al-§iddiq, ff. 98b, 99a.
2Ibid.. A.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 10.2.72, Sidon, 18.3.72.
3A.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 23.11.71. ^p. 98
5A.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 23.11.71.
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*1
ascenes which amounted to 600 purses. On 15 Ramadan/2  ^December, the
$urra arrived.in Damascus,^ and on 15 ShaxwalAf January Muhammad Pasha
3
left with the Pilgrimage,
The Pilgrimage suffered no attacks on its way to and from the Hijaz. 
This was probably due to two main factors. Firstly, the militant * Anaza 
and $akhr Beduin who used to threaten it were appeased by Muhammad Pasha. 
Rather than depend on one tribe to the detriment, and very often to the out­
rage, of the other, he hired transport animals from both of them as well as 
from other lesser tribes.^ Secondly, there was no imminent Mamluk threat, 
as there was to. the previous Pilgrimage, because the Mamluks and Zahir had
other more urgent problems on their hands. In spite of the threats of^Ali 
— 5
Zahir to Muzayrib and its adjoining regions, after the departure of the
Pilgrimage, Muhammad Pasha managed to conduct it safely, and it returned to
6
Damascus on 8 Safar 1186/11 Play 1772.
Calls for help against the attacks of *Ali §ahir were.* made' to the auth­
orities’.in.Damasch^ >.but-ho:: substantial relief materialized. True, Muhammad 
Pasha was on the Pilgrimage at the time, but he had a mutasallim in
Damascus where also there was Busman Pasha. However, not all
the troops that were assigned to the command of Nu*man Pasha had 
arrived. On 14 Rama^an/21 December, Vinan -^ asha ms deprived of hig 
functions and a certain *Uthmah -ftgha was given the rank of wazir and appoint
■*Tbn al-§iddxq, ff. 108a, 109bj Barik, 98. ^Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 106b,
3Ibid.. f f .  111a, 111b; A.N.B1 1035j Sldon, 10.2.72.
4lbn al-§iddiq, f. Ilia. Ibid., ff. 114a-125a; Barik, 98.
6 i
A.H.B 1035s Sidon, 21.5.72 (Bulletin including a letter from Dayr al- Qam^ r; 
12.5.72).
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ed commander-in-chief and governor of Egypt in his place. On 8 Shawwal/
14- January 1772, Nu‘man Pasha left Damascus for Siwas to which he was posted' 
The new commander-in-chief, ‘Uthirian Fqsha. had previously served as waki.
(deputy)*^  of the Kislar Agha in Egypt in his capacity as controller of the
pious foundation whose revenue, referred to as mal al-Haramavn. was assigned
to the Two Holy Sanctuaries,^ During his bid for povrer *'Ali Bey expelled 
‘Uthman Agha from Egypt and confiscated ten thousand purses from him.*’ He 
resided temporarily in Medina and shortly afterwards, before the deposition 
of * Uthman Pasha al-Kurjii* from Damascus, the Sultan ordered him to go to 
Damascus i-fith a view to appointing him as commander-in-chief and governor 
of Egypt because of his popularity there, ^othing materialized in the mean4
time, and he resided in the Qanawat quarter of Damascus until he was chosen
—  ^  ^
as successor to Wurman Pasha, When ‘All Bey learned of this appointment h£
7
tried to kill the deputy whom *Uthman Pasha left behind in Egypt. Because
1Ibn al-§iddiq, f. 106a; A.H.B1 92; Aleppo, 29.1.72; A.H.B 1035s Sidon,
10.2.72.
2Ibn al-§iddlq, f. 108b.
3It seems that this was the origin of the title of al-Wakil with whichjie 
was later known, cf. PRO, S*P* 97/34* Istanbul, 23.8,49. ‘A.^ al-fJabbajgh, 
f. 29a, states that ‘Uthrnan Pasha, in one of his letters to Zahir, men­
tioned that he was wakll al-Sultan in * Arabia tan (according to Heyd, 66 
n. 6, this term signifie seither'the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire 
or the regions inhabited by Beduin, cf. ibid. 74)? °f* Barik, 99,
^Ibn al-Siddlq, f. 105b; cf. A.H.B 1035; Sidon, 10.2.72; Gibb and Bowen, 
I, ii, 171} Hammer, XIII, 54} S.J.Sbaw, Othman Egypt. 1517-1798, p. 270.
5l-bn al-Siddlq, f. 105b. It seems that £abarti, I, 334, referred to this
4UthnSn*Agha when he_mentioned that ‘All Bey expelled in Mujjarram 1183/ 
May-June, 1769 ‘Uthman Agha al-Wakil, see also PRO, S.P. 97/34; Istanbul 
25.8.49.
6Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 105b, 106a. ibid.. f. 123b.
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of his association with Egypt ‘Uthman Fasha earned the surname al-Migri which I 
appears alternately, sometmnes side by side, with the title al-Wakil in the 
writings of local chronicles and European writers. It should be made quite . 
clear here with regard to the misleading statements by various writers,1 that 
CUthman Pasha al-Misri or al-Wakil was never appointed governor of Damascus.^ 
The confusion seems to have arisen partly from his stay in Damascus^ and part­
ly from the role he played while there in his capacity as commander-in-chief, 
which indeed overshadowed that of the governor of Damascus, particularly in 
external affairs. On his appointment as successor to Na‘m§n Pasha he made his 
headquarters in the sarava probably because Muhammad Pasha, was on the Pil­
grimage at the time,^ * This might have occurred during other Pilgrimages and 
probably this practice became established.
The military potential of Damascus at the time was no better than before, i 
It is true that there was a commander-in-chief there besides the governor,
but both of them lacked money and, more ominously, the first lacked troops 
5
as well. Even the citadel lacked munitions for self-defence and an appeal 
was made to the Sultan by the Kapi Kulus and the dignitaries of the city to
"Shidyaq, 439? 440? states that ‘Uthman Pasha al-Mi§ri al-Wakil was appointed 
governor of Damascus after the death of * Uthman Pasha (al-ICurji^ , which is 
doubly wrong, Similar errors appear in Shibab. Ta*rikh ai-Jazzar, 4^ , 6A, 
al-Sabbagh, f. 23a, Gibb and Bowen, l.i,221.
2 -  -
Of. Ibn al-§iddiq, ff. 105b-126a5 Bar^ c, 99? states that the Sultan sent a
Damascus (Wazir muijif i% li* 1-Sham) called ‘Uthman Pasha 
aI~Mi§ri. His protection of Damascus was part of his duty, and does not 
necessarily mean that he was sent to govern it. MuradT and al-Qari mention 
nothing=about his appointment as governor of Damascus. Nor did ‘Uthman 
Pasha al-Mi^rl figure in the lists of the governors who were appointed to 
Damascus•
%'his was probably the reason why one dispatch from Istanbul referred to him 
as ‘Uthman Pasha of Damascus and commander-in-chief, see PEQ, S.P. 97/4&S 
Istanbul, 3.6.72.
4lbn al-Siddlq, f. 112a.
Slbid.. ff. 106a, 106b, cf. ff. 112a, 112b; cf. A.N.B 92; Aleppo,29.1.72.
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this effect. The Sultan promised to send what they had asked for by sea.l 
With the authority of the governor of Damascus very much diminished outside 
Damascus, and with promises of help rather than actual military strength dis­
played in it, both Muhammad Pasha and ‘Uthman Pasha tried to negotiate with 
Zahir, partly under the pressure of the Damascenes, who thought that if an 
accommodation could be reached they would be relieved economically. Such 
negotiations would also gain the authorities of Damascus time during which
they would work to undermine Zahir1s power by encouraging the dissidence of
2
his sons. Zahir showed apparent readiness to .^.negotiate partly because he
was biding his time to see the result of the struggle between Abu *1-Dhahab
and ‘Ali Bey in Egypt. He was also once more threatened with attempts made
3
by some of his sons to revolt against him.
* Ali Bey was driven out of Egypt on 25 Muharram 1186/28 April 1772,^ On
5 _ 6
8 May he arrived in G-aaa. and on the 15th Zahir met him in Bamle. *Ali Bey
was interested primarily in restoring his authority in Egypt and in seeing
7
Zhhir well established on his side so as to shield him from the Ottoman forces 
With the lack of efficient leadership on the part of either Muhammad 
Pasha al-^Agm or 4 Uthman Pasha al-Mi§ri, petty chiefs in the province of Dam­
ascus took the initiative into their own hands. A certain Muhammad, probably
hbn al-§iddiq, f. 99b. 2Ibid.. ff. 97b, 113a-113b.
tl.H.B1 1035s Sidon, 10.2.72, Sidon, 30..4,72 (Bulletin); PRO. S.P. 97/43* 
Istanbul, 3.6.72; Ibn al-Siddiq, f. 124a.
trabarti, I, 365-6, 371; ‘A. al-§abbagh, f.22a; il.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 18.3.72, 
Sidon, 30.4.72 (Bulletin); PRO, S.P. 97/4Ss Istanbul, 3.7.72.
5a .N.B 1035; Sidon, 21.5.72 (Bulletin); FRO. S.P. 110/39, Pt. Is Aleppo, 
20.5.72; ‘A. al-§abbagh, f. 22a.
6A.N.b1 1035s Sidon, 2.6.72 (Bulletin). 7Ibid.. Sidon, 21.5.72.
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the brother of Mustafa Bey Tawqan, with about seven to eight hundred pea­
sants from the region of iGblus, took Jaffa from the Mamluks with the help 
of its inhabitants. After ‘Ali Bey left Gaza to meet Zahir, Abu Maraq, 
a former governor of this place, managed to occupy it with the help of the
SaliJ. Beduin, who had been suppressed earlier by 5 All Bey, and Muhammad
3 —Pasha al-cAzm confirmed him as its governor. Deli Khalil Pasha who re­
appeared in Damascus with relief troops^ was at this time in the Druze
5
territory preparing to attack Sidon.
At this juncture a new factor intervened to turn the scales temporarily 
in favour of Zahir rather than eAlT Bey, In the afternoon of 1 June 1772, 
Russian vessels approached Haifa to succour Zahir and *Ali Bey. Although 
this help did not radically change the situation, its significance was enor­
mous because Muslims called on Infidels for help against fellow Muslims,
On the demand of *Ali Bey and Zahir, the Russian vessels proceeded to 
bombard Beirut on 18 June, The aim was to destroy certain Ottoman vessels
^f. A.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 31.7.72 (Bulletin, Ramie, 16.7.72).
2Ibid., Sidon, 21.5.72 (Bulletin, Ramie, 13.5.72).
I^bid., Sidon, 2.6.72 (Bulletin, Ramie, 22.3.72); cf. above p.$21.
^A.H.B1 1035: Sidon, 30.4.72 (Bulletin); PRO. S.P. 97/4-3: Istanbul, 17.7.72.
A^.N.B"^  1035: Sidon, 2.6.72 (Bulletin); eA. al-Sabbagh. f. 22a; Shlhab,
LuJjngn, I, 92.
I^t is interesting to note that the governor of Damascus, thinking that the 
Russian vessels were either Maltese or Franks1, put pressure on the foreign 
missionaries in Damascus to urge the Drench Consul ift Sidon to make them 
leave. The latter made it known to him that the troops in these vessels 
were Greeks and that the Russians gave them their flag and employed them, 
see A.H.B 1033s Sidon, 28.6.72 (a letter from the French Consul to the 
Governor of Damascus). The Consul referred to these vessels in his dis- j
patches as .1vaisseaux Russes Grecs1. Sometimes he referred to them simply |
as 1les bailments Grecs1, see for example A.N.B 1035: Sidon, 26.9.72 !
(Bulletin)„
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gathered there and, more important, to divert the attention of the Drupes
who, together with some troops from Damascus, were preparing to attack Sidon.
Russian troops landed in Beirut but they soon re-embarked on 23 June, after
1
Amir Yusuf had bought them off.
While the Russians were moving towards Beirut to bombard it, the Druses
and Deli Khalil Dasha were defeated by £ahir and his Mamluk and Matawila
2allies near Sidon on 11 June. Fearing lest SJahir, with the help of his
allies, might extend his control over Beirut and encourage the retired
Amir Mansur, who was biding his time, to take his place, Amir Xusuf appealed
to * Uthman Pasha al~ML§rI to send troops to reinforce the defences of Beirut.
*■ Uthman Pasha dispatched Ahmad Bey al-Jazzar with a group of Majjhariba and
entrusted him with this task,^
Although the victoryof Zahir and his allies was heartening to them, it
did not gain them a clear-cut superiority. Much confusion and indecisive-
i _
ness reigned at the time. AJJ. Bey was preparing to return to Fgypt. Accord­
ingly, the Mamluk governor of Sidon withdrew, and Sidon remained in the hand; 
of gahirh ^he land route to Bgypt was not secure for rAlI Bey. Fht'thermoEe,
Zahir and ^AlT Bey were still besieging Jaffa.^
Muhammad Pasha al-‘Aam and sUthman Pasha al-Mi^ri did not interfere ef-
5
fectively because they still lacked adequate troops and money. Their main 
resource $aa to levy forced loans on the inhabitants over whom they bad 
direct control, and these were exacei'bated as a result. The commercial 
activity in Damascusvas almost at a standstill. This was partly due to
lA.N.B^ 1035* Sidon, 15.6.72 (Bulletin), Sidon, 19.6.72, Sidon, 28.6,72; 
A.N.B 92: Aleppo, 17.7.72; PRO^ S.P, 97/7+8; Istanbul, 3*8.72; Auriant,212~ 
216; Anderson, 298; * A. al-§abbagh, f.22b; Shiliab, Lubnan. 1, 94; Shidyaq, 
441-442.
^For an account of the battle see, Shihab, Lubnan, 1,93$ *A. al-Sabbagh, f. 
22b; Volney,85,86; Hammer ,:m,352,353:PRO,8.P.97/48: Istanbul,3.8.72.
^A.N.B1 1035: Sidon,31.7*72 (Bulletin, Beirut, 1.7.72); PRO,S.P.97/48Istan­
bul, 3.8.72. Shiliab, Lubnan.1.94; * A. al-§abbagh, f. 23a.
4For a detailed account, see A.H.Bl 1035: Sidon,31.7.72 (Bulletin), *A.al- 
S^abbath. f.23b. a «
5A.N.BS~1035: Sidon,16.8.72. %bid.. Sidon, 29.8.72. ~Barik, 9 8.
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the effect of exactions, and partly to the disruption of commercial trans­
actions and coimnunications in the coastal regions because of political up-
1 * - heavals. The unstable value of the currency which *Ali Bey had issued
earlier, in Egypt further aggravated the financial situation* After the ex­
pulsion of*All Bey from Egypt, this currency was declared null by Abu *1-
2 _
Dhahab. Nevertheless, it was still in use in the territory which 2Iahir
controlled, but it was reduced to half its original value? Zahir tried to
persuade the French merchants not to refuse it* This encouraged speculation
eighty ^
and on one occasion, ■/: thousand piastres were smuggled into Acre from Egypt
Muhammad Pasha al-VA§m tried once more to detach ?ahir from * All Bey.
Two attempts were made in this direction. At first Muhammad Pasha .sent a 
messenger to IJahir, but he had no success. Then the agha of the Yerliyya. 
in Damascus, probably acting on behalf of its governor, sent two other mess­
engers to gnhir to intimate to him his readiness to act as mediator beti^ een
5
him and the Sultan. Their lot was no better than that of their predecessor. 
In fact nothing substantial came of these approaches at the time, probably 
because $ahir did not yet feel militarily pressed to seek an accommodation, 
all the more so because 4 All Bey was preparing to return to Egypt to regain 
his supremacy, and probably because he suspected that the authorities of 
Damascus were merely trying to gain time.
1BarIk, 98; A.H.B1 1035* Sidon, 2.15.72, Sidon, 31.7.72.
^Jabarti, X, 371.
3A.W.B1 1035* Sidon, 20.7.72 (Bulletin).
^Ibid.i Sidon, 16.8.72.
5Ibid.s Sidon, 20.7.72 (Bulletin).
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At a time when the discontent of the Damascenes had soared as a result 
of the extortions and forced loans MuTjammad Pasha al-^A^m was deposed in
_ i
Rabi* I 1186/June-July 1772, . This short term of ‘Agm rule in Damascus, of 
less than a year, has no precedent among members of this family who governed
_  2
Damascus. Its nearest non-*A5m parallel was the governorship of Ghaliq.
It seems that the complacent role of Muhammad Pasha in reacting to events 
rather than in successfully shaping them had infuriated the Sultan who was 
still busy in the war with Russia, The French Consul in Aleppo remarked at 
the time that Muhammad Pasha Jparait disgracie de la Porte1, and that as a 
sign of this, he was appointed to Konya which was normally given to a govern-
v 3or with two tugs. The British ambassador in Istanbul commented that !the
W n N N M i
news from Syria has alarmed the Porte so much that I fancy it will facili­
tate the peqce*,^ (meaning with Russia). His speculation came to be true
5as an armistice was concluded between the Sultan and Russia on 10 June 1772, 
The Sultan took advantage of this occasion to tiyto put an end to the revolt 
of IJahir and fAlT Bey. He ordered a naval force to prepare for this object­
ive. Hews of this move by the Sultan was communicated by the Russian Naval
commander, Orlov, to tfAli Bey and was followed up with an undertaking made
£
by the latter to block the way of the Sultan*s force. Neither action took
W a d i ,  IV, 101; A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 29.8.72. 2See above, p.
3A.N.B1 92: Aleppo, 23.10.72; of. Murldl, IV, 101.
S.P. 97/48s Istanbul, 3.8.72. 5Hammer, XVII, 263.
A.N.B1 1035: Sidon, 3.12.72; Auriant, 218.
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place after all, because the war with Russia was soon resumed. It was not 
till after the peace treaty in 1774 that such a force ms really dispatched. 
It seems that the deposition of Muhammad Pasha was part of the Sultan*s 
plans to accomplish a tour de force against 2iahir and *Ali Bey by sending 
a former commander-in-chief to govern Damascus in place of Muhammad Pasha,
If this was the Sultan*s intention then the new governor, Mustafa Pasha, 
disappointed him in turn. However, Muhammad Pasha al-‘ A^m was not resigned 
to his fate and he exerted much pressure in Istanbul to reverse his deposi­
tion. On 22 December 1772 he was still waiting in Syria for the result of 
his manoeuvres.^ About a year after his deposition, he was re-appointed to 
Damascus,
—  —  —  2 The Governorship of Mustafa Pasha Sabayekji.
Before his appointment to Damascus Mu^afa Pasha was governor of Erze- 
runr* and commander-in-chief, probably at the same time, of the Ottoman army 
in Georgia.^ When he entered Aleppo on. 15 Oct. on his way to Damascus, 
about six thousand troops were accompanying him. This show of force sug-
A.N.B1 1035s Sidon, 18.11.72 (Bulletin, Damascus, 7.11.72); A.N.B1 92t 
Aleppo, 24.ll.72 (Diverses Nouvelles, Aleppo, 22.11.72).
%he spelling of this word is based on the terms given by al-Qari, 84, and 
Muwaqqi*, f. 251b. Risala. f. 15a gives it as Ispansgji. The French dis­
patches referred to him as Spankgy or as Spanatgy.
1035s Sidon, 24.4.73 (Bulletin, Damascus, 17.4.73); another source 
mentions him as governor of Kars, see A.W.Er* 92: Aleppo, 23.10.72* cf, 
Risala. f. 15a.
^A.N.B1 92: Aleppo, 23.30-.72. 5!bid.
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gests that the Sultan ms determined to put an end. to the fluid and disturb­
ing military situation in Syria. On 5 November, about three months after the
deposition of Muhammad Pasha. Mustafa Pasha entered Damascus amid a superb 
1
procession. In this interval the Sultan appointed the agha of the Kapi
in Damascus made the governor^ presence less necessary.
^uring his governorship which lasted for about one year, nothing specta^
cular whs achieved by Mustafa Pasha. Barik mentioned his name only twice,
3
first on his appointment, and then on his deposition, when referring to a
The little information given on Mu^’Jafa Pasha causes no surprise be­
cause the scene of events during his governorship was the province of Sidon 
and the southex-n districts of the province of Damascus, where Mustafa Pasha 
played no major part. It is not that he was completely unacquainted with 
this part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1770 he had visited Damascus on a
special commission to look into the vexations of cUthman Pasha al-Kurji
6and make reparations. It is rather because he was confronted with a situ­
ation which he could not control. Nothing is more representative of the 
•^ A.NJB1 1036* Sidon, 24.4*73 (Bulletin, Damascus, 17.4*73)*
^A.N.B1 1036; Sidon, 18.2.73 (French translation of a letter by Mustafa 
Pasha to the French Consul in Sidon, dated 29.12.72).
^ulus as mutasalllm. It seems that the presence of * Uthman Pasha al-Mi^rT
building which Mu§-Jjafa Pasha built near the place of al-Assali in the vicl
4
nity of Damascus, Al-!Qari states that he was a just and a rich governor
5
who contributed from his wealth to the expenses of the Pilgrimage.
?siaon,29ue. 72.
4Ibid.. 100.
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frustration of Mu§ta a^ Pasha than the letter which he igrote to the French
Consul in Sidon on the occasion of his preparations for the Pilgrimage, In
it he solicited his advice on how to collect the miri duties of the province
of Sidon, which he was authorized by the Shltan to obtain so as to finance 
1
the Pilgrimage, It is strange tint Mustafa Pasha should have referred to
the Consul who, no matter how versed he was in the methods of collecting the
miri dues, could not offer him any substantial help, if only for fear of
alienating the de facto master of Sidon, 2ahir. It could be that Mu^afa
Pasha* by making known to the Consul his need for money, might have hoped
to use this as a preliminary step to asking him for a loan, or perhaps for
his intercession with Zahir to acquire the money. The significance of this
demand by Mustafa Pasha was not lost on the Consul, who commented, 1 qu*un
homme tel que lui, qui occupe une des premiers places dans 1* empire OttomanJ
et qui doit vraisemblement §tre parfaitement instruit du fond et de tous lei
details des troubles de la Syrie, s*adresse a moi pour spavoir comment il
2
doit s*y prendre pour percevoir le mirrby1, If Mu^ 'Jafa Pasha was really 
determined enough and strong enough to obtain what he needed and what he 
was ordered by the Sultan to obtain, then the only immediate means was to 
resort to force. In this he proved hopeless. In spite of a rumour that 
he had left Damascus at the head of an army to relieve Jaffa, which was be­
sieged by the troops of ?ahir and f All Bey,^ nothing was achieved in this 
direction.
1 1A.N.B 1035s Sidon, 3J2.72 (attached to this dispatch a French translatioz 
of the letter of Mu§tafa Pasha).
2Ibid.. Sidon, 3.12.72. 3Ibid.. Sidon, 3.12.72 (Bulletin).
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On 16 Shawwal 1186/10 January 1773 Mu§tafa Pasha left Damascus with
the Pilgrimage♦ The number of pilgrims was estimated at more than 100,000
persons. According to a contemporary source, the magnitude of this Pilgrim-
1
age is almost unique* The large number of pilgrims was attributed to the
excitement that stirred the devotion of the Muslims as a result of the
2
troubles that befell Syria and the Ottoman Empire in general. It might 
be also that the short-lived armistice with Bussia shortly before had de­
served some sort of religious acknowledgment. Economically, the large 
number of pilgrims was very beneficial to the Damascenes.^
On 16 February 1773 Jaffa surrendered to the troops of Zahir and tfAli 
Bey, after about eight months of siege.^ As a result, *Ali Bey felt free 
to return to Egypt, Without adequate preparation, he made for Egypt at 
the beginning of March 1773* accompanied by some of §ahir*s troops. In 
a battle with Abu * 1-Dhahab at SalihiyyaAon 5 §afaf 1187/28 April 17739 
*Aii Bey was defeated and captured. On 15 §afar/8 May he died,^
1A.K.B1 1036s Sidon, 12.1.73 (Bulletin).
2Ibid.
3cf. A.N.B1 1036s Sidon, 18.3.73 (attached to it a dispatch from Sidon, 
5.3.73).
^Ibid. Sidon, 19.3.73 (Bulletin); Holt, !The Cloud-catcher)1, 86, *A. al- 
Sabbagh, f. 23b; Auriant, 219.
5JahartI, I, 376, 377; Hammer, XVI, 353, 354; A.N.B1 1036s Sidon, 22.4.73 
(Bulletin, Gaaa, 20.4.73, Sidon, 24.4.73), Sidon, 14.6.73; PRO, S.P.
97/498 Istanbul, 3.6.73, Istanbul, 17.6.73; Auriant, 219. 220.
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The death of 4H i  Bey had far-reaching repercussions. Although mili­
tarily he was not very important at the time of his death, he was still 
the rallying point of his allies. Furthermore, he symbolised the Mamluk 
defiance to Ottoman authority in Egypt, and carried it into Syria. IJahir 
was politically and militarily embarrassed as a result, in spite of the 
fact that the weakened *Ali Bey had become more of a problem to him than 
an asset.
Neither the governor of Damascus, Mu§tafa Pasha, who returned safely 
with the Pilgrimage on 5 §afar/28 April, nor the commander-in-chief, ‘'Uth­
man Pasha al-Mi§ri, exploited the death of *Ali Bey to threaten, let alone 
to fight 2ahir. They were satisfied to reinforce the garrison of Beirut 
under Jazsar. The latter started to fortify this city and refused to 
quit it when Amir Yusuf, whose suspicions were aroused at this ally’s show 
of force, asked him to do so. The appeals to this effect which Amir Yusuf 
made to the authorities of Damascus were of no avail. Beirut was essential 
to the Ottoman authorities of Damascus, not only because it provided them 
with a strategic position should they decide to tighten their grip on 
2ahir, but more essentially because it gave them a link with Istanbul.
Beirut, it is to be recalled, was the only port under Ottoman authority
2
along the coast between Egypt and Tripoli.
1 1
A.N.B 1036s Sidon, 4.5.73.
2Ibid.s Sidon, 22.4.73 (Bulletin).
Against the threat of Jazzar the Shihabs resolved their differences and 
prepared to regain Beirut by force. In a bid to strengthen themselves they
made an accommodation with gahir and the Matawila on 9 June 1773. Amir Man-
1 ^
§ur was behind this orientation of policy. ^ahirls positive reaction is 
illustrative of his need, as much as that of Amir Yusuf, for allies. The 
absence of *Ali Bey from the scene had isolated him and put him face to face 
with a new threatening enemy in Egypt, ^he grip was being tightened around 
him, and a governor nominated by the Sultan to Sidon had already arrived in 
Damascus.2
In the meantime, Hu^Jafa Pasha of Damascus was authorized by the Sultan 
to reach an accommodation with 2ahir, It seems that the Sultan x^ as afraid 
lest the Russians exploit the situation in §yria and interfere still further 
in its affairs, or lest Abu ?1- Dhahab might find a pretext to interfere, 
apparently on the Sultan1 s behalf, and eventually to dominate in the style 
of *All Bey. This does not mean, however, that the Sultan xrould ultimately 
reconcile himself with 2ahir; rather, he vras in need of time until his war 
with Russia should come to an end. Negotiations betx-jeen Zahir and Mugjafa 
Pasha x^ ere conducted by the latter1s bazarganbashi (chief purveyor),^ a 
certain Philip, through the good offices of the French Consul at Sidon. Af­
ter declaring that he was not a rebel against the Sultan but only defending
See A.N.B1 1036: Sidon, 24.4.73, Sidon, 14.6.73;_PR0, S.P. 97/49! Istanbul, 
3.9.73; Shihab. Lubnan. I, 97, 93; Shitiab, Ta*rikh al-Jazzar, 52; 'A. al-| 
Sabbagh. ff. 25a, 25b; Shidvaq. 443, 444; ^unavvir. al-Mashriq. 49 (1935) 
268; Volney, 235, 236..
A.N.B 1036: Sidon, 14-6.73.
^Translated in the French dispatch, ibid.. as ‘premier marchand1.
38 8
the rights of the people, Zahir demanded that the governor of Damascus 
ensure his continued possession; (probably in the form of malikane) of the 
territories he occupied at the time, §nd he undertook' that he would pay 
the miri dues punctually, together with all arrears. Zahir made it known 
also that he did not desire to have the two jugs which were usually con­
ferred on the governor of Sidon and that he would provide for the jarda.
2However, these negotiations were abandoned, probably under the stress of 
the ensuing events.
$ahir, as the ally of Amir Yusuf, became embroiled in the struggle with 
Jazzar over Beirut. The Russian vessels which £ahir and ‘All Bey had asked 
for previously, arrived at this time and were entrusted by Jahir with the 
task of attacking Jazzar in Beirut. Accompanied by Dinkizli, this force 
appeared before Beirut on 6 July 1773 and started bombarding it. In the 
meantime Jahir was threatened with a revolt by his sons tfAli and Sa^d.
Their differences were patched up, however, because of the impending dangers 
For, on 27 August 1773* a messenger arrived in Acre from Abu ' 1-Dhahab. ask­
ing Zahir to forward to him the possessions which *AlT Bey had left with hin
U
and to vacate Nablus, Ramie;', Gaza and Jaffa, which the Sultan, as Abu >1-
5
Dhahab alleged, had given him for his services.
^Shihab. Lubnan. I, 100.
o 1
A.N.B 1036; Sidon, 14.6.73 (translation of two letters, dated 9 May 1773 
and 2 June 1773* addressed by the governor of Damascus to the French Consul 
in Sidon), Sidon, 3.7.73* Sidon, 7.7.73 (translation of a letter from Jaf:p 
dated July 1773* addressed by Zahir to the governor of Damascus), Sidon,
16.S.73; cf. Shitiab. Lubnan. I, 99, 100.
3A.N.B 1036: Sidon, 7.7.73; Anderson, 302.
•^There is no evidence that ^hir occupied Nablus. Probably Abu * 1-Dhahab was 
referring to Jabal Nablus (cf. Shihab, Lubnan. I, 108), which was nevertha-
(cont.)
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The bombardment of Beirut by the Russians gave rise to demonstrations in 
Damascus at the inactivity of the governor and the commander-in-chief, all 
the more so because the attackers were Christians. The tension x^ as aggravated 
by the scarcity of bread. Unable, as it seems, to control the revolts that 
took place in Damascus, Mustafa Pasha withdrew from the city and encamped in 
its vicinity. In late August 1773/around the middle of Jumada II, 1187 he 
was deposed. He was succeeded by Muhammad Pasha al-^A^m who appointed as 
mutasallim a certain Ahmad Agha. In raid-Rajab 1187/beginning of October 1773, 
Muhammad Pasha entered Damascus.
The Second Governorship of Muhammad Pasha al-*Azm in Damascus.
Ever since his deposition from Damascus, and indeed ever;-1 since he was 
appointed governor, Muhammad Pasha had always worked to obtain the governor­
ship of Damascus. Previously, he had ensured the safety of the Pilgrimage.
In spite of his levying loans from the Damascenes, he did not alienate them. 
Furthermox*e, his past experience as governor had trained him in the tech­
niques of obtaining appointments.
Shortly after his second appointment to Damascus, Muhammad Pasha*s son,
3lusuf Pasha, was appointed governor of Tripoli. '* This was surely a further 
success to Muhammad Pasha and explains the strong support he had, or rather !
i
the efficacy of his manoeuvres, at Istanbul. A few months later, Muhammad 
Pasha was not displaced by the death of Sultan Mustafa III on 9 Shawwal 
1187/24 December 1773 and the accession of Sultan *Abd al-Hamid II, even ;
4 !
though this entailed, as usual, changes among officials. _____    1
(cont.) less not directly under the control of IJahir but under that of his 
allies the Jarrars.   ;
1036: Sidon, 23.8.73,Sidon, 31.8.73, Sidon, 2.9.73; Sabbath,1.622.
1A.H.B1Sidon, 16.8.73, Sidon,31.8.73. 2lbid.. Sidon, 2.9.73; Risala.f.15a.
1036s Sidon,30.11.73jA.NJB 1122sTripoli,16.11.73,Tripoli,16.2.74. | 
ApR0.S.P.97/50sIstanbul,17.1.74,Istanbul,3.2.7A; Hammer,XVI,370,372-3,376-80.
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The development of events outside Damascus, particularly during the first 
two years of the second governorship of Muhammad Pasha* was of major import- 
ance not only in shaping the position of the governor of Damascus vis-a-vis 
the neighbouring poxjer groups but also, and as a result, in affecting his 
policies inside Damascus.
Between 1773 and 1775 the chief rebels were eliminated one after another, 
At- times Muhammad Pasha took part in the operations against them, but his 
role was neither decisive nor consistent. In the interval between the depo­
sition of Mustafa Pasha and the arrival of Muhammad Pasha, major development! 
occurred in Beirut. In August 1773* Amir Yusuf and the Russian vessels be­
sieged Jazzar in Beirut by land and sea. Zahir was unable to send rein­
forcements to Amir Yusuf because he was confronted with the impending attack
1 . 
of Abu '1-Dhahab* The punitive expedition led by * Uthman Pasha al-Mi§ri
against the Druzes for the attacks by some of. their members on the trade
caiavans of Damascus in al-Biqa** was defeated by Amir Yusuf, who was helped
by Shaykh Ua^if and *Ali 2ahir, in al-Biqa* on 13 Rajab 1187/30 Sept. 1773.^
It seems that this event took place after Jaazar was overwhelmed in Beirut,
3
and besieged in its citadel* Eventually Jazzar surrendered, and took re- 
— 4fugewlth Zahir.
Unable to subdue Zahir and his allies after they gained the prestige of 
having chased him and salvaged Beirut from Jazzar, f Uthman Pasha al-Mi§rT
‘•A.N.B 1036: Sidon, 2.9.73.
2
*A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 25b, 26a; PRQ, S.P. 97/49: Istanbul, 3.-12*731 Volney, 
260; Shihab, Lubnan. I, 103; Shihab. Ta*rikh al-Jazzar, 59;. Shidyaq, 443-5.
P^RO, S.P* 97/49: Istanbul, 3.9.73. Ihe Lebanese chroniclers as well as 
Volney placed the expedition of *Uthman Pasha after the surrender of Beir­
ut. This does not seem to be true.
'7n§0>,S.P. 97/49 L Istanbul, 3.12.73; ‘A. al-Sabbagh, ff. 26b, 27a; Shi tab, 
la nkh al-JazzarT 53.
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started negotiating with Zahir* 4Uthman Pasha was acting under various
pressures. After the death of Sultan Mu^ jiafa III he was anxious lest he
be deposed if he did not contribute to resolving the situation. Militarily,
he proved unable so far to achieve victory. The new Sultan seems not to have
been averse to a reconciliation, perhaps a temporary one, because he was
still embroiled in war with Russia and was in need of money, part of which
1
could be acquired from Zahir. An all-out attack on Zahir would necessitate 
the dispatch of more troops and entail further expenditure. Furthermore, 
Jaazar had defected to IJa.hir, and Muhammad Pasha al-^Agm commanded the Pil­
grimage on 13 Shawwal/28 December. It might be also that 4 Uthman Pasha 
wanted to anticipate the arrival of Abu ' 1-Dhahab and indeed to avert his
t
expedition by coining to terms with Zahir, Overtures for peace were, there­
fore, beneficial for the time being at least, for both 4Uthman Pasha and the 
Sultan*?
Agreement was reached between U^thman Pasha, in his capacity as com-
mander-in-chief, and IJahir an(^  k^e Matawila, through the intercession of
Shavkh Qablan and a certain official called Husayn ££endi. According to a
buvuruldu issued by 4Uthman Pasha on 27 Dhu* 1-Qa‘da 1187/9 Feb. 1774* Zahir
would be granted the province of Sidon (probably what he then occupied) as
malikane on condition that he paid 1000 purses to cover the arrears in the
miri dues until Muharram 1188/March 1774* &nd then an annual sum of 450
purses from this date onwards. In addition £ahir would forward provisions
for the .iarda which the governor of Sidon used to provide.^  It is to be
H^ammer, XVI, 375. ^A.U.B1 1036: Sidon, 31.1.74 (Bulletin, Tyre,
31.1.74).
^Ibid.. Sidon, 31.1.74 (Bulletin, translation of a letter addressed by the
mufti of Damascus to a Turk in Sidon, dated 7 Dhubl-Qacda 1187, also a dis--
patch from Acre, 3.2.74), Sidon, 28.2.74 (Bulletin, translation of the
(cont.)
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noted here that these terms offered by iUthman Pasha were not confirmed by 
the Sultan, in spite of a promise to ^ahir that a Khatti Stierif would be
issued to this effect. All that the Sultan seat to §ahir was a safe-conduct
_  1 
but nothing about a malikane or other appointments* In Nov* 1774 Zahir re-
—  —  2quested the Sultan to give him Sidon, Jaffa, Bamle and Gaza as malikanes.
That he did not ask to be granted the whole of the province of Sidon as mali­
kane ^ as already suggested by * Uthman Pasha, was probably to avoid being em- . 
broiled in struggles with Amir Xusuf. AJ.so. , ?ahir preferred to be given the 
places he suggested as malikanes rather than be appointed governor of the 
province of Sidon because, apart from the complications which might then 
arise with the Druzes and the Matawila, he would be subject to the usual vicigh 
situdes of Ottoman governors including deposition and confiscation of property. 
Events were moving fast and the Ottoman authorities proved to be neither
serious nor sincere in their promises to Zahir. Around July 1774 *Uthman
%Pasha al-Mi§ri ms posted to another office. Muhammad Pasha al-*A^m was later 
appointed as coramander-in-chief Militarily, * Uthman Pasha had proved hope-
(cont.) *Bouriourdi*), Sidon, 4*3*74 (Bulletin, Sidon, 28.2.74)5 Shihab. 
Lubnan. I, 99, 100* M. al-Sabbagh. 164-5*
S^hihab. Lubnan, I, 107, 108; 4 A, al-§abbagh, ff. 29a-30a; M. al-Sabbagh. 
165-7; aVn .B1 1036s Sidon, 2.11.74; A.N.B~1037s Sidon, 7.4*75*
1035s Sidon, 14.11.74. 
1036s Sidon, 5.8.74; ‘A, al-Sabbagh. f. 29b, Shihab. Ta' rikh al-Jazzlr
60; Munayyir, al-Mashriq* 49 (1955), 273, as well as other chronicles, were! 
mistaken in stating that Muhammad Pasha al-^A^m was appointed to Damascus i) 
place of 4Uthman Pasha al-MigrX. He was already its governor. Rather, he 
was appointed later as commander-in-chief in place of *Uthman Pasha* see 
below p. f^7-
■ ' *’> A “« r ~ V  f ‘ *   V H ,, - ' .*j *'*/>— -•> ' *• -
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less, particularly after his defeat by the Druzes* His main task ~ to pro­
ceed to Egypt, discipline 4Ali Bey and instal himself as governor in Cairo - 
became irrelevant after the death of *AlT Bey and Abu "1- Phahab!s declaration
of allegiance to the Sultan, furthermore, another governor was appointed to
1
Egypt and was received by Abu * 1-Dhahab. In fact, as early as March 1773,
- 2 
*Uthman Pasha was appointed governor of Aleppo* He remained in Damascus as
commander-in-chief, however, and appointed a mutasallim to Aleppo.^ Although
this shows the extent of his prestige and the efficacy of his manoeuvres, it .
also reveals that his appointment as governor of Egypt .was not taken seriously
Ostensibly, the deposition of *Uthman Pasha bolstered the prestige of
Muhammad Has ha al-^ Aijm because he could focus more attention on himself.
But this involved more responsibility as well. Muhammad Pasha was not, as
a result, in a better position to suppress 5^hir nor, in fact, did Zahir be-
come more apprehensive of this particular change, indeed Zahir was alarmed
at the time, but owing to other factors which were as serious to him as they
were eventually to Muhammad Pasha, ^fter Jazzar took refuge with Zahir he
defected while helping his men to collect the miri revenue, in the region
4
of Jerusalem, and made for Damscus around the end of Nov. 1773. On the 
other hand, ever since his accommodation with the Shihabs and the apparently 
conciliatory attitude of the Ottoman authorities towards him, ^ahir’s immed­
iate tensions relaxed. This encouraged some of his sons to resume their
1JabartI, I, 377. ^ A B 1 92s Aleppo, 31.3.73.
^Ibid.. Aleppo, 8.7.74-.
4-A.N.B1 1036s Sidon, 31.1.74 (Bulletin., Acre, 31.1.74) J.PBO, S.P. 97/50: 
Istanbul, 17.2.74; * A. al-$abbagh. ff. 27a-29a; Shihab, Lubnan. I, 115.
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dissidence against him. One of them, Ahmad, occupied Jabal *Ajlun, a 
district under the jurisdiction of the governor of Damascus, who eventually 
recognised his rule over it, partly because he was unable at the moment to 
west it from him, being about th command the Pilgrimage, and perhaps partly 
because by this act he would confirm il^ madrs position and consequently deep­
en the rift between him and his father. However, the most serious of these
familial revolts was that of 6Ali, which occurred on the eve of Abu *1-
2
Dhahab1 s invasion.
Around the beginning of Muharram 1189/be ginning of March 1775, Abu >1- 
Dhahab left Cairo at the head of an army to combat a^hir, allegedly with the :
3approval of the Sultan. On 29 Muharram/l April Gaza capitulated to Abu '1-j 
Dhahab.^ ' Bamle followed suit and, after a long siege, Jaffa surrendered and; 
many of its inhabitants were massacred. There was no mention of the local 
inhabitants declaring in advance for the invader, probably because they had 
become tired of the change of governors. Here the significance of the re­
volt by gator1 s son, *Ali, becomes apparent because he conspired with Abu ' Lj 
Dhahab against his father. Stunned at the successful advance of Abu #1 Dha-j 
hab, ijahir fled from Acre and it surrendered to Abu * 1-Dhahab. Sidon also 
capitulated to the latter!s naval forces. News of these conquests was cele*y 
brated in Cairo in early Kabl* II 1189/early June 1775. But before these
celebrations were over, the Mamluk army was thrown into confusion at the
5
death of Abu ' 1-Dhahab in Acre on 10 Habi"' Il/lO Jane. Controversial though;
"^A.H.B1 1036s Sidon, 28.8.73, Sidon, 31.7.83,Sidon, 15.10.7-4.$ Volney,260,261, 
2A.N.B 1036: 31.1.74 (Bulletin, Acre, 31.1.74).
3JahartI, I, 413; Shihab. Lubnan. I, 110: Shihab. Ta*rlkh al-Jazzar, 63-4; i 
M. al-jjSabbagh, 130.
4A.N.B1 1037; Sidon (Bulletin, Acre, 10.4.75). _
'’A.N.B1 1037s 25.6.75; Jabarti, I, 414 mentions that he died on 8 Rabi‘
11/ 3 June.
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the causes of his death remain, the fact remains that his army immediately 
withdrew back to Egypt, giving up all its conquests.
The death of Abu * 1-Dhahab seems to have relieved the Sultan of a poten­
tial rebel, and the governor of Damascus of an impending threat. No matter 
how much Abu * 1-Dhahab alleged that he was executing the orders of the Sultan 
it ms almost certain, in the light of the evidence available, that he would 
eventually tear off the mask and follow the example of rAli Bey. Abu '1- 
Dhahab was determined to govern at least what he had conquered of Syria. On
the very day of his death, he made it known to his troops that they were to
3
govern what they had conquered. Had Abu / 1-Dhahab lived longer, conditions 
for the expansion of his power were not unfavourable, For, no sooner was the 
Sultan relieved of the war with Russia by the signature of the Treaty of 
Kuchulc Kaynarja on 12 Jumada IX 1188/21 July 17745 than a new threat on the 
part of Karim Khan of Persia became manifest.^ The hostilities that ensued 
seriously occupied the Sultan for several years.
Apparently grateful for the services of Abu '1-Dhahab. the Sultan^ac­
cording to foreign sources in Istanbul, conferred on him the rank of wazir 
and appointed him governor of Oairo (probably Egypt), which dignity made him 
eligible for removal to other governorships. According to Jabarti, the 
Sultan agreed to the demand by Abu y 1-Dhahab and appointed him governor of
"Stor these developments see, A.N.B’*' 1037s Sidon, 7.4*75 (Bulletin, Acre,
10.4*75), Sidon, 17, 5.75, Sidon, 5.6.75, Sidon, 25.6.75; PRO, S.P. 79/51*.,
Istanbul, 3.7.75; PRO, S.P. 110/43: Aleppo, 17.6.75, Aleppo, 24.6.75; A.N.B 
442s Istanbul, 3-7.75; Rabbath, I, 622-4; *A. al-§abbajgh, ff. 30a-33a; H. 
al-Sabbagh, 130-7, 169-70, 172* Shiliab, Lubnan, I, 110, 111; Shihab, TaVrSd 
al-Jazzar. 64-7; Jabart*i, I, 413, 414; Volney, 261, 262; Bank, 102, 103.
R^abbath, I, 622. 3Jabarti, I, 414.
4PR0 , S.P. 97/50: Istanbul, 30.11.74, $.P. 97/51: Istanbul, 3.7.75.
%R0, S.P. 97/51: Istanbul, 3.7.75; A.N.B1 442: Istanbul. 3.7.75.
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Egypt and al-Sham (probably southern Syria including Damascus). News to 
this effect reached Abu * 1-Dhahab shortly before his death. However, the 
Sultan dispatched the qapudan. Hasan Pasha, at the head of a naval force,
apparently to suppress 2ahir and probably also to see that Abu * 1-Dhahab did
2
not get out of control. Some sources suggest that Hasan Pasha was dis­
patched after the death of Abu * 1-Dhahab to prevent possible confusion and 
the exploitation of the situation by £ahir.^
During the attack of Abu 41-Dhahab. Muhammad Pasha al-*Azm did no more 
thanajait the result of the struggle, which was bound to affect him, no mat­
ter who the victor was. The Mamluk governor of Sidon, who was determined to 
withdraw after the death of Abu ' 1-Dhahab. appealed to Muhammad Pasha and to 
his son, the governor of Tripoli, to send forces and occupy the city in the
name of the Sultan. Accordingly, Muhammad Pasha sent his kahya who entered
Sidon on 22 June 1775 and took control of it until further instructions from
the Sultan.^1 On 10 August a certain Melek Muhammad Pasha arrived in Sidon 
5 —as governor. Although IJahir reoccupied Acre, and probably Jaffa and Gaza as 
well, after the withdrawal of Abu '1-Dhahab, the loss of Sidon was the be­
ginning of his end. Muhammad Pasha made his appearance on the scene not 
through the force of arums, but only to fill a power vacuum, albeit temporar­
ily. This in no way attests his military supremacy. Many opportunities still
1JabartI, I, 413, 414. 2(k. al-§abbagh, £. 33a.
3A.H.B1 442s Istanbul, 3.7.7$; Rabbath, I, 623.
^A.N.B 1037: Sidon, 25.6.75 (Bulletin); Rabbath, I, 623.
%.N.B1 1037: Sidon, 30.8.75; ‘A. al-§abblg£. £. 39b.
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lay* ahead to demonstrate his initiative. While Hasan Pasha was proceeding
tox/ards Acre, Muhammad Pasha xias appointed commander-in-chief, probably over
1
the local Ottoman forces. Apart from its prestige, this office carried 
heavy responsibility and it remained to be seen if he was worthy of it.
Hasan Pasha arrived in the proximity of Haifa on 7 August 1775, and the 
garrison of Maghariba surrendered the city to him. Zahir made his headquart­
ers in Acre, and on 21 August Hasan Pasha appeared before its walls. Nego­
tiations about the payment of the miri dues failed because, it was alleged, 
they were sabotaged by the counsellors of Zahir, Ibrahim al-Sabbagh and 
Dinkizli. It seems also that Hasan Pasha was not interested in their suc- 
cess* Partly through the treachery of Dinkizli and the Mayhariba* Zahir was 
forced to flee and was killed not far from the gates of the city by his own 
Majjbariba. His property was confiscated and his famous man of affairs,
w 2
Ibrahim al~$abbagh. was arrested and taken to Istanbul. Dinkizli was later
3 —killed, around April 1776, by gas an Pasha. But not all the sons of Zahir
were eliminated or arrested because they took to the countryside.
In his capacity as commander-in-chief, Muhammad Pasha al-^A^m haBtened
to take part in the struggle against ^ahir. He arrived in the vicinity of
Acre on 26 August, rather late to take part in the battle. His late arrival
1A.N»B1 1037s- Sidon, 2.9.75 (Bulletin, Sidon, 30.8.75); ‘A. al-gabbagh. ff. 
33a, 39a.
2  i *i
A.N.B 1037s Sidon, 2.9.75 (Bulletin); A.N.B 93s Aleppo, 6.10,75 (Nou- 
velles, No. 15, Acre, 13.9.75), also (Precis des revolutions d'Acre depuis 
le 20 du mois de May jusqu'au 15 Juin 1775); PRO, S.P^ , 97/51s Istanbul, 
4.9.75; Rabbath, I, 623-4; Volney, 262-5; ‘A. al-§abbagh, ff. 33b-39b; M. 
al-§abbagh, 143-9, 172-4; Shihab, Lubnan. I, 112, 113; Shihab, Tl'rilch 
a1-Jazzar. 67-70.
%.N.B1 1037s Sidon, 30.4.76; Sjjiliab, Lubnan. I, 117; Munayytt; al-hfashriq,
50 (1956), 196.
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may not have been deliberate but it was typical of his lack of initiative
and portended his future minor position in the struggle for political power.
Hasan Pasha accused him of treachery for this.'** The governor of Sidon did nj>1
2
take part in this battle, because he also arrived late. Both of them re­
turned to the centres of their governorshipsyithout laurels and spoil and, 
more important, without taking part in the political solutions that were im­
posed.^
With the elimination of Zahir, the Matawila and the Shihabs lost their 
rallying point. The balance of power in southern Syria adjusted by the pres­
ence of Sjahir was thus disrupted. The power vacuum time created invited an 
adventurer. Such a man was found in Jazzar, who reappeared on the scene ancjl 
was appointed by the Sultan as (muhaf 1 z) of Acre.^ On IS
December 1775 Melek Muhammad Pasha was deposed from the governorship of Sid<>n,
— 5Jazzar immediately sent a mutasallim to govern it in his name. On 11 Marc
1776 Jazzar himself entered Sidon after the Sultan had appointed him its go
6
ernor with the rank of wazir. A new phase in the history of the province 
of Sidon and Damascus^identified with Jazzar, was initiated. In the period 
between 1776 and 17&3 a- new balance of power began talcing shape.
1‘A. al-Sabbagh, f. 93a. 2 A.N.B1 1037s. Sidon, 2.9.75;rA. al-Sabbagh,
Q -i f. ^
^A.N.B 1037:. Sidon, 3.10..75 (Bulletin).
^A.N.B1 1037: Sidon, 2.9.75; *A. al-Sabbagh. f. 39b; M. al-Sabbagh. 145 n
175. According to Hammer, XV, 155> a commander on the frontier or in '.a- 
fortress was called muhafiz/*
5A.H..B1 1037: Sidon, 18.2.75; cf. A.N.B1 93: Tripoli, 2.12.75 (Nouvelles 
No. 26/7).
^A.N.B1 1037: Sidon, 12.3.76; cf. Shihab, LubnanX 116: Shihab, Ta'rlkh al- 
Jazzar, 71.
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II The Province of Damascus between 1776 and 1733.
With the elimination of the main rebels in the coastal regions by the 
end of 1775, the economic prospect for Damascus looked brighter because the 
roads between it and. these regions would, be more secure. Also, the governor 
of Damascus would be able to retain his hold over those regions of his pro­
vince which Zahir had usurped, and this would relieve him and the Damascenes 
economically.
Free of major military entanglements, Muhammad Pasha undertook con­
struction work inside Damascus both of a private and public nature. He
1built a residence near the market whichms associated with his name. It is 
interesting to note here that every * Aqm governor built his own house, part­
ly as a matter of prestige and partly also because the 4Asm family was est­
ablished in Damascus and so there was no chance of occupying the house of a 
former * Asm governor. One of his major works was his enlargement in Jumada 
1 1195/April-May 1731 of the market which extended from the gate of 5ucj al- 
Arwam to the citadel. Later on, this market was burnt down and in its
place today stands $uq al-Hamidiyya, called after Sultan tfAbd al-Hamid II,
2
in whose reign it seems to have been rebuilt. Between the end of this
3
market and his house he installed a public fountain. He carried out re­
construction work 011 certain administrative buildings such as the saraya,
A /r
the treasury, and the main law-court (mahkamat al-bab). He reconstructed
-r t -r 6many of the tombs of holy men, such as the famous Sufi Ibn al- Arabi. The
hiuradx, IV, 101; al-<£ri, 85; ?asibx, f. 49b.
hiarlk, 3.13; Muradx, IV, 101; al-Qai-i, 85. -^ Muradx, IV, 110,
I^Jasibi, f. 49a gave the date of this work as 1196/1781-2.
SMuradx, IV, 102* : ..;; j /-/“’h - - ■'■o-.j .
6Muradi, IV, 101. .
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Sufis were of much importance in Damascus, and their satisfaction would gain 
Muhammad. Pasha credit of political value* His chief contribution to the 
Pilgrimage route was his rebuilding of the fortress and water reservoir in 
Bi'r al-Zumurrud.-**
These works, together with many others, mainly of a charitable natur^, 
won Muhammad Pasha much praise in Damascus, particularly from poets whom he 
patronized. It is no wonder, therefore, that of all the * Azins, governors 
and otherwise, Muhammad Pasha was the only one who had a biography in 
Murad.i1 s Silk al-Durar. 3
The political situation in Damascus remained quiet during the whole 
governorship of Muhammad Fas ha * Muradi states that seditions subsided dur­
ing his rule.4 This was partly due to the just rule of Muhammad ftasha."* 
However, he did not lack decisiveness when the situation warranted it.. Im­
mediately after his second appointment to Damascus, he put to death the agha 
of the Yerliyya. 'Uthman b* Shabib, whom he accused of insolence and injust*- 
ice. It is to be recalled here that *Uthman Agha was appointed to this of­
fice at the intercession of Muhammad Pasha himself during his first govern-
n . _
orship. However, this action against 4Uthman Agha did not necessarily 
alienate the Yerliyya corps, since the agha did not focus the real loyalties 
of its members. It shows, nevertheless, the high-handed policy of Muhammad
1 31 ' ! ~ ' — — — — —  ■ —
Muradx, IV, 101; al-Qarx, 84; Muhammad Adib, 56. From the last source i 
is learned that Muhammad Pasha contributed this work before 1193/1779.
For the location of this place see Appendix,.#, P- hH.
2MuradI, IV, 101, 102. '^See above p./g.
^Muradi, IV, 101. 5qiuwaqqT, f. 251b.
^Barik, 100. ^See above p. $10-
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Pasha, particularly at the beginning of his rule, to give an impression of 
forcefulness. Muhammad Pasha seems to have been helped by the fact that the 
Yerliyya corps was already purged (under Ghataji) of the bulk of its dissi­
dent members, after which it became more amenable. Also, many of the top
ranks of this corps wei^ e staffed, at the time, by *Azm members or by depend-
1
ants of this family as well as by other influential groups whose favour
Muhammad Pasha had courted.^
Muhammad Pasha did not play a major role in the events outside Damascus
because he was confronted with a strong rival, Jazzar. The immediate task
of Jazzar after his appointment as governor of Sidon was to eliminate Zahir's
sons and to establish his authority over the amirs of Mount Lebanon and the
Matawila. This he did fairly easily. The redoubtable 4All Zahir was finally
3
killed around October 1776 through the efforts of the governor of Damascus.
~ * - 4
It seems that around 1776 Amir Yusuf forfeited Beirut to Jazzar, In Sept­
ember 1781 Jazzar subdued the Matawila, killed Shaykh Hagif, and took away 
5Tyre from them, ■
Local opposition to Amir Yusuf became conspicuous and it found a focus 
in two of his brothers, Amir Afandi and Amir Sayyid Ahmad, who con­
tested his office. The Struggle did not take a strictly Yazbakl- 
JanbalatT character as there had been much confusion and change 
of sides. However, this struggle brought Muhammad Pasha al-'A^m into
"^See the list of names of some members of the Yerliyya corps on the back 
of the front cover of the work of Ibn al-Siddiq.
2Cf. al-Sari, 84; Barik, 1U.
1037s Sidon, 31.10.-76, cf. 20.8.76 ^ Bulletin); PRO, S.P. 97/52s 
Istanbul, 18.11.76; Muradi, IV, 101; Barik, 105, 106; Shihab, Lubnan, I, 
118; Munayyir, al-Mashriq, 50 (1956), 200.
S^hihab. Lubnan. I, 120, TV rikh al-Jazzar, 72-4.
^A.N.B^ 1039t Sidon, 2.10.81; Barik, 112.
the scene. Muhammad Pasha al-^A^m was not so much averse to interfering 
in the affairs of Mount Lebanon as he was afraid of being embroiled in a 
struggle which would bring him face to face with Jazzar. In 1773 Ara£r Yusuf 
gave up his office under the pressure of his brothers, who were supported by 
Ja2zar. However, Amir Yusuf was not resigned to his fate, and he sought the 
help of Muhammad Pasha. When AmTr Yusuf demonstrated his superiority in the 
struggle with his brothers, Jazzar, shrewd enough to pick the winning card, 
backed him, and he consequently regained his office* In 1731 Amir Yusuf mur­
dered Amir Afandi. Amir Sayyid Ahmad then turned to Muhammad Pasha aI-4 A£m 
for support* But he was defeated together with his supporter by Amir Yusuf, 
who was backed .by the troops of Jazzar, in a battle in the Biqa* in June 173li 
While Jazzar was playing hot and cold with Amir Yusuf until he finally 
brought about his deposition in 1733, Muhammad Pasha played a minor role and 
his aid was usually sought by the weak party. The help he gave to the con­
testants for the paramount office in Mount Lebanon brought him discredit and 
did not benefit the party that sought it. Apart from his participation in 
the murder of *Ali £ahir, which was after all achieved through intrigue, the
only successful military action by Muhammad Pasha was a punitive expedition
2
against the Beduin chief, Ibn fcAdwan, who held the fortress of al-Salt.
Alarmed at the growing power of Jazzar, the Sultan tried to depose him,
but without success. His messengers, as well as the governor he appointed
_ 3
to Sidon, were intimidated and turned away by Jazzar. The latter had estab­
lished his power while the Sultan was busy in a lengthy war with Karim Khan of
S^hihab, Lubnan. I, 122-3; Shihab, Ta*rikh al-Jazzar, 77-32; Shidyaq, 453-9> 
Munayyir, al-Mashrlq. 50 (195&), 202-7; "ll.N.B^  1033f Sidon, 16*4*79; A.NJ3 
1039t (Acre), 11*4*81* Sidon, 11*5.31, Sidon, 11.9*31 (Des evenements arrives 
a la montagne).
Barik, 111, 112; Muradi, IV, 101. 1037:: Sidon, 1.1.77.
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Persia, which dragged on from 1774 to 1779, during which time Basra was
occupied by the troops of Karim Khan and then evacuated * Amid the dis-
2
orders caused by rebels, Beduin and highwaymen, particularly in the region
3 —between Aleppo and Alexandretta, Jazzar could still be regarded by the Sul­
tan, no matter how arbitrary he was ih his rule and reluctant to accept his 
deposition, as a factor of stability. The Sultan was satisfied at Jazzar1s 
rigorous suppression of the schismatic and rebellious communities in his 
province.^ * Nevertheless, Jazzar x^ as always on the alert to counter any
5
possible attack which the Sultan might order against him, and he streng­
thened the fortifications of Acre^ x^ here he largely resided.7
While the hegemony of Damascus x^ as overs had ox-red by Jazzar, Damascus 
was better off economically than any other place in Syria during the govem-
8 Torship of Muhammad Pasha al- A^ m. it is true that, as the market of the 
hinterland, it had suffered as a result of the political upheavals that be­
fell the coastal regions.^ But the damage it sustained was less than that
1PK0, S.P. 97/51: Istanbul, 3.9.75; PRO, S.P. 97/52: Istanbul, 3.2.76, 
Istanbul, 17.9.76, Istanbul, 17.12.76; S.P. 97/53! Istanbul, 17.1.77, 
Istanbul, 4*2*77, Istanbul, 18.11.77, PRO,JF,0.^ 261/3: Pera. of Istanbul, 
3.3.78; 01. Huart, E.I.. 1st ed., s.v. Karim Khan Zend; Cavid Baysun, E.J 
nex^  ed. s.v. *Abd al-gamid^ I,
'T’RO, S.P. 97/5! Istanbul, 3.2.75.
3PB0, F.O. 78/3! Istanbul, 8.2.82, Istanbul, 11.2.82, Istanbul, 25.2.82, 
Istanbul, 19.3.82, Istanbul, 11.4.82, Istanbul, 1.3.82, Istanbul, 10.6.82, 
Istanbul, 25.9.82.
^JLN.B1 1039« Sidon, 22.6.82. ^A.N.B1 1038: Sidon, 3.6.80.
^A.N.B1 1037: Sidon, 31.5.77; Shihab. Ta>rikh al-Jazzar, 79.
A^.N.B'1" 1039: Acre, 11.4.81; cf. Shihab. Ta/ rikh al-Jazzar, 79, Barik, 112.
%R0, F.O, 26l/4: Pera of Istanbul, 27.2.81; A.N.B1 1040: Sidon, 11.10.83; 
cf. Barik, 111. ^
9Cf. A.N.B*** 979: Acre, 6.7.82 (Memoire sur le commerce).
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sustained by the latter regions* Sidon had begun to decline commercially
ever since 5?hi:r made Acre the centre of his power. Acre, in turn, suffered
from the attack of Abu '1-Dhahab and from the disorders that preceded and
succeeded the elimination of £ahir. The extortions practised by Jazzar on
1
the Frencjh merchants were no less damaging than the devastation of the
2
countryside by his troops* Jaffa suffered immensely from the vengeance of 
Abu' 1-Dhahab. and, together with Gaza and the region in between, particular!;!
3
suffered from the decline in the trade of ash on which they had prospered.
Beirut was subjected to two Russian attacks and a blockade by the Druzes
which disrupted its commercial activity. The continuous depopulation of the
rural regions, largely caused by the political upheavals and perpetuated by
the tyranny of Jazzar, dealt a heavy blow to commerce.^ Jazzar resorted to
a corvee in fortifying Acre, and the villagers were called on to offer:- their
services. A shortage of labour resulted in the cultivated areas and large
6
tracts of land remaining unexploited. Natural calamities such as draught,
7 &occasional threats of plague, and the spread of locusts,3 caused further
damage.
Damascus m s  better off because it could still count on the commerce 
connected with the Pilgrimage. It also attracted the little that remained ci
A.N.B1 1037s Sidon, 31.10.76; cf. A.N.B1 1037s Acre, 24.9.77, Sidon, 
30.4-.76, B 1036: Sidon 7 /i3 #io.80 (Observations sur le m&noire).
S^hihab, Ta* rikh al-Jazzar. 74-* 76.
'^a AB'*' 1037: Sidon. 26.9.76, Sidon 7/13^10.60 (Observations sur le memoire}: 
A.N.B^ 4-33 (Marine;: Sidon (?).(?).73 (Description topographique des lieux).
'^A.N.B'1' 1036: Sidon, 17.11.77. ^Shihab, Ta*nkh al-Jazzar, 79.
^ A ABl 1037: Acre, 24-9.77, Sidon, 17,12.77; Volney 290-313.
7A.N.B1 1037: Sidon, 2.10.76. ^A.N.B1 10378 Sidon, 17.12.77; Barik,109
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the foreign trade by this very factor.1 It benefited from trading with
Baghdad, either directly or as a centre for transit trade.^  In spite of
the Beduin threat along this route, this branch of commerce was still a 
3
going concern. The relative prosperity of Damascus was a great asset for
Mul^ ammad a^sha. It partly enabled him to finance his public works, already
mentioned, and seems to have satisfied the inhabitants with his rule.
However, the general decline of commerce in southern Syria was not
balanced by a corresponding revival in northern Syria, in the region of Al-
eppo, where the English merchants of the Levant Company were based.^ English
5
trade there continued in a *most languishing1 state. The French merchants 
in Aleppo were not in a better position.^  . One cause for this decline in Al­
eppo was the lade of safety on the roads as a result of the ravages by Turko­
mans, Kurds and Beduin. Other causes were the requisitioning of men and ani­
mals for the war with Russia, and, later on, with Persia, the closing of the 
latter1s markets, the dislocation caused in the markets of Baghdad and Basra 
as a result of the Persian invasion, the competition by the East India Com­
pany with the Levant Company, and the extortions practised by oppressive 
governors.^ Lurking below these causes, and certainly perpetuated by them, 
was a steady decline which had continued from the first quarter of the 18th 
century.
A^.N.B"** 1039* Sidon, 11.4.81, Sidon, 1.9.81 (Memoire sur le commerce, Sidon, 
30.4.81)} A.NyB1 1040: Sidon, 11.10.83, A.N.B1!! 233s Sidon, 9.12.76 (In- 
. spection des Echelles du Levant par Baron de Tott, No. 3); A.N.B^  979* Acre 
6.7.83 (Memoire sur le commerce).
2
FB0, F.O. 261/4.: Pera of Istanbul, 27.2.81.
3pR0, F.O. 261/4, Pera of Istanbul, 27.2.81: A.N.B1 1040: Sidon, 11.10.83. A
cording to the last dispatch two or three tirade caravans left Damascus for 
Baghdad each year.
4 Cf. Nopd, 163. (cont.)
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This general decline of commerce in Syria marked the end of a phase 
in the commercial activities of the English and French merchants and had 
deep repercussions on the economic life of the country. The Levant Company
t
was doomed. Emphasis shifted now to the Bed Sea route where both English 
and French merchants, largely based on India, sought to arrange the passage 
of their Indian goods through Sues. The Levant Company opposed this scheme 
by the East India Company because it was damaging to its interests.1
On 13 Jumada I 1197/16 April 1783 Muhammad Pasha al-^ Ajgm died in
  o
Damascus and was buried in the cemetery of Bab al-§aghir. With his death 
a phase of 4A§m rule and a generation of *A§m governors came to an end in 
Damascus. In terms of length of tenure he ranks with As*ad Pasha and *Uth- 
man Pasha al~Kurji i*1 ike history of Ottoman Damascus. Several factors 
contributed to the lengthy rule of Muhammad Pasha. He was not entangled 
in a major crisis, either inside or outside Damascus, which might weaken his 
position in Istanbul. The accusation of treachery by the qanudan Pasha 
does not seem to have borne fruit at Istanbul. Muhammad a^^ sha ensured the 
safety of the Pilgrimage all through his governorship. The credit was 
largely his, by managing the Beduin through the exact payment of their 
~~(cont.)
5pEQ, S.P. 110/39, Ft. IIs Aleppo, 12.5.80, see also, Aleppo, 16.5.80, 
Aleppo, 18.9.80.
6 1 * ^A.N.B 94*8 Aleppo, 16.4.77 (^ emoire donnant connalssance de l*Echelle
d1 Al&p)..
^Ibid.; Wood, 162-3.   %ee above p./g7.
1See, PHO, S.P. 97/52: Istanbul, 3.1.76, S.P. 97/53: Cairo, 22.1.77, Istan­
bul, 3.5.77, S.P.97/54s Istanbul, 17.12.18, S.P. 97/55s Istanbul, 4.1.79; 
Bruce, VI, 541> 5 Wood, l67-74| :
^Muradi, IV, 102$ al-" Q$ri, 85; Risala. f. 15a; A.N,B^ 9795 Acre, 15.3. 3^ 
gives the date of his death as 15 April*
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hI  ias it seems, and/force when necessary. A belief existed at the time that 
the Sultan was forced to appoint the *Ajms as governors so as to ensure the 
safety of the Pilgrimage and the .iarda. because they were on good terms with 
the Beduin, The implication underlying this belief was that, being Arabs, 
the A^gms could manage the * Arab (the Beduin) While this has some truth 
in it in the sense that the *A m^s were a local family, several members of 
which assumed local governorships and, as such, were acquainted with the 
Beduin and vice-versa, the fact remains that every governor, *Azm or other­
wise, dealt with the situation according to his own ability and according 
to the prevailing conditions. Muhammad Pasha did not find much difficulty 
in financing the Pilgrimage - an important factor towards ensuring its safe­
ty - because, particularly after the elimination of IJahir, there were no 
political upheavals in his province of a nature that would hinder his going 
on the dawra, as happened during his first governorship. Then, he had to 
raise loans from the Damascenes rather than suspend the garr for the Beduin 
Nor were there defiant rebels in his province who might withhold the payment
Q
°£ the mlrl dues. Even Jazzar, with his greed for money, did not dare cur 
tail his contribution to the .iarda. probably for fear of alienating Muslim 
opinion.4* Furthermore, Muhammad Pasha did not have trouble in finding a 
reliable commander for the .iarda. This command ms  assumed during most of 
his governorship by his sons Yusuf Pasha and *Abd Allah Pasha in their 
capacity as governors of Tripoli.^ Their appointment to Tripoli and to the
1PR0, F.O. 78/3s Istanbul, 26.3.82. 2A.W.B1 1123: Tripoli, 2,4.6.82.
3Of. PRO, S.P. 110/47: Aleppo, 27.6.83. A.W.B1 1037: Sidon, 17.2.77.
^A.H.B1 1036: Sidon, 30.11.73; A.N.B 1122: Tripoli, 16.11.73, Tripoli, 
16.2.74, Tripoli, 28.4.75, Tripoli, 7.10.76, cf. Bl 1123: Tripoli, 25.3.82
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Iarda is a further proof of the ability of Muhammad Pasha to manoeuvre 
successfully at Istanbul and partly explains why they held their governor­
ships for so long a period.
It may be said that the death of Muhammad Pasha came at the right timjs 
and he was spared a possible humiliation by the Sultan, if only the confis­
cation of his wealtjh, and a more certain forceful confrontation with Jazzar. 
Two days after learning of the death of Muhammad Pasha, the Sultan dispatched
on 1 May 1783* an official to Damascus with orders to confiscate the pro-
1
party of Muhammad Pasha. At about the same time, his son *Abd Allah Pasha
2
was deposed from Tripoli and arrested, and his property was confiscated.
Later, at the turn of the century, ‘Abd Allah Pasha was three times appointed
3
to the governorship of Damascus. He was the last member of the A^^ ms to 
govern this province,^ * and during his governorship he was confronted with 
the bitter rivalry of Jazzar.
Jazzar was in Acre when he learned, on the morning of 17 April 1783* 
of the death of Muhammad Pasha. He immediately dispatched a messenger to 
Istanbul asking for the governorship of Damascus. An eye witness in Acre 
described how Jazzar then behaved as if he had already become the governor 
of Damascus and how he received congratulations to this effect from various 
persons on the very day on which he learned of the death of Muhammad Pasha. 
However, the Sultan appointed Muhammad Pasha, son of *Uthman Pasha al-Kurji,
rRO, F.O. 78/4s Istanbul, 10.5.83.
^A.N.B1 1123: Tripoli, 24.7.83, Tripoli, 1.12.83.
^al-Qari, 90; Risala. ff. l6b-17b; MjJc^'il al-Dimashqi, Ta'rlkh hawadith 
al-Sbam wa-Lubmn. 1197-1257 A.H.. ect. by L. Ma'luf, Beirut, 1912, p.-9.
4-See the list of the governors of Damascus in Munajjid, Wulat Dimashq, 90-5.
}
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as governor of Damascus. Jazzar seems to have been anxious not to alienate
the Sultan by any show of force and desirous, at the same time, to keep the
governorship of Sidon within his grasp by having his kahya. Selim ilrrha, ap~
1pointed to it should he be given the governorship of Damascus.
On 9 >3ha*ban 1197/10 July 1783, the newly appointed governor of Damas-
2
cus, Muhammad Pasha, died after less than a month in office. Jazzar was so
optimistic that he would be given the governorship of Damascus that he started
making preparations to conduct the Pilgrimage. He even nominated mutasallims
for the various regions of his present and future governorships. On 7 August
he learned that Darwish Pasha, another son of iUthman Pasha al-Kurji, was
3
appointed governor of Damascus.
After the deposition of Darwish Pasha on 18 Rabi4 1199/28 February
-  L
1785, Jazzar was at last appointed to Damascus. This was the first of four
times in which he was appointed to Damascus between 1785 and his death in
1804-* Sidon remained virtually under his control because his marnluk Selim
succeeded him in the governorship.^ Another mamluk of his, Sulayman, was
7appointed governor of Tripoli at the same time. A new phase in the history I
of the province of Damascus, and indeed in the history of Syria, had begun.
A.NJ3 979s Acre, 15*5.83. a^l-Qari, 85$ M. al-Dimashqi, 2.
h.N.B1 979: Acre, 12.8.83; cf. PRO,F.O.78/4: Istanbul,24.7.83;al-Qari,85.
^A.N.B 979: Acre, 20.3.85; aJL-Qjari, 85. S.J.Shaw in Ottoman Egypt in the 
eighteenth century - the Nizamname-i Mi^ir of_Cezzar Ahmad Pasha. Harvard 
1962, p. 9 n.4, erroneously implies that Jazzar was governor of Damascus in 
1775. His other statement that Jazzar was governor of Syria,pp.6, 7 n.l. 
lacks precision because no such office then existed. Furthermore, a state- | 
ment in the text pp. 9, 10 suggests that this report by Jazzar ms written j 
before the death of Zahir in 1775, which j. if true, renders the date which 
the editor gave for the report as 1199/1785 erroneous, see Ibid., p.7.
^See al-Qari, 85, 88, 90; Risala. ff. 15b~17b; cf. Shihab, Ta'rikh al~ 
Jazzar. 87, 101, 166.
1041: Sidon, 23.3.85; Shihab. Ta*rlkh al-Jazzar. 87. j
S^hihab, Lubnan. I, 141.
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.APPENDIX I
A genealogical table of the fAgm governors
daring the period under study
IbrahTm
L
1
Musa Isma* 11 (c,1659-1733) Sulayman (?-1743) Muhammad Faris
Ibrahim Saf d al-Din Mustafa As * ad (1705-6*1753) daughter — — Mustafa
Notes governors of Damascus are underlined*
T^abbakh. VI, A&1 does not mention Faris among the sons of Ibrahim. 
However, he states, later on the same_j>age, that Isma‘11 married his 
daughter to his nephew, Mustafa b* Faris. That Faris^was the son 
of IbrahTm is further supported by a statement by Muradi, IV, 97, 
who mentions that Muhammad was the son of Mugtafa^b. Faris b* Ibrahim 
see also Kamil al-Ghazzx, III, 303, and *Abd al-Qadir al-*Azm, p. 25*
ifasin Na§§uh daughter Muhammad (1731-1733)!
Yusuf Abdlllah
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APPENDIX II
The halting places (manazil) along the Pilgrimage 
route (al~tariq al-sultani) between Damascus and Mecca:
Qubbat a 1-Ha3 j - Muzayrib - a 1-1'%Iraq - al-Zarqa3 - al-Balqal - 
al-Qatrana - al-Hasa (Tabut Qarasi) - * Anaza — Ma*an - Dhahr al-*’ Aqaba 
(* Aqabat al-Ijalawa) - Jughayman (al-Mudawarra) - Dhat Ha:j.j-al-Qae 
(Qa* al-Basit* or Qa* al-SaghXr) - Tabuk - Mughal ir Shu* ayb - al- 
AkIidar (al-Ukha^ir) - al-Muf'a^ sam - Bar al-ljamra (Uqayri*, or Magh- 
arish al-Ruzz, or Shag al-*Ajuz) - !%di3in Salih (Diyar or Abar Thamud* 
or al-IJijr) - al-*Uia - al-Matran (Biyar or Abar al-Ghanam, or Tawamir) 
- Bi*r al-Ztinmrrud - Shi*b al-RTa#am - Hadiyya - al-Fahlatayn (al- 
Nakhlatayn) - Had! al-Qura ~ al-Jurf - Medina - Qubur al-Shuhada* - 
al-Judayda - al-Qa* - Rabigh - Qudayd - Kbali§, *Usf an - Wadi Fatima - 
Mecca.
I1 his is based on the descriptions given by: Ibn %%lwan* Khiyari,
Muhanmiad Adib ? Babulsi* al-Iiaqiqa, Suwaydi and 'Uthnian, Some 
variations of names are given in brackets. The list by no means 
exhausts the names of all the small places where the pilgrims halted. 
Moreover* it was not necessary for the pilgrims to stop at every place 
mentioned above. In emergencies the Pilgrimage diverted its route.
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